The traditional approach to the topic of fiscal federalism is generally to highlight the limited capacity of State governments to independently raise sufficient revenue to acquit their extensive responsibilities in major service areas including health, education and transport. This is then contrasted with the financial strength of the Commonwealth which it employs to effect policy domination over the hapless States, who, driven by penury, accept offers of ‘financial assistance’ on such terms and conditions as the Commonwealth thinks fit. The effects of this have, as many have illustrated at length, been harmful to accountability and responsible government on one hand and the vitality of the federal division of power on the other.
However, in just the last three years, there have been two important developments in fiscal federalism that present the opportunity for a reappraisal of this all too familiar landscape. The two developments are, of course, the 2009 decision of the High Court in Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation and the 2008 Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial Relations. This paper considers both to offer a contemporary assessment of the state of Australian federalism and intergovernmental relations.
Constitutional Law | Politics | Public Law and Legal Theory | Tax Law
Date of this Version
Andrew Lynch, "Commonwealth Financial Powers – Taxation, Direct spending and Grants – Scope and Limitations" (August 2011). University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series 2011. Working Paper 24.