University of Virginia Legal Working Paper Series
University of Virginia John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper Series
General and Specific Legal Rules
Article comments
forthcoming in the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
Abstract
Legal rules may be general (that is, applicable to a broad range of situations) or specific. Adopting a custom-tailored rule for a specific activity permits the regulator to make efficient use of information about the social costs and benefits of that activity. However, the rule maker typically relies on the regulated parties for such information. The regulated parties may attempt to influence the rule maker, producing rules that reflect their private interests. We show that in some cases limiting the rule maker to a single rule for multiple activities will moderate this influence and maximize welfare.
Subject Area
Law and Economics
Recommended Citation
Paul G. Mahoney and Chris W. Sanchirico,
"General and Specific Legal Rules"
(October 2004).
University of Virginia Legal Working Paper Series.
University of Virginia John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper Series.
Working Paper 7.
http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/olin/art7
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