These problems will not be solved by glib references to market ideology that claims markets alone adequately regulate corporate behavior. Nor will these problems be solved by assuming that a few bad apples were responsible. Indeed, only by examining the environmental context in which decision making occurs will corporate ethics in the health care marketplace be furthered.

This article is a brief overview of the importance of an organization’s structure, policies and practices in the establishment of an ethical climate. An organization’s climate affects whether individual employees, as well as the leaders of the organization, make ethical or unethical decisions. Part II of this article begins by defining ethical climates and describes how they are ascertained. Part III discusses two contextual factors in more detail: workplace leadership and reward structures. Finally, this article concludes with some basic recommendations for motivating organizations to work toward creating ethical climates.

The Article begins in Part I, Introduction, with two observations. First, the function of procedure is to particularize general substantive norms so that they can guide action. Second, the hard problem of procedural justice corresponds to the following question: How can we regard ourselves as obligated by legitimate authority to comply with a judgment that we believe (or even know) to be in error with respect to the substantive merits?

The theory of procedural justice is developed in several stages, beginning with some preliminary questions and problems. The first question - what is procedure? - is the most difficult and requires an extensive answer: Part II, Substance and Procedure, defines the subject of the inquiry by offering a new theory of the distinction between substance and procedure that acknowledges the entanglement of the action-guiding roles of substantive and procedural rules while preserving the distinction between two ideal types of rules. The key to the development of this account of the nature of procedure is a thought experiment, in which we imagine a world with the maximum possible acoustic separation between substance and procedure.

Part III, The Foundations of Procedural Justice, lays out the premises of general jurisprudence that ground the theory and answers a series of objections to the notion that the search for a theory of procedural justice is a worthwhile enterprise. Sections II and III set the stage for the more difficult work of constructing a theory of procedural legitimacy.

Part IV, Views of Procedural Justice, investigates the theories of procedural fairness found explicitly or implicitly in case law and commentary. After a preliminary inquiry that distinguishes procedural justice from other forms of justice, Part IV focuses on three models or theories. The first, the accuracy model, assumes that the aim of civil dispute resolution is correct application of the law to the facts. The second, the balancing model, assumes that the aim of civil procedure is to strike a fair balance between the costs and benefits of adjudication. The third, the participation model, assumes that the very idea of a correct outcome must be understood as a function of process that guarantees fair and equal participation. Part IV demonstrates that none of these models provides the basis for a fully adequate theory of procedural justice.

In Part V, The Value of Participation, the lessons learned from analysis and critique of the three models are then applied to the question whether a right of participation can be justified for reasons that are not reducible to either its effect on the accuracy or its effect on the cost of adjudication. The most important result of Part V is the Participatory Legitimacy Thesis: it is (usually) a condition for the fairness of a procedure that those who are to be finally bound shall have a reasonable opportunity to participate in the proceedings.

The central normative thrust of Procedural Justice is developed in Part VI, Principles of Procedural Justice. The first principle, the Participation Principle, stipulates a minimum (and minimal) right of participation, in the form of notice and an opportunity to be heard, that must be satisfied (if feasible) in order for a procedure to be considered fair. The second principle, the Accuracy Principle, specifies the achievement of legally correct outcomes as the criterion for measuring procedural fairness, subject to four provisos, each of which sets out circumstances under which a departure from the goal of accuracy is justified by procedural fairness itself.

In Part VII, The Problem of Aggregation, the Participation Principle and the Accuracy Principle are applied to the central problem of contemporary civil procedure - the aggregation of claims in mass litigation. Part VIII offers some concluding observations about the point and significance of Procedural Justice.

A few scholars, however, have found reason to pause in their celebration of the initiative, finding shortcomings in its process, its outcomes, or both. In this paper we argue that initiatives will only infrequently improve the public’s welfare. We begin with a survey of the basic social choice and public choice critiques of the initiative process. We argue that, despite recent rigorous scholarly attention as to the effects of initiatives, we find little reason yet to reject the social and public choice criticisms of policy making via direct democracy. We then offer a series of anecdotes about the rise of crypto-initiatives, which are initiatives that use direct democracy as an instrument to achieve non-policy related goals. Finally, we conclude that the problems inherent in the initiative process are being magnified by the increase in crypto-initiatives and the rise of the crypto-political machines, the new 527 PACs, that sponsor them. Increasingly, the public welfare may be only an incidental consideration in the sponsorship, passage and implementation of initiatives. This in turns implies that we consider anew limiting or amending the initiative process.

This article has three parts. First, I introduce some basic concepts of network science, including such important ideas as nodes, links, random graphs, evolving networks, scale-free networks, small worlds, the rich get richer dynamic, node fitness, and clusters. Oddly enough, the mathematical tools that have proven most useful for studying networks (or at least scale-free networks) come from statistical mechanics, a branch of physics. Having introduced network theory in Part I, and having presented evidence that American case law is a scale-free network in Part II, I argue for the significance of this discovery in Part III. I hope that by the time they reach Part III, readers will already be realizing the potential richness of applying network theory to legal systems. In Part III, I describe some insights that appear from this application and suggest areas for future research.

The most famous hypothesis about the structure of law is that it is a seamless web. This old phrase, however, is just a metaphor we have used to grope for a reality we have not been in a position to express more precisely. Network science changes that. The Web of Law can be considered as a mathematical object whose topology can be analyzed using the tools pioneered by physicists and others who wanted to explore the structure of the Web and other real networks. The Web of Law has a structure very similar to that of other real networks, such as the Web and the network of scientific papers. The Web of Law is in substantial part a scale-free network, organized with hub cases that have many citations and the vast majority of cases, which have very few. The distribution of citation frequency approximates a power-law distribution, as is common with real scale-free networks, with truncations at either extreme of its distribution, which is also common.

Many promising hypotheses can be generated by considering the law as a scale-free network. State and federal systems can be examined empirically to measure how well integrated each is with itself, and with each other, and how this is changing over time. Legal authorities can be measured to determine whether their authority is emerging or declining. Institutional bodies, such as courts, can be examined in the same way. Clusters of cases, which will reveal the semantic topology of law, can be mapped to determine whether traditional legal categories are accurate or require reform. These methods can be used to develop computer programs to improve the efficiency of searching electronic legal databases. The topology of American law can be compared to that of other legal systems to determine whether legal systems share universal architectural features, and in what respects different systems are unique. Changing dynamics of the citation frequency and the fitness of particular cases can be studied over historical periods to test historiographical hypotheses. So, for example, Farber's hypothesis that changes in constitutional interpretation occur suddenly, and many others, may be tested rigorously. The dynamics of authority in law generally can be studied much more rigorously. The mere fact that law is a scale free, not a random network, suggests a high degree of intellectual coherence, contrary to what some critics have suggested. The shape of the degree distribution graph of the Web of Law, in its similarity to the scientific citation network, also suggests that cases age, in the sense of losing the ability to attract citations, over time, just as scientific papers do. Yet Supreme Court cases seem to age more slowly. How nodes age profoundly affects overall network structure and therefore affects the shape of the Web of Law. Network theory hints at complex, but analyzable, interactions between the legal doctrines of precedent, and the systems of common law and multiple sovereignties.

Because law grows and because it has doctrines of authority, it creates a network of a certain shape, which spontaneously organizes itself. This is the product of laws that govern networks of computers as inexorably as they govern networks of cases, laws arising from the underlying mathematics of networks. Legal databases, which are huge, precisely documented, and readily accessible, present a perfect opportunity for the application of network science. This research would produce new knowledge of general jurisprudence that has simply been impossible until now, when we have the necessary advances in network science, the fast computers, and the existence of a complete record of the legal network in electronic form, waiting to be explored.

Both proposals mark a shift in the scholarship addressing the problem of gatekeeper liability. Until recently, scholarship on gatekeepers had focused on reputation – not regulation or civil liability – as the key limitation on gatekeeper behavior. Indeed, many scholars have argued that liability should not be imposed on gatekeepers in various contexts, and that reputation-related incentives alone would lead gatekeepers to screen against fraudulent transactions and improper disclosure in an optimal way, even in the absence of liability. From a theoretical perspective, this article is an attempt to move the literature away from a focus on reputation to an assessment of a potential reinsurance market for securities risks, where gatekeepers would behave more like insurers than reputational intermediaries.

The Root Server System and associated name space are scarce resources in the economic sense. The root servers have a finite capacity and expansion of the system is costly. The name space is scarce, because each string (or set of characters) can only be allocated to one Registry (or operator of a Top Level Domain). In addition, name service is not a public good in the economic sense, because it is possible to exclude strings from the DNS and because the allocation of a string to one firm results in the inability of other firms to use that name string. From the economic perspective, therefore, the question arises: what is the most efficient method for allocating the root resource?

There are only five basic options available for allocation of the root. (1) a static root, equivalent to a decision to waste the currently unallocated capacity; (2) public interest hearings (or beauty contests); (3) lotteries; (4) a queuing mechanism; or (5) an auction. The fundamental economic question about the Domain Name System is which of these provides the most efficient mechanism for allocating the root resource?

This resource allocation problem is analogous to problems raised in the telecommunications sector, where the Federal Communications Commission has a long history of attempting to allocate broadcast spectrum and the telephone number space. This experience reveals that a case-by-case allocation on the basis of ad hoc judgments about the public interest is doomed to failure, and that auctions (as opposed to lotteries or queues) provide the best mechanism for insuring that such public-trust resources find their highest and best use.

Based on the telecommunications experience, the best method for ICANN to allocate new Top Level Domains would be to conduct an auction. Many auction designs are possible. One proposal is to auction a fixed number of new Top Level Domain slots each year. This proposal would both expand the root resource at a reasonable pace and insure that the slots went to their highest and best use. Public interest Top Level Domains could be allocated by another mechanism such as a lottery and their costs to ICANN could be subsidized by the proceeds of the auction.