University of Southern California
University of Southern California Law and Economics Working Paper Series
Corruption and Private Law Enforcement: Theory and History
Abstract
This article analyzes private law enforcement in an environment with corruption. The effect of corruption is studied both under the assumption of monopolistic enforcement by a single private enforcement agency and under the assumption of competitive enforcement by many private enforcers. In addition, the model takes into account the different objectives of a benevolent, social welfare-maximizing group and a self-interested, rent-seeking group, as well as the possibility of a government divided between welfare-maximizing and rent-seeking groups. Among the central results of the paper are (1) corruption is especially problematic under monopolistic enforcement, (2) when governmental decision making is divided, a rent-seeking group which is unable to control the level of fines and rewards usually prefers monopolistic to competitive enforcement. The article demonstrates the plausibility and relevance of the model by examining corruption and private law enforcement in pre-modern England.
Subject Area
Criminal Law and Procedure, Law and Economics, Legal History
Recommended Citation
Nuno Garoupa and Daniel M. Klerman,
"Corruption and Private Law Enforcement: Theory and History"
(June 2009).
University of Southern California.
University of Southern California Law and Economics Working Paper Series.
Working Paper 97.
http://law.bepress.com/usclwps/lewps/art97
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