This paper reviews the existing law and economics literature on crime, noting where various models might apply to the terror context. Specifically, it focuses on two strands of the literature, deterrence and incapacitation. Challenging the conventional application of the basic rational agent model of crime in the context of terrorism, it considers anti-terror measures enacted by different countries, highlighting how the details of the laws correspond to the insights from economic models of crime. In conclusion, the paper proposes an efficient sorting mechanism in which individuals will be provided with adequate incentives to reveal their type to law enforcement authorities.
Comparative and Foreign Law | Criminal Law | Criminal Procedure | Injury and Tort Law | Law and Economics
Date of this Version
Nuno M. Garoupa , Jonathan Klick, and Francesco Parisi, "A Law and Economics Perspective on Terrorism" (September 2005). George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series. Working Paper 42.