88 Minnesota Law Review 357 (2003)


In this Article, Professor Sharfman addresses the problem of "discretionary valuation": that courts resolve valuation disputes arbitrarily and unpredictably, thus harming litigants and society. As a solution, he proposes the enactment of "valuation averaging," a new procedure for resolving valuation disputes modeled on the algorithmic valuation processes often agreed to by sophisticated private firms in advance of any dispute. He argues that by replacing the discretion of judges and juries with a mechanical valuation process, valuation averaging would cause litigants to introduce more plausible and conciliatory valuations into evidence and thereby reduce the cost of valuation litigation and increase the chance of settlement. He further argues that imposition of the valuation averaging procedure would not deprive litigants of their constitutional entitlements to due process and the right to trial by jury. Finally, he argues that valuation averaging would improve upon current law and is superior to other proposed alternatives.


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Date of this Version

December 2003