University of Virginia Legal Working Paper Series
University of Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series
The Problem with Cooperation
Article comments
Chapter for book on international regulatory cooperation to be published by Oxford University Press
Abstract
The case for international cooperation in competition policy is weaker than commonly thought. First, the lion's share of international transactions (the only kind for which international cooperation is relevant) involves industries for which there is no clear consensus about optimal industry structure. Second, there are strong theoretical reasons why states would exploit all forms of regulation, including competition regulation, to benefit incumbent producers to the cost of consumers. Third, the historical record demonstrates that states have invoked competition policy exactly in this manner. Fourth, arguments that competition regulators can gain solidarity and increased leverage against their domestic adversaries through strengthened international cooperation do not withstand scrutiny.
Subject Area
International Law, Public Law and Legal Theory
Recommended Citation
Paul B. Stephan,
"The Problem with Cooperation"
(June 2009).
University of Virginia Legal Working Paper Series.
University of Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series.
Working Paper 126.
http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/uva_publiclaw/art126
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