As a result of the underdeveloped nature of the literature, simple rules that result in extreme tradeoffs between type I and type II errors may dominate more complex tests that attempt to differentiate procompetitive from anticompetitive behavior. Such complex tests may work well within the confines of a theoretical model, but not when applied to firms in actual antitrust cases. Improving the reliability of more complex tests for anticompetitive behavior will require economists to expand their understanding of both the anticompetitive and procompetitive reasons firms engage in bundling. This will entail studying the reasons bundling is adopted by firms without market power, relaxing the assumption of monopoly in theoretical models, and generating testable hypothesis and the data to test them.

A review of the major cases involving loyalty and other volume discounts suggests the following general observations. In the single product case, courts have consistently applied the “not easy to establish” two part test for predatory pricing set out by the Supreme Court in its Brooke Group decision. As a result, the courts have generally ruled that above-cost volume discounts, including those that use market share discounts and near exclusive thresholds, are lawful and do not violate the antitrust laws. In cases involving multimarket or bundled rebates, however, courts have not generally followed the Brooke Group Court’s presumption that above cost bundled discounts are presumptively legal. However, they have generally followed the Brooke Group Court’s focus on the actual facts or realities of the marketplace rather than on hypotheticals. Thus, while the lower courts have considered the theories and tests contained in the recent theoretical literature on loyalty discounts, they have generally refused to find liability absent sufficient proof that the conditions required by these tests apply, and that the underlying tests reflect market realities. This approach is consistent with the federal courts’ generally cautious approach to expanding Section 2 liability, and the recognition of the underdeveloped and untested state of the academic literature.

Moreover, there are significant flaws in the two cases where courts have found use of bundled loyalty rebates to be unlawful. In SmithKline, the court did focus on data and concluded that an equally efficient competitor would have been excluded by the bundled discounts evaluated in the case. However, economic theory suggests that the court may have used a flawed standard, and should have instead focused on the fact that changes to the bundled rebate programs served to increase rather than decrease prices. And the court’s decision in LePage’s not only suggested use of the same flawed standard, it found liability without requiring sufficient proof that the standard even applied to the facts of the case.

Writing for the Lopez majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist had claimed not to disturb the expansive post-New Deal Commerce Clause precedents, but rather to fit all of the cases neatly into three circumscribed categories: the use of channels of interstate commerce; instrumentalities or persons or things traveling in interstate commerce; and economic activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Significantly, the Lopez Court redefined the third and most important category from its original formulation set out in Wickard. While Wickard had allowed Congressional regulation of local activity, “whatever its nature . . . if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce,” Rehnquist instead used “economic” to qualify the activity itself.

Following the revised Lopez formulation, the Raich Court inquired whether cultivating, acquiring, and using medical marijuana qualified as a regulable economic activity. Relying upon a dictionary for the proposition that economics refers to “the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities,” Stevens determined that just as the Wickard Court had sustained Congress’s regulation of wheat production, so too, the Raich Court was compelled to sustain Congress’s prohibition of marijuana acquisition, production, and use even if for medical purposes and on the advice of a physician as permitted under state law.

This Article traces the Lopez Court’s doctrinal modification, explores its implications, and offers an alternative economic analysis that considers the need for a central coordinating authority to effectuate the Congressional policy enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. The analysis reveals the shortcomings of Justice Stevens’s analysis in employing a dictionary definition of economics and of focusing strictly on the nature of the underlying activity to equate Wickard and Raich. Using an analysis that draws instead upon the prisoners’ dilemma and the multiple Nash equilibrium bargaining game, this Article demonstrates that the Court could have reconciled the expansive post-New Deal Commerce Clause cases with the more recent efforts, embodied in Lopez and in Morrison v. United States, to impose meaningful substantive restraints on the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers. And it could have done so while applying Lopez to invalidate the CSA as applied to Respondents’ activities.

Most notably, the analysis reveals that Wickard does not represent an extreme example of Congressional Commerce Clause powers. Instead, Wickard relies upon the need for a central authority to curb national wheat outputs as a means of controlling price, and the need for a meaningful signal concerning the level at which the governmentally imposed quota regime will be enforced to avoid the consequence of cheating in undermining the overall pricing scheme. Neither of these concerns, nor any of the other identified concerns that justify the broad post-New Deal exercise of Congressional Commerce Clause powers, properly bear on the facts of Raich.

This dichotomy between facts and intuitions is built on sand. Emotions and intuitions can be reasonable, and reasons are often predicated on emotions. Even as courts have, over the past two generations, grown more dismissive of hunches, there has been a counter-revolution in the cognitive sciences. Emotions and intuitions are not obstacles to reason, but indispensable heuristic devices that allow people to process diffuse, complex information about their environment and make sense of the world. If the legal rules governing police conduct are premised on a mistaken assumption about human cognition, can one craft a doctrine of policing that credits the wisdom of hunches? Can the legal system defer to police officers’ intuitions without undermining protections against law enforcement overreaching?

This article argues that, to some extent, judicial skepticism about police hunches can and should be abandoned. As a practical matter, the current legal regime substitutes palliative euphemisms for useful controls on police discretion. When an energetic police officer has a hunch that something is wrong and action is imperative, the officer will simply act. Months will pass before a suppression hearing, and by then it will be a simple matter to reverse-engineer the objective “reasons” for the stop — e.g., “I saw a bulge.” The legal system in practice simply rewards those officers who are able and willing to spin their behavior in a way that satisfies judges, while it penalizes those officers who are less verbally facile or who are transparent about their motivations. It would be preferable if politically accountable authorities joined the courts in monitoring police practices. The focus should be less on what police say after the fact and more on what they do — that is, how successful police officers are in catching criminals and how respectful they are of all citizens.

The right to expressive association had languished in obscurity for more than two decades after the Supreme Court articulated it in the late 1950s and early 1960s in the course of protecting civil rights activists from racist Southern governments. Controversy over constitutional protection of expressive association arose in the 1980s, when private associations claimed that it protected their right to discriminate when necessary to pursue the associations' goals. The Supreme Court seemed aghast that the expressive association right was being used as a tool of those who would seek to use its protection of their associative status in order to discriminate. In a series of opinions in the mid to late 1980s, the Court both narrowly defined the circumstances in which expressive association rights are impinged, and suggested that antidiscrimination laws are always "compelling government interests" sufficient to override these rights. The right of expressive association had been significantly weakened.

Dale, however, dramatically revived the right of expressive association. The Court found that the Boy Scouts had an expressive association right to exclude gay scoutmasters even though the Scouts' anti-homosexual activity policy was neither well-publicized nor especially central to its mission. Moreover, the Court rejected New Jersey's claim that the law was justified by the state's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against homosexuals.

The essay examines the right of expressive association and the consequences of its reinvigoration by the Supreme Court in Dale. Part I recounts the ups and downs of the right from its inception in civil rights cases, to its low ebb in the 1980s, to its reinvigoration in Dale. Part II discusses some of the scholarly commentary on Dale and concludes that the right to expressive association after Dale will continue to be a broad one, with some limitations. Part III discusses some of the post-Dale decisions that support the interpretation of Dale as expounding a broad-based expressive association right fully applicable to a variety of situations. Finally, Part IV looks at some of the untapped potential uses of the right. In particular, Dale will often shield religious associations from intrusive antidiscrimination laws.

This essay reviews LoPucki’s book and its central theoretical and empirical arguments. LoPucki offers powerful empirical evidence that something is amiss with much of current American bankruptcy practice. This essay will try to flesh out in more detail the model and theoretical foundations that implicit underlie LoPucki’s indictment of bankruptcy forum-shopping (and other forms of forum-shopping as well). Empirical evidence standing alone is insufficient to draw conclusions about whether forum-shopping is in general good or bad without a clearly-stated hypothesis to test. Instead, it is necessary to also have a theoretical model sufficient to generate testable hypotheses as a predicate both for determining whether forum-shopping is good or bad on net, as well as the likely effects of reform proposals. Although LoPucki identifies several problem areas in the current Chapter 11 reorganization process, it is not as clear that all of these problems can be clearly attributed to runaway forum-shopping. Instead, they may simply be good-faith errors or mistakes, for which continued competition may be beneficial, in that the competition may actually expedite the process of self-correction.

This review essay develops a model of the institutions and incentives governing the forum-shopping competition described by LoPucki in an effort to determine whether the empirical observations proffered by LoPucki can be best explained as the outcome of improper forum-shopping competition. The essay then closes with an analysis of provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, noting that many of the provisions in the legislation offer substantive responses to many of the problems identified by LoPucki.

The controversy reflects the widespread belief that the outcome in Bolling reflected the Justices' political preferences and was not a sound interpretation of the Due Process Clause. The Bolling Court stands accused of "inventing" the idea that due process includes a guarantee of equal protection equivalent to that of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.

A careful analysis of Bolling v. Sharpe, however, reveals some surprises. First, the almost universal portrayal of Bolling as an opinion relying on an "equal protection component" of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause is incorrect. In fact, Bolling was a substantive due process opinion with roots in Lochner era cases such as Buchanan v. Warley, Meyer v. Nebraska, and Pierce v. Society of Sisters. The Court, however, chose to rely explicitly only on Buchanan because the other cases were too closely associated with Lochner.

Another surprise is that the proposition that Bolling has come to stand for, that the Fifth Amendment prohibits discrimination by the Federal Government, was not simply "made up" by the Supreme Court, but has a basis in longstanding precedent.

Finally, Bolling is an important example of the distorting effect of Lochnerphobia on Supreme Court jurisprudence. Bolling would have been a much stronger opinion had it been willing to explicitly rely on Lochner era precedents such as Meyer, and to employ a more explicitly Lochnerian view of the Due Process Clause.

This evolution in thinking, however, has not been accompanied by the development of a systematic, analytical framework to guide the application of the state action doctrine in particular cases. Developing such a framework should therefore remain a top priority of leading antitrust policymakers, including those at the Federal Trade Commission.