University of Virginia Legal Working Paper Series
University of Virginia John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper Series
Surveillance and Reporting of Disease Outbreaks: Private Incentives and WHO Policy Levers
Abstract
In spite of the obvious global public goods nature of warnings about infectious disease outbreaks, international legal requirements for reporting outbreaks remain weak and disclosure of outbreaks depends on the self-interest of nations. Using a simple game-theoretic model, we explore the incentives of countries to invest in disease surveillance and to report outbreaks to international health authorities. We evaluate existing and potential policy instruments available to the WHO to encourage countries to detect and report disease outbreaks, including medical assistance to control outbreaks, trade sanctions for non-reporting and assistance in disease surveillance. These ideas are relevant to policy design, not just in the context of singular events such as avian influenza, but also for more routine problems such as hospital-acquired infections.
Subject Area
Health Law and Policy, Law and Economics
Recommended Citation
Anup Malani and Ramanan Laxminarayan,
"Surveillance and Reporting of Disease Outbreaks: Private Incentives and WHO Policy Levers"
(February 2006).
University of Virginia Legal Working Paper Series.
University of Virginia John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper Series.
Working Paper 27.
http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/olin/art27
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