I find that U.S. IPO prospectus disclosure exhibits significant correlation with first day underpricing, consistent with theories of underpricing as caused by informational asymmetry. In particular, a 1 standard deviation increase in positive prospectus disclosure is associated with almost a third reduction in first day underpricing. More disclosure also has a significant positive relation to measures of informational completeness. Further, I show that the amount of disclosure may derive from litigation risk. Controlling for measures of litigation risk, more disclosure exhibits a significant and positive relation to IPO litigation, while absent controls the relation is negative – suggesting that the amount of disclosure responds to ex ante perceived risk of litigation.
Corporation and Enterprise Law | Economics | Law and Economics | Securities Law
Date of this Version
James C. Spindler, "IPO Underpricing, Disclosure, and Litigation Risk" (April 2009). University of Southern California Law and Economics Working Paper Series. Working Paper 94.