University of Michigan Legal Working Paper Series
University of Michigan John M. Olin Center for Law & Economics Working Paper Series
The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control and Jurisdictional Competition
Abstract
For the most part, the United States has a decentralized criminal justice system. State legislatures define the majority of crimes and set out the punishments for those crimes. In addition, the enforcement of criminal laws lies, in most cases, in the hands of local law enforcement agencies. This article points out how this decentralized structure drives local jurisdictions to harshen their criminal justice system in order to displace crime to neighboring jurisdictions. More precisely, local jurisdictions can attempt to displace crime in two distinct ways. First, they can raise the expected sanction to a level that is higher than that in neighboring jurisdictions in order to become less attractive crime targets. Second, they can remove from them individuals who demonstrated that they have a high propensity to commit crimes. The article then turns to analyze the policy implications of the existence of jurisdictional competition in the area of criminal justice, and argues that the United States’ criminal justice system might need a comprehensive structure reform that will regulate the competitive market for criminal justice.
Subject Area
Criminal Law and Procedure, Jurisdiction, Law and Economics
Recommended Citation
Doron Teichman,
"The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control and Jurisdictional Competition"
(September 2004).
University of Michigan Legal Working Paper Series.
University of Michigan John M. Olin Center for Law & Economics Working Paper Series.
Working Paper 25.
http://law.bepress.com/umichlwps/olin/art25
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