After the Argentine Crisis: Can the IMF Prevent Corruption in Its Lending? A Model Approach


This paper focuses on curtailing the corruption inherent in the lending practices of the IMF and, subsequently, preventing another economic disaster as has occurred in Argentina. In fact, if it is at all to succeed in future attempts to restore a state’s monetary and fiscal standing, the IMF should incorporate language of the Accounting and Record-keeping provisions of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act into its loan agreement policies, thereby conditioning its loans upon transparency and good governance over borrowed funds. Part I of this article introduces corruption and its affect on international lending. Part II describes the IMF and its mandates, and illustrates its role in the recent economic problems in Argentina. Part III outlines Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and demonstrates its potential effectiveness in curbing corruption on an international scale. Part IV concludes, as the paper begins, with the notion that the IMF will better serve its function as international lender when it deals directly with the problem of corruption inherent in its loans.


Banking and Finance Law | Criminal Law | Criminal Procedure | International Law | International Trade Law

Date of this Version

February 2004