CIRCUIT-SPECIFIC APPLICATION OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE: AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAX

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The federal government’s power to tax is omnipotent. Federal taxes can be assessed in any amount on anything or anyone for any reason. For all practical purposes, the Constitution prescribes only one limit on the federal government’s power to tax: the Uniformity Clause, which requires that indirect taxes, such as income and excise taxes, be “uniform throughout the United States.” Uniformity should not be confused, however, with fairness or equality. There is no requirement that rich people pay the same tax as poor or that oil companies pay the same

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2 See, e.g., Penn Mut. Indem. Co. v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 16, 19 (3d Cir. 1960) (the taxing power of Congress is exhaustive and embraces every conceivable power of taxation); United States v. Richardson, 107 F. Supp. 38, 39 (E.D. Mich. 1952) (Congress may select any object, occupation, or transaction as the subject matter of a tax).

3 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Constitution also requires that direct taxes to be apportioned among the states, but this limitation has little practical significance and was largely repealed by the 16th Amendment. See Section I.B., infra. In addition, the federal government is barred from taxing exports, but this limitation has a very limited scope. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. See Section I.A., infra.
tax as pharmaceutical companies or that married couples pay the same tax as singles. The Uniformity Clause merely requires geographic uniformity; it is violated, therefore, only if the federal government imposes a different tax on the residents of, say, Tennessee, than it imposes on the residents of, say, Virginia.

It is exceedingly rare for a federal tax law to violate the Uniformity Clause.⁴ The Internal Revenue Code does not fix different taxes for different states, for Congress has carefully crafted the tax laws to avoid geographical distinctions.⁵ Unfortunately, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) has not always been so careful. In recent years, the IRS has adopted a practice of applying different tax laws to different states. This occurs when the IRS issues a formal opinion declaring that it will not enforce certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code in states located within certain federal circuits.⁶

⁴In fact, the Supreme Court has never used the Uniformity Clause to invalidate a tax law. Thomson Multimedia, Inc. v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1325 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2002).

⁵But see United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74 (1983) (court upheld tax on domestic oil despite the fact that it exempted oil produced “from a well located on the northerly side of the divide of the Alaska-Aleutian Range and at least 75 miles from the nearest point on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System”); Amoco Oil Co. v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1340-41 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1999) (court upheld Harbor Maintenance Tax despite exemptions for Alaska and Hawaii, where exemptions were not discriminatory in nature).

⁶For examples of such opinions, see Section II, infra.
The author of this Article submits that the IRS’s non-uniform application of the tax law violates the Uniformity Clause of the United States Constitution. In an endeavor to substantiate this hypothesis, Section I of this Article will analyze the constitutional restrictions on the federal government’s power to tax and the effect the 16th Amendment had on those restrictions. Section II will offer examples of the IRS’s practice of applying tax laws in a non-uniform manner. Section III will demonstrate why the IRS’s practice violates the Uniformity Clause. Section IV will propose a practical and constitutional solution to the IRS’s arguably unconstitutional practice.

Whether the IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax law violates the Uniformity Clause is an issue of first impression. It has not been addressed by courts, except for an oblique reference in Peony Park v. Webber,7 but that court sidestepped the issue by refusing to assume, despite unambiguous evidence, that the IRS was applying different tax laws in different states.8 It also has been largely ignored by scholars, but that is not altogether surprising, for tax scholars, as Professor Bittker explains, generally pay little attention to constitutional law: “[I]n law school courses, once the instructor has finished flogging Eisner v. Macomber, the class usually moves


8 Id. at 695 (“Insofar as the Commissioner adopted an enforcement policy contrary to the statute, the enforcement policy was unlawful.”).
on to the ‘real’ issues of federal income taxation, leaving the Constitution, including the sixteen amendment, behind.”

I. The Constitution’s Taxation Provisions

Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government did not possess the power to tax individuals or property. Rather, the federal government was forced to rely exclusively upon state governments for revenue, a mechanism that quickly proved ineffectual:


10E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 268 n.4 (1983) (“A major weakness of the system created by the Articles of Confederation was the central government’s inability to collect taxes directly. Remediing this defect was thus one of the most important purposes of the Constitutional Convention.”) (citations omitted). In the Articles of Confederation, the power to tax was conferred upon the states. Arts. of Confederation of 1781, art. VIII (“All charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several States, in proportion to the value of all land within each State, granted to or surveyed for any person, as such land and the buildings and
Congress could not, under the old confederation, raise money by taxes, be the exigencies ever so pressing and great. They had no coercive authority—if they had, it must have been exercised against the delinquent states, which would be ineffectual, or terminate in a separation. Requisitions were a dead letter, unless the state legislatures could be brought into action; and when they were, the sums raised were very disproportionate. Unequal contributions or payments engendered discontent, and fomented state-jealousy.\footnote{Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 178 (1796) (upholding federal tax on carriages as a uniform indirect tax).}

The inability of the federal government to raise revenue was one of the reasons for the Constitutional Convention of 1787.\footnote{Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 595-96 (1880) (“Many of the provisions of the Articles of Confederation of 1777 were embodied in the existing organic law. They provided for a common treasury and the mode of supplying it with funds. The latter was by requisitions upon the several States. The delays and difficulties in procuring the compliance of the States, it is known, was one of the causes that led to the adoption of the present Constitution.”).} At that convention, the Framers of our current Constitution vested in Congress broad, general powers to lay and collect taxes.\footnote{U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.} These power are contained

\ldots improvements thereon shall be estimated according to such mode as the United States in Congress assembled, shall from time to time direct and appoint. The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by the authority and direction of the Legislatures of the several States within the time agreed upon by the United States in Congress assembled.”).
in the first clause of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which provides: “The Congress shall have the Power To Lay and Collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States. . . .”14

The federal government’s authority to tax “is exhaustive and embraces every conceivable power of taxation.”15 The expansive nature this power was acknowledged by the Supreme Court as early as 1796, when Justice Paterson observed that it was “obviously the intention of the

14U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Supreme Court has held that Congress’s power to tax is not limited to the other enumerated powers in Article I, Section 8, but rather Congress may impose any tax that is in the general welfare of the nation. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65–66 (1936). In Veazie Bank v. Fenno, the Court held that the Framers intended to give to Congress the power to tax in “its fullest extent.” 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 547, 540 (1869). The Court continued:

The comprehensiveness of the power, thus given to Congress, may serve to explain, at least, the absence of any attempt by members of the Convention to define, even in debate, the terms of the grant. The words used certainly describe the whole power, and it was the intention of the Convention that the whole power should be conferred. The definition of particular words, therefore, became unimportant. Id. at 541.

framers of the Constitution that Congress should possess full power over every species of taxable property, except exports.” 16 More than a century later, Justice Cardozo, elaborating on the breadth of the federal government’s power to tax, stated: “The subject-matter of taxation open to the power of the Congress is as comprehensive as that open to the power of the states, though the method may at times be different. . . . [It] include[s] every form of tax appropriate to sovereignty.” 17

The Taxing Clause is construed liberally and flexibly in favor of the federal government. 18 Any tax designed to promote the general welfare of the nation is constitutional, and it is for Congress, and not the courts, to decide which taxes promote the general welfare:

16 *Hylton*, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 176. The Court continued: “The term taxes, is generical, and was made use of to vest in Congress plenary authority in all cases of taxation. The general division of taxes is into direct and indirect. Although the latter term is not to be found in the Constitution, yet the former necessarily implies it. Indirect stands opposed to direct.” *Id.*


18 *La Croix v. United States*, 11 F. Supp. 817, 821 (W.D. Tenn. 1935) (“It is the opinion of this court that it was the purpose of the framers of the Constitution that this clause, giving the right to levy taxes to pay the public debts, provide for the common defense and general welfare, was to be applied as a liberal and flexible means of providing for the welfare of the United States in times of disaster; provided, of course, that no other and restraining clause was violated.”).
“The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.”19 Specifically, the power to choose one welfare over another or a particular welfare over a general is vested in Congress.20 Accordingly, Congress has broad powers to tax for the general welfare so long as it does not violate other constitutional provisions:

as this court repeatedly has held, the power to tax carries with it the power to embarrass and destroy; may be applied to every object within its range in such measure as Congress may determine; enables that body to select one calling and omit another, to tax one

19 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937) (upholding Social Security Act); Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976) (“The basic principle that must govern an assessment of any constitutional challenge to a law providing for governmental payments of monetary benefits is well established. Governmental decisions to spend money to improve the general public welfare in one way and not another are not confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.”).

20 Davis, 301 U.S. at 640-41 (“The line must still be drawn between one welfare and another, between particular and general. Where this shall be placed cannot be known through a formula in advance of the event. There is a middle ground or certainly a penumbra in which discretion is at large. The discretion, however, is not confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment. This is now familiar law.”).
class of property and to forbear to tax another; and may be applied in different ways to different objects. . . .

The federal government’s power to tax, however, is not without limits. According to the Constitution, “Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity.” Thus, the Constitution prescribes three limits on the federal government’s power to tax. The first is that Congress may not tax exports. The second is that capitation taxes and other direct taxes must be apportioned among

21 Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 256 (1920) (upholding federal income tax despite the fact that it effectively reduced the salaries of Article III judges, which the Constitution generally prohibits).

22 Kelly v. Lewellyn, 274 F. 108, 110 (W.D. Pa. 1921); Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 174 (“two rules are prescribed for [the power to tax], namely, uniformity and apportionment: Three kinds of taxes, to wit, duties, imposts, and excises by the first rule, and capitation, or other direct taxes, by the second rule”).

23 Tax laws are also subject to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Such clause are rarely used, however, to invalidate tax laws. See, e.g., Mathews, 429 U.S. at 185 (Social Security Act, which treats males differently than females, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 12 (1913 income tax act, which was retroactive, does not violate the Due Process Clause).

24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
the several states based on population.\textsuperscript{25} The third limit is that duties, imposts, excises, and other indirect taxes must be uniform throughout the United States.\textsuperscript{26} In order to provide a complete

\textsuperscript{25}U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.

\textsuperscript{26}U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. In 1916, the Supreme Court observed that the requirements of apportionment and uniformity are not so much limitations upon the complete and all-embracing authority to tax, but simply regulations concerning the mode by which the plenary power is to be exerted. \textit{Brushaber}, 240 U.S. at 13. Later decisions have called this liberal interpretation of the Uniformity Clause into question.

The fact that the Supreme Court in 1916 categorized the Uniformity Clause as a regulation does not convince this Court that the Uniformity Clause is not also a limitation as the Supreme Court used the word in Flast. The Uniformity Clause restricts the method by which the Congress can assess taxes. Thus, it is a limitation on the means by which Congress can tax. This view of the Uniformity Clause is consistent with other Supreme Court decisions. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 80, 103 S.Ct. 2239, 2242, 76 L.Ed.2d 427 (1983) (“The Uniformity Clause conditions Congress’s power to impose indirect taxes.”); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 150, 31 S. Ct. 342, 348, 55 L.Ed. 389 (1911) (the Uniformity Clause allows Congress “to lay and
picture of the constitutional limits on Congress’s power to tax, all three these limitations are examined in the next Section. The Uniformity Clause, however, is the primary focus of this Article.

A. The Export Clause

The Export Clause plainly states: “No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.”27 It categorically bars Congress from imposing taxes on exports.28 The Export Clause explicitly states:

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27U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.

28United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 362 (1998). “The Clause, however, does not rule out a ‘user fee,’ provided that the fee lacks the attributes of a generally applicable tax or duty and is, instead, a charge designed as compensation for Government-supplied services, facilities, or benefits.” Id.
Clause “was originally proposed by delegates to the Federal Convention from the Southern States, who feared that the Northern States would control Congress and would use taxes and duties on exports to raise a disproportionate share of federal revenues from the South.” To allay such fears, the Framers’ couched the Export Clause in unconditional language that protects all exports from federal tax burdens. Along with the Import-Export Clause, which


\(30\) See, e.g., Records of the Federal Convention, supra note 28, at 307 (Mr. Gerry thought the legislature could not be trusted with such a power to tax exports. It might ruin the Country. It might be exercised partially, raising one and depressing another part of it); id. at 305 (Mr. Mason urged the necessity of connecting with the power of levying taxes so that no tax should be laid on exports.).

\(31\) International Bus. Machs., 517 U.S. at 859-60, Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 292-93 (1901) (“So it is clear that the framers of the Constitution intended, not merely that exports should not be made a source of revenue to the national government, but that the national government should put nothing in the way of burden upon such exports. If all exports must be free from national tax or duty, such freedom requires, not simply an omission of a tax upon the articles exported, but also a freedom from any tax which directly burdens the exportation; and, as we have shown, a stamp tax on a bill of lading, which evidences the export, is just as clearly a
prohibits states, without the consent of Congress, from laying “any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports,” the Export Clause was “one of the compromises which ... made possible the adoption of the Constitution.”

“[T]he Export Clause ... specifically prohibits Congress from regulating international commerce through export taxes, disallows any attempt to raise federal revenue from exports, [but] has no direct effect on the way the States treat imports and exports.” In other words, the Constitution “left to the states a greater power over exports than congress had, for by the ninth section of the first article, they were prohibited from taxing exports, without any qualification, even by the consent of the states; whereas, with the consent of congress, any state can impose such a tax by law, subject to the conditions prescribed.”

The Export Clause is not limited to taxes imposed exclusively on exports. It also applies to “the imposition of a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory federal tax on goods in export burden on the exportation as a direct tax on the article mentioned in the bill of lading as the subject of the export.”).

32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.

33 Fairbank, 181 U.S. at 290 (invalidating a stamp tax on bills of lading).


transit.”\textsuperscript{36} That is, the Export Clause exempts from federal taxation not only export goods, but also services and activities closely related to the export process.\textsuperscript{37} Accordingly, even those taxes that are imposed equally on exports and imports or other articles of commerce may be prohibited by the Export Clause,\textsuperscript{38} for exports are not to be obstructed by the burdens of federal taxation.\textsuperscript{39}

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\textsuperscript{36}\textit{International Bus. Machs.}, 517 U.S. at 859-60.
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\textsuperscript{37}\textit{International Bus. Machs.}, 517 U.S. at 846.
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\textsuperscript{38}\textit{International Bus. Machs.}, 517 U.S. at 860. (“The better reading [of the Export Clause], that adopted by our earlier cases, is that the Framers sought to alleviate their concerns by completely denying to Congress the power to tax exports at all.”). To determine whether a tax is an export tax, as compared to a general tax on property, a court must examine the immediacy of exportation and the proximity of the tax imposed to the value of the articles exported. United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 907 F. Supp. 408, 417 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1995), aff’d, 114 F.3d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1997), aff’d, 523 U.S. 360 (1998).
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\textsuperscript{39}\textit{R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Robertson}, 14 F. Supp. 463, 464 (M.D.N.C. 1935). Although the Supreme Court has allowed states to impose nondiscriminatory taxes under the Import-Export Clause and the Commerce Clause, it has consistently barred all federal taxes, discriminatory and nondiscriminatory, under the Export Clause. \textit{International Bus. Machs.}, 517 U.S. at 650-62.
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The Export Clause does not, however, preclude federal taxation of pre-export goods and services.\textsuperscript{40} Thus, general excise taxes on property, such as a tax on all distilled spirits, and income taxes derived from the exporting business are not prohibited by the Export Clause,\textsuperscript{41} as that Clause applies only to taxes laid on exports or matters related to exports and not on taxes laid generally on the manufacture or handling of products.\textsuperscript{42}

The Export Clause applies only to international commerce,\textsuperscript{43} and is limited to “goods.”\textsuperscript{44} It does not apply to passengers.\textsuperscript{45} Although the Export Clause is a genuine limitation on the

\textsuperscript{40}“The true construction of the constitutional provision is that no burden by way of tax or duty can be cast upon the exportation of articles, and does not mean that articles exported are relieved from the prior ordinary burdens of taxation which rest upon all property similarly situated.” Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418, 427 (1904).

\textsuperscript{41}Thompson v. United States, 142 U.S. 471 (1892) (upholding tax on distilled spirits, some of which are exported); William E. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 (1918) (upholding income tax on profits derived from exporting goods).

\textsuperscript{42}United States v. West Texas Cottonoil Co., 155 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1946) (upholding penalty on excess cotton, regardless of whether such cotton was sold in the United States or abroad).

\textsuperscript{43}Florida Sugar Mktg. & Terminal Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 1331, 1335-37 (Fed. Cir.2000) (finding Export Clause does not bar tax on interstate shipments). Exports destined for U.S. territories are not subject to the Export Clause. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt,
federal government’s power to tax, its scope is quite limited.\textsuperscript{46} It applies exclusively to taxes on the international exportation of goods. As such, it plays no significant role in the IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax law, which, of course, is the focus this Article.\textsuperscript{47}

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\textsuperscript{44}International Business Machs., 517 U.S. at 846, 848, 849, 855, 862; \textit{U.S. Shoe}, 523 U.S. at 367 (“the Export Clause allows no room for any federal tax, however generally applicable or nondiscriminatory, on goods in export transit.”).

\textsuperscript{45}Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. United States, 200 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The passengers on Carnival’s cruise ships are neither ‘articles’ nor ‘goods.’ They are people. The application of the Harbor Tax to them would not involve the laying of any tax upon “Articles” exported from any state. ‘Articles’ and ‘goods’ relate to items of commerce, not people. To apply the Export Clause to people would be inconsistent with the basic purpose of the Clause.”).

\textsuperscript{46}The 16th Amendment had no effect on the Export Clause. Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 521 (1926) (“the Sixteenth Amendment did not extend the taxing power to any new class of subjects”).

\textsuperscript{47}See Section I.C., infra.
B. The Apportionment Clauses

The Constitution provides that “direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included in the Union, according to their respective Numbers”\(^{48}\) and that “[n]o Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein directed to be taken.”\(^{49}\) These clauses are designed to ensure that the citizens of each state pay no more than their proportional share of direct taxes.\(^{50}\)

The apportionment clauses were proposed by southern states to prevent the federal government from imposing a tax on land or slaves, which would disproportionately burden southerners:

The [southern states] possess a large number of slaves; they had extensive tracts of territory, thinly settled, and not very productive. A majority of the states had but few slaves, and several of them limited territory, well settled, and in high state of cultivation. The southern states, if no provision had been introduced in the Constitution, would have been wholly at the mercy of the other

\(^{48}\)U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.

\(^{49}\)U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.

\(^{50}\)Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 96 (1900); Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 176 (Paterson, J.) (“each state will be debited for the amount of its quota of the tax, and credited for its payment”).
states. Congress in such case, might tax slaves, at discretion or arbitrarily, and land in every part of the Union at the same rate or measure: so much a head in the first instances, or so much an acre in the second. To guard against imposition in these particulars, was the reason for introducing the clause in the Constitution...\textsuperscript{51}

As a result, the Framers insisted that direct taxes be apportioned among the states based on population. Assume Congress, for example, enacts a direct tax, such as a federal property tax, to raise $50 million. For this tax to be constitutional, its burden must be apportioned among the 50 states based on population. A sparsely populated state like South Dakota cannot be required to pay the same amount (\textit{e.g.}, $1 million) as a densely populated state like California. Rather, the citizens of each state must pay only a proportional amount of the federal tax burden based on that state’s population.

Not long after the Constitutional Convention, it became apparent that compliance with the apportionment clauses would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve:

It appears to me that a tax on carriages cannot be laid by rule of apportionment, without very great inequality and injustice. For example: Suppose two States, equal in census, to pay 80,000 dollars each, by a tax on carriages, of 8 dollars on every carriage; and in one State there are 100 carriages, and in the other 1000. The owners of carriages in one State, would pay ten times the tax of owners in the other. A, in one State, would pay for his carriage 8 dollars, but B, in the other State, would pay for his carriage, 80 dollars.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{51}Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 177.

\textsuperscript{52}See, \textit{e.g.}, \textit{Hylton}, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 176 (Chase, J.)
Compliance with the apportionment clauses, therefore, was a formidable obstacle to direct federal taxes, ultimately prompting the 16th Amendment.

1. What Are Direct Taxes?

Originally, “direct taxes” were defined to include only capitation taxes (e.g., poll taxes)\(^{53}\) and taxes on real property imposed solely by reason of ownership by the taxpayer.\(^{54}\) Later, taxes on personal property, and taxes on the income from both real and personal property, such as rents and interest on bonds, were held to be direct taxes.\(^{55}\)

Direct taxes are levied upon persons and their possession or enjoyment of rights, whereas indirect taxes are levied upon events, such as transferring, exchanging, or using property. Indirect taxes are not subject to the apportionment clauses. Examples of direct taxes include

\(^{53}\) Even if a poll tax were to pass muster under the apportionment clauses, it is highly unlikely that a poll tax could survive an equal protection challenge. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia St. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding that Virginia’s poll tax violated the Equal Protection Clause).

\(^{54}\) Federalist No. 21 (“Those of the direct kind, which principally relate to land and buildings, may admit of a rule of apportionment. Either the value of land, or the number of the people, may serve as a standard.”); Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 176 (Chase, J.) (direct taxes limited to capitations and taxes on land); Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 160, 166 (4th Cir. 1962).

\(^{55}\) Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (invalidating income tax).
local property taxes, state *ad valorem* taxes, and, presumably, European-style wealth taxes.\textsuperscript{56} These taxes are imposed directly on the taxpayer or his or her property; they are not imposed on transfers or exchanges of property.

For all practical purposes, there are only two types of direct taxes: capitation taxes, such as poll taxes, and taxes on real and personal property ownership, such as real estate or *ad valorem* taxes. As a result, the apportionment clauses have little relevance to modern federal taxation because there are no federal poll taxes or federal property taxes.\textsuperscript{57} Instead, the federal government raises most, if not all, of its internal revenue via indirect taxes, such as excise taxes, death taxes, and income taxes. The Supreme Court has consistently held that excise and death taxes are not direct taxes and, therefore, not subject to the apportionment clauses.\textsuperscript{58} The law has been less certain, however, with regard to income taxes.

Prior to the passage of the 16th Amendment, there was considerable uncertainty over whether income taxes were direct or indirect. As early as 1874, the Supreme Court held that a tax upon income was a duty rather than a direct tax, and thus federal income taxes were not

\textsuperscript{56}Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 176 (Chase, J.) (direct taxes limited to capitations and taxes on land).


\textsuperscript{58}See, e.g., Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 54-55 (upholding 1898 inheritance tax as a valid excise tax and not a direct tax).
required to be apportioned among the states.\textsuperscript{59} It reaffirmed this conclusion in 1880, when it held that a tax levied on personal income, gains, and profits is an excise or duty and not a direct tax.\textsuperscript{60} From 1880 to 1895, there appeared to be a consensus that income taxes were indirect excise taxes not subject to the apportionment clauses.

In 1895, however, the Supreme Court changed course, holding that taxes on the income (\textit{e.g.}, rent) derived from real property was the legal equivalent of a direct tax on the property itself and thus must be apportioned.\textsuperscript{61} As a result, the Court invalidated an income tax on rents that was not apportioned among the states. Later that year, the Court ruled that a tax on income derived from personal property was also a direct tax and that the law imposing such tax was

\textsuperscript{59}Smedberg v. Bentley, 22 F. Cas. 368 (N.J. Cir. 1874) (No. 12,964) (“Under the constitutional designation of the different kinds of taxation to which resort might be made by congress, a tax upon incomes must be classed among the duties authorized, rather than among the direct taxes. No apportionment is necessary when it is laid, and there is nothing to be done here but to sustain the demurrer to the first count of the plaintiff’s declaration, and it is ordered accordingly.”). In 1868, the Supreme Court held that a gross receipts tax on the amounts insured, renewed, or continued by insurance companies was a duty or excise and not a direct tax. Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. 433, 445-46 (1868). \textit{See also} Veazie Bank, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 547 (upholding 10\% tax on notes state banks paid to other banks).

\textsuperscript{60}Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880) (income tax is an indirect tax).

\textsuperscript{61}Pollock, 157 U.S. at 639.
unconstitutional for failure to comply with the apportionment clauses. In so doing, the Court stated:

The tax imposed by sections twenty-seven to thirty-seven, inclusive of the act of 1894, so far as it falls on the income from real estate and of personal property, being a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution, and therefore unconstitutional and void because not apportioned according to representation. . . .

Moreover, the Court found that the provisions of the act taxing income derived from real and personal property were inseparable from the remainder of the Revenue Act of 1894. Consequently, the Court invalidated the entire 1894 federal income tax scheme:

We do not mean to say that an act laying by apportionment a direct tax on all real estate and personal property, or the income thereof, might not also lay excise taxes on business, privileges, employments, and vocations. But this is not such an act, and the scheme must be considered as a whole. Being invalid as to the greater part, and falling, as a tax would, if any part were held valid, in a direction which could not have been contemplated except in connection with the taxation considered as an entirety, we are constrained to conclude that [the Act is] wholly inoperative and void.

The Court thus concluded that a tax on a taxpayer’s entire income, if it included income derived from property, is a direct tax and therefore must be apportioned among the states based on population.

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62 *Pollock*, 157 U.S. at 637.

63 *Id.*

64 *Id.*

65 *Id.* at 637.
2. The 16th Amendment

*Pollock* raised serious doubts about whether income taxes were direct or indirect taxes.\(^{66}\) It also started a debate over whether a federal income tax could be imposed consistent with the Constitution. The 16th Amendment, however, rendered this debate academic. Ratified in 1913, the 16th Amendment provides that “Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on income, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”\(^{67}\) The purpose of the 16th Amendment was to relieve Congress of the obligation to apportion any tax on classes of income which would require apportionment due to its source.\(^{68}\) Under the 16th Amendment, Congress has the power to tax income from whatever source derived—labor, real estate, personal property, etc.—without

\(^{66}\) Subsequent decisions have generally held that taxes on income are not direct taxes. *See e.g.*, Richardson v. United States, 294 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 1961) (tax on accrued interest of notes passing to certain legatees not a direct tax); Jones v. United States, 551 F. Supp. 578 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (tax on wages is not a direct tax); Krzyske v. Commissioner, 548 F. Supp 101 (E.D. Mich 1982) (social security taxes are not direct taxes).

\(^{67}\) U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (emphasis added).

\(^{68}\) *Brushaber*, 240 U.S. at 17-19.
concern for apportionment. Thus, the apportionment clauses are no longer a barrier to federal income taxes.  

In sum, the apportionment clauses are not a barrier to federal income, death, or excises taxes, and these taxes comprise most, if not all, of the federal government’s internal revenue.  

Today, the apportionment clauses would pose a barrier only to a federal property or wealth tax, both of which are unlikely to be invoked.

69 The apportionment clauses would still inhibit the federal government’s imposition of property or wealth taxes. Of course, “[t]here is no federal property tax. Imposition of a federal property tax would be politically impractical because the Constitution requires that ‘direct’ taxes be proportional to the population of each state. Thus, if a federal property tax were imposed, people living in a state with 50% of the country’s population but only 20% of the country’s property value would still be required to pay 50% of the total federal property tax bill. The federal government has levied property taxes twice: in 1798 and in 1813. The taxes were apportioned among the states as constitutionally required.” John A. Swain, The Taxation of Private Interests in Public Property: Toward a Unified Theory of Property Taxation, 2000 Utah L. Rev. 421 n.2. See also Eric Rakowski, Can Wealth Taxes be Justified, 53 Tax L. Rev. 263, 269 n.14 (2000) (arguing that a federal wealth tax would be subject to apportionment).

70 The Supreme Court has generally assumed that once a tax is found to be outside the reach of the apportionment clauses, it is an indirect tax subject to the Uniformity Clause. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 83.
C. The Uniformity Clause

The Uniformity Clause limits the federal government’s power to impose indirect taxes. It provides: “The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, . . . but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.” But what does the term “uniform” mean?

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71Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 80. By contrast, the apportionment clauses limit the federal government’s power to impose direct taxes. See Section I.B., supra.

72U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (emphasis added). The Uniformity Clause applies only to the 50 states and not to Puerto Rico or other U.S. territories. Downs v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (upholding duty on merchandise imported from Puerto Rico). The Uniformity Clause has received little attention from the courts. Indeed, the Supreme Court has never invalidated a tax law on the basis of the Uniformity Clause. As Professor Bittker aptly states, the Uniformity Clause “might have dramatically influenced the structure of the federal income tax, but has shriveled away to a mere flyspeck.” Bittker, supra note 8, at 9.

73The Framers themselves were uncertain as to the meaning of indirect taxes: “What is the distinction between direct and indirect taxes? It is a matter of regret that terms so uncertain and vague in so important a point are to be found in the Constitution. We shall seek in vain for any antecedent settled legal meaning to the respective terms. There is none. We shall be as much at a loss to find any disposition of either which can satisfactorily determine the point.” Springer 102 U.S. at 597- 598 (quoting Alexander Hamilton).
The Framers of the Constitution furnished little guidance on the meaning of “uniform.”\textsuperscript{74} The concerns giving rise to the Uniformity Clause, however, provide some insight into its purpose. Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government lacked the power to regulate interstate commerce, resulting in interstate trade barriers and regionalism.\textsuperscript{75} Prior to the

\textsuperscript{74}Reference to other clauses in the Constitution is also unhelpful. There are two other uniformity clauses in the Constitution: the Bankruptcy Clause and the Naturalization Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The Bankruptcy Clause vests in Congress the power to “establish . . . uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” \textit{Id}. Unlike the narrow construction it has given to the Taxation Uniformity Clause, the Supreme Court in \textit{Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons}, held that the Bankruptcy Uniformity Clause requires that all similarly situated individuals be treated the same. 455 U.S. 457, 472-73 (1982). The Court acknowledge that it construed the two Uniformity Clauses differently, despite the fact that they are both contained in Article I, Section 8. The Court based this distinction, however, on the intent of the Framers. The Naturalization Uniformity Clause was intended, not as an anti-discrimination provision, but rather as a grant of exclusive power to the federal government over immigration matters. \textit{In re Hood}, 319 F.3d 755, 763 (6th Cir. 2003).

\textsuperscript{75}\textbf{James Madison, Journal of the Federal Convention} 46-48 (E. Scott ed. 1898). The sole power to regulate commerce was vested in the states. \textit{See Arts. of Confederation}, art. IV (“the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such restrictions
Constitution Convention of 1787, Americans were accustomed to putting the interests of their respective states or regions over that of the nation.\textsuperscript{76} In an effort to remedy this situation and unify the nation, the Framers of the Constitution vested the power to regulate interstate commerce in the federal government.\textsuperscript{77} Some states remained concerned, however, that the

\begin{quote}
shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any State, to any other State of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also that no imposition, duties or restriction shall be laid by any State, on the property of the United States, or either of them.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{76}DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 397 (2001). \textit{See also} PAUL C. NAGEL, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 50 (1997) (“[T]he Congress of the United States, operating under the severe restrictions contained in the Articles of Confederation . . . seemed unable to cope with the young republic’s growth. This was especially apparent in interstate and foreign commerce. The national economy had become sorely depressed.”). Not surprisingly, the economic woes of the nation led to social unrest, the most notable event being the short-lived Shay’s Rebellion, in which a group of debt-ridden farmers banded together and closed courthouses in order to forestall creditors. Robert A. Gross, \textit{The Uninvited Guest: Daniel Shays and the Constitution, in In Debt To Shays: The Bicentennial of an Agrarian Rebellion} 1, 1-2 (Robert A. Gross ed., 1993).

\textsuperscript{77}2 MAX FARRAND, \textit{THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787} 308 (rev. ed. 1937); \textit{see also}, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 180 (1992) (“the Framers no doubt endowed Congress with the power to regulate interstate commerce in order to avoid further instances of the interstate trade disputes that were common under the Articles of Confederation”.)
regionalism that marked the Articles of Confederation would continue. These states were worried that the federal government would use its power over interstate commerce to favor certain states. Some of the delegates at the Convention were fearful of conspiracies by large

\[\ldots\])); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) (“Under the Articles of Confederation, state taxes and duties hindered and suppressed interstate commerce; the Framers intended the Commerce Clause as a cure for these structural ills.”).

\[\text{FARRAND, supra note 76, at 308.}\]

\[\text{CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 586-587 (1928). The Clause was proposed on August 25 and adopted on August 31 without discussion. The origins of the Uniformity Clause are linked to those of the Port Preference Clause. The Port Preference Clause provides: “No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another, nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.” ART. I, § 9, cl. 6. The purpose of the Port Preference Clause is to give small states protection against deliberate discrimination by other, more powerful states. Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1032 n.14 (5th Cir. 1991). The Port Preference Clause does not prohibit legislation that incidentally prefers some ports over others. Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1558 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 906 (1991). Rather, its purpose is to prevent the federal government from discriminating between states. Pennsylvania v. Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421, 435 (1855) (Nelson, J., concurring). Like the Tax Uniformity Clause, the Port Preference Clause is a limit on the federal government, and not state governments. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135 (1876). The Port Preference Clause and

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states or regional combinations.\textsuperscript{80} According to Justice Story, the Uniformity Clause was promulgated to:

cut off all undue preferences of one State over another in the regulation of subjects affecting their common interests. Unless duties, imposts, and excises were uniform, the grossest and most oppressive inequalities, vitally affecting the pursuits and employments of the people of different states, might exist. The agriculture, commerce, or manufactures of one State might be built up on the ruins of another; and a combination of a few States in Congress might secure a monopoly of certain branches of trade and business to themselves, to the injury, if not the destruction, of their less favored neighbors.\textsuperscript{81}

The Uniformity Clause, therefore, is designed to ensure that Congress does not impose an indirect tax on the citizens of one state different than that imposed on the citizens of another state.\textsuperscript{82}

The Uniformity Clause was proposed on August 25, 1787 and adopted by the Framers on August 31, 1787 without discussion.\textsuperscript{83} As adopted, the language provided that all taxes shall be

the Tax Uniformity Clause were proposed together and reported out of a special committee as an interrelated limitation on the national government’s commerce power. \textit{Knowlton}, 178 U.S. at 103-106. They were separated without explanation when James Madison remedied the omission from the Tax Uniformity Clause. \textit{Ptasynski}, 462 U.S. at 81 n.10.

\textsuperscript{80}FARRAND, \textit{supra} note 76, at 308.

\textsuperscript{81}JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 957 (T. Cooley ed. 1873).

\textsuperscript{82}Apache Bend Apartments, 702 F. Supp. at 1296.
“uniform and equal” throughout the United States. This clause was proposed by delegates from Maryland. But when the Committee on Style reported the final draft of the Constitution to the Framers, it failed to include the tax uniformity clause. Two days later, however, this omission was noticed and corrected by James Madison, who handwrote the term “uniform” into Article I, Section 8, but omitted the term “equal.”

1. What is “Uniformity”?

Following the ratification of the Constitution, a debate ensued as to the scope of the Uniformity Clause. Some argued that the Uniformity Clause required intrinsic fairness and equality among taxpayers. According to this view, a federal tax must be levied in precisely the same manner and amount upon all individuals. A tax that treats two people differently would

83Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 81 n.10.

84Luther Martin, Genuine Information, Delivered to the Legislature of the State of Maryland (Nov. 12, 1787), in Records of the Federal Convention, supra note 28, at 172, 205.

85Id.


87Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 84.
not, accordingly, be uniform. This view found support in *Hylton v. United States*, a case in which the Supreme Court was asked to determine the constitutionality of a federal tax on carriages. In that case, Justice Paterson stated: “Uniformity is an instant operation on individuals, without regard to the intervention of assessments, or any regard to states. . . .”

Similarly, Justice Iredell, voting to uphold the carriage tax, opined “the tax ought to be uniform, because the present Constitution was particularly intended to affect individuals, and not states. . . .”

A few years later, the Supreme Court, upholding a federal excise tax on distillers, again lent support to the argument that the Uniformity Clause required equality among taxpayers:

> The law is not in our judgment subject to any constitutional objection. The tax imposed upon distillers is in the nature of an excise, and the only limitation upon the power of Congress in the imposition of taxes of this character is that they shall be “uniform throughout the United States.” The tax here is uniform in its operation; that is, it is assessed equally upon all manufacturers of spirits, wherever they are. The law does not establish one rule for one distiller and a different rule or another, but the same rule for all alike.

The view that the Uniformity Clause required intrinsic fairness and equality was short-lived. By the late 19th Century, the Supreme Court declared once and for all that the Uniformity Clause mandates:

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88 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).

89 *Id.* at 181.

90 *Id.* at 181.

Clause simply requires geographic uniformity. That is, an indirect tax “is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found.”\textsuperscript{92} There is no requirement that the tax apply equally to all taxpayers. This view was first pronounced in the \textit{Head Money Cases},\textsuperscript{93} in which the Supreme Court upheld a federal head tax on persons immigrating through port cities such as New York. Challengers of the head tax had argued that it was not uniform because it applied to persons immigrating at port cities but not to those immigrating at inland cities. The Court, however, sustained the tax, concluding that because the tax applies to all port cities alike, “there is substantial uniformity within the meaning and purpose of the Constitution.”\textsuperscript{94}

“Subsequent cases have confirmed that the Framers did not intend to restrict Congress’s ability to define the class of objects to be taxed. They intended only that the tax apply wherever the classification is found.”\textsuperscript{95} Thus, Congress may distinguish between similar classes in selecting the subject of a tax. For example, in \textit{Knowlton v. Moore},\textsuperscript{96} the Supreme Court upheld a federal inheritance tax despite the fact that the law imposed a progressive tax on legacies and

\footnotesize{
92Head Money Cases (Edye v. Robertson), 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1884).

93112 U.S. 580 (1884).

94\textit{Id.} at 595.

95\textit{See, e.g., Ptasynski}, 462 U.S. at 82.

96178 U.S. 41 (1900).}
varied the rate of tax among classes of legatees. In so doing, the Court reaffirmed that the Uniformity Clause simply requires geographic uniformity and not intrinsic equality.

The Knowlton court gave three reasons for rejecting an intrinsic equality interpretation of the Uniformity Clause. First, if the Framers had intended something more than geographic uniformity, there would have been no reason to add the phrase “throughout the United States” in Article I, Section 8. That phrase clearly denotes a geographic limitation and would be redundant if the Uniformity Clause required intrinsic equality among individual taxpayers. 97 To interpret that phrase otherwise would “lead to a disregard of the elementary canon of construction which requires that effect be given to each word of the Constitution.” 98 Second, the Framers imposed two limits on Congress’s power to tax: direct taxes must be apportioned among the states based on population and indirect taxes must be uniform throughout the United States. The purpose of the apportionment clauses is to protect individual taxpayers from paying disproportionate shares of federal taxes. The apportionment clauses, therefore, impose a form of intrinsic equality. But this intrinsic equality applies only to direct taxes. If the Framers had intended to extend this intrinsic equality to indirect taxes, they would not have distinguished the two taxes. 99 Thus, for

97 Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 87.

98 Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 87.

99 Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 89 (“Now, that the requirement that direct taxes should be apportioned among the several states, contemplated the protection of the States, to prevent their being called upon to contribute more than was deemed their due share of the burden, is clear.”).
indirect taxes, the Framers must have intended only geographic uniformity.100 Third, the experience in England and the American states and colonies provided no evidence that indirect taxes must be imposed in an intrinsically equal manner. To the contrary, the experience in those jurisdictions, and the records of the Continental Congress and Constitution Convention of 1787,101 made clear that the Uniformity Clause mandates nothing more than geographic uniformity.102

Ever since Knowlton, it has been clear that “the uniformity in excise taxes enacted by the Constitution is geographic uniformity, not uniformity of intrinsic equality and operation. . . . The Constitution does not command that a tax have an equal effect in each State.”103 Rather, geographic uniformity simply precludes the federal government from imposing “a different tax

100Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 87-89.

101Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 101 (“[N]ot a single word is found in any of the debates . . . which gives the slightest intimation that any suggestion was even made that the grant of power to [impose an indirect] tax was considered from the point of view of its operation on the individual.”)

102Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 89-106. “By the result of an analysis of the history of the adoption of the Constitution it becomes plain that the words ‘uniform throughout the United States’ do not signify an intrinsic, but simply a geographical, uniformity.” Id. at 106.

in one state or states than was levied in another state or states.” 104 A “tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found.” 105 Thus, a tax law may not be “drawn on state political lines.” 106

There is no lack of uniformity, however, simply because the subject of the tax is not found in some states 107 or because “[d]ifferences in state law . . . may bring a person within or without a category designated by Congress as taxable . . . .” 108 An indirect tax may affect citizens of different states differently, as long as the purpose of the tax is not to favor the citizens of one state over the citizens of another state. 109 The Uniformity Clause does not require a tax to be intrinsically uniform; that is, it is not necessary that the tax operate upon one individual in

104 Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 12.

105 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 594.

106 Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 78.

107 Fernandez, 326 U.S. at 359.

108 Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 117 (1930) (“differences of state law, which may bring a person within or without the category designated by Congress as taxable, may not be read into the Revenue Act to spell out a lack of uniformity”); Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 17-18 (1927) (federal estate tax credit for state inheritance taxes paid is uniform despite the fact that Florida does not have an inheritance tax).

109 Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 85-86.
precisely the same manner as on all individuals. Indeed, indirect taxes will necessarily affect taxpayers in different states differently since states naturally will have different quantities on the subject being taxed. “Perfect uniformity and perfect equality of taxation . . . is a baseless dream. . . .” Accordingly, a tax law is uniform if the same rates apply generally throughout the United States.


111 Apache Bend Apartments, 702 F. Supp. at 1296. “This created the possibility of most of the revenue from the tax on this activity coming from a few states where the activity is widely conducted, and very little revenue from those states where the activity is relatively unimportant.” Chiles, 61 A.F.T.R.2d at 88-1378. Congress is not even prohibited from using geographic terms to define a class of objects to be taxed. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 84 (taxation of “Alaskan oil” upheld where tax applied, at the very same rate, in all portions of the United States where the subject of the tax is found).

112 Head Money Case, 112 U.S. at 595 (citation omitted) (“Is a tax on tobacco void, because in many of the States no tobacco is raised or manufactured? Is the tax on distilled spirits void, because a few states pay three-fourths of the revenue arising from it?”).

113 Heitsch v. Kavanagh, 200 F.3d 178, 180 (6th Cir. 1952) (upholding estate tax despite the fact that some taxpayers settle with the government for less than the full rate); R.C. Tway Coal Co. v. Glenn, 12 F. Supp. 570, 595 (W.D. Ky. 1935) (1 ½ percent tax per ton of coal is a uniform tax).
2. What Are Indirect Taxes?

The Uniformity Clause identifies three categories of indirect taxes: duties, imposts, and excises.\textsuperscript{114} For all practical purposes, however, the Uniformity Clause applies to any tax that is not a direct tax.

The terms duties, imposts and excises are generally treated as embracing the indirect forms of taxation contemplated by the Constitution. Therefore, if a tax is not a direct tax, it falls within the general category of indirect taxes, and it is a matter of no moment whether its classification be further refined as a duty, or an impost, or an excise.\textsuperscript{115}

Whether a tax is direct or indirect depends upon what is being taxed.\textsuperscript{116} “Direct taxes bear immediately upon persons, upon the possession and enjoyment of rights; indirect taxes are levied upon the happening of an event or an exchange.”\textsuperscript{117} For example, a tax imposed upon a

\textsuperscript{114}\textit{U.S. Const.} art. I, § 8, cl. 1.

\textsuperscript{115}\textit{Penn Mut. Indem.}, 32 T.C. at 660-61.


\textsuperscript{117}\textit{Knowlton}, 178 U.S. at 47.
particular use of property incidental to ownership is an excise tax. An excise tax is “an indirect tax, one not directly imposed upon persons or property, and is one that is imposed on the performance of an act, the engaging in any occupation, or the enjoyment of a privilege.”

Another example of an indirect tax is the federal estate and gift tax, which is imposed on the transfer of property and not the property itself:

Although different modes of assessing such duties prevail, and although they have different accidental names, such as probate duties, stamp duties, . . . estate taxes, or privilege taxes, nevertheless tax laws of this nature in all countries rest in their essence upon the principle that death is the generating source from which the particular taxing power takes its being, and that it is the power to transmit, or the transmission from the dead to the living, on which such taxes are more immediately rested.

118 Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 136 (1929) (estate tax, which included within gross estate transfers made in contemplation of death, is an indirect tax not subject to apportionment).


120 Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 56. See also Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 502-03 (1930).
Income taxes\textsuperscript{121} and corporate taxes\textsuperscript{122} are also indirect taxes because they are imposed on the earning of money and not directly on individuals or property.\textsuperscript{123} The list of taxes found to be indirect by the Supreme Court is extensive:

- A ‘license’ or ‘special’ tax upon dealers in certain commodities (License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462; cf. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437);
- A tax on sales at commodity exchanges (Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509);
- A tax on the transfer or sale of securities (Treat v. White, 181 U.S. 264; Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363; Provost v. United States, 269 U.S. 443);
- A tax on the issuance of State bank notes (Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533);
- A tax on manufactured tobacco having reference to its origin and intended use (Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608);
- A tax on the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine (McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27);
- A tax on devolutions of title to real estate (Schloeg v. Rew, 23 Wall. 331);
- A tax on the receipt of legacies (Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41);
- A tax on transfers at death (New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345);
- A tax on transfers inter vivos (Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124).

\textsuperscript{121}Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 15; Apache Bend Apartments, 702 F. Supp. at 1295) (1986 Tax Reform Act that granted temporary exemptions to certain taxpayers does not violate Uniformity Clause).


\textsuperscript{123}See generally, C. Johnson, The Illegitimate “Earned” Requirement in Tax and Nontax Accounting, 50 Tax. L. Rev. 373, 412 (1995) (“viewed as a tax on earnings, the income tax is an indirect tax”).
Indeed, in response to the contention in *New York Trust Co. v. Eisner*, that the estate tax was a direct tax, the Supreme Court swept away all logical arguments with Justice Holmes’s infamous statement: “Upon this point a page of history is worth a volume of logic.”\(^{124}\) The category of indirect taxes, therefore, is “wide and comprehensive . . . in striking contrast to the very narrow range within which ‘direct’ taxes have been limited. . . .”\(^{125}\)

**3. The 16th Amendment**

The 16th Amendment had no effect on the Uniformity Clause,\(^{126}\) so federal income tax laws are still required to be “uniform throughout the United States.”\(^{127}\) This, of course, calls into question the necessity of the 16th Amendment. The federal government had the power to tax

\(^{124}\)256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (holding that federal estate tax is an indirect tax).

\(^{125}\) *Penn Mut. Indem.*, 32 T.C. at 661. Direct Taxes are not, as Woodrow Wilson proclaimed in 1885, favored in America: “All direct taxes are heartily disliked. . . .” WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 100 (1981)

\(^{126}\)The 16th Amendment says nothing about uniformity: “Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on income, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration.” U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.

\(^{127}\) *Brushaber*, 240 U.S. at 24 (federal income tax subject to Uniformity Clause after 16th Amendment).
income prior to the 16th Amendment. The sole purpose of the 16th Amendment was to relieve Congress of the obligation to apportion income taxes. But only direct taxes are subject to apportionment. There is no dispute today—and arguably no dispute prior to the ratification of the 16th Amendment—that income taxes are indirect taxes and, as such, are not subject to the apportionment clauses. As a consequence, the 16th Amendment served no real purpose.

II. Circuit-Specific Application of the Internal Revenue Code

In recent years, the IRS has instituted an official practice of applying various parts of the Internal Revenue Code in only some states. This occurs when the IRS disagrees with a federal circuit court’s interpretation of the Code. In such cases, the IRS issues a formal opinion stating that it will adhere to the circuit court’s interpretation of the tax law in states in that circuit, but not in other states. As a result, different tax laws are being applied in different states in direct contravention of the spirit, if not the letter, of the Uniformity Clause.

128 Flint, 220 U.S. at 151-52. “Among the numerous indirect taxes imposed by Congress under article I, section 8, of the Constitution were the various income taxes levied for a period of nearly 10 years at about the time of the Civil War.” Penn Mut. Indem., 32 T.C. at 662.

129 Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 17-19.

130 Flint, 220 U.S. at 150-151 (holding that a corporate income tax was an indirect tax and thus not subject to the apportionment clauses).
Three examples of the IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax law should suffice. In a Field Service Advisory dated August 7, 1992, the IRS was asked to opine on whether a taxpayer is entitled to interest, for the period when the taxpayer’s refund checks were initially issued until the time when they were reissued, on checks that were mailed to the wrong address. The IRS declared that the taxpayer was not entitled to interest. The IRS made clear, however, that the outcome would have been different had the taxpayer resided in New York, Connecticut, or Vermont. Why the geographical distinction? In 1990, the Second Circuit had ruled in *Doolin v. United States*, that a similarly situated taxpayer was entitled to interest. The IRS, though, refused to apply *Doolin* outside the Second Circuit: “The Service does not intend to follow the decision in any circuit, except the Second Circuit.” By so doing, the IRS is


132 The Second Circuit is comprised of New York, Connecticut, and Vermont.

133 918 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Under all the circumstances, we cannot agree that there was a proper tender of the March 1986 check to plaintiffs; that check was therefore not a “refund check” within the meaning of § 26 U.S.C. 6611(b)(2). Accordingly, the first check that was properly tendered was the March 1990 check, and plaintiffs are entitled to appropriate interest for the period between March 18, 1986 and a date within 30 days of March 9, 1990, the date of the ‘refund check.’”).

applying federal tax law differently in some states than it is in others. As a result, residents of New York are entitled to interest but residents of California are not.

Second, in A.O.D. 1994-004, the IRS issued a nonacquiescence in response to a decision of the Eighth Circuit involving the correction of a prohibited transfer under § 4975. The Eighth Circuit had held that corrections under § 4975(f)(5) are automatic and thus no additional tax was owed by the taxpayers. The IRS disagreed, opining that the taxpayers had failed to take the proper actions to correct a prohibited sale or exchange under § 4975(c)(1)(a)


136 I.R.C. § 4975 imposes additional taxes on certain prohibited transfers from qualified pension plans.

137 Zabolotny v. Commissioner, 7 F.3d 774, 778 n.3 (8th Cir. 1993) ("The IRS also asserts that, because § 4975(a) imposes a blanket prohibition on certain types of transaction regardless of the transaction’s financial success and demands a 5% of the value of the transaction from the disqualified person involved whether or not the transaction turned out to be a ‘good deal,’ the same standards should apply to § 4975(b). We disagree. Congress created a two-tier, not a one-tier, tax liability scheme, and one of the distinguishing features of the second-tier tax is that instead of being imposed automatically it is avoidable through correction. The mandatory nature of the first-tier excise tax simply does not require us to hold that the financial consequences of the transaction to the plan are irrelevant for the purposes determining the propriety of a second-tier excise tax liability.") (citations omitted).
and thus a 100% tax was due under § 4975(b).\textsuperscript{138} Despite the fact that no other circuit courts had ruled on this issue, the IRS declared that it would continue to apply § 4975(f)(5) in a manner inconsistent with the Eighth Circuit’s opinion, but only for taxpayers living outside the Eighth Circuit.\textsuperscript{139} Thus, taxpayers residing in, say, Arkansas,\textsuperscript{140} are treated differently than those residing in, say, Colorado.

Third, in Revenue Ruling 72-583,\textsuperscript{141} the IRS declared two rules for gifts to political campaigns. If the taxpayer resides, say, in Virginia or any other state outside the Fifth Circuit,\textsuperscript{142} gifts to political campaigns are considered taxable gifts under the federal gift tax. For taxpayers residing in Texas or any other state within the Fifth Circuit, such gifts are not taxable. Why? Because the Fifth Circuit had so held.\textsuperscript{143}

\begin{enumerate}
\item[AOD 1994-004, 1994 WL 805237 (May 31).]
\item[A.O.D. 1994-004, 1994 WL 805237 (May 31).]
\item[The Eighth Circuit is comprised of Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota.]
\item[1972-2 C.B. 534. Revenue Ruling 1972-2 was subsequently superceded by statute. See I.R.C. § 2501(e).]
\item[The Fifth Circuit is comprised of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.]
\item[United States v. Stern, 436 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1971) (“The transactions in controversy were permeated with commercial and economic factors. The contributions were motivated by]
In all three examples, the IRS is applying one tax law in some states and another tax law in other states. And the IRS’s distinction is based solely on geography, as the federal circuits are drawn on state political boundaries. The IRS’s distinction is not based on state law or the taxpayers themselves. This is nothing more, therefore, than a non-uniform application of the tax law by the federal government.

III. Application of the Uniformity Clause to the IRS

“The Uniformity Clause requires that an excise tax apply, at the same rate, in all portions of the United States where the subject of the tax is found.” If Congress passed a law that applied different taxes to different circuits, the law would undoubtedly violate the Uniformity Clause. The IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax laws, therefore, clearly violates the appellee’s desire to promote a slate of candidates that would protect and advance her personal and property interests. To assure that the funds would be spent in a manner consonant with the attainment of that goal, appellee and her group retained control over the disbursement of their contributions. In a very real sense, then, Mrs. Stern was making an economic investment that she believed would have a direct and favorable effect upon her property holdings and business interests in New Orleans and Louisiana. These factors, in conjunction with the undisputed findings of the lower court that the expenditures were bona fide, at arms length and free from donative intent, lead us, in light of what we have said above, to the conclusion that the expenditures satisfy the spirit of the Regulations and are to be considered as made for an adequate and full consideration.”

144Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 84 (emphasis added).

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spirit of the Uniformity Clause, as the IRS is applying different tax laws to different states. But does the IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax law violate the letter of the Uniformity Clause?

The Uniformity Clause is contained in Article I of the Constitution. By its terms, therefore, it does not limit the actions of the IRS; it applies only to Congress. As a consequence, it is arguable that only Congress, and not the IRS, can violate the Uniformity Clause. Such an argument, however, would render the Uniformity Clause meaningless.

There are two ways of viewing the IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax law. First, it could be argued that the Uniformity Clause applies only to the legislative process, and the IRS is not making law, but simply choosing not to enforce an otherwise uniform law in some states. The problem with this argument is that the “power to alter or repeal laws is a legislative power and executive officers may not by means of construction, rules and regulations, orders or otherwise, extend, alter, repeal, set at naught or disregard laws enacted by the legislature.”

145 The federal circuits follow state political boundaries. The Seventh Circuit, for instance, includes Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin.

146 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.

147 As part of the executive branch, the IRS is governed by Article II of the Constitution.

This is particular true in the area of tax law, where courts have held that it is unlawful for the IRS to adopt different enforcement policies for different circuits: “The letter of the Commissioner [setting forth a different enforcement policy for the Eighth Circuit] could not have the effect of changing the law. Insofar as the Commissioner adopted an enforcement policy contrary to the statute, the enforcement policy was unlawful.”

Alternatively, it could be argued that the IRS is involved in the legislative process by virtue of the fact that Congress has delegated its power to make tax law to the IRS. It is well settled that the executive branch lacks the independent power to impose taxation; only Congress has that authority. Accordingly, any power the IRS has to impose tax law must have been

1441 (9th Cir. 1983) (Pregerson, J., concurring) (agency’s refusal to adhere to circuit court’s decision is “akin to the repudiated pre-Civil War doctrine of nullification”); Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (nonacquiescence renders “[t]he judiciary’s duty and authority . . . to say what the law is . . . a virtual nullity”).

149 Peony Park, 121 F. Supp. at 695.


151 Inland Prods. Co. v. Blair, 31 F.2d 867, 868 (4th Cir. 1929) (“The Revenue Acts in force in 1918 and 1919 did not impose the soft drink tax upon sweet cider, and the regulations of the Revenue Department attempting to impose it were void.”); Investment Annuity, 442 F. Supp. at 693; Peony Park, 121 F. Supp. at 695.
delegated to it by Congress.\textsuperscript{152} When Congress delegates powers to the executive branch, however, the executive branch assumes those powers subject to the same constitutional restrictions that limited Congress’s power.\textsuperscript{153} For example, the First Amendment provides that \textit{“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. . .”}\textsuperscript{154} By its terms, only Congress, and not the executive branch, is subject to the First Amendment. If applied literally, the executive branch could promulgate regulations that abridge free speech with impunity. Such a construction would, of course, render the First Amendment meaningless, and courts have so held:

Petitioner argues that the [FCC’s] regulations . . . violate the First Amendment. The First Amendment states, \textit{“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”} Although the text of the First Amendment refers to legislative enactments by Congress, it is actually much broader in scope and encompasses, among other things, regulations promulgated by administrative agencies.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{152}Congress has the authority to delegate its Article I, § 8 powers to the executive branch. California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 59 (1974); District of Columbia v. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 109 (1953) (Congress may delegate its legislate power “subject of course to constitutional limitations to which all lawmaker is subservient.”).

\textsuperscript{153}See, e.g., U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).

\textsuperscript{154}U.S. CONST. amend. 1.

\textsuperscript{155}U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1232 (First Amendment prohibits FCC from requiring telecommunications company to obtain affirmative approval from customers before company could use that customer’s proprietary network information for marketing purposes).
The same holds true for restrictions on Congress contained in Article I on the Constitution: “Congress may delegate [under Article I, § 8, cl. 17 its] . . . full legislative power, subject of course to constitutional limitations to which all lawmaking is subservient . . . .”\textsuperscript{156} Obviously, Congress cannot delegate more power than it has: “[O]ur operating premise must be that an agency, or as here, an executive office with delegated power to promulgate rules, cannot have greater power to regulate . . . conduct than does Congress.”\textsuperscript{157} Otherwise, Congress could easily avoid constitutional restrictions like the Uniformity Clause by simply delegating authority to the executive branch. Accordingly, if the IRS is imposing tax law—rather than enforcing tax law—it must do so in compliance with the Uniformity Clause.\textsuperscript{158}

In summary, when the IRS applies tax law in a circuit-specific manner, it is either unlawfully refusing to enforce a tax statute in certain states or imposing a non-uniform tax law in violation of the Uniformity Clause. In either case, the IRS’s actions are unconstitutional.

\textsuperscript{156}Thompson, 346 U.S. at 109.

\textsuperscript{157}Neinast v. Texas, 217 F.3d 275, 281 (5th Cir. 2000).

IV. Proposal

The IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax law violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the Uniformity Clause. The IRS, however, is not totally to blame. The real culprit is a judicial system in which thirteen different circuit courts independently interpret federal tax law.159 When the IRS disagrees with a circuit court’s interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, the IRS has three unappealing choices. It can apply the tax law in accordance with the circuit court’s interpretation in that circuit, but not in other circuits. This is the IRS’s current practice, which arguably violates the Uniformity Clause.160 Alternatively, the IRS could apply the tax law in accordance with the circuit court’s interpretation in all circuits. Under this approach, each circuit court would effectively speak for the entire nation, raising the circuit court’s prominence to that of the United States Supreme Court. This approach is not followed in other areas of federal

159 ROSEWELL MAGILL, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAXES 209 (1943) (“If we were seeking to secure a state of complete uncertainty in tax jurisprudence, we would hardly do better than to provide for 87 Courts [as of 1943] with original jurisdiction, 11 appellate bodies [now 13] of coordinate rank, and only a discretionary review of relatively few cases by the Supreme Court.”). Appeals from district courts are heard by the circuit court in which that district is located. See 28 U.S.C. § 1294. Appeals from the Tax Court are heard by the circuit court in which the taxpayer resides. See 26 U.S.C. § 7482. Appeals from the Court of Federal Claims are heard by the Federal Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295. In all, 13 different circuit courts hear tax appeals.

160 See Section II, supra.
law,161 and, of course, is not feasible where there are contradictory circuit court interpretations.162 Finally, the IRS could, theoretically, ignore the circuit court’s interpretation altogether.163 But this alternative violates one of the first principles of judicial review: a federal


162 If there were a split in the circuits, the IRS, under this alternative, would have no choice but to apply different laws in different states. Circuit splits are not uncommon in tax law. For example, the circuits are split on whether a contingent fee is a part of the client’s taxable income. Compare Foster v. United States, 249 F.3d 1275, 1279-80 (11th Cir.2001); Srivastava v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d 353, 364-65 (5th Cir.2000); Davis v. Commissioner, 210 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir.2000) (per curiam); Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir.2000); Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119, 125-26 (5th Cir.1959), with Young v. Commissioner, 240 F.3d 369, 376-79 (4th Cir.2001); Coady v. Commissioner, 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir.2000), and Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1454-55 (Fed. Cir.1995).

163 This practice has been condemned by courts. See, e.g., Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1441 (Pregerson, J., concurring) (agency’s refusal to adhere to circuit court’s decision is “akin to the repudiated pre-Civil War doctrine of nullification”); Stieberger, 615 F. Supp. at 1357 (nonacquiescence doctrine renders “[t]he judiciary’s duty and authority . . . to say what the law is . . . a virtual nullity”).
court’s interpretation of federal law is final and controlling.\textsuperscript{164} Accordingly, any proposal to reform the IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax law must start with a change in the appellate process.

The simplest and best solution would be to require all federal tax appeals to be heard in a single forum. This Article, therefore, proposes that Congress amend 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) by adding a provision granting exclusive jurisdiction of federal tax appeals to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.\textsuperscript{165} The Federal Circuit was created to provide “a forum for appeals from throughout the country in areas of the law where Congress determines that there is special need

\textsuperscript{164}Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).

\textsuperscript{165}Such an amendment could read: “(a) The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction--

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(15) of appeals from a final decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims, the United States Tax Court, or a United States District Court involving claims under Title 26 (the Internal Revenue Code).
for . . . uniformity."\textsuperscript{166} For example, in an effort to unify and stabilize the law of patents, Congress assigned jurisdiction over virtually all federal patent appeals to the Federal Circuit.\textsuperscript{167} This exclusive jurisdiction, many argue, has added a needed stability and unity to the law of

\textsuperscript{166}S. Rep. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., \textit{reprinted in} U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1982, pp. 13 (Nov. 18, 1981). “[T]here are areas of the law in which the appellate courts reach inconsistent decisions on the same issue, or in which—although the rule of law may be fairly clear—courts apply the law unevenly when faced with the facts of individual cases.” \textit{Id.} at 13. The Federal Circuit was designed to provide “a prompt, definitive answer to legal questions” in these areas. \textit{Id.} at 11.

\textsuperscript{167}\textit{Id.} at 11, 12-17. According to 28 U.S.C. § 1295, “[t]he United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a decision of (A) the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences of the United States Patent and Trademark Office with respect to patent applications and interferences, at the instance of an applicant for a patent or any party to a patent interference, and any such appeal shall waive the right of such applicant or party to proceed under section 145 or 146 of title 35; (B) the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office or the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board with respect to applications for registration of marks and other proceedings as provided in section 21 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1071); or (C) a district court to which a case was directed pursuant to section 145, 146, or 154(b) of title 35.”
There is no reason the Federal Circuit could not do the same for tax law. Uniformity is needed in tax law ever bit as much as patent law: “[U]niformity among the


169 See generally Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Final Report 73 (Dec. 18, 1998), available at http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/final/appstruc.pdf (suggesting that a specialized court of tax appeals is unnecessary and that tax appeals should be centralized in the Federal Circuit). Alternatively, Congress could create a new appellate court to hear all tax appeals. Various tax jurists, practitioners, and academics have proposed the creation of a court of tax appeals. None of these proposals, however, was prompted by the IRS’s circuit-specific application of the tax law. See, e.g., H. Todd Miller, A Court of Tax Appeals Revisited, 85 Yale L.J. 228 (1975); Oscar E. Bland,
circuits is particularly desirable in tax cases to ensure equal application of the tax system to our citizenry.”

Indeed, as this Article illustrates, uniformity of tax law is not only desirable, it is constitutionally prescribed.

Congress has nearly unlimited authority to modify or expand the appellate jurisdiction of federal courts; thus, the proposed amendment would be constitutional. Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the tax law would be final and binding on the IRS, subject only to


171 See, e.g., Ex Parte McCordle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868) (upholding statute removing Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions); but see United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871) (suggesting that Congress’s power over the court’s appellate jurisdiction is not unlimited).

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review by the United States Supreme Court or, in some instances, a Congressional amendment to the tax law.

This proposal offers several advantages to the current state of the law. Appeals from final decisions of the district courts, the Court of Federal Claims, and the Tax Court would be heard by a single circuit court.\textsuperscript{172} This would eliminate inconsistent circuit court decisions, as all tax appeals would be decided by the Federal Circuit.\textsuperscript{173} In the event of inconsistent decisions by different panels of the Federal Circuit, the Federal Circuit could resolve such inconsistencies \textit{en banc}.\textsuperscript{174} The Tax Court has adhered to such a policy for years.\textsuperscript{175}

\textsuperscript{172}Under current law, the Federal Circuit has appellate jurisdiction over tax cases arising out of the Court of Federal Claims. \textit{See} 28 U.S.C.A. \textsection{} 1295 ("The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a final decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims").

\textsuperscript{173}Appeals would continue to be as a matter of right. \textit{See} e.g., McDonald v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 255, 265 n.3 (1987) (parties have a "right to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"). Thus, the IRS could appeal any trial court decision with which it disagrees. This would prevent the trial courts from becoming the new bastion of non-uniformity.

\textsuperscript{174}\textit{Fed. Cir. R.} 35 ("A majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service may order that an appeal or other proceeding be heard or reheard by the court of appeals en banc. An en banc hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless: (1) en
Because the Federal Circuit’s decision would be final, binding, and not subject to inconsistent circuit court interpretations, non-acquiescence would not be an option for the IRS. Under the proposal, the IRS must apply the tax law as interpreted by the Federal Circuit until such time as the Federal Circuit’s interpretation is modified or overruled by the Supreme Court or the tax law is amended by Congress.176 As a result, the IRS would no longer have any reason to apply the tax law in a circuit-specific manner because there will be only one circuit court interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, thereby eliminating any Uniformity Clause problems.

banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions; or (2) the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.”). The Federal Circuit also has the power to stay enforcement, pending appeal, of any trial court decision. Fed. Cir. R. 8.

175In the Tax Court, every proposed decision of a trial judge must be referred to the chief judge before release to assure consistency with the court’s existing position. The chief judge may refer the case to the full Tax Court for possible change. I.R.C. § 7460.

176See generally, The First Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 100 F.R.D. 499 (1983) (“A single court of tax appeals, insulated as a practical matter from any but the rarest Supreme Court review, but always subject to correction through the legislative process, inevitably would promote uniformity and coherence. Things would not always be settled “right,” as losing litigants and the similarly situated will assert with fervor, but subject to congressional review they will be settled. That seems to me worth a great deal.”).
Fourth, if the Federal Circuit hears all tax appeals, that court can develop an expertise in tax matters, as it has in patent cases: “Clearly, the Federal Circuit has developed patent expertise of a higher average level than that previously found in the regional circuits, as a result of deciding over 200 patent appeals per year. The fact that the Federal Circuit has a principal responsibility for the patent system, rather than for deciding the odd case, contributes to the development of that expertise.”177 The same should hold true for tax appeals.178 Tax law is every bit as intricate and incoherent as patent law, particularly to generalized judges who rarely


178 First Annual Judicial Conference, supra note 175, at 499 (“A court of tax appeals would be a specialist’s tribunal. Sensibly, I think, it would be a tax specialist tribunal, its jurisdiction limited to and exclusive . . . over appeals of cases arising under the federal tax laws. Sacrificed in the process, necessarily, is the leavening influence of the generalist appellate judge. Taking account of what our Internal Revenue Code and regulations have become, and likely will remain, I think it a price worth paying.”).
encounter tax appeals.  

Finally, there is no reason to believe that the Federal Circuit would become a tool of the IRS. “No tax venue restrains the IRS’s aggression and power better than the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. Other tax venues lack the Federal Circuit’s history and monetary-claim

\[179\] Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 188 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Every experienced tax practitioner also knows that our Internal Revenue Code is a structured and complicated instrument perhaps too complex that deserves careful and historical analysis when, as here, longstanding provisions of that Code are challenged.”); Koss v. United States, 69 F.3d 705, 712 (3d Cir. 1995) (“We cannot close this opinion without making an additional observation. It is, of course, commonplace to note that the Internal Revenue Code is remarkably complicated. In this case, these complications have cost the Kosses dearly. Indeed, at oral argument we were told that their debt to the IRS now exceeds $300,000 because of the inclusion of interest. Yet it is very possible that, but for the operation of the non-substantive, highly technical procedural provisions that have been applied, they would not owe this money. We are disturbed by the harsh result.”)

\[180\] Congress created the Federal Circuit to achieve consistency in patent cases by avoiding the “contradictory decisions often issued by the 12 existing Courts of Appeal and seldom untangled by the Supreme Court.” Paula Dwyer, et al., The Battle Raging Over “Intellectual Property,” BUS. Wk., May 2, 1989, at 79.
expertise. The Federal Circuit specializes in bringing uniform justice to disputes between the United States and its citizens.” 181

V. Conclusion

The Internal Revenue Code is interpreted by thirteen different circuit courts. The circuit courts’ interpretations, though, are not always in accord, but they are usually final, as the Supreme Court rarely hears tax appeals. 182 As a result, the IRS is often forced to apply different tax laws in different circuits in violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the Uniformity Clause of the Constitution. But there is a simple, practical, and constitutional solution to this problem. This Article proposes that Congress amend 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a) by adding a provision granting exclusive jurisdiction of federal tax appeals to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Such an amendment would not only unify and stabilize the tax law, it would permanently solve the Uniformity Clause issue identified in this Article.


182 “This is a tax case. Deny.’ This was [Justice’s] Brennan’s normal reaction to a cert request in a tax case.” BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 429 (1979). See also See Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, supra note 168 (infrequent Supreme Court review of tax cases often leaves the interpretation of the tax law unsettled for years).