Title
When Second Comes First: Correcting Patent’s Poor Secondary Incentives through an Optional Patent Purchase System
Abstract
As research has advanced, technologies have become more closely knit, and the relationships between them—both complementary and competitive—have become increasingly important. Unfortunately, the patent system’s use of monopoly power to reward innovators creates inefficient results by overly encouraging the development of substitute technologies and discouraging the development of complementary technologies. This paper explains how an optional patent purchase system could help ameliorate such problems and discusses the implications of such a system.
Disciplines
Administrative Law | Antitrust and Trade Regulation | Economics | Government Contracts | Intellectual Property Law | Internet Law | Law | Law and Economics | Law and Society | Property Law and Real Estate | Science and Technology Law | Social Welfare Law
Date of this Version
January 2007
Recommended Citation
Jordan Barry, "When Second Comes First: Correcting Patent’s Poor Secondary Incentives through an Optional Patent Purchase System" (January 28, 2007). bepress Legal Series. bepress Legal Series.Working Paper 1963.
https://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1963
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