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<title>University of Illinois Legal Working Paper Series</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2010 University of Illinois College of Law All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps</link>
<description>Recent documents in University of Illinois Legal Working Paper Series</description>
<language>en-us</language>
<lastBuildDate>Wed, 06 Oct 2010 01:30:14 PDT</lastBuildDate>
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<item>
<title>Bankruptcy Reorganizations and the Troubling Legacy of Crysler and GM</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art109</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art109</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 04 Oct 2010 09:08:56 PDT</pubDate>
<description>The Chrysler and General Motors bankruptcy reorganizations represent the culmination of a sea-change in corporate restructuring practice that has occurred largely over the course of just the past decade.  A bankruptcy reorganization has traditionally been effectuated though a chapter 11 plan of reorganization, with elaborate requirements for disclosure, creditor voting, and allocation of stakes in the reorganized debtor entity’s new capital structure among creditors and owners.  Such an internal boot-strap reorganization, though, is on the decline, and many reorganizations are now accomplished through a relatively expeditious going-concern sale of the debtor’s business and assets to a third-party purchaser, with a subsequent distribution of the proceeds to creditors and shareholders in accordance with their relative priority rights.	What Chrysler and GM vividly illustrate is that there actually is no clean, clear distinction between reorganization by “plan” and reorganization by “sale”—through the wonders of sophisticated transaction engineering, each can be the precise functional equivalent of the other.  The acute danger this presents, and that actually came to pass in the GM case, is that a nominal “sale” structure can be used to effectuate a purely internal boot-strap reorganization that distributes the value of the reorganized debtor entity among creditors in a manner that indisputably contravenes their relative priority rights in the debtor’s assets.  Indeed, when examined in the context of an even longer historical perspective on corporate reorganizations, one can readily discern that what came to pass in GM (and that the Second Circuit’s Chrysler opinion fully sanctions) is precisely that which the Supreme Court prohibited in a series of decisions in the late 1800s and early 1900s that formed the basis for chapter 11’s codification of creditors’ priority rights in corporate reorganizations.	Contrary to the received wisdom regarding the implications of Chrysler and GM, their combined effect foretells the literal death of the fundamental distributive principles that are the essence of bankruptcy law and that have been the bedrock of bankruptcy reorganizations for at least a century.  Moreover, no one (and particularly not the judges presiding over those cases) seems to appreciate that fact!  Amazingly, we find ourselves in the midst of a sub silentio destruction of the very core of bankruptcy reorganization law.</description>

<author>Ralph E. Brubaker</author>


<category>Law and Economics</category>

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<item>
<title>Bail-ins:  Cyclical Effects of a Common Response to Financial Crises</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art108</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art108</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 06 Aug 2010 09:37:56 PDT</pubDate>
<description>In the wake of financial crises, public authorities often respond by using law to modify private contracts to transfer value from those who fare better in the crisis to those who fare worse. From the perspective of the crisis victim, this is a bailout. Because this article focuses on the perspective of the other party to the contract (specifically, on the incentives this response creates to that party), this article will refer to such responses as “bail-ins”. Recent examples include staying foreclosures, authorizing bankruptcy courts to modify mortgage terms, or threatening criminal prosecution to induce banks to undo transactions made with their clients.Bail-ins have greater political appeal than other forms of redistributive government action (e.g., increased government spending and taxation). Bail-ins are expected to reduce future investment, as investors fear similar actions in future crises. But how harmful is that? Market-skeptics question that the market correctly determines the optimal amount of investment, and are thus untroubled by government’s manipulation of it. And to appease those who do trust market allocation of investment, government can offset the investment reduction by subsidizing investment (e.g., making mortgage interest tax-deductable to encourage lending and offset the effects of staying foreclosures or of court-modified mortgage terms).This essay argues that bail-ins are significantly harmful from both market-trusting and market-skeptic perspectives. Rather than a permanent reduction in future investment, bail-ins reduce investment cyclically – significantly when the bail-in is imposed, but declining gradually as cognitive biases cause managers to underestimate the risk of future contract modifications and agency costs incentivize the managers to increase investment regardless of future bail-in risk.Cyclical fluctuation in investment deterrence may seem less harmful than permanent deterrence, but the opposite is true.  As this essay explains, cyclical fluctuation of investment makes bail-ins harmful from the perspectives of both market-skeptics and market-trusters, and exacerbates the magnitude of future business cycles.</description>

<author>Amitai Aviram</author>


<category>Banking and Finance</category>

<category>Contracts</category>

<category>Corporations</category>

<category>Economics</category>

<category>Law and Economics</category>

<category>Legislation</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>Interviewing the Domestic Violence Victim:  Incorporating Interdisciplinary Lawyering Skills inito the 1L Curriculum</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art107</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art107</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 06 Aug 2010 09:33:05 PDT</pubDate>
<description>Many legal problems require attorneys to navigate issues crossing between law and economics, law and psychology, or law and social work.  These intersections represent classic problems presented to lawyers in their “real world” practice with multi-dimensional clients.  However, in the 2008 Law School Survey of Student Engagement, 45% of the students surveyed recognized this challenge and maintained “that their legal education does not contribute substantially to their ability to apply legal writing skills in real-world situations.”[1]  By including an exercise requiring students to conduct an interview with a domestic violence victim in the 1L curriculum, professors can address this pressing concern by encouraging students to navigate issues ranging from the psychological and physical needs of their client to the client’s safety and monetary concerns.Although interviewing a witness at first glance does not seem to fit within the traditional legal research and writing pedagogy, the open memorandum problem lends itself to permitting students to gather facts using “client” interviews.   Additionally, by fostering the development of practical lawyering skills in addition to oral advocacy and legal research and writing, legal writing professors provide students with an essential tool every lawyer needs to successfully represent a client[2] and assists upper level clinical professors by laying the groundwork for clinical courses.[3]  Thus, incorporating the domestic violence client interview into the legal writing curriculum prepares students for real world practice and multi-faceted client problems; incorporates interdisciplinary skills into law school training; and trains students for upper level clinical work.</description>

<author>Sara Benson</author>


<category>Law and Society</category>

<category>Legal Education</category>

<category>Legal Profession</category>

<category>Women</category>

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<title>The Inequality of Sacrifice--Reducing Moral Hazard for Bailed-Out Homeowners:  The Case for Compulsory Community Service</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art106</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art106</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 28 Aug 2009 15:42:22 PDT</pubDate>
<description>Should homeowners be required to perform community service in order to receive federal aid that reduces their mortgage debt? The U.S. requires sacrifices from bailed-out banks and auto firms; and at the other end of the wealth spectrum, welfare laws require public aid recipients to work or perform community service. But 9 million middle class homeowners— a term used by the Treasury Department— who took out risky mortgages are targeted to receive a free subsidy. To stem foreclosures, one Treasury Department program gives low interest rate loans, while another forgives debt. These programs require nothing in return from recipients.The mortgage crisis was fueled by unconventional loans that promoted moral hazard— for example, teaser rates that temporarily insulated borrowers from bad credit decisions. Now, U.S. debt relief programs add a new moral hazard, according to a recent GAO report: they encourage more borrowers to fall behind on mortgage payments to qualify for a bailout.My study asks whether the U.S. can require homeowners to perform community service as a condition for debt relief. I propose 200 hours of service in programs such as Habitat for Humanity. This idea is based on my analysis of five groups of citizens who were ordered by government to perform a public service. The first group is men who labored on road duty. Tracing to the early 1800s, these state and local laws required citizens to build roads several days each year without pay. Lawyers were ordered in the 1800s to represent indigent defendants without pay. In the 1940s, the draft law allowed conscientious objectors to avoid combat by accepting mandatory assignment to jobs in charitable organizations. In the 1970s, welfare recipients were required to work on community projects if they could not find a job. The National Health Service Corps required new physicians who received tuition grants to serve the poor.My study of 441 court rulings from 1807 to 2002 focuses on recalcitrant individuals who challenged these compulsory service policies. In 83% of the cases, state and federal trial courts upheld government imposed work. In 100% of their rulings, the U.S. Constitution did not prohibit government imposed obligations. However, 37.5% of trial courts ruled in favor of individuals who raised state constitutional claims. In appellate cases, only 8% of courts ruled that a work or service obligation violated a right in the U.S. Constitution. In narrow rulings, individuals won 48% of cases before appellate courts when their challenge was based on state statutes. The results suggest that courts would not interfere with a federal policy that requires community service in return for mortgage relief. My research also shows that compulsory service requires a compelling and overarching purpose— plus an egalitarian ethos that justifies its imposition. The mortgage relief programs satisfy these pre-conditions. In an age when the poor and powerful are required to make sacrifices, mortgage bailouts to the middle class perpetuate the spendthrift mentality that dug the nation’s deep financial hole. There is wisdom in assisting millions of strapped debtors, but why is no thought given to a policy of requiring bailed-out homeowners to pay back part of their debt relief by serving their communities? If millions of homeowners who face foreclosure performed community service, moral hazard would be reduced by making them more responsible for their credit behavior, while other homeowners would be discouraged from intentionally falling behind on their loans.</description>

<author>Michael Leroy</author>


<category>Bankruptcy Law</category>

<category>Civil Rights</category>

<category>Constitutional Law</category>

<category>Employment Practice</category>

<category>Housing Law</category>

<category>Judges</category>

<category>Labor Law</category>

<category>Law and Economics</category>

<category>Legislation</category>

<category>Politics</category>

<category>Social Welfare</category>

</item>






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<title>The Windfall Myth</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art105</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art105</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 14 Aug 2009 15:59:25 PDT</pubDate>
<description>Currently, decrying others’ profits as windfalls is popular among journalists, policy makers, law makers, industry participants, and the public at large.  Once an economic gain is spotted that seems suspiciously large or too easily earned, then like the “pod people” in Invasion of the Body Snatchers, the observer must point and alert the public that this “windfall” gain deviates from an acceptable baseline.  If laws are not in place to prevent this gain, then regulators should step in and correct this loophole by promulgating new laws tailored to the situation that produced the unlawful windfall.  The law may prohibit the transaction altogether, constrain the terms of any future transaction, or tax the windfall gain so as to deprive the windfall recipient of all or part of the benefit and redistribute the benefit to the larger public.  Currently, legislation has been introduced both to create a “Wall Street Windfall Profits Tax” to limit or create negative tax implications for executive compensation and to revive a windfall profits tax on crude oil, natural gas, and other products of the energy industry.  This Article argues that this type of legislation finds its impetus not in sound economics, but in more base feelings of outrage, indignation and envy.  This Article employs both a theoretical framework to create a taxonomy of windfalls and an empirical study of the use of the word “windfall” in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, state law cases and congressional history to analyze the rhetorical power of the term in popular and legal discourse.  Though the term “windfall” originally referred to fruits literally falling off trees due to the vagaries of the wind and no action on the part of the recipient, the term windfall is currently commonly used to refer to marketplace gains between freely negotiating parties.  In addition, courts sparingly use the term “windfall” to refer to double recoveries and recoveries where no underlying loss has occurred.  In popular discourse, however, speakers employ the term to convey a sense that a marketplace gain of another is undeserved somehow.  This overuse of the term “windfall” reflects a misunderstanding not only of what a windfall is, but also a misunderstanding of the appropriateness of law to rewrite existing bargains and to limit private parties’ abilities to freely bargain without other considerations.  Any defensible argument that redistributing luck by redistributing windfalls falls apart once the so-called windfall gains are the product of industry, innovation, ambition and bargaining.  This Article argues against the temptation to label private gains as windfalls that are subject to recapture.</description>

<author>Christine Hurt</author>


<category>Contracts</category>

<category>Corporations</category>

<category>Law and Economics</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>The Inequality of Sacrifice -- Reducing Moral Hazard For Bailed-Out Homeowners:  The Case For Compulsory Community Service</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art104</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art104</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2009 13:49:17 PDT</pubDate>
<description>Should homeowners be required to perform community service in order to receive federal aid that reduces their mortgage debt? The U.S. requires sacrifices from bailed-out banks and auto firms; and at the other end of the wealth spectrum, welfare laws require public aid recipients to work or perform community service. But 9 million middle class homeowners— a term used by the Treasury Department— who took out risky mortgages are targeted to receive a free subsidy. To stem foreclosures, one Treasury Department program gives low interest rate loans, while another forgives debt. These programs require nothing in return from recipients.The mortgage crisis was fueled by unconventional loans that promoted moral hazard— for example, teaser rates that temporarily insulated borrowers from bad credit decisions. Now, U.S. debt relief programs add a new moral hazard, according to a recent GAO report: they encourage more borrowers to fall behind on mortgage payments to qualify for a bailout.My study asks whether the U.S. can require homeowners to perform community service as a condition for debt relief. I propose 200 hours of service in programs such as Habitat for Humanity. This idea is based on my analysis of five groups of citizens who were ordered by government to perform a public service. The first group is men who labored on road duty. Tracing to the early 1800s, these state and local laws required citizens to build roads several days each year without pay. Lawyers were ordered in the 1800s to represent indigent defendants without pay. In the 1940s, the draft law allowed conscientious objectors to avoid combat by accepting mandatory assignment to jobs in charitable organizations. In the 1970s, welfare recipients were required to work on community projects if they could not find a job. The National Health Service Corps required new physicians who received tuition grants to serve the poor.My study of 441 court rulings from 1807 to 2002 focuses on recalcitrant individuals who challenged these compulsory service policies. In 83% of the cases, state and federal trial courts upheld government imposed work. In 100% of their rulings, the U.S. Constitution did not prohibit government imposed obligations. However, 37.5% of trial courts ruled in favor of individuals who raised state constitutional claims. In appellate cases, only 8% of courts ruled that a work or service obligation violated a right in the U.S. Constitution. In narrow rulings, individuals won 48% of cases before appellate courts when their challenge was based on state statutes. The results suggest that courts would not interfere with a federal policy that requires community service in return for mortgage relief. My research also shows that compulsory service requires a compelling and overarching purpose— plus an egalitarian ethos that justifies its imposition. The mortgage relief programs satisfy these pre-conditions. In an age when the poor and powerful are required to make sacrifices, mortgage bailouts to the middle class perpetuate the spendthrift mentality that dug the nation’s deep financial hole. There is wisdom in assisting millions of strapped debtors, but why is no thought given to a policy of requiring bailed-out homeowners to pay back part of their debt relief by serving their communities? If millions of homeowners who face foreclosure performed community service, moral hazard would be reduced by making them more responsible for their credit behavior, while other homeowners would be discouraged from intentionally falling behind on their loans.</description>

<author>Michael Leroy</author>


<category>Biography</category>

<category>Law and Economics</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art103</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art103</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 24 Nov 2008 08:36:06 PST</pubDate>
<description>Just three years ago, Congress enacted controversial amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. The proponents claimed that the changes would drive the &quot;can pay&quot; debtors (of which there were supposedly many) from the bankruptcy courts with tough new income-based eligibility requirements. And indeed, after the enactment of the amendments, the number of people filing for bankruptcy plunged. In this Article - the initial report of the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project - the authors analyze the first national, random sample of post-amendments bankruptcy filers. Contrary to the advocates' claim that high-income filers would be driven from the system and, by implication, that those remaining would have more modest incomes, the data show no change in the income levels of bankruptcy filers after the amendments. These findings thus cast doubt on the suggestion that those purged from the bankruptcy courts - approximately 800,000 in 2007 alone based on trend extrapolation - were high-income deadbeats; they instead appear to have been ordinary American families in serious financial distress. The data also show that debtors filing for bankruptcy in 2007 have even greater debt loads than their counterparts from 2001, a development that seems to track a national trend of increasing consumer debt. The findings thus align with at least two predictions of some legal scholars. The first is that the bankruptcy reform bill was not aimed at high-income abusers but was instead a general assault on all debtors, regardless of their financial circumstances. The second is that debtors are waiting longer - and incurring more debt - before ultimately seeking bankruptcy relief, consistent with the so-called &quot;sweat box&quot; theory of credit card lending.</description>

<author>Robert M. Lawless</author>


<category>Bankruptcy Law</category>

<category>Law and Economics</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>A Guide to Starting Social Security Benefits</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art102</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art102</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 21 Nov 2008 13:50:51 PST</pubDate>
<description>When a person should begin taking Social Security retirement benefits is a critical question for planning one’s retirement. This article explains the various factors at play in determining the optimum starting point, including: longevity considerations; spousal implications, whether for a previously employed or a previously unemployed spouse; the impact of post-retirement employment; the availability of health insurance prior to Medicare eligibility for the worker and the worker’s spouse; alternative sources of retirement income, including distributions from retirement savings plan assets and lifetime liquidation of nonretirement assets (and the pertinent income tax ramifications); and anticipated investment strategies.</description>

<author>Richard L. Kaplan</author>


<category>Law and Economics</category>

</item>






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<title>Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists:  Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art101</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art101</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 21 Nov 2008 13:32:00 PST</pubDate>
<description>To be effective in working with clients, witnesses, judges, mediators, arbitrators, experts,jurors, and other lawyers, attorneys must have a good understanding of how people think and make decisions, and must possess good people skills. Yet, law schools have tended to teach very little, directly, about human behavior, and current critiques of legal education do not focus on the importance of psychological insights to attorneys. In particular, lawyers and legal education have not taken full advantage of the great strides that have been made in the field of scientific psychology in recent decades. Similarly, psychologists are not doing as much as they might to apply their discipline to all aspects of law. Law and psychology texts and courses often focus primarily on criminal rather than civil law and practice, and place their emphasis on the psychology of juries, eyewitness testimony, interrogation, and trials. This Article begins to fill some of the gaps that exist in the application of psychology to legal practice, focusing on psychological insights that are important to the endeavor of interviewing and providing initial counseling to clients in civil cases. Law students commonly graduate from law school understanding little if anything about perception, memory, communication, cognitive heuristics, or decision-making. While good lawyers ultimately pick up some of this information through experience, there is no reason to leave new lawyers to flounder based on a lack of understanding of these psychological principles. Further, even experienced lawyers can benefit from more explicit study of psychology. While the best lawyers may have intuited some of what will be discussed here, some of the findings are counterintuitive, and even experienced lawyers can improve their approach to interviewing and counseling by drawing on relevant psychology.</description>

<author>Jennifer Robbennolt</author>


<category>Law and Economics</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>A Single-License Approach to Regulating Insurance</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art100</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art100</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 21 Nov 2008 08:47:56 PST</pubDate>
<description>State regulation of insurance companies has been criticized for many years because of the burden imposed on insurers by having to comply with the laws of many jurisdictions. These higher costs are passed on to consumers. The problems with the current regulatory structure are prompting calls for increased federal regulation of insurance. However, all proposals to federalize insurance regulation create opportunities for abuse at the hands of the federal government and fail to utilize the benefits of a federal system. This article shows how many of the problems of the current system can be addressed without resorting to a large scale intrusion of federal regulators into insurance markets. The proposed solution calls for minimal federal intervention to provide for jurisdictional competition between states that would be allowed to charter insurers that could operate nationally with only the single license granted by the charter.  This single-license approach addresses the most salient concerns of proponents of federal optional chartering. It also has the potential for triggering competition and innovation in insurance products and rates while preserving a meaningful role for state regulation.</description>

<author>Henry N. Butler</author>


<category>Law and Economics</category>

</item>






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<title>Uncorporating the Large Firm</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art99</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art99</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 21 Nov 2008 07:51:36 PST</pubDate>
<description>This article examines private equity firms as an example of partnership-type, or “uncorporate,” structures in the governance of large firms. Other examples include publicly traded partnerships, real estate investment trusts, hedge funds and venture capital funds. These firms can be seen as an alternative to the corporate form in dealing with the central problem of aligning managers’ and owners’ interests. In the standard corporate form, shareholders monitor powerful managers by voting on directors and corporate transactions, suing for breach of fiduciary duty and selling control. These mechanisms deal with managerial agency costs by relying on other agents, including auditors, class action lawyers, judges, independent directors and shareholder intermediaries such as mutual and pension funds. Uncorporations substitute other devices for corporate-type monitoring, including more closely tying managers’ economic well-being to the firm’s fortunes and greater assurance of distributions to owners. Continued concerns with managerial agency costs, the inadequacy of regulatory responses such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, changing costs and benefits of public ownership, leverage and capital lock-in all contribute to the rise of uncorporate structures in large firms. Political considerations may, however, constrain these developments.</description>

<author>Larry E. Ribstein</author>


<category>Law and Economics</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>Pondering the Politics of Private Procedures:  The Case of ICANN</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art98</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art98</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 20 Nov 2008 14:02:58 PST</pubDate>
<description>The creation of ICANN was sought by the United States government to promote international cooperation in the governance of the Internet based on a bottom-up system in which government intervention was limited, if not eliminated. However, as the Internet has become a global phenomenon, this initiative has faced increasing opposition from the international community. As we have shown in this article, the evolution of ICANN reveals how it slowly departed from its mere technical role into a more political one, in which all groups and constituencies try to impose their preferences. During the reform movement initiated from inside ICANN, different constituencies tried to exploit the situation by gaining power positions in the new structure. The political strength of different groups and constituencies reversed some of the initial reforms and produced a totally new structure. Reform attempts from inside ICANN were challenged by the international community. These efforts concentrated on changing the main structure of ICANN into a multilateral organization controlled by international governments and removing the direct control of ICANN from the United States government. In the end, even though the proposals seem to look for different structures to regulate domain names and numbers on the Internet, they represent a political struggle between opposite points of view.</description>

<author>Andres A. Gallo</author>


<category>Law and Economics</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>Lost in Translation:  Interoperability Issues for Open Standards -- ODF and OOXML as Examples</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art97</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art97</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 20 Nov 2008 13:48:14 PST</pubDate>
<description>Open standards are widely considered to have significant economic and technological benefits. This has led many governments to consider mandating open standards for document
formats. Document formats are how a computer stores memos or spreadsheets. Governments are moving away from Microsoft’s proprietary DOC format to open standard document formats,
such as the OpenDocument Format (ODF) and Office Open XML (OOXML). The belief is that by shifting to open standards, governments will benefit from choice, competition, and the ability to seamlessly substitute different vendor implementations.This paper suggests that governments seeking the benefits of open standards need to consider the role of interoperability. Without multiple interoperable implementations, i.e.,
“running code”, users will not gain the advantages of competition and substitutability. To highlight the issues around interoperability, we examined the interoperability issues around ODF and OOXML.This research assesses interoperability among different software implementations of each document formats. For example, the implementations for ODF included KOffice, Wordperfect,
TextEdit, Microsoft Office, and Google Docs. A set of test documents was used to evaluate the performance of other alternative implementations.Our analyses show that there are significant issues with interoperability among various implementations. Users face numerous issues when transferring files between different
implementations. While the best implementations may result in formatting problems, the worst implementations actually lose information, e.g., information found in pictures, footnotes,
comments, tracking changes, and tables. Our findings include specific scores for each implementation. There was considerable variation among how well each implementation performed. For ODF, the compatibility scores ranged from a raw score of 151 (100%--weighted percent) to 48 (55%--weighted percent).We consider several implications of these results including the lack of perfect compatibility between implementations, the lack of good implementations outside of Windows, and the surprisingly good overall performance of OOXML implementations. The
interoperability issues are troubling and suggest the need for improved interoperability testing for document formats. The results also highlight the importance of interoperability for open standards in general. Without interoperability, governments will be locked-in to the dominant implementations for either standard and in the process lose many of the benefits that might
accrue from adopting an open standard in the first instance.</description>

<author>Rajiv Shah</author>


<category>Law and Economics</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>The Comparative Law and Economics of Judicial Councils</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art96</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art96</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 20 Nov 2008 12:53:46 PST</pubDate>
<description>In recent decades, many countries around the world have institutionalized judicial councils, institutions designed to enhance judicial independence and accountability. Our paper, the first comparative inquiry into this phenomenon, has two aims. First, we provide an economic theory of the formation of judicial councils and identify some of the dimensions along which they differ. Second, we discuss the national experience of several legal systems in light of our theory.</description>

<author>Nuno Garoupa</author>


<category>Law and Economics</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>Judicial Independence and Party Politics in the Kelsenian Constitutional Courts:  The Case of Portugal</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art95</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art95</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 20 Nov 2008 12:29:19 PST</pubDate>
<description>In this paper we test to what extent the Kelsenian-type of constitutional judges are independent from political parties by studying of the Portuguese Constitutional Court.  The results yield three main conclusions.  First, constitutional judges in Portugal are quite sensitive to their political affiliations and their political party's presence in government when voting.  Second, peer pressure is very relevant.  Third, the 1997 reform that was enacted to increase judicial independence has had no robust statistically significant effect.</description>

<author>Sofia AmaralGarcia</author>


<category>Law and Economics</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>Happiness and Punishment</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art94</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art94</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 26 Aug 2008 13:47:32 PDT</pubDate>
<description>This article continues our project to apply groundbreaking new literature on the behavioral psychology of human happiness to some of the most deeply analyzed questions in law.  Here we explain that the new psychological understandings of happiness interact in startling ways with the leading theories of criminal punishment.  Punishment theorists, both retributivist and utilitarian, have failed to account for human beings' ability to adapt to changed circumstances, including fines and (surprisingly) imprisonment.  At the same time, these theorists have largely ignored the severe hedonic losses brought about by the post-prison social and economic deprivations (unemployment, divorce, and disease) caused by even short periods of incarceration.  These twin phenomena significantly disrupt efforts to attain proportionality between crime and punishment and to achieve effective marginal deterrence.  Hedonic psychology thus threatens to upend conventional conceptions of punishment and requires retributivists and utilitarians to find novel methods of calibrating traditional punitive sanctions if they are to maintain the foundations upon which punishment theory rests.</description>

<author>Jonathan S. Masur</author>


<category>Law and Economics</category>

<category>Law Enforcement and Corrections</category>

<category>Psychology and Psychiatry</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>Borders &amp; The Environment</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art92</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art92</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 18 Aug 2008 13:22:09 PDT</pubDate>
<description>Despite regular acknowledgement of the interconnectedness of global ecosystems, government policies at the national level focuses on environmental problems within their borders. As a result, the level of public and private resources expended on environmental protection in rich and poor countries is dramatically different on both a per capita and an absolute basis. While this outcome is readily explained by the politics of environmental issues, in which voters reward governments for domestic expenditures but are skeptical of expenditures outside the jurisdiction, these differences mean that the total amount of environmental quality purchased across nations is lower than it could be. It means that some nations are purchasing small, expensive increments in environmental quality while large, low-cost increments in other jurisdictions are not purchased. By applying the principles of marginal analysis from economics, this article demonstrates that this produces both less total environmental quality and treats residents of rich and poor countries different in a morally unacceptable way. The authors propose that governments provide more transparent cost and benefit information to allow public discussion of such differential treatment and to encourage environmental gains from wherever most efficiently achievable</description>

<author>Andrew P. Morriss</author>


<category>Environmental Law</category>

<category>International Law</category>

<category>Law and Economics</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>Spiritualism and Will(s) in the Age of Contract</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art91</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art91</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 18 Aug 2008 12:56:06 PDT</pubDate>
<description>Spiritualism was one of the most salient cultural phenomena of late-nineteenth-century American life.  The belief of considerable numbers of respectable citizens that they could communicate with the dead via an entranced medium called into question both popular and scientific conceptions of rationality, volition, and freedom.  In turn, these changing ideas about the mind challenged American law’s commitment to its belief in free and reasonable legal actors.  This Article, the first to consider Spiritualism’s implications for American law, examines the legal reaction to the anxieties Spiritualism generated for the Age of Contract.  Principally, it looks at the judicial response to cases of Spiritualists’ wills that were challenged on the grounds of insanity and undue influence.  In these cases, concerns about the mind forced their way through the curtain of formalist objectivity at the heart of contractarian jurisprudence.  In dealing with such concerns, I argue, American judges adopted a realist, pragmatic strategy of promoting polyphonic discussion, protecting individual belief, and preserving democratic decision-making.  Approaching the subject from the perspective of cultural legal history, I suggest that popular culture, science, and the law were mutually constitutive discourses in which nineteenth-century Americans enacted their anxieties about the mind, the will, and the family.  Finally, I propose that a contextualized understanding of these nineteenth-century debates can suggest much about current legal concerns regarding behavioral psychology and cognitive neuroscience.</description>

<author>Christopher Buccafusco</author>


<category>Contracts</category>

<category>Jurisprudence</category>

<category>Law and Society</category>

<category>Legal History</category>

<category>Medical Jurisprudence</category>

<category>Psychology and Psychiatry</category>

<category>Science and Technology</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>The Uncorporation and Corporate Indeterminacy</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art90</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art90</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 03 Jun 2008 07:29:51 PDT</pubDate>
<description>William Carney and George Shepherd argue that Delaware's success in corporate law is a &quot;mystery&quot; when one considers the high transaction costs engendered by the indeterminacy and instability of Delaware law.  This paper shows that the mystery is clarified by analyzing Delaware law on &quot;uncorporate&quot; cases – that is, limited partnerships and limited liability companies.  In this setting, parties can rely on specific contractual incentive and disciplinary devices rather than on open-ended fiduciary duties. Delaware lawmakers provide substantial coherence by focusing on the parties' contracts.  It follows that the problems of Delaware law seem to be mainly a function of the corporation rather than of Delaware lawmakers.</description>

<author>Larry E. Ribstein</author>


<category>Law and Economics</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>Top Ten Myths of Social Security</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art89</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art89</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 02 Jun 2008 08:48:16 PDT</pubDate>
<description>Few federal programs are as well known and as widely misunderstood as Social Security, despite its national rominence in matters both political and economic. As efforts to reform this creation of the Great Depression era are likely in the coming years,this article examines the principal myths surrounding this program to set the stage for evaluating possible revisions. The myths considered in this article include the following:  (1) there is a trust fund, (2) Social Security does not increase the federal budget deficit; (3) retirees are only recovering their own money, (4) Social Security will not be there when one retires, (5) retirement benefits are proportional to one’s lifetime earnings, (6)Social Security favors two-income married couples, (7) Social Security favors long-lived marriages, (8) one could do better investing directly, (9) working after retirement makes financial sense, and (10) retirement benefits are taxed more heavily than other pension payments.</description>

<author>Richard L. Kaplan</author>


<category>Law and Economics</category>

</item>





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