George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series
George Mason University Working Paper Series
The Unsolvable Dilemma of a Paretian Policymaker
Abstract
In this paper, we argue that social decisionmaking is subject to a fundamental conflict between consistency and completeness. We show that a consistent welfarist method of policy assessment, that is, one that never violates the Pareto principle, may be incomplete in the sense of being incapable of providing a solution to important social welfare problems.
Subject Area
Economics, Law and Economics
Recommended Citation
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci and Nuno Garoupa,
"The Unsolvable Dilemma of a Paretian Policymaker"
(November 2004).
George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series.
George Mason University Working Paper Series.
Working Paper 10.
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/gmule/art10
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