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<title>University of Southern California</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2013 University of Southern California Law School All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps</link>
<description>Recent documents in University of Southern California</description>
<language>en-us</language>
<lastBuildDate>Wed, 19 Jun 2013 01:45:33 PDT</lastBuildDate>
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<title>Understanding the Procrastination Cycle</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lss/99</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 17 Jun 2013 10:02:42 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>Procrastination is one of the enduring challenges of human existence, as well as one of the chief problems with which law students struggle.  Understanding the cycle of procrastination can help law professors and advisors more constructively address students' issues in this area -- not to mention our own.</p>

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<author>Meehan Rasch et al.</author>


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<title>Overcoming Writer&apos;s Block and Procrastination for Attorneys, Law Students, and Law Professors</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lss/98</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lss/98</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 17 Jun 2013 10:02:40 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>Legal writers face unique challenges.  Law is a particularly writing-heavy profession.  However, lawyers, law students, and law professors often struggle with initiating, sustaining, and completing legal writing projects.  This article provides a guide for legal writers who are seeking to understand and resolve writing blocks, procrastination, and other common writing productivity problems.</p>

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<author>David A. Rasch et al.</author>


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<title>Measuring Agency Attributes with Attitudes Across Time: A Method and Examples Using Large-Scale Federal Surveys</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/170</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/170</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 17 Jun 2013 09:23:03 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>Public management researchers are interested in many characteristics of organizations that cannot be directly captured, making aggregated attitudes from surveys an attractive proxy.  Yet difficulties in measuring meaningful attributes over time and across organizations have frequently limited statistical designs to a single organization or time.  We offer a method for creating such statistical measures across agencies and time using item response theory.  Focusing our attention on U.S. federal administrative agencies, we marshal a variety of questions from surveys commissioned by the Office of Personnel Management and Merit Systems Protection Board and employ statistical models to measure three important attributes -- autonomy, job satisfaction, and intrinsic motivation -- for 71 agencies between 1998-2013.  Our study provides a wealth of data for quantitative public management research designs as well as an adaptable framework for measuring a wide range of concepts.</p>

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<author>Anthony M. Bertelli et al.</author>


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<title>Democracy, Courts and the Information Order</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/169</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/169</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 20 May 2013 13:16:48 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>Conventional wisdom about civil litigation, both among scholars and political actors, holds that abuse of the legal process is common, that there is too much litigation, that it is “all about the money,” and that “a bad settlement is better than a good trial.” This constellation of attitudes that emphasize the economic function of law suggests that courts are an expensive conflict resolution mechanism of last resort and that their use would be minimized in a healthy market-based democracy. In this paper we apply a new sociological framework to understand the meaning and function of civil litigation in a democratic society. We focus in particular on the democratic function of the informational characteristics of litigation that require substantial disclosure and engagement between plaintiff, defendant and third parties. We do not look to the instrumental function of information transfer—in effecting deterrence, assessing compensation or enforcing underlying rights. Instead we examine the role courts play in the maintenance and attainment of a social information order—norms and legal rules governing the sharing and withholding of information that depend on and constitute particular status relationships between actors (Ryan 2006). Using interviews and surveys of family members of victims of 9/11 about their experiences with the Victims Compensation Fund (Hadfield 2005,2008a) and  other sources, we develop a theory of the lived experience of entitlement to information in in Anglo-American legal settings with suggestions of how these ideas might translate to civil law systems.</p>

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<author>Gillian K. Hadfield et al.</author>


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<title>Law without the State: Legal Attributes and the Coordination of Decentralized Collective Punishment</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/168</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/168</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 09:16:17 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Most social scientists take for granted that law is defined by the presence of a centralized authority capable of exacting coercive penalties for violations of legal rules. Moreover, the existing approach to analyzing law in economics and positive political theory works with a very thin concept of law that does not account for the distinctive attributes of legal order as compared with other forms of social order. Drawing on a model developed elsewhere, we reinterpret key case studies to demonstrate how a theoretically informed approach illuminates questions about emergence, stability, and function of law in supporting economic and democratic growth.</p>

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<author>Gillian K. Hadfield et al.</author>


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<title>Through a Latte, Darkly: Starbucks&apos; Window into Stateless income Tax Planning</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/167</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/167</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2013 09:53:46 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>This paper uses Starbucks Corporation, the premier roaster, marketer and retailer of specialty coffee in the world, as an example of stateless income tax planning in action. “Stateless income” comprises income derived for tax purposes by a multinational group from business activities in a country other than the domicile of the group’s ultimate parent company, but which is subject to tax only in a jurisdiction that is neither the source of the factors of production through which the income was derived, nor the domicile of the group’s parent company.</p>
<p>The paper reviews both Starbucks’ recent U.K. tax controversy (including a parliamentary inquiry), which revolved around the intersection of its consistent unprofitability in the United Kingdom with large deductible intragroup payments to Dutch, Swiss and U.S. affiliates, and its more recent submission to the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee. The paper draws from this review two lessons.</p>
<p>First, if Starbucks can organize itself as a successful stateless income generator, any multinational firm can. Starbucks follows a classic bricks and mortar retail business model, with direct customer interactions in thousands of “high street” locations in high-tax countries around the world. Moreover, Starbucks is not a firm driven by hugely valuable identifiable intangibles that are separate from its business model, which it employs whenever it deals with those retail customers. Nonetheless, it appears that Starbucks enjoys a much lower effective tax rate on its non-U.S. income than would be predicted by looking at a weighted average of the tax rates in the countries in which it does business.</p>
<p>Second, The Starbucks story – in particular, its U.K. experience – demonstrates the fundamental opacity of international tax planning, in which neither investors in a public firm nor the tax authorities in any particular jurisdiction have a clear picture of what the firm is up to. It is not appropriate to expect source country tax authorities to engage in elaborate games of Twenty Tax Questions, in turn requiring detailed knowledge of the tax laws and financial accounting rules of many other jurisdictions, in order simply to evaluate the probative value of a taxpayer’s claim that its intragroup dealings necessarily are at arm’s-length by virtue of alleged symmetries in tax treatment for expense and income across the group’s affiliates. U.S.-based multinational firms owe a similar duty of candor and transparency when dealing with the Congress of the United States.</p>
<p>The remedy begins with transparency towards tax authorities and policymakers, through which those institutions have a clear and complete picture of the global tax planning structures of multinational firms, and the implications of those structures for generating stateless income. National governments should recognize their common interest in this regard and promptly require their tax and securities agencies to promulgate rules providing a uniform world-wide disclosure matrix for actual tax burdens by jurisdiction. As a first step the United States should enforce the current rule requiring U.S. firms to quantify the U.S. tax cost of repatriating their offshore “permanently reinvested earnings.”</p>

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<author>Edward D. Kleinbard</author>


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<title>Reading, Writing, and Questions in Advance: Teaching English Legal History</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lss/97</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lss/97</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 02 May 2013 13:41:58 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>This short essay describes and explains a teaching method with four key elements: (1) telling students in advance the questions to be discussed in the next class, (2) requiring some students to submit written answers to the questions before class, (3) assigning only short, primary source readings, (4) banning laptops, recording classes, and distributing PowerPoint slides.  This method enhances the quality of class discussion and helps students appreciate the importance of careful reading of primary sources.  With minor modifications, this method can also be used for modern law classes.</p>

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<author>Daniel M. Klerman</author>


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<title>Regulating Banking Bonuses in the European Union: A Case Study in Unintended Consequences</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/166</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 04 Apr 2013 14:38:58 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>On 27 February 2013, the European Union (EU) reached a provisional deal to limit the amount of bankers' bonuses to the amount of fixed remuneration (i.e., a one-to-one ratio); the cap could be increased to 2:1 with the backing of a supermajority of shareholders.  I demonstrate that the pending EU regulations restrictions will: (1) increase rather than decrease incentives for excessive risk taking; (2) result in significant increase in fixed remuneration; (3) reduce incentives to create value; (4) reduce the competitiveness of the EU banking sector; and (5) result in a general degradation in the quality of EU investment bankers, thereby decreasing access to capital and increasing the cost of capital in the European Union.</p>

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<author>Kevin J. Murphy</author>


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<title>Copyright Without Creators</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/165</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/165</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 04 Apr 2013 08:47:31 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Copyright is typically justified by the rationale that profits induce authors and other artists to invest resources in cultural production. This rationale is vulnerable to the objection that some artists have intrinsic incentives to invest in cultural production and do not require significant capital to do so. Even accepting this objection, copyright is justified by an alternative rationale: it supports the profit-motivated intermediaries that bear the high costs and risks involved in evaluating, distributing and marketing content in mass-cultural markets. This “authorless” rationale is consistent with the intermediated structure of mature mass-cultural markets and accounts for long-standing features of copyright law that have conventionally been dismissed as mere transfers from consumers to media interests. The digital transformation of mass cultural markets, which has been accompanied in some media by a decline in production and distribution costs but no change or even an increase in screening and marketing costs, challenges and clarifies the intermediary-based rationale for copyright. Even in digitized content markets, copyright plays a critical role by enabling intermediaries to select freely from the full range of transactional structures for most efficiently bearing the costs and risks of screening, producing, distributing and marketing content to a mass audience.</p>

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<author>Jonathan M. Barnett</author>


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<title>The Supercharged IPO</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/164</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/164</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 26 Mar 2013 10:25:13 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>A new innovation on the IPO landscape has emerged in the last two decades, allowing owner-founders to extract billions of dollars from newly-public companies. These IPOs—labeled supercharged IPOs—have been the subject of widespread debate and controversy: lawyers, financial experts, journalists, and Members of Congress have all weighed in on the topic. Some have argued that supercharged IPOs are a “brilliant, just brilliant,” while others have argued they are “underhanded” and “bizarre.”</p>
<p>In this article, we explore the supercharged IPO and explain how and why this new deal structure differs from the more traditional IPO. We then outline various theories of financial innovation and note that the extant literature provides useful explanations for why supercharged IPOs emerged and spread so quickly across industries and geographic areas. The literature also provides support for both legitimate and opportunistic uses of the supercharged IPO.</p>
<p>With the help of a large-N quantitative study—the first of its kind—we investigate the adoption and diffusion of this new innovation. We find that the reason parties have begun to supercharge their IPO is not linked to a desire to steal from naïve investors, but rather for tax planning purposes. Supercharged IPOs enable both owner-founders and public investors to save substantial amounts of money in federal and state taxes. With respect to the spread of the innovation, we find that elite lawyers, especially those located in New York City, are largely responsible for the changes that we observe on the IPO landscape. We conclude our study by demonstrating how our empirical findings can be used to 1) advance the literature on innovation, 2) assist firms going public in the future, and 3) shape legal reform down the road.</p>

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<author>Victor Fleischer et al.</author>


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<title>Dynamic Analysis of Intellectual Property: Theory, Evidence and Policy</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/163</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/163</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 25 Mar 2013 13:27:57 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Intellectual property law always intervenes in markets that already have private sources of intellectual property rights.  This observation complicates the conventional assumption that more IP always reduces the size of the public domain and less IP always expands it.  Withdrawing “public IP” makes no difference in the size of the public domain if the market responds by migrating to “private IP” substitutes.  Withdrawing public IP can even enhance entry barriers and reduce the size of the public domain if certain firms have lower-cost access to private IP than others.  That perverse case is not only plausible but typical.  In general, weaker public IP tends to advantage more integrated firms that have lower costs of adopting private IP; conversely, stronger public IP protects less integrated firms that have high costs of adopting private IP.    Restricting public IP restricts the feasible range of organizational forms, resulting in hierarchical environments dominated by integrated firms that maintain a complementary suite of innovation, financing and commercialization capacities or bureaucratic environments dependent on tax-based and philanthropic transfers.  Expanding public IP restores the full range of organizational forms, enabling entrepreneurial environments populated by specialized R&D-intensive firms that rely on contract to procure the financing and commercialization inputs required to reach market.  These relationships between intellectual property, firm organization and market structure provide the basis for a novel reconstruction of U.S. patent history that identifies tendencies in the organizational structure of U.S. technology markets under weaker and stronger patent regimes.  Consistent with theoretical expectations, periods of weak patent protection tend to drive innovation toward organizationally homogenous environments dominated by hierarchical and bureaucratic entities while periods of strong patent protection tend to support organizationally diverse environments consisting of bureaucratic research entities, large integrated corporations and smaller R&D-intensive firms.</p>

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<author>Jonathan Barnett</author>


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<title>Corporate Capital and Labor Stuffing in the New Tax Rate Environment</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/162</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/162</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 25 Mar 2013 13:27:55 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Federal tax legislation enacted on January 2, 2013 to resolve the “fiscal cliff” policy controversy has reintroduced substantially higher maximum individual income tax rates on ordinary income, but has retained the 2003-2012 innovation of taxing dividend income at the same relatively low rate as long-term capital gains. At the same time, corporate tax reform is likely to lead to a substantially lower statutory corporate tax rate than current law’s 35 percent. The combination of these three factors will in the near future usher in the return, for the first time in a generation, of the taxable corporation as a personal tax shelter for owners of closely-held businesses.</p>
<p>This paper assumes that corporate headline rates in fact are lowered, and analyzes an individual’s incentives in that new tax rate environment to retain corporate earnings not strictly needed to support business operations (or to inject new investment capital into the corporation), rather than to extract that capital and earn the same income through direct investment (“capital stuffing”), and to understate the labor income of corporate owner-managers, so as to treat a disproportionate amount of their income as capital income, in the form of corporate retained earnings (“labor stuffing”). To aid in that analysis, the paper offers a new mode of conceptualizing the time value of deferring a tax liability. Finally, the paper analyzes current law’s tools to combat capital and labor income stuffing, and finds them wholly inadequate to the task.</p>

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<author>Edward D. Kleinbard</author>


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<title>Meaning and Belief in Constitutional Interpretation</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lss/96</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lss/96</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 04 Feb 2013 09:26:08 PST</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>The distinction between an evaluative concept and its possible conceptions plays a prominent role in debates about constitutional interpretation. The main purpose of the paper is to raise some doubts about the linguistic assumptions that are employed in this debate, arguing that the semantic considerations underlying the concept versus conceptions distinction are much more problematic and inconclusive than generally assumed. The ways in which concepts are used in a speech act crucially depend on pragmatic determinants, and those, in turn, depend on the nature of the conversation. The paper shows that the debate about constitutional interpretation is better seen as a moral debate about the nature of the conversation that constitutional regimes should be taken to establish. The linguistic considerations in play depend on this moral issue; by themselves, they do not support any particular interpretative stance.</p>

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<author>Andrei Marmor</author>


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<title>Distracted from Distraction by Distraction: Reimagining Estate Tax Reform</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/160</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/160</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 16 Jan 2013 14:27:24 PST</pubDate>
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	<p>Recent legislation has left a gift and estate tax that will apply to far fewer than 1% of all decedents each year. This Article, prepared for a symposium on <em>Tax Advice for the Second Obama Administration</em>, argues that the estate tax has become largely irrelevant, except ironically as a spur to the creation and perpetuation of dynastic wealth via “Dynasty Trusts.” The tax no longer meets any compelling policy rationale, such as raising revenue, “backing up” the income tax, injecting progression into the tax system, or breaking up large concentrations of wealth. It is time to move on, and to meaningfully address the 800lb gorilla in the room – the problem of unrealized appreciation. The de facto demise of the death tax gives policymakers reason to reconsider the “stepped-up basis” rule of IRC Section 1014 for assets acquired from a decedent. This rule allows those with financial capital to live tax-free and escape all taxation. Its rationale has been linked to the estate tax. Out of the ashes of the estate tax, then, a path for hope arises – lawmakers should consider a capital gains/realization-on-death rule, as Canada has, or a consistent carryover basis regime for all gratuitous transfers, whether on life or at death.</p>

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<author>Edward J. McCaffery</author>


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<title>Why Tax Revenues Must Rise</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/159</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 16 Jan 2013 10:36:40 PST</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>This PowerPoint presentation reviews the fiscal picture of the United States in light of the resolution of the "fiscal cliff" controversy. The presentation argues that, while long-term trends in mandatory spending (entitlements programs) must be addressed directly, any meaningful modifications of these programs of necessity will be phased in very slowly, and in the meantime the large deficits that the United States will incur must be financed. The presentation demonstrates that over a 10-year horizon (the standard Congressional budget window), further government spending cuts are unrealistic, and tax revenues must rise to finance government operations. If one rules out new taxes (VAT, carbon tax), then the most efficient sources of additional tax revenues are tax expenditures — in particular, personal itemized deductions.</p>

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<author>Edward Kleinbard</author>


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<title>The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice through the Corporate Practice of Law</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/158</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 07 Dec 2012 10:16:50 PST</pubDate>
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	<p>The U.S. faces a mounting crisis in access to justice. Vast numbers of ordinary Americans represent themselves in routine legal matters daily in our over-­‐burdened courts. Obtaining ex ante legal advice is effectively impossible for almost everyone except larger corporate entities, organizations and governments. In this paper, I explain why, as a matter of economic policy, it is essential that the legal profession abandon the prohibition on the corporate practice of law in order to remedy the access problem. The prohibitions on the corporate practice of law rule out the use of essential organizational and contracting tools widely used in most industries to control costs, improve quality and reduce errors. This keeps prices for legal assistance high by cutting the industry off from the ordinary economic benefits of scale, data analysis, product and process engineering and diversified sources of capital and innovation. Lawyers operating in law firms have not generated these benefits but they have appeared in settings, such as basic document completion, and countries, such as the U.K., where the corporate practice of law doctrine does not prevail. Eliminating restrictions on the corporate practice of law can significantly improve the access ordinary Americans have to legal help in a law-­‐thick world.</p>

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<author>Gillian K. Hadfield</author>


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<title>Is the Role of Tort to Repair Wrongful Losses?</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/157</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/157</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 15 Nov 2012 09:13:13 PST</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>For more than a generation, corrective justice theories of tort have been the principal alternative to economic theories. Corrective justice conceptions claim (as Jules Coleman, a leading corrective justice theorist puts it) that “tort law is best explained by corrective justice” because “at its core tort law seeks to repair wrongful losses.” This thesis encapsulates a powerful critique of the economic theory of tort. That theory is committed to a relentlessly forward-looking conception of the institution. On the economic account, tort is a mechanism for inducing actors whose activities put others at risk of injury to minimize the combined costs of accidents and their prevention. It does so by placing responsibility for repairing past losses on those actors who are the “cheapest cost-avoiders.” The “cheapest cost-avoiders” are those who are in the best position to minimize the combined costs of accidents and their prevention. Because past costs can no longer be affected, this criterion looks forward and only forward. It therefore misconceives the point of tort adjudication. Tort adjudication looks backwards and assigns responsibility for repairing harm wrongly done.  Tort adjudication holds tortfeasors liable <em>to</em> those they have wronged <em>for</em> the losses that they have wrongly inflicted <em>because</em> they are responsible for having wrongly inflicted those losses on those victims.</p>
<p>Corrective justice theory thus articulates a powerful critique of the economic theory of tort. That critique, however, spawns its own misconception of tort law. Corrective justice theory puts the cart before the horse and misconceives tort as an essentially remedial institution. Tort is a law of wrongs, not just a law of redress for wrongs. Logically and normatively, obligations of repair are dependent on primary obligations not to wrong others in the first instance. Logically, remedial responsibilities are conditioned on and arise out of failures to discharge primary responsibilities. Normatively, primary responsibilities provide the reason for honoring remedial responsibilities and largely determine the shape of remedial responsibilities.  Repairing harm wrongly done is the next best way of complying with an obligation not to do harm wrongly in the first place.  Primary and remedial responsibilities form a unity in which primary responsibilities have priority.  Corrective justice is thus an essential, but subordinate, aspect of tort. The heart of tort law is constituted by primary obligations to avoid committing various wrongs.</p>

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<author>Gregory C. Keating</author>


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<title>Repealing Rights: Proposition 8, Perry, and Crawford Contextualized</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lss/95</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lss/95</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 14 Nov 2012 14:56:04 PST</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>California's Proposition 8 stripped same-sex couples of the right under the California Constitution to "marry" civilly, while leaving in place the right to every other state-controlled legal incident of marriage.   The U.S. District subsequently court held that Prop 8 violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in an opinion whose broad reasoning would invalidate the exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage by any state.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed on narrow grounds specific to California's legal history.  Those defending Prop 8 in this litigation ("the Proponents") have argued that this narrow reasoning is legally erroneous and that Prop 8's constitutionality is affirmatively established by the U.S. Supreme Court's 1982 decision in <em>Crawford v. Los Angeles Board of Education</em>, which said that state laws merely repealing rights not required by the Fourteenth Amendment (here designated "constitutionally optional rights") do not violate that Amendment.  This paper, originally presented at the <em>N.Y.U. Review of Law & Social Change</em> Symposium “Making Constitutional Change: the Past, Present, and Future Role of <em>Perry v. Brown</em>” held October 5, 2012, argues that the Proponents' optional rights argument misreads <em>Crawford</em>, ignoring the context of the broad pronouncements in this "political restructuring" case.  Properly read, <em>Crawford</em>'s blunt statements about the constitutionality of the repeal of constitutionally optional rights are limited to measures, unlike Prop 8, that operate neutrally rather than repealing a right only from a disfavored group (and the fact that state law treated the right to marry as a right to marry the person of one's choice equally available to Californians of all sexual orientations suffices to show that Prop 8 was not an impartial repeal) and that do not entrench themselves by disbarring legislatures from re-extending such optional rights beyond the point established by a repealing state law.</p>

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<author>David B. Cruz</author>


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<title>Political Theology With a Difference</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lss/94</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lss/94</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 25 Sep 2012 14:53:35 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>This paper proposes for consideration a version of political theology that differs from standard accounts of the content of political theology, particularly with regard to political theology's relationship to liberalism. The account of political theology proposed here is "political theology with a difference" both in the sense that it differs from the standard account of political theology (inasmuch as rejects the view that liberalism and political theology are mutually antagonistic) and in the further sense that it is based upon a philosophical doctrine that not only accepts, but valorizes human differences. That doctrine, which stands at the core of the alternative political theology presented here, is the doctrine of accommodation. For centuries, this principle was enshrined in Christian and Jewish theology as the "doctrine of divine accommodation." That theological doctrine derived in turn from the principle of accommodation that was codified in the ancient Aristotelian tradition of classical rhetoric. This article provides an overview of the evolution of the medieval doctrine of divine accommodation, showing how it gave birth to modern secularist thought, in particular secularist political thought. It demonstrates that the secularist political theory that evolved out of the principle of divine accommodation was an emergency theory of politics (hence a political theology, in the narrow sense of the term.) But it shows how the tradition of secularist political theory that derived from the principle of accommodation was also a proto-liberal political theory, out of which modern liberalism originated. On this basis, the paper argues, <em>contra</em> the standard view that political theology and liberalism are mutually antagonistic, that (this) emergency political theology and liberal political theory are actually one and the same thing.</p>

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<author>Nomi M. Stolzenberg</author>


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<title>Stateless Income&apos;s Challenge to Tax Policy, Part 2</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/156</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 20 Sep 2012 09:11:26 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>This report considers the tax policy implications of the phenomenon of stateless income. Stateless income is income that is derived for tax purposes by a multinational group from business activities in a country other than the domicile of the group’s ultimate parent company but that is subject to tax only in a jurisdiction that is neither the source of the production factors through which it was derived nor the domicile of the group’s parent company. Google Inc.’s ‘‘Double Irish Dutch Sandwich’’ structure is one familiar example.</p>
<p>Part 1 of this report, available at Tax Notes, Sept. 5, 2011, p. 1021, Doc 2011-14206, 2011 TNT 172-5, showed that the U.S. tax rules governing income from foreign direct investments often are misapprehended: In practice they do not operate as a worldwide system of taxation, but as an ersatz variant on territorial systems, with hidden benefits and costs when compared with standard territorial regimes. That claim holds whether one analyzes these rules as a cash tax matter or through the lens of financial accounting standards. Part 1 of this report rejected as inconsistent with the data any suggestion that current U.S. law renders U.S. multinational firms less competitive when compared with their territorial-based competitors.</p>
<p>Stateless income privileges multinational corporations over domestic ones by offering the former the prospect of capturing ‘‘tax rents’’ — low-risk inframarginal returns derived by moving income from high-tax foreign countries to low-tax ones. Other important implications of stateless income include reduced coherence in the concept of geographic source; the systematic bias toward offshore rather than domestic investment; the more surprising bias in favor of investment in high-tax foreign countries to provide the feedstock for the generation of low-tax foreign income in other countries; erosion of the U.S. domestic tax base through debt-financed tax arbitrage; many instances of deadweight loss; and, essentially uniquely to the United States, the exacerbation of the lockout phenomenon, under which the price that U.S. corporations pay to enjoy the benefits of dramatically low foreign tax rates is the accumulation of extraordinary amounts of earnings ($1.4 trillion or more, by the most recent estimates) and cash outside the United States.</p>
<p>Part 2 of this report picks up at this point. It is adapted and condensed from Edward D. Kleinbard, ‘‘The Lessons of Stateless Income,’’ 65 Tax L. Rev. 99 (2011).</p>
<p>Part 2 demonstrates that policy conclusions that are useful in a world without stateless income do not follow once its presence is considered. The report identifies and develops the significance of implicit taxation as an underappreciated assumption in the capital ownership neutrality model that has been advanced as an argument for why the United States should adopt a territorial tax system, and it shows how stateless income tax planning undermines this critical assumption.</p>
<p>The report concludes that policymakers face a Hobson’s choice between the highly implausible (a territorial tax system with teeth) and the manifestly imperfect (worldwide tax consolidation). Because the former is so unrealistic, while the latter’s imperfections can be reduced through the choice of tax rate, the report ultimately recommends a worldwide tax consolidation solution.</p>

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<author>Edward D. Kleinbard</author>


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