Abstract
Lowering the standard of negligence below the first-best socially optimal level has been shown by Ganuza and Gomez (2004) to increase the level of care taken by judgment proof injurers. In this paper, I consider a more complex model of negligence in which cause in fact is taken into account, and I show that this conclusion holds when the injurer’s care reduces the magnitude of the accidental harm but not when the injurer’s care reduces the probability of the accident. Thus, such soft negligence strategies aimed at tackling the adverse effects of judgment proofness need to be conditioned to the accident prevention technology available to injurers.
Disciplines
Environmental Law | Health Law and Policy | Torts
Date of this Version
October 2004
Recommended Citation
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, "Soft Negligence and Cause In Fact: A Comment on Ganuza and Gomez" (October 2004). George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series. Working Paper 4.
https://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art4