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<title>bepress Law Collection</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2012  All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://law.bepress.com</link>
<description>Recent documents in bepress Law Collection</description>
<language>en-us</language>
<lastBuildDate>Wed, 16 May 2012 04:32:25 PDT</lastBuildDate>
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<title>“The World Daguerreotyped – What a Spectacle!” Copyright Law, Photography and the Commodification Project of Empire</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/unswwps/flrps12/art18</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 15 May 2012 23:43:07 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This paper concerns copyright law and the history of photography. As has been documented by other writers such as Edelman, Bently and Deazley, the inclusion of photography in the copyright regime was controversial because of the mechanical and scientific nature of the method of production. However there is more to the story of copyright law and photography than one about classificatory objections and the derisory attitudes of particular legal and cultural elites about a new technology. The legal history needs to be understood in light of a much wider celebration of the wonder of photography and its importance to the world. Enthusiasm for the photographic medium impacted on political, economic and social life. This in turn left a mark on copyright law. This paper considers how the inclusion of photography within the copyright act served a larger economic ambition of Empire. Photography was an important new tool for representation of peoples, character and place in this world and the law encouraged new forms of exhibition and consumption that impacted on social, economic and private life across the British Empire.</p>

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</description>

<author>Kathy Bowrey</author>


<category>Intellectual Property Law</category>

<category>Law and Technology</category>

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<title>Assessing Research Performance in the Discipline of Law, 2006-2011</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/unswwps/flrps12/art17</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/unswwps/flrps12/art17</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 15 May 2012 23:27:35 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This report surveys the current state of research assessment in the discipline of law in Australia. Its purpose is to document what is already known in light of the discipline’s participation in government-led research performance assessment initiatives from 2006 to 2011 and to draw out the challenges in assessing research quality that Law faces in the future. The report is in four parts, which, combined, provide a clearer empirical foundation for assessing existing research areas and publication opportunities for legal researchers.</p>
<p>Part One: Assessing Law Outputs explains the Higher Education Research Data Collection (HERDC) in relation to law.Part Two: Research Assessment Codes evaluates the fit of FOR codes with current legal research areas, making recommendations for appropriate accommodation of several new research specialisations to provide a clearer picture of the diversity of legal research and assist in assignment of grant assessors. Part Three: Specialist Law Journal Ranking provides a brief explanation of the heritage of the ARC ERA2010 journal ranking list and a discussion of its reliability. It also evaluates current research specialisations with respect to journal rankings in order to provide feedback on areas where little is known about publication venues. Part Four: General Law Journal Ranking analyses ERA 2010 ranked A and A* Australian General Law Journals by subject area and author alignment, to provide a clearer understanding of the ambit of these prestigious publication venues.</p>
<p>Neither the report nor its recommendations have been formally endorsed by CALD at this time.</p>

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</description>

<author>Kathy Bowrey</author>


<category>General Law</category>

<category>Legal Education</category>

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<title>What Sports Can Teach Tax Policymakers: Lessons from the Luxury Tax</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps/lewps/art147</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/usclwps/lewps/art147</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 15 May 2012 11:14:08 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Luxury taxes are increasingly used by major sports leagues, such as Major League Baseball and the National Basketball Association, to raise revenue and affect behavior.  This brief article lists three lessons that general tax policy can take from the sport world’s taxes, helping to make the case for a progressive spending tax on a national scale.</p>

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</description>

<author>Edward J. McCaffery</author>


<category>Law and Economics</category>

<category>Taxation</category>

<category>Taxation-State and Local</category>

</item>






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<title>Working with the Judicial Review: The New Operation of the Takeover Panel</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/unswwps/flrps12/art16</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/unswwps/flrps12/art16</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 13 May 2012 17:43:39 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This article examines the position of the Takeovers Panel in light of the scope for judicial review of its decisions. In 2000, the role of the Panel was transformed to make it the primary forum for resolving disputes during a takeover bid. However, opportunities for judicial review have the potential to compromise this role. The first judicial review cases reinforced these concerns in invalidating two Panel decisions. Following this, the Panel’s jurisdiction was amended significantly and the High Court subsequently upheld its constitutional validity. The recent decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in CEMEX Australia Pty Ltd v Takeovers Panel further strengthens the Panel’s position in regard to judicial review of its decisions.</p>

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</description>

<author>Emma Armson</author>


<category>Commercial Law</category>

<category>Courts</category>

<category>Dispute Resolution</category>

<category>Practice and Procedure</category>

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<title>Hong Kong’s privacy enforcement:  Issues exposed, powers lacking</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/unswwps/flrps12/art15</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/unswwps/flrps12/art15</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 13 May 2012 17:14:57 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This article concerning the Hong Kong SAR is the second in a series surveying significant recent examples of data privacy enforcement actions  in the Asia-Pacific. Hong Kong’s Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data (the PC) does not have any power under the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (the Ordinance) to award compensation or order other remedies. His most significant legal power is the power to serve an enforcement notice when he concludes that a data user is likely to repeat or continue a contravention of the Ordinance. Where a suspected breach of the Ordinance may constitute a criminal offence he may refer the matter to the Police and the Department of Justice for investigation and prosecution. Where the PC completes investigations of more serious cases of breaches of the Ordinance, it is now common for him to issue detailed reports on the outcomes under s48(2), and in 2010 and 2011 he issued thirteen such reports.</p>
<p>One of the s48(2) reports issued in 2010 was on the ‘Octopus’ case, which involved the transfer of personal data of users of the widely-used Octopus contactless-card payment system to third-parties for direct marketing purposes. The PC issued s48(2) reports in June 2011 in respect of four of the bank cases in which he named the banks, and announced that such naming ‘will henceforth be adopted for all investigation reports published under section 48(2) of the Ordinance’, subject to certain exceptions. He is is the first personal data authority in the Asia-Pacific to explicitly adopt ‘naming and shaming’ of data users found to have been in breach as a means of promoting compliance with personal data legislation.</p>
<p>This article examines a wide variety of s48(2) reports on the following issues: the CITIC Bank case, where there was mass infringement, but no real penalty, on data retention, on fees for data access which were excessive, on disclosure of details of a debtor’s relatives, on unfair collection practices and improper use of public register information, and where covert monitoring was unfair collection. Other than in the debt collection case, the PC did not serve an enforcement notice in any of the cases summarised above because he was not of the opinion that the breaches found by him had occurred in circumstances that made it likely they would continue or be repeated.</p>
<p>The most recent s48(2) reports relate to “paparazzi” style photo journalism using systematic surveillance and telescopic lens photography to take clandestine photographs of TV personalities within their private residences. In both cases, the PC found that the taking of the photographs amounted to collection of their personal data by unfair means contrary to DPP1(2). He served enforcement notices directing the magazines to remedy their contraventions and the matters occasioning them. The details of the enforcement notices are, however, omitted from the published versions of the PC’s reports.The two magazines have appealed to the Administrative Appeals Board. The article also examines a number of  criminal prosecutions resulting from breaches of the Ordinance which have resulted in small fines. The PC commented that ‘the current level of fine is too low to be of deterrent effect, especially for organizational data users’. The overall conclusion is that the PC is tackling a wide variety of compliance issues in spite of the limitations on his formal powers of enforcement, and the absence of powers to order compensation or other remedies, as well as the inadeuqate penalties imposed by Courts.</p>

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</description>

<author>Graham Greenleaf et al.</author>


<category>Human Rights Law</category>

<category>Intellectual Property Law</category>

<category>Law and Society</category>

<category>Law and Technology</category>

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<title>ASEAN‘s ‘New’ Data Privacy Laws: Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/unswwps/flrps12/art14</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/unswwps/flrps12/art14</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 May 2012 00:00:55 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>In the first quarter of 2012, the ASEAN region (Association of South East Asian Nations) has become the most active region in the world for new privacy developments. None of the Bills in Malaysia, the Philippines or Singapore is yet a law, but they all could be within 2012. They have very different strenghts and weaknesses in the protections they give to data subjects, and present differing compliance challenges for businesses.</p>
<p>Malaysia’s Personal Data Protection Act of 2010 has not yet been brought into force, primarily because the government has not appointed a Personal Data Protection Commissioner as required by the Act. The Malaysian government has now indicated it is considering bringing the Act into force without a Commissioner. This article considers whether such a move could result in serious enforcement.</p>
<p>The Philippines Senate passed the Data Privacy Act of 2011 on 20 March 2012, but the Senate Bill differs from House Bill 1554 passed in 2011. There must now be a bicameral conference committee to ‘reconcile’ the versions of the two houses,  and then the reconciled version will be sent to the President for signature after its passage by both Houses. No timetable has been set. This article examines the main features of the Senate Bill, including its attempt to exempt outsourcing of foreign personal data, which may reasult in a Phyrric victory for outsourcers if it makes it impossible for the European Union to find that Philippines law is ‘adequate’.</p>
<p>Singapore’s Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts (MICA) has issued a draft Personal Data Protection Bill, and further consultation paper, while calling for submissions. The data protection principles in the draft Bill are to OECD or better standard in relation to access, correction, data quality, security, notice and deletion/de-identification. However,  it does not have specific provisions restricting data exports. Contrary to suggestions in the previous consultation paper, the Bill does not include special protection for some forms of sensitive data; nor an ‘opt-in’ by industry sectors for its more onerous principles; nor an ‘opt-out’ for industry sectors (with DPC permission) from some of the basic principles. The draft Bill therefore appears to be   a minimal version of a ‘normal’ data privacy law, rather than the somewhat derisory version promised by the earlier consultation paper.</p>
<p>The article highlights some interesting comparisons: Whereas Malaysia seems intent on abandoning its enacted (but not appointed) data protection authority, both the Philippines and Singapore are going ahead with enacting laws establishing DPAs. Whereas the laws in neither Singapore or Malaysia will cover the public sector, the Philippines law will do so. The Malaysian law does not seem to include a means for complaints to make claims for compensation, but both the Singaporean and Philippnes laws do so.  ASEAN member countries have agreed to develop ‘best practices / guidelines’ on data protection (but not to legislate) by 2015, as part of their commitment to establish an integrated ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2015. It is an area to watch.</p>

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</description>

<author>Graham Greenleaf</author>


<category>Computer Law</category>

<category>Intellectual Property Law</category>

<category>International Law</category>

<category>Law and Technology</category>

</item>






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<title>China’s Internet data privacy Regulations 2012: 80% of a Great Leap Forward?</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/unswwps/flrps12/art13</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/unswwps/flrps12/art13</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 30 Apr 2012 23:46:54 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Internet-based businesses in China have until now not been required to comply with any comprehensive data privacy law, but from March 15, 2012 business providing ‘Internet information services’ in China must comply with a much more comprehensive data privacy law, which can be briefly called the Internet Information Services Regulations. ‘Internet information service provider’ refers to all parties providing information to Internet users over the Internet. The Regulations use a definiton that is similar to the definition of personal data used in laws in other countries, and clearly implies that this is broader than information collected from the user, such as information collected from third parties or information generated by the IISP itself from transactions with the user. They are to be enforced by China’s various ‘Telecommunications Authorities’.</p>
<p>The data privacy principles in the Regulations are analysed here in accordance with the usual division of privacy principles found in such instruments as the OECD Guidelines, and other principles developed since then. They are on the one hand surprisingly comprehensive, but on the other hand have a couple of major omissions. The enforcement methods in the Regulation are diverse, but primarily at the initiative of the Telecommunications Authorities. They do not include civil damages provisions, but these may be provided by other aspects of Chinese law, read in conjunction with these Regulations.</p>
<p>Commentators on China’s Internet industry expect that these Regulations will be actively enforced, in part as a result of a string of widely publicised unauthorized disclosures of user information by Internet companies in 2011, and that some industry sectors will have considerable compliance problems. The article concludes with reasons for the significance of these Regulations, and how they compare with international standards. The Regulation is a very significant step for China, even if it would be a very limited one in other countries.</p>

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</description>

<author>Graham Greenleaf</author>


<category>Computer Law</category>

<category>Human Rights Law</category>

<category>Intellectual Property Law</category>

<category>Law and Technology</category>

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<title>The Federal Court of Australia&apos;s Fast Track</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/unswwps/flrps12/art12</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/unswwps/flrps12/art12</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 30 Apr 2012 23:07:30 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This paper examines the Fast Track List in the Federal Court of Australia. The review of this specialised procedures is undertaken to illustrate innovative forms of case management that may be employed in relation to civil litigation. The procedures will usually be used within the Fast Track but the considerable discretion given to judges in relation to case management means that the procedures may be utilised in other proceedings as well.A similar adoption of Fast Track procedures is expected. The paper also concludes with a comparison of the Fast Track with the Commercial List in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.</p>

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</description>

<author>Michael Legg</author>


<category>Courts</category>

<category>Practice and Procedure</category>

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<title>Discovery in the Information Age-The Interaction of ESI, Cloud Computing and Social Media with Discovery, Depositions and Privilege</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/unswwps/flrps12/art11</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 30 Apr 2012 22:42:53 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Electronically stored information (ESI) has prompted a wholesale change in legal culture because information technology and telecommunications have rapidly increased the volume of potentially relevant material leading to the legal profession and courts needing to find new ways to efficiently conduct the discovery process.</p>
<p>In this information age documentation relating to a case is not simply stored in manila folders and filing cabinets, but it is stored electronically in various forms and in a range of (virtual) locations. ESI is data that is stored on an electronic medium, usually a computer or server, and which is accessed through some form of computer program.  For example it includes an email, database, Word document, PowerPoint presentation or spreadsheet.  ESI by its nature is voluminous as it is easily duplicated. It has replaced the telephone, postal service, face-to-face meetings and even conversations. It can be difficult (although not impossible) to delete. It gives rise to metadata or data about data.  ESI is also dynamic; the information can change with time or through the routine operations of the information technology environment, and frequently is incomprehensible when separated from the system that created it.</p>
<p>The volume of ESI is particularly significant for discovery purposes as traditionally the cost of finding information, reviewing it for relevance and examining it for privilege is directly related to the number of documents.  The importance of ESI may be illustrated by research that estimated that worldwide email traffic will total 247 billion messages per day in 2009 and in 2013, this figure will almost double to 507 billion messages per day. However, in 2009, about 81% of all email traffic was spam.</p>
<p>Beyond increased volume, ESI can cause many other issues which also increase cost and delay, such as determining the location of ESI, sorting responsive ESI from irrelevant ESI, seeking to retrieve ESI that may have been lost by deletion, overwriting, or recycling. In addition, there is a concern with being able to preserve legal professional privilege that may be strewn amongst vast amounts of documentation. Furthermore, beyond the office, social media such as Facebook and Twitter have created additional avenues for the creation of "documents" which may need to be considered in discovery searches.</p>
<p>There are a few ways in which issues with regards to ESI can be minimised, and this article will consider case management, the pre-discovery conference, and the deposition as potential tools to this end, in addition to discussing in further detail the problems foreshadowed above. These different approaches to discovery allow for a better response to the unique problems of ESI and may be the path to smooth sailing through the oceans of discovery documents.</p>

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</description>

<author>Michael Legg et al.</author>


<category>Computer Law</category>

<category>Courts</category>

<category>General Law</category>

<category>Human Rights Law</category>

<category>Intellectual Property Law</category>

<category>Law and Technology</category>

<category>Practice and Procedure</category>

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<title>Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/umichlwps/empirical/art47</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/umichlwps/empirical/art47</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 30 Apr 2012 09:15:39 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This article explores the potential value of insurance as a substitute for government regulation of safety. Successful regulation of behavior requires information in setting standards, licensing conduct, verifying outcomes, and assessing remedies. In some areas, the private insurance sector has technological advantages in collecting and administering the information relevant to setting standards, and could outperform the government in creating incentives for optimal behavior. The paper explores several areas in which regulation and other government-oriented forms of control are replaced by private insurance schemes. The role of the law diminishes to the administration of simple rules of absolute liability or of no liability, and affected parties turn to insurers for both risk coverage and safety instructions. The paper illustrates the existing role of regulation-through-insurance in various areas of risky activity, and then explores its potential application in additional, yet unutilized, areas: (1) consumer protection; (2) food safety; and (3) financial statements.</p>

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</description>

<author>Kyle D. Logue et al.</author>


<category>Law and Economics</category>

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<title>The Better Base Case</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps/lewps/art146</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/usclwps/lewps/art146</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 27 Apr 2012 12:59:35 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>The most recent Congressional Budget Office forecast for the federal budget estimates that the federal deficit will decline to about 1 percent of GDP a decade from now. But this essentially rosy forecast is predicated on the expiration of all current temporary tax policies – in particular, the 2001/03 personal income tax cuts – and a reversion to pre-2001 tax law. We argue that revenue collections of the same magnitude as those projected by the CBO are necessary over the medium term. But certain aspects of current tax law are problematic, and the efficiency and equity of current law’s scheduled post-2012 tax system can readily be improved.   We therefore develop an alternative post-2012 personal income tax regime, the “Better Base Case.” This proposal contemplates modifying current law by limiting personal itemized deductions to a 15 percent tax rate benefit, and then “spending” the resulting incremental revenues to (1) permanently patch the AMT, (2) tax dividends at the same preferential rates as net capital gains, (3) restore the estate tax to 2009 rates and exclusion and (4) restore the child credit to its current levels. Using the Tax Policy Center’s microsimulation model, we demonstrate that this package of reforms is revenue neutral compared with current law, and is slightly more progressive in its distribution of tax burdens. We further consider the political economy implications of the proposal, and conclude that the Better Base Case is a logical and feasible next step in the evolving debate over the size and financing of the federal government.</p>

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</description>

<author>Edward D. Kleinbard et al.</author>


<category>Banking and Finance</category>

<category>Economics</category>

<category>Law and Economics</category>

<category>Politics</category>

<category>Taxation</category>

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<title>Is Tax Law Culturally Specific? Lessons from the History of Income Tax Law in Mandatory Palestine</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/taulwps/fp/art131</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/taulwps/fp/art131</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 17 Apr 2012 05:14:12 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Tax law is a technical area of law which does not seem to be culturally specific. It is thus seen as easily transferable between different societies and cultures. However, tax law is also based on definitions and notions which are not universal (the private sphere, the family, the gift etc.). So, is tax law universal or particular? Is it indeed easily transferable between different societies? And in what ways does tax law reflect ethnic or cultural rather than economic differences? This Article seeks to answer these questions by analyzing one specific example — the history of income tax legislation in Mandatory Palestine. This history reveals the dual nature of income taxation. On the one hand, the Income Tax Ordinance which was enacted by the British in Palestine in 1941 was based on a one-size-fits-all colonial model, and the lawyers involved in its enactment, in Palestine and in the Colonial Office in London, made relatively little effort to adapt it to local conditions. On the other hand, other actors — the officials, politicians and businessmen involved in the initial debate about the imposition of income taxation in Palestine in the 1930s, and the administrators involved in the application of the specific rules of the Ordinance after it was enacted in the 1940s — were aware of the need to adapt the law to the specific conditions of Palestine. Thus, while on a formal level the Ordinance seems to represent a process in which the tax law of Palestine converged with that of other British colonies (and ultimately, with English income tax law), once we expand our framework and examine not just law in the books, but also law in action, and actors such as politicians and administrators, we discover that particular local conditions were an important factor in the enactment and application of the Palestine Income Tax Ordinance. The study of the process of transplantation, the Article concludes, should therefore focus not only on the formal norms being transplanted, but also on the role of the different non-legal actors involved in the process.</p>

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</description>

<author>Assaf Likhovski</author>


<category>Comparative and Foreign Law</category>

<category>Law and Society</category>

<category>Legal History</category>

<category>Taxation</category>

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<title>Chasing Ghosts: On the Possibility of Writing Cultural Histories of Tax Law</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/taulwps/fp/art130</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/taulwps/fp/art130</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 17 Apr 2012 04:32:08 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This Article discusses the use of arguments about “culture” in two debates about the imposition, application and abolition of income tax law: A debate about the transplantation of British income taxation to British-ruled Palestine in the early twentieth century, and a debate about tax privacy in late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century Britain. In both cases, “culture,” or some specific aspect of it (notions of privacy) appeared in arguments made by opponents of the tax. However, it is difficult to decide whether the use of cultural arguments in these debates simply reflected some “reality” that existed prior to these debates, whether “culture” was actively constituted in these debates to further the specific interests of the participants, or whether the cultural arguments that appeared in the debates combined reflection and constitution in some determinable way. Using legal debates to learn something about culture, the Article concludes, is sometimes problematic. The Article therefore suggests an additional approach to the study of law and culture, one which focuses on the rhetorical level, seeking to map the ways in which arguments about “culture” (and related terms referring to the traditional and particular), appeared in tax law debates.</p>

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</description>

<author>Assaf Likhovski</author>


<category>Law and Society</category>

<category>Legal History</category>

<category>Taxation</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>Is Financial Regulation Structurally Biased to Favor Deregulation?</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps/lewps/art145</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/usclwps/lewps/art145</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 13 Apr 2012 14:39:29 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This article finds that the financial regulatory agencies operate in an environment where regulatory actions often face legal challenge, but deregulatory actions are rarely challenged, and argues that the growing use of interpretive rules combined with administrative law doctrines that restrict access to legal review create an environment that is structurally biased to favor deregulation.</p>
<p>Two examples of deregulatory agency action are explored in detail.  The implementation of the 2004 Final Rule governing the provision of eligible liquidity facilities to asset-backed commercial paper conduits is evaluated and found to almost certainly fail a “clearly erroneous” standard of judicial review.  The second example reviews Omarova’s study of the process by which the “business of banking” was reinterpreted to include trade in derivatives; the method of legal analysis that supported this reinterpretation was rejected by the D.C. Circuit.  Both of these actions were implemented using interpretive rules, and in both cases these deregulatory actions have not faced legal challenge.</p>
<p>This article argues that the combination of the growing use of interpretive rules and the application of doctrines determining who has standing to challenge the actions of the financial regulatory agencies in court forces agencies to favor deregulatory action over regulatory action.  The article proposes (i) that every financial regulatory statute be amended to include a “citizen suit” clause and that courts uphold the right of citizens to sue under such clauses, and (ii) that a division of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau be created that is dedicated to opposing the policy proposals made by regulated parties to financial regulatory agencies.</p>

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</description>

<author>Carolyn Sissoko</author>


<category>Banking and Finance</category>

<category>Commercial Law</category>

<category>Economics</category>

<category>Law and Economics</category>

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<title>Varieties of Vagueness in the Law</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps/lss/art89</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/usclwps/lss/art89</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 12 Apr 2012 13:19:30 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>The main purpose of this essay is to articulate the different types of vagueness, and related linguistic indeterminacies, that we find in statutory language and to explain their different rationales. I argue that the various normative considerations involved in employing vague terms in legislation depend on the kind of vagueness in question. I show that while some cases of vagueness in law are concerned with fairly standard problems of borderline cases, other are not. I also argue that semantic vagueness can be distinguished from conversational vagueness, which we also find in law, and that vagueness in law should be clearly distinguished from cases of ambiguity and polysemy.</p>

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</description>

<author>Andrei Marmor</author>


<category>Jurisprudence</category>

<category>Legislation</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>Constitutional Reform and its Relationship to Land Justice</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/unswwps/flrps12/art10</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/unswwps/flrps12/art10</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 10 Apr 2012 22:54:16 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>While many key legal settings for native title are already in place, recent history tells us that important legislative and judicial choices about Indigenous land justice will continue to be made in coming years and that constitutional arrangements will exert a significant shaping influence on the outcome. A range of viable proposals for constitutional reform are presently under consideration for a 2013 referendum which could materially affect the future pursuit of land justice for first peoples in Australia. These include, in particular, a non-discrimination clause with respect to race, which allows for positive Indigenous-specific laws, including ones enacted under a revised power in section 51(xxvi) of the Constitution, and a constitutional provision to support agreement-making between governments and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people.</p>

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</description>

<author>Sean Brennan</author>


<category>Constitutional Law, Generally</category>

<category>Estates and Trusts</category>

<category>Human Rights Law</category>

<category>Indian and Aboriginal Law</category>

<category>Land Use Planning</category>

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<item>
<title>Law, Power, and &quot;Rumors of War&quot;: Robert Jackson Confronts Law and Security After Nuremberg</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/usclwps/lss/art88</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 09 Apr 2012 09:32:14 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson’s most important legacy was his role as chief prosecutor for the United States at the Nuremberg Trials.  This essay follows Jackson’s legal thought from his return to the United States after Nuremberg, until his death in 1954.  Jackson hoped that the lesson of Nuremberg would be “to establish the supremacy of law over such lawless and catastrophic forces as war and persecutions.”  Jackson changed law that applied to warfare. In looking to the future, he seems to have assumed that although law had changed, war would retain its essential character. Yet as the post-war years became instead the Cold War years, Jackson found himself in an era when the boundaries around wartime were eroding.  The world entered an ambiguous era that seemed to be neither war nor peace. As Jackson himself would put it in 1951, rather than a break between wartime and peacetime, there was instead “a prolonged period of international tension and rumors of war, with war itself as the ever threatening alternative.”</p>
<p>Jackson’s response to the Cold War era was twofold.  In cases involving members of the Communist Party, he argued that they were different in kind from other dissenters, so that the Justice who argued that the rule of law should apply to Nazi leaders also argued for a departure from applicable first amendment analysis because of the dangers posed by communism.  In the area of war-related powers, Jackson took up more directly the ambiguous character of an era that seemed neither wartime nor peacetime.  In this context, he favored limits on presidential power.  Calling the Korean War an undeclared “foreign venture,” he argued in his famous Steel Seizure concurrence that it would subvert constitutional limits for a president to go to war without a declaration from congress, and then use that state of war as the basis for expanding his own domestic authority.</p>
<p>The essay is based on my contribution to the 2011 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture program at SUNY Buffalo Law School, which commemorated Robert Jackson’s inaugural Mitchell Lecture in October 1951.</p>

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</description>

<author>Mary L. Dudziak</author>


<category>Constitutional Law, Generally</category>

<category>Human Rights Law</category>

<category>Judges</category>

<category>Law and Society</category>

<category>Legal History</category>

<category>Politics</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>Rethinking the Presumption of Mens Rea</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art115</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art115</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Mar 2012 07:27:04 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This paper answers a question that has divided courts and scholars, namely:  To which elements of a criminal offense does the traditional presumption of mens rea apply?  Scholars long ago settled on the view that the presumption applies to every objective element—every proscribed result, for example, and every attendant circumstance.  Courts, on the other hand, usually have held that the presumption applies only to elements that “make the conduct criminal,” and not to elements that make the conduct a more serious offense.  In this paper, I will argue that both views are problematic and that the right answer to the question of the presumption’s scope lies somewhere in between.  The right answer, as Justice Stevens once suggested, is that the presumption of mens rea applies to every element except those designed exclusively to measure the degree of harm inflicted by the actor’s conduct.  The reason why this is the right answer is that elements designed to me  asure instead the risk posed by the defendant’s conduct ordinarily cannot perform their function—cannot tell us anything about the wrongfulness of the actor’s conduct—without being assigned a mental state.</p>

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</description>

<author>Eric A. Johnson</author>


<category>Criminal Law and Procedure</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>Credit Bidding, Security, and the Obsolescence of Chapter 11</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art114</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art114</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 09 Mar 2012 09:50:14 PST</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Chapter 11 was a monumental achievement when it was enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978.  Reflecting the financial world of the times, chapter 11 and related provisions effected a carefully calibrated balance between the rights and powers of competing stakeholders.  A core component of that delicate balance was to protect the right of secured creditors to “credit bid” if their collateral was being sold, whether during the pendency of the case or in a cram down reorganization plan.   Some high-profile recent cases have denied secured creditors the right to credit bid in a sale under a cram down plan, concluding that alternative protection may be afforded through invocation of the “indubitable equivalent” option.  The Supreme Court will settle this dispute in the RadLAX case.</p>
<p>After a detailed examination of the nature of secured credit and the historical evolution of the treatment of secured claims in bankruptcy, this paper first explains why, on the statute as written in 1978, Congress intended for secured creditors to have the right to credit bid in a sale under a cram down plan, and did not intend for that right to be supplanted by an alternative indubitable equivalent treatment.  However, the paper then demonstrates how the financial world for which the 1978 Code was written has fundamentally changed, with the rise of dominant secured creditors.  That change has upset the balance of power, rendering the Code’s scheme obsolete as regards secured creditors in this context.</p>
<p>The paper then asks what can and should be done, either judicially or legislatively, to address the problem of chapter 11’s obsolescence.   As a matter of statutory interpretation, a “faithful” Court should be bound to uphold the secured creditor’s right to credit bid, although a dynamic interpretation might counsel otherwise.  Legislatively, the time has come to amend the Bankruptcy Code to reverse the default rule on credit bidding; suggested Code amendments are offered.  Contrary to the virtually unanimous body of scholarly opinion, the paper argues that credit bidding should not presumptively be required.  Instead, a secured creditor should be permitted to credit bid only if it makes a specific showing of “cause”  to the court, demonstrating how denial of that right would prejudice the secured creditor in the particular case.</p>

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</description>

<author>Charles Tabb</author>


<category>Bankruptcy Law</category>

</item>






<item>
<title>Congressional Silence and the Statutory Interpretation Game</title>
<link>http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art113</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art113</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 06 Mar 2012 16:16:44 PST</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This Article explores the circumstances under which the federal legislative apparatus may be unable to respond to a politically objectionable statutory interpretation from the Supreme Court.  The Article builds upon existing economic models of statutory interpretation, for the first time incorporating transaction costs into the analysis.  The Article concludes by identifying recent real-world disputes in which transaction costs constrained Congress and the President from overriding the Court.</p>

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</description>

<author>Paul Stancil</author>


<category>Courts</category>

<category>Law and Economics</category>

<category>Legislation</category>

</item>





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