Rethinking Visitation:
From a Parental to a Relational Right
Ayelet Blecher-Prigat

Introduction
1. Visitation as a Parental Right
   A. Parental Visitation Rights
   B. The Traditional View: Denying Visitation Rights to Non-Parents

2. Challenging Traditional Visitation Rules

3. The Visitation Debate
   A. The Disarray in Third-Party Visitation Statutes
   B. Troxel v. Granville and Its Aftermath
   C. The Malleability of Parental Status
   D. Reformulating the Question as a Way Out of the Maze

4. Visitation as a Parental Right: An Inadequate Construct
   A. Children’s Relational Interests
   B. The Inconsistency of the Legal Approach
   C. Protecting Marriage and Nuclear Families
   D. The Shadow of the “Children as Property” Conception

5. Reformulating Visitation—Reformulating Parenthood
   A. The Two Faces of Visitation
   B. Reconceptualizing Parental Rights
   C. Without Unbundling Parenthood

6. The Role of Parental Exclusivity

7. Conclusion
Introduction

Visitation with children is an issue that has occupied the public and legal limelight for several decades. Despite the enormous interest evoked by this issue and the extensive concern with this right, dissatisfaction with existing legal rules and confusion on this issue have only intensified. In this article, I argue that the perplexity surrounding this issue reflects the absence of an underlying theory of visitation that would specify the interests and values that a right to visitation should aim to protect. I further argue that the current perception of visitation rights as parental rights and the attempts to resolve the dilemmas prompted by visitation within a parental rights context thwart the development of a theory of visitation. I propose an alternative perspective on these dilemmas that challenges the fundamental premise of visitation as a parental right and as an integral component of the rights cluster associated with parental status. Instead, I submit an understanding of the right to visitation as independent of the cluster of rights associated with parental status and based on relational values.

In rejecting the understanding of visitation rights as parental rights, I do not follow the child advocates’ view of visitation rights as children’s rights.1 Rather, my framework of analysis conceives of visitation rights as (or at least also as) adults’ rights. Nevertheless, I argue that the law’s distinction between

---

1 See e.g., James G. Dwyer, The Relationship Rights of Children (2006).
different adult claimants based on their parental status (or lack thereof) is flawed. My proposal seeks to redirect the law concerning adults’ claims to enjoy relationships with children toward a legal model based on relational interests and on the needs of both children and adults.

The first part of the article deals with the current view of visitation as a parental right and with the implications of this perception. I describe the legal rules based on this approach, which distinguish between claimants of visitation rights on grounds of parental status or lack thereof. I then address the growing critique of traditional visitation rules in the wake of extensive changes in family structure and their effect on the meaningful relationships that children form with adults, whether or not they are legally recognized as their parents. Following this analysis, I examine the legislative and judicial reactions to this critique and the deep confusion that plagues this area of law, which culminated in the Troxel v. Granville decision of the Supreme Court.2

I will argue that the current confusion concerning visitation can be attributed to the existence of two separate and conflicting notions of visitation appearing in case law, in legislation, and in jurisprudence. The first and more overt emphasizes the relational values underlying this right, which enable children and adults to maintain significant relationships. The second and more implicit embodies remnants of the perception of children as their parents’ property, extolling the institution of marriage and the nuclear family

as the preferred model. The co-existence of these two conflicting subtexts within visitation jurisprudence, I argue, thwarts the development of a visitation theory and perpetuates turmoil in this legal domain. I further demonstrate that the understanding of visitation as a parental right, which marginalizes the nurture and care of children and disregards their relational interests, is incompatible with a relational understating of visitation. Only by detaching visitation from the cluster of rights, privileges (and responsibilities) comprised in parental status can we begin to construe it as a relational right and develop a coherent visitation theory.

Detaching visitation from the bundle of rights associated with parenthood will transform not only the right to visitation but legal parenthood itself, strengthening the tie between child rearing and rights considered parental. Note that, although my proposal seeks to detach one element from the cluster of rights associated with parenthood, it does not pave the way for the unbundling of legal parenthood. I recognize the significance of parental status and also acknowledge that, at least partly, this significance stems from the exclusiveness of this status. An additional advantage of my proposal, then, is that it enables the preservation of parental exclusivity while recognizing the visitation rights of both parents and non-parents.
1. Visitation as a Parental Right

The right to visitation is generally perceived as a parental right, part of the cluster of rights associated with parental status. This understanding is mainly evident in two basic principles of visitation rules. First, visitation rights are considered to arise from the very fact of parenthood, so that parents are entitled to this right simply by being legally recognized as parents. Second, visitation rights are subject to the general rule of parental exclusivity, whereby only a child’s legal parents have rights considered parental, rights that non-parents cannot acquire. Thus, whereas parents are usually entitled to visitation, non-parents are not.

A. Parental Visitation Rights

Parents' rights to visitation are considered natural, inherent, and arising from the very fact of parenthood. The parental right of visitation is considered, absent custody, to protect the parents' interest in the companionship of their children. Parental visitation rights are strong and granted as a matter of

---


5 The right of parents to the companionship and custody of their children was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in, e.g., *Meyer v. Nebraska*, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Rethinking Visitation

entitlement, so that courts are usually reluctant to deny them or even restrict them.6

Ostensibly, parents’ visitation rights are subject to the best interest of the child standard, but this is not an accurate description of the law as presently applied.7 Visitation rights are granted to parents even when the parent making the request has never lived with the child or never demonstrated any willingness or even any desire to have custody of the child.8 Most courts are averse to deny visitation to legally recognized parents, even in cases of abusive parents, where supervised visitation seems sufficient to guard the child against serious danger.9 Even where a child expresses unwillingness to

For the weight and importance that is attributed to this right see, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).

7 James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children’s Existing Rights in State Decision Making About Their Relationships, 11 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 845-932 (2003). The best interest of the child standard does play some role in determining the amount and particular form of visitation. But here as well, the presumption in most jurisdictions is that non-custodial parents should receive “standard visitation” — understood as weekend-long stays every other week, one overnight every week, and a couple of weeks in the summer — absent a showing that this is likely to significantly harm the child. Id. at 938.

8 Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents, Parents and Grandchildren: Actualizing Interdependency in Law, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 1315, 1369 (1994); Dwyer, supra note 7, at 934.
9 Leigh Goodmark, From Property to Personhood: What the Legal System Should Do for Children in Family Violence Cases, 102 W. Va. L. Rev. 237, 271 (1999); Dwyer, supra note 7, at 936. This interpretation certainly stretches the best interest of the child standard to its outer limits.
spend time with the parent, courts will generally refuse to deny or suspend parents’ visitation, which are routinely ordered over children’s objection. Indeed, a parent will be denied visitation rights only under exceptional and rare circumstances, usually when there is a clear showing of physical or emotional danger to the child.

Some scholars have even suggested that parental visitation rights are constitutionally protected. So far, no Supreme Court case has appeared to recognize visitation as a fundamental interest of non-custodial parents, entitled to substantial due process. Nevertheless, several decisions seem to have recognized the interests of non-custodial parents in having a relationship with their children as a liberty interest sufficient to warrant

10 Cynthia E. Cordle, Note: Open Adoption: The Need for Legislative Action, 2 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 275 295-296 (1995). See also: Michael J. Lewinski, Note: Visitation Beyond the Traditional Limitations, 60 Ind. L. J. 191, 198 (1984); Dwyer, supra note 7, at 936-937. Cases of children expressly opposing visitation involve mostly older children, and the issues they raise are thus different from the ones I discuss in this article. Nevertheless, I found it worthy to mention these cases to exemplify the strength of parental visitation rights. Practically, older children can usually avoid spending time with a non-custodial parent by not complying with court orders. Usually, courts would not cut off child support or use extreme measures such as ordering police enforcement of visitation orders, although children have occasionally been jailed to coerce them to visit the non-custodial parent. Dwyer, id at 937.

11 24A Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 973; Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 407.

12 See e.g., Steven L. Novinson, Post-Divorce Visitation: Untying the Triangular Knot, 1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 121, 124-139.
application of procedural due process doctrine. Federal and state courts have occasionally interpreted these Supreme Court rulings as suggesting that parental visitation rights are constitutionally protected. Other courts, however, have declined to recognize constitutional protection of parental visitation rights.

While the constitutionality of parents’ visitation rights is still undecided, the strength of parental visitation rights is unquestionable. For my purposes, 

---

13 See e.g., *Santosky v. Kramer*, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). In *Santosky*, the Supreme Court struck down a New York law that terminated parental rights if the state proved by a “fair preponderance of the evidence” that the child was permanently neglected. The Court held that a parent’s right to raise his or her child could be terminated only upon “clear and convincing” proof that the child was neglected. *Santosky* 455 U.S. at 769. The Santosky Court declared that “[e]ven when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.” *Santosky* 455 U.S. at 753. Thus, the interests of parents in visiting and communication with their children after temporarily losing custody were acknowledged by the Court as important enough to entitle the parent to procedural protections mandated by the Due Process Clause. In *Armstrong v. Manzo*, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) the Court held that failure to give a non-custodial parent notice of an adoption proceeding “violated the most rudimentary demands of due process of law.” The Court thus recognized the interest of a divorced non-custodial father in the preservation of his visitation rights as a “liberty interest” sufficient to warrant application of procedural due process doctrine.


15 Some scholars have criticized the one-sided nature of parents’ visitation rights, namely, that the visitation rights of parents that courts and legislators seem so eager
doubts over the constitutionality of parental visitation rights attest that these rights represent an exception in the cluster of rights associated with parenthood. Visitation provides the only means enabling a non-custodial parent to maintain a relationship with the child so that, in essence, denying visitation is tantamount to terminating the parental rights of the non-custodial parent. Nevertheless, the constitutionality of parents’ visitation rights remains debatable, unlike other parental rights associated with custody whose constitutionality has long been recognized.

B. The Traditional View: Denying Visitation Rights to Non-Parents

Since visitation is considered part of the cluster of rights associated with parenthood, non-parents have usually been barred from claiming visitation rights. Contrary to the almost absolute right of parents to visitation, the interests of non-parents in an opportunity to develop or maintain a relationship with children have not traditionally enjoyed, absent special circumstances, legal recognition or protection. The law has created a stark to protect, are not reciprocal. See e.g., Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1415 (1991). Currently, a child does not have a legal right of visitation with her parents. Courts have refused to recognize such a right and rejected claims to compel visitation. See e.g., Louden v. Olpin, 118 Cal. App. 3d 565, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981); Dana v. Dana, 789 P.2d 726, 730 (Utah App. 1990); In re Joshua M., 274 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1990). Courts have also denied children’s claim for compensation for emotional damage allegedly resulting from the lack of parental companionship. See e.g., Burnette v. Wahl 588 P.2d 1105 (Or., 1978).
dichotomy between “parents” and “non-parents,” and parenthood has
generally been considered an exclusive status in that only a child’s legal
parents could claim rights with respect to the child.16 More recently, as I
discuss in more detail in another section, some exceptions have emerged to
the complete exclusivity of parenthood.17 Nevertheless, and barring special
statutory provisions, non-parents are not held to have any rights to visitation,
constitutional or otherwise.

When non-parents seek to protect their interests in a relationship with a
child by making a claim for visitation, they often encounter the countervailing
(constitutional) rights of parents. The United States constitution has long been
construed to protect the parents’ exclusive authority to make childrearing
decisions,18 including the right to decide with whom their children shall
associate.19 Legally, non-parents are often considered “outsiders” who
threaten the parent-child relationship. Non-parents may be characterized as
“third parties” and even “strangers” to a child, especially when the legal

16 Bartlett, supra note 3.
17 See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
18 See e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972).
19 The paradigmatic example is, of course, Troxel v. Granville 530 US 57 (2000). For
a detailed discussion of Troxel see infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
system assesses their request for visitation. This understanding involves implications for their visitation claims as well because, under the constitution, a right to privacy is recognized in families and in the parent-child relationship, giving them a private realm that cannot be entered. The constitution, then, has also been interpreted as providing shelter to the parent-child relationship by creating a boundary that protects parents and their children from outside interference.

---

20 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, *Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights*, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747, 1786 n. 150 (1993). The terms “third party” or “stranger” denote disconnection, detachment, and even a threat. In reality, however, many of those referred to as “third parties” and “strangers” are hardly detached from the child’s life. Thus, for instance, the term “strangers” was used to describe grandparents. *Id.* and a surrogate mother. Janet L. Dolgin, *Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood*, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 637, 684-685 (1993). On these grounds, I have chosen to use the term “non parents.”


22 Prior to *Troxel*, several state courts found that third party visitations violated family privacy. See e.g. *Hawk v. Hawk*, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993). The plurality’s decision in *Troxel*, however, was not founded on the parents’ or the family’s right to privacy but on the parental autonomy to make childrearing decisions. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. Jennifer Nedelsky is critical of the notion of legal rights as boundaries and of this understanding of the right to privacy in particular. According to Nedelsky, this view depicts the self as bounded and fosters independence and selfishness rather than interdependence and connectedness. Jennifer Nedelsky, *Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self*, 30 Representations 162 (1990). Nedelsky’s critique, however, does not fully take into account the role of rights as boundaries around groups and, particularly, intimate groups such as the family. Ferdinand Schoeman, for example, argues that boundaries protecting
2. Challenging Traditional Visitation Rules

The last decades of the twentieth century witnessed growing unease with traditional legal conceptions of family and parenthood, including traditional visitation laws. The main reason for the current discontent with existing laws has been the changing reality of the American family, partly due to changes in social norms: the high rate of divorce, the growing numbers of blended (or “step”) families and of single-parent families, the increase in the proportion of children born outside of marriage, and the emergence of new gay and lesbian families. In addition, advancements in medical technology have radically relationships from intrusion are essential for the very possibility of intimate relationships. Boundaries, according to Schoeman, enable and foster the creation of a safe environment enabling individuals to expose and share their selves with each other. In his view, the notion of intimacy provides the basis for according the family a right to privacy. Ferdinand Schoeman, Rights of Children, Rights of Parents, and the Moral Basis of the Family, 91 Ethics 6, 14-15 (1980). Elsewhere, I criticize the notion of rights as establishing boundaries, even around the family. Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Rights, Boundaries, and the Family, 27 Tel-Aviv U. L. Rev. 539 (2003) [Hebrew].

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (U.S. 2000). These variant family patterns are grouped under the category of “nontraditional” families. This term, however, is misleading, for it is used to describe all family patterns that depart from the model of the nuclear family, although they have in fact existed throughout human history. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “It All Depends on What You Mean by Home”: Toward a Communitarian Theory of the “Nontraditional Family”, 1996 Utah L. Rev. 569, 570.
expanded the range of procreative possibilities, undermining traditional conceptions of procreation and parenthood. 24

This confluence of changing social norms and advancement in reproductive technologies has had a tremendous effect on the family relationships between children and adults. An ever increasing number of children began to form strong and meaningful attachments with adults who are not legally recognized as their parents, and these relationships have challenged the legal system in a multitude of ways. 25 With visitation defined as a parental right and parenthood as exclusive, these relationships between children and non-parental adults have been denied recognition and protection under the law. Stepparents, partners of legal parents, grandparents, surrogate mothers, foster-parents—all have sought and generally failed to protect their interest in continuing their relationships with children by claiming visitation rights. 26 Their stories exemplified the ever-

25 Bartlett, supra note 3.
26 See e.g. Cox v. Williams, 502 N.W.2d 128, 131 (Wisc. 1993) (holding that a former stepparent did not have standing to petition for visitation); Pierce v. Pierce, 645 P.2d 1353 (Mont. 1982); Worrell v. Elkhart County Office of Families & Children, 704 N.E.2d 1027, 1028 (Ind. 1998) (former foster parents lacked standing to seek visitation with former foster child); In re Melissa M., 421 N.Y.S.2d 300, 304 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1979) (former foster parents denied visitation rights after child was returned to biological father and stepmother); In re Corey Richardson, 53 Va. Cir. 128, 132 (2000); Swiss v.
increasing disjunction between the new reality of people’s lives and the dominant legal norms, and have captured public as well as academic attention.27

When legal rules cease to relate to people’s actual lives, their justification is significantly undermined, hence the extensive criticism of family law in general and of existing visitation laws in particular.28 The law’s failure to protect the meaningful relationships shared by children and adults and its seeming disregard for their respective relational interests have yielded various proposals for its modification. In all fifty states, legislative and

Cabinet for Families & Children, 43 S.W.3d 796 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991) (lesbian co-mother denied visitation after the relationship with the biological mother had ended); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782-83 (Cal. 1993) (denying legal rights for relationship with a child from a surrogate mother after deciding that legally, she was not the child’s mother).


28 Id.
judicial initiatives have attempted to adapt the law to “the changing realities of the American family.”

The main change adopted in the various reforms has been the erosion of parental exclusivity concerning visitation and the recognition of visitation rights for various non-parents. This move has generated an intensive debate, which is still ongoing: How to reconcile parental authority on child-rearing decisions with the associational interests of both children and adults and with the best interest of the child standard? What place is there for parental exclusivity in the changing reality of family life? Whose interest in access to the child should be legally recognized and protected? What should be the basis for recognizing individuals’ visitation rights? These and various other dilemmas remain unresolved. In the following sections, I review the legal reforms and the legal chaos surrounding visitation issues that culminated in Troxel v. Granville and its aftermath, suggesting that the turmoil and the impasse on the visitation issue can be attributed to the lack of an underlying theory of visitation.

3. The Visitation Debate

A. The Disarray in Third-Party Visitation Statutes

Recognizing the changes affecting the American family, the legal system began to deviate from parental exclusivity on the issue of visitation and to

---

acknowledge relationships between children and non-parents, *inter alia*, by enacting various third-party visitation statutes. Like most matters of family law, visitation issues are subject to state discretion, and all states have indeed recognized some form of third party visitation.\(^3\) The common denominator of all the different statutes is the perception of visitation as a parental right. When recognized, visitation by non-parents is regarded as the exception. Except for this feature, however, the visitation statutes and the case law concerning non-parents are “dazzlingly varied,” and even a cursory review of them is sufficient to reveal vast inconsistencies and confusion.\(^3\)

States diverge significantly as to who may be entitled to visitation rights. Although every state has enacted legislation according some visitation rights to grandparents, the circumstances under which visitation would be granted differ significantly from state to state.\(^3\) Only about one-third of the states

\(^3\) See e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73, n.1.


provide for visitation by stepparents in their legislation, either expressly or in language that is broad enough to include them,33 and state courts addressing visitation rights of stepparents have arrived at different conclusions.34 The uncertainty and lack of consistency intensify with regard to other interested parties, such as foster parents, siblings, uncles, and cousins. Such interested parties have rarely been accorded visitation rights in states’ legislation, and the courts have varied widely on whether they should be.35

State laws, however, differ not only on who may seek visitation, but also regarding the circumstances in which visitation rights should be granted to non-parents and on the substantive standards that should govern the

33 Gregory, supra note 31, at 361.
decision.\textsuperscript{36} To give but a few examples: states differ on whether or not a
disruption in family relations in the form of death or divorce is a precondition
for awarding visitation to non-parents, or whether other requirements, such
as mediation, should also be met prior to such a decision.\textsuperscript{37} Visitation laws are
indeed as varied as the different jurisdictions, and the prevalent confusion is
also evident in the frequent changes in third-party visitation laws in various
states.\textsuperscript{38}

Differences in third-party visitations laws between states are not
intrinsically problematic and do not constitute a violation of "integrity," in

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
Dworkin’s terms. Family matters always involve conflicting interests and policy considerations. Whenever children are concerned, emotions also tend to run high. Varied political and social forces have also influenced state legislation on visitation. With so many interests, policy considerations, and emotions at play, and with intuitions pointing in conflicting directions, it is not surprising that people disagree on what the law should be and only plausible, and even inevitable, that different states should have developed different non-parents’ visitation regimes.

My critique, then, does not target the variance in visitation rules for non-parents, although this fact alone can cause great uncertainty to family members. My objection is to the lack of any principle or theory underlying the current variations of visitation laws among states. Statutes and case law on this issue were triggered by the rapidly changing social reality and by the pressures exerted by various political groups. Instead of developing these

39 “Integrity holds within political communities, not among them... The American Constitution provides a federal system: it recognizes states as distinct political communities and assigns them sovereignty over many issues of principle. So there is no violation of political integrity in the fact that the tort laws of some states differ from those of others even over matters of principle.” Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 185-186 (1986).

40 Third party visitation statutes, and particularly statutes awarding visitation rights to grandparents, were pushed by powerful lobbies, including the AARP (formerly known as the American Association of Retired Persons). Janet L. Dolgin, The Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?, 102 Colum L. Rev. 337, 372 (2002).

41 See e.g., Coombs, supra note 36, at 13-17.
changes on solid theoretical grounds stating the nature of visitation rights, the values that should underlie them, and how to reconcile these rights with parental authority, they seem erratic, ad hoc responses to perceived injustices. Hence, they fail to offer a calculated and coherent scheme that could serve as a basis for alternative jurisprudence. This disarray is evident in *Troxel v. Granville*, the 2000 Supreme Court ruling that addressed the constitutionality of third party visitation statutes.

**B. Troxel v. Granville and Its Aftermath**

The extent to which third party visitation statutes infringe the constitutional rights of parents to make child rearing decisions has long been a contested issue. Although supreme courts in various states reached mixed rulings on this question during the 1990s, the Supreme Court had denied review of cases involving third-party visitation prior to granting certiorari in *Troxel*.  

---

42 The confusion and absence of a coherent and principled jurisprudence are evident not only on visitation issues but on family matters in general. See Dolgin, *supra* note 40.


44 *Changing Realities of Parenthood*, *supra* note 31, at 2056.


Rethinking Visitation

The Court’s decision to hear *Troxel*, therefore, generated expectations that the ruling would clarify some of the concerns pertaining to this issue. These expectations, however, were to be disappointed.

The statute under consideration at *Troxel* was a law permitting “any person” to petition for visitation rights “at any time,” whenever such visitation was seen to be in the child’s best interest. Acting under this statute, a family court judge ordered the broadening of visitation rights granted to paternal grandparents, contrary to the wishes of the children’s mother.

There was no opinion for the Court in this case. The Court was deeply split and issued six separate opinions. Judges disagreed about whether the case should have been considered at all and, if so, whether it should have been considered as a facial or an as-applied challenge; about the scope, if any, of the proper constitutional protection accorded to parental rights; about whose interests should have been considered, and about various additional matters. Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion (for four judges only) digressed to fact-specific grounds and concluded that, on the facts of the case,

48 Martin Guggenheim, however, contends that “the Court was in considerably more substantive agreement on the basic constitutional issues concerning third-party visitation statutes than is apparent from the number of opinions filed and the inability of any one opinion to capture a majority of views.” Martin Guggenheim, *The Making of the Model Third-Party (Non-Parental) Contact Statute: The Reporter's Perspective*, 18 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial Law. 15, 20 (2002).
the Washington family court had failed to show adequate deference for the mother’s decision.\footnote{Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer joined Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion. Troxel, 530 U.S.,at 60 (2000).}

The lack of a majority, the multiplicity of opinions, and the confusion characterizing each one of them have provided fertile ground for diverse and even contradictory interpretations of Troxel. Indeed, non-parental visitation cases attempting to follow the Troxel precedent are mixed and confused. Courts in different states have interpreted Troxel differently and even within states, variant understandings of Troxel have led to contradictory rulings as to the constitutionality of their states’ statutes.\footnote{See e.g., Dolgin, supra note 40, at 396 – 401 (reviewing conflicting cases from New York and California); Kristine L. Roberts, State Supreme Court Applications of Troxel v. Granville and the Courts’ Reluctance to Declare Grandparent Visitation Statutes Unconstitutional, 41 Fam. Ct. Rev. 14 (2003) (reviewing post-Troxel case law from different states, including Maine, West Virginia, Mississippi, Kansas, Iowa, and Oklahoma); Dwyer, supra note 7, at 977 – 984.} Troxel has also proven a rich vein for the extensive academic attempts seeking to discern its meaning and implications.\footnote{A recent Lexis search found 870 references to Troxel in the US & Canadian Law Reviews, Combined database, of which at least 202 seem to undertake an in-depth analysis of the case (addressing it at least ten times in their text).} Not surprisingly, these scholarly analyses also offer contradictory readings of the case and of the various judicial opinions.\footnote{Compare, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 7, at 978, interpreting the case as clearly having “put the breaks on the trend toward expansion of third-party visitation,” with Changing Realities of Parenthood, supra note 31, at 2057-2058, interpreting Troxel}
many respects, *Troxel* seems to have triggered only further doubts regarding non-parents’ visitation issues.\(^{53}\) The confusion exposed in *Troxel* is exacerbated by the perplexity surrounding the meaning of legal parenthood.

C. The Malleability of Parental Status

The swift and extensive changes in family patterns and norms over the last decades have significantly challenged traditional conceptions of parenthood. Thus far, current law has failed to keep up with changing social norms and bio-technological changes and has not produced clear and stable new principles according to which legal parenthood could be determined.

Questions about motherhood and fatherhood in cases of surrogacy, sperm donation, same-sex families, children born out of wedlock, and other family situations are still occupying legislators and judges.\(^{54}\) This situation involves significant implications for visitation issues. Since visitation is considered a parental right, deciding whether a claimant for visitation is a parent and thus prima facie entitled to visitation or a non-parent and thus generally not as implicitly endorsing non-parents’ visitation rights: “By leaving in place only a hazy presumption that parents act in the best interests of their children, the plurality has allowed plenty of room for states to grant [visitation] rights to nonparents.”

\(^{53}\) For an in-depth analysis of *Troxel* see Dolgin, *supra* note 40.

entitled to this right, is an important issue. Given that legal parenthood is fluid, open, and indeterminate, however, discerning parents claimants from claimants who are non-parents is at times a complicated task.

Besides the negative implications for legal predictability involved in this situation, the indeterminacy of legal parenthood broadens and distorts the scope of visitation issues. Claimants for visitation, and particularly in non-traditional family situations, are encouraged to state their claim as one of visitation by parents, thus requiring consideration of their parental legal status. Two telling, highly publicized examples are the Supreme Court case of *Quilloin v. Walcott*55 and the New York case of *Thomas S. v. Robin Y.*56

The common features of these different cases concern a biological male progenitor who maintained an ongoing relationship with the child, but neither initiated nor showed interest in initiating legal proceedings to be recognized as the child’s legal father. After the relationship had continued for several years, access to the child was denied by the mother, who was the legal parent.57 Only when access to the child was denied (in both cases when the child was approximately twelve years old) and the men had to seek enforced access through rights of visitation, did they initiate proceedings to be legally

57 In *Thomas S.*, the child lived with two lesbian mothers, and both were opposed to the child’s continued contact with Thomas. Under the law, however, only the biological mother was considered a legal parent authorized to make decisions as to who should be allowed to associate with the child.
recognized as the children’s respective fathers so as to secure parental visitation rights. In *Thomas S.* in particular, it was evident that Thomas’ sole concern was to continue his relationship with the child, Ry. Since the claimants’ prospects of being awarded visitation rights as non-parents were almost non-existent, they had to take their chances on a paternity claim, which is far broader and substantially different. Disputes over visitation thus become distorted into battles about who the child’s parents really are and slide into demands for parental rights in toto, including custody, thereby muddling significant questions. Instead of considering whether the nature of the relationship between the claimant and the child justifies awarding visitation rights, and the potential implications of awarding visitation rights for the child’s relationship with her custodians, the courts enter a debate about a different and larger issue: what makes one a parent.

58 In *Quiloin*, the mother’s husband wanted to adopt the child and the couple found that contact with Quiloin was disruptive. See infra notes 100-104 and accompanying text. In *Thomas S.* access to the child was denied following a deterioration of the relationship between Thomas and the child’s two lesbian mothers.

59 Indeed, once his status as father was not recognized by the Supreme Court, Quiloin’s claim for visitation was succinctly denied. So was the claim of Thomas S., according to the New York family court’s decision that was reversed on appeal. Another example often cited, which broadens and distorts the dispute, is *Michael H. v. Gerald D.*, 491 U.S. 110 (1989). See infra notes 109-113 and accompanying text.

60 Whereas in *Quiloin* the child explicitly stated a wish to continue visitations with Quiloin, in *Thomas S.*, the child expressed anxiety about continued visitations. As noted, both children were approximately twelve years old and thus of an age
Another consequence of the confused meanings of legal parenthood is that it is subject to manipulation. Legal parenthood can easily be interpreted in ways that fit a desired outcome, including but not limited to visitation issues. A claimant adjudged to be worthy of visitation can be legally recognized as a parent and vice-versa, parental status can be denied to block visitation. Visitation, then, is not only derivative from prior recognition of a legal parent but also a factor in determining it. The New York family court decision in *Thomas S.* again provides an example. Judge Kaufmann denied Thomas’s paternity claim because he found that compulsory visitation between him and the child, Ry, would be harmful to the child by undermining her relationship with her two mothers and her sister and the where their wishes should be considered. Once Quilloin was denied paternal status, however, the almost automatic result was the denial of visitation. The visitation question was not considered per se. Thomas S., on the other hand, was eventually recognized as the legal father, and although the appellate court stated that visitation was to be considered separately, it was obvious that a paternity determination also determined that visitation would take place. Thomas S., however, stopped the contest at this point and did not pursue his visitation rights. Susan Dominus, *Growing Up With Mom & Mom, N.Y. Times*, October 24, 2004, 6 (magazine) at 69 (an interview with the child, Ry, at the age of 22).

The idea of rights considered parental is that legal parenthood is a given and that all rights, duties, and obligations considered parental follow and are simply attached to the legal parent. For a critique of this idea, see *infra* notes 98, 147 and accompanying text.
Rethinking Visitation

stability of her family unit. Although these concerns may have been real and may have justified denying Thomas rights of visitation, they are (or should be) unrelated to the question of paternal status. This was indeed the point asserted by the appellate court, which reversed the decision and held that the benefit or harm to Ry as a result of Thomas’s visitation was irrelevant to his paternity claim. These considerations, the appellate court held, could and

62 Legally, Ry had no sister and only one (biological) mother. Judge Kaufmann’s decision was at first indeed celebrated in lesbian circles for recognizing non-biological ties in lesbian families, adopting a functional approach to legal parenthood and family. The functional approach to family law was developed by various theorists as a response to the traditional or formal approach, which defines familial relationships in accordance with the nuclear family model. The formal approach generally “recognizes only individuals related to each other by the bonds of blood, adoption, or marriage.” Note: Looking for Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1640, 1645 (1991). In contrast, the functional approach asks what group of people functions as a family, that is, what group of people shares the essential characteristics of a family. See e.g. Martha L. Minow, Redefining Families: Who’s In and Who’s Out?, 62 U. Col. L. Rev. 269, 272 (1991). In so doing, the functional approach attempts to bridge the gap between law and reality, namely, between the formal legal definitions of familial relations (such as parenthood) and the reality of people’s lives. But misgivings have been raised as to whether the functional approach really achieves what it attempts to do. See e.g., Brad Sears, Winning Arguments/Losing Themselves: The (Dys)Functional Approach in Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 559 (1994); Craig W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family Values: The Case of Gay and Lesbian Families, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1299 (1997).
should be addressed under the best interest of the child standard when considering Thomas’s request for visitation (as a father).63

The argument of the appellate court stating that the potential impact of Thomas’s visitation was irrelevant to his paternity claim is in principle correct. Courts are indeed required to determine visitation with parents guided by the best interest of the child. But parents’ rights of visitation, as noted, are firm and denied only under extreme circumstances.64 Under current law, then, denying visitation rights to protect a child from potential harm to her and her family requires us to negate the claimant’s paternity.65

The malleability of legal parenthood, then, together with the prevalent understanding of visitation as a parental right, open the way for the improper conflation of questions concerning visitation and questions concerning legal parenthood.66 The move toward recognition of third party visitation was supposed to alleviate the improper conflation of issues, as it enables claimants

64 Supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
66 As in Quilloin and in Michael H., denying paternity in these cases was also meant to enable another man to assume the role of legal parent through adoption or the presumption of paternity, not only to block visitation. The malleability of legal parenthood, however, again enabled the Court to reach the desired outcome. The focus tends to be on the family rather than on the individual child, especially if the case concerns a traditional nuclear model. See infra notes 98-117 and accompanying text.
to make a claim for visitation without being recognized as parents.\textsuperscript{67} Nonetheless, and especially following \textit{Troxel}, visitation by non-parents is still an exception whereas visitation by parents is the well established rule. As long as visitation is understood as a parental right, then, questions of visitation and questions concerning parenthood will remain entangled.

This is also evident in the use of such notions as de facto parenthood, psychological parenting, or functional parenthood. These notions were developed in response to the changing reality of parenthood and child-adult familial relationship, and they enable to confer rights considered parental upon individuals who are not legally recognized as parents. As these notions suggest, although these individual claimants are not legally recognized as parents, they should have been. Janet Dolgin offers recent examples of state courts using concepts such as de facto parenthood or psychological parentage to award visitation rights to claimants by distinguishing these cases from \textit{Troxel}, which had purportedly addressed the visitation rights of non-parents who did not \textit{function} as parents.\textsuperscript{68} These notions do blur the once clear line dividing parents from non-parents, but they re-establish the understanding of visitation as a parental right and its connection to all other rights considered parental. Thus, individuals recognized as de facto, functional, or psychological parents can make a claim for all rights considered parental, not

\textsuperscript{67} Sears, \textit{supra} note 62, at 575.

only to visitation. Thus, a visitation claim submitted by a de facto, functional, or psychological parent can, just like a paternity claim, reopen the way to a claim for parental rights in toto.69

D. Reformulating the Question as a Way Out of the Maze

The disarray of third party visitation status and the Supreme Court's confusion in *Troxel* revealed the absence of an underlying theory of visitation that would specify the interests and values that a right to visitation should aim to protect. Furthermore, as long as parental status is the main distinguishing factor between visitation claimants, the malleability of legal parenthood and concepts such as de facto parenthood compound the current confusion about visitation rights, especially by non-parents. It also clouds the real questions that should be debated concerning these rights, and thus thwarts the development of a theory of visitation.

On the way to developing such a theory of visitation, however, to take as given that visitation is a parental right sets it on the wrong track. Rather than asking why only the parents’ interests in their relationship with their children should be protected, I wish to challenge the basic assumptions of the existing laws and ask instead how we should understand rights of visitation and what should be the basis for recognizing such rights. My answer would be that visitation should be understood as an independent relational right, rather

69 See *infra* notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
than as a parental right, part of the cluster of rights associated with parenthood.

4. Visitation as a Parental Right: An Inadequate Construct

In light of the central role that children’s interests should play in constructing legal rules that affect them, I begin my case against the conception of visitation as a parental right by discussing children’s interests in the issue of visitation. My discussion will show that visitation as a parental right is incompatible with children’s interests and embodies remnants of a perception

70 Talking about children’s interests to challenge, and even more so to justify, adults’ rights requires some further consideration. Children’s interests can and often should be protected through children’s rights as such. Occasionally, however, adults are granted rights in order to serve children’s interests. Meir Dan-Cohen calls these derivative rights because they are recognized in A out of concern for B. Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communications by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 Calif. L. Rev. 1229, 1233 (1991). Recognizing adults’ rights is sometimes a better way of protecting children’s interests, given that children depend on adults for the exercise of their rights and thus become subject to abuse and manipulation. Martin Guggenheim, What’s Wrong with Children’s Rights (2005). Visitation is particularly conducive to the use of a children’s rights vocabulary to conceal adults’ interests. Emily Buss, Children’s Associational Rights?: Why Less is More, 11 Wm & Mary Bill of Rts J 1101, 1102 (2003). Nonetheless, advocates of the view that the interests of adults (and not only those of children) deserve legal recognition and protection, should be particularly careful when taking care of adults’ rights, lest they contradict children’s interests. A limited claim stating that when two alternative legal models of adults’ rights are available, the one more compatible with children’s interests should be preferred, will suffice for my current purposes.
construing children as their parents’ property. I further demonstrate that the perception of visitation as a parental right plays down relational values.

A. Children’s Relational Interests

A good starting point for the argument that the right to visitation as a parental right is not compatible with, and even contradicts, children’s interests is the anti-compulsory visitation stance of Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit in their renowned work, Beyond the Best Interest of the Child.71 Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit emphasize the negative side of court-ordered visitation over the objection of children’s custodial parents. In their view, court ordered visitation may expose children to conflicting loyalties, threatening the intimacy and the relationship with their custodians. These potentially harmful effects of compulsory visitation mandate that no visitation rights, of any kind, should be legally recognized, not even the visitation rights of non-custodial parents.72

72 Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit addressed only non-custodial parental visitations following divorce and did not address the visitation rights of non-parents. The reason is not that they found visitation of non-parents less troubling but rather that when Beyond the Best Interest of the Child was written, visitation of non-parents was not yet recognized. Under the prevalent understanding of parental exclusivity, only non-custodial parents were then awarded visitations. Bartlett, supra note 3.
Although their proposal for revoking the visitation rights of non-custodial parents encountered fierce opposition, the debate it triggered provided strong arguments against the notion of visitation as a parental right. Their critics did not dismiss the claim they raised about the potential harms of visitation, but emphasized that compulsory visitation still involves advantages to children, which offset and even exceed its harms. But the benefits of compulsory visitation noted by the critics exist only when visitation rights had been meant to secure the continuation of an already ongoing relationship. If not, the arguments that Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit raise against compulsory visitation, whether by parents or non-parents, remain unanswered.

The anti-visitation proposal of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit relies mainly on the authors’ psychoanalytic theory of child development.73 Their view

73 It should be noted that the authors’ depiction of their work as scientific has also been heavily criticized. See e.g., Daniel Katkin, Bruce Bullington & Murray Levine, *Above and Beyond the Best Interest of the Child: An Inquiry into the Relationship Between Social Science and Social Action*, 8 Law & Society Rev. 669 (1974) The thrust of the argument against the authors was that they had failed to provide empirical basis for their contentions. *Id.* See also Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, *The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policy Making: Custody Determinations and Divorce*, 1987 Wis. L. Rev. 107, 145-146; Robert D. Felner & Stephanie S. Farber, Social Policy for Child Custody: A Multidisciplinary Framework, 50 Amer. J. Orthopsychiatry 341 (1980); Michael S. Wald, *Thinking About Public Policy Toward Abuse and Neglect of Children: A Review of Before the Best Interests of the Child*, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 645, 664 (1980); Peter L. Strauss & Joanna B. Strauss, Book Review, 74 Col. L. Rev. 996, 1002 (1974) [reviewing *Beyond the Best Interest of the Child*].
emphasizes children’s need for a continuous and stable relationship with at least one parent, involving not only continuous physical care but also the parent’s exercise of absolute authority.74 According to their theory, any disruption or interference in the child’s relationship with the parents is detrimental because it undermines stability and the child’s view of the parent as “omniscient and all powerful.”75 Court-ordered visitation by a person who is unwanted by the custodial parent falls under their definition of a disruption, from which the parent-child relationship should be shielded.

These authors argue that a visitation the custodial parent considers undesirable may expose the child to conflicting loyalties, compromise the intimacy between the child and the custodial parent, and shatter the child’s required trust in the parent’s autonomy and omnipotence when exercising control over the child’s life.76 They emphasize that children’s need for stability

74 The question of how to identify this parent or establish parental status is less significant for my endeavor. Hence, I will not address Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit’s proposal, which seeks to replace the traditional standards of marriage and biology for determining legal parenthood with psychological standards and with their concept of the psychological parent. Beyond the Best Interest of the Child, supra note 71, at 98. Instead, my focus will be on the alleged implications of the child’s need for a steady relationship with a parent, regardless of how the parent’s identity is determined legally.

75 Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud & Albert J. Solnit, Before the Best Interests of the Child 9 (1979) [hereinafter Before the Best Interests of the Child].

76 Beyond the Best Interest of the Child, supra note 71, at 37-38.
is particularly acute following a crisis experience in the family relations, such as divorce, which may leave children “shaken, disoriented and confused.”

Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit further contend that the threat that compulsory visitation poses to the child’s relationship with her custodian is in no way offset by any of visitation’s potential benefits, due to the limited nature of the relationship that a child can form with an individual who is merely visiting. They have also argued that facilitating children’s positive relationships with two people in conflict with one another is beyond the courts’ capacity.

Their strong arguments against compulsory visitation were subject to heavy criticism in academic circles. Critics did not question these scholars’ arguments on the potential harms of compulsory visitation and did recognize that visitation is not an unalloyed blessing. They did note, however, that the arguments of Goldstein and his colleagues had overstated the damage of

77 Id. at 117-118. The authors qualify their argument to children below the age of five or six at the time of parents’ separation: “Once a child is past the age of five or six, he may be unwilling to give up the relationship to a parent who has played a large part in his early development. By that time he has outgrown his earlier unquestioning trust in parents, he has learned to criticize, to take sides in quarrels, to begin to understand that parents in some way share responsibility for the separation. In short, the progress in his cognitive capacity may help him with his emotional difficulties inherent in the situation.” Id. at 119 note*.

78 Beyond the Best Interest of the Child, supra note 71, at 38.

79 Id. at 117.
compulsory visitation and played down the potential harm of its denial. In highlighting the harms of denying visitation, many of their critics have relied on Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit’s own recognition of the importance of continuity of relationships in children’s lives. Studies on divorce, foster care, adoption, and cross-cultural perspectives suggest that children are not only dependent on a network of attachments rather than on a primary single bond, but also point out the significance of continuity and the harmful effect of loss in the various relationships in children’s lives.

Studies of families after divorce demonstrate that maintaining ties with non-custodial parents through visitation is highly significant for children.

---

80 See e.g., Wald, supra note 73.
82 The research most often cited in countering Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit’s argument against post-divorce visitation is probably the long-term study conducted by clinical psychologist Judith Wallerstein and her associates, tracking the effects of divorce on children. Judith S. Wallerstein & Joan Berlin Kelly, Surviving the Breakup: How Children and Parents Cope with Divorce (1980) [hereinafter Surviving the Breakup]; Judith S. Wallerstein & Sandra Blakeslee, Second Chances: Men, Women, and Children a Decade After Divorce (1989) [hereinafter Second Chances]; Judith S. Wallerstein & Sandra Blakeslee, The Good Marriage: How and Why Love Lasts (1995). In Surviving the Breakup, Judith Wallerstein together with Joan Kelly analyzed and reported the effects of divorce on the lives of sixty divorced couples and their children, both at the time of marital breakup and at subsequent intervals of eighteen months and five years. For our purposes, one of their main findings concerned the importance for the child of a continued relationship with both parents following divorce and the
Data from foster placement and adoption of older children contexts also indicates that continued contact with the original parents generally promotes the child’s sense of well-being and emotional security. Cross-cultural research has expanded the framework of discussion, arguing that children form multiple attachments to psychological parents and to others who are members of their kin groups. These studies point to the extensive and varied network of children’s attachments, with any loss argued to be potentially harmful.

Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit do recognize the importance of continuing relationships in children’s lives and the potential harm ensuing from breaking up attachments. Their advice in situations of divorce is to encourage custodial divorced parents to facilitate visitation between the non-custodial parent and

significance of visitation in this regard. Subsequent studies, however, emphasized the centrality to children’s adjustment following divorce of the custodial parent-child relationship. Judith S. Wallerstein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move: Psychological and Legal Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30 Fam. L.Q. 305, 310-311 (1996).


the child. They even suggest that, other things being equal, courts should award custody to the parent most willing to provide the child opportunities for contact with the other parent. Nevertheless, they argue that children benefit from multiple ties on condition that the relationships between the adults involved are positive, or at least not hostile and negative. If the latter, children not only do not benefit but actually suffer. Hence, they do not oppose visits in general but only compulsory visits that jeopardize children’s relationship with their custodians and thus, in their view, entail far greater harm than that involved in breaking up attachments in children’s lives.

Although with reservations, critics of Goldstein and his colleagues do acknowledge the centrality of the relationship with the custodial parent to the child’s well-being, as well as the potential harm of visits to which the custodial parent objects. These critics, however, contest that conflicting

---

85 Beyond the Best Interest of the Child, supra note 71, at 118-119. It might also be desirable, in their view, for courts to add to their (unconditional) custody awards an appropriate warning, in a paraphrase of the state’s warning to smokers: “Denial of Visits may be Detrimental to your Child.” Id. at 185, note 8.

86 Their proposal in this regard was often misunderstood. Many of their critics simply misinterpret Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit as suggesting that children do not form multiple attachments. Beyond the Best Interest of the Child, supra note 71, at 116-118.

87 Wallerstein and her associates note: “[N]early half of the children had witnessed intensely antagonistic exchange between parents at the time of visiting.” Surviving the Breakup, supra note 82, at 141 and “[a]ll in all, one-third of the children were consistently exposed to intense anger at visiting time. The tension generated by the parents burdened the visits and stressed them and the children.” Id. at 125. The
loyalties are potentially more harmful than broken attachments. In their view, by allowing custodial parents to sever meaningful attachments in children’s lives, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit misapply the continuity principle they themselves had formulated.

The debate, therefore, hinges on the balance of harms resulting from court ordered visitations, when denying visitation means breaking up an existent attachment. When visitation is sought to enable the claimant to establish a new relationship with the child and the custodial parent objects, consensus appears to be that ordering visitation would be more detrimental to the child. Data on the least detrimental alternative\textsuperscript{88} to the child is confused and unreliable: Should we safeguard one unconditional relationship in the child’s life at the expense of breaking up another attachment? Or should we preserve the continuity of relationships despite conflicting loyalties and a potential threat to the child-custodian relationship?\textsuperscript{89}

anxiety that surrounded visits in these cases affected the child’s behavior. Children “developed symptomatic behavior in response to the anxiety and fear of angering one or the other parent. They felt that they were in jeopardy between two warring giants and they reacted accordingly.” Id. at 126.

\textsuperscript{88} I follow Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's proposal to use the “least detrimental alternative” for a child rather than the “best interests of the child” as a reminder of the limits of what can be attained within the limits of the law. Before the Best Interests of the Child, supra note 75, at 6.

\textsuperscript{89} For an in-depth search of this literature, see Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Toward Relational Understanding of Visitation 177-217 (2005) (unpublished JSD dissertation, Columbia Law School). Even in a divorce context, where our strongest intuition suggests that
Without attempting to resolve this issue, my own interest in surveying this literature is twofold. First, I use the debate on court-ordered visitation, and particularly the points of agreement between the two parties, to demonstrate that provisions in visitation laws should rely on the existence or absence of a relationship with the child rather than on parental status. Second, I use the debate to expose the inconsistencies of the legal approach based on parental status in different contexts, thereby exposing the genuine rationale that underlies this approach and its inadequacy. My proposal seeks to replace these policy considerations with relational values.

B. The Inconsistency of the Legal Approach

The debate within the social sciences suggested that, insofar as visitation rights are to be recognized, their main justification from the perspective of the children’s interests is to maintain continuity in the children’s relationships. This rationale, however, is irreconcilable with visitation understood as a parental right, which generally denies visitation rights to non-parents, even when visitation is meant to preserve an ongoing relationship with a child. By contrast, parents are entitled to visitations even without any previous relationship with the child. This legal distinction, which is based on parental the child’s “best” and not merely “least detrimental” alternative is to maintain contact with the noncustodial parent, researchers admit that the question of whether a relationship with two antagonistic parents or with one overburdened but stable one remains open. Felner & Farber, supra note 73, at 344.
status rather than on the existence of a relationship, seems incompatible with children’s interests.

Furthermore, when visitation laws rely on parental status, the result is inconsistency and incoherence. In the debate on the advantages of maintaining multiple albeit conflicting attachments vs. safeguarding one unconditional attachment for children, the law endorses the former option in certain contexts and the latter in others. When the claimant for visitation is a non-parent, the law prefers to maintain one unconditional relationship with the child, and views legally enforced visitation as an intrusion on the custodian-child relationship. The law rejects this perception of visitation rights, however, when the claimant is a legally recognized parent. Sustaining multiple, even if conflictual, attachments in children’s lives is viewed as the best, not just the least detrimental, alternative when they involve a child’s parents. Yet, social science provides no grounds for a distinction between parents and non-parents, either as figures with whom visitation disturbs the custodian-child relationship or as figures with whom a continued relationship is important to the child.

But the inconsistency evinced in the legal approach goes beyond the parent/non-parent distinction. Over two decades ago, Marsha Garrison

90 This perception of non-parents’ visitation is also evident in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
91 On the problematic distinction between “parents” and “non-parents,” see section 3.C. above.
recognized a further discrepancy. Garrison compared the widespread legal acceptance of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit’s ideas in the contexts of foster care and adoption with the extremely negative reaction to their ideas in the context of divorce. In the context of long-term foster care and adoption, the legal system embraced children’s need for an unconditional permanent relationship and, upon children’s adoption, terminated the original parents’ parental rights, including visitation. In the post-divorce context, however, the idea of one unconditional permanent relationship was fiercely rejected, and the legal system endorsed children’s need for the continuity of familial relationships. Children’s presumed legal need for a continuity of relationships following divorce led not only to strong visitation rights of non-

92 Garrison, supra note 83.
93 Garrison, id at 450-453. See also Peggy C. Davis, “There’s a book Out… “: An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1539 (1987) (documenting the judiciary’s blanket acceptance of the arguments in Beyond the Best Interest of the Child in regard to child’s placement disputes).
94 Garrison’s purpose in demonstrating the law’s inconsistency was to bolster her argument against the termination of parental rights to allow post adoption visitation. Garrison, supra note 83 at 455. Whereas Garrison sides with Goldstein, Freud and Solnit’s critics and claims they were wrong, I merely argue that it is inconsistent to adopt the critics view on visitation with regards to parents while endorsing Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit’s approach in the context of non-parents’ visitation. Hence, to the extent that the legal system recognizes visitation rights, it cannot do so on the basis of the claimant’s parental status.
custodial parents but also to the popularity of joint custody legislation in the late 1970s and 1980s.95

What makes Garrison’s comparison particularly interesting is that the situations of post-divorce and of adoption after long-term foster care address the visitation rights of parents who had lost custody of their children. Garrison argued that children’s needs in both these contexts are similar, and she questioned the law’s differential treatment of these situations.96 In the post-divorce situation, children and the parents who lose custody of them retain contact through visitation rights whereas, following adoption, children lose contact with their original parents, who are normally denied visitation rights.

In technical-legal terms, the post-divorce situation concerns parents’ visitation while the post-adoption situation concerns non-parents’ visitation, since the adoption terminated the parental status and rights of the original parents. But the title of Garrison’s article—“Why Terminate Parental Rights?”—Vividly pinpoints that legal parenthood is a human creation, and terminating parental status is a decision rather than a given. Legal decisions cannot be made by internal deduction from the legal concept of “parent.”

95 See Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 Ohio St.L.J. 455, 466 (1984). Later experience, however, showed that, contrary to consensual arrangements, court ordered joint custody is harmful to children’s interests by exposing them to perpetual conflict. Id. at 487-495. See also: Eleanor E. Maccoby & Robert H. Mnookin, Dividing the Child: Social and Legal Dilemmas of Custody 284-285 (1992).

96 Garrison supra note 83.
Garrison’s research highlighted that classifying a claimant for visitation as parent or non-parent is open and undetermined, all the more so given the upheaval in the traditional legal definitions of motherhood, fatherhood, and parenthood in recent decades.97

C. Protecting Marriage and Nuclear Families

Denying visitation to original parents in cases of adoption is justified on the grounds of not disrupting or undermining the new family created by the adoption.98 This rationale is endorsed regardless of the adopted children’s previous attachment to their original parents, and without explaining why a preference for children maintaining stable and undisturbed relationships is utterly rejected in situations of divorce. This approach affords a glimpse into the true motives underlying the legal system’s visitation policy. Visitation rules, including the general rule of denying the original parents’ visitation rights upon a child’s adoption, are probably not about protecting the

97 Section 3.C. above.
children’s primary relationship with the custodial parents but rather about preserving the traditional model of the nuclear family and the institution of marriage. The true justification for denying visitation to original parents in cases of adoption, then, is to avoid interference with the new (nuclear) family, viewed as the ideal family pattern, rather than to protect the children’s interests and their relationships with their custodians.

This rationale can be discerned not only in the inconsistent legal approach endorsed in post-divorce and post-adoption situations but in other family situations as well. Thus, for instance, preserving the traditional nuclear family was at the heart of the Supreme Court decision in Quilloin as well as in other cases known as the “unwed fathers’ cases,”99 which culminated in the 1989 case of Michael H. v. Gerald D.100 The circumstances of three of these cases concerned a child born out of wedlock, whose mother subsequently married a man who was not the biological father and wanted to adopt the child.101 The adoption was dependent upon a priori determination that the biological male progenitor was not the child’s legal father, thus focusing on the paternal status of biological fathers of children born out of wedlock. Another central 

_____


100 491 U.S. 110 (1989).

101 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the first case that began this chain of cases is an exception. Stanley was not a case of one man against another but a biological father against the state.
issue, however, concerned the very continuation of a relationship between the biological father and the child through legal rights of visitations that, in turn, also depended on his parental status.102

Recognizing the biological father’s parental status, therefore, could impede the adoption and hinder the creation of a traditional nuclear family for the child by enabling the biological father to interfere with its functioning. These considerations, as noted, affected the determination of parental status as well as the more limited question of visitation. My critical view of the confluence of issues in these cases, as well as of the disproportionate influence of the wish to deny visitation on the determination of denying paternity, was noted above.103 In three of these cases—Michael H., Lehr, and Quilloin—the biological father was denied paternal status. A supposedly unavoidable consequence was a denial of his claim for visitation rights.

Resembling post-adoption situations, denying visitation to the biological fathers in these cases might be theoretically justified for the purpose of securing children a stable and unconditional relationship, as Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit advocated. On closer scrutiny, however, it is obvious that underlying the legal rules is not a child’s need for one unconditional

102 Three of the biological fathers, Quilloin, Caban, and Michael H., did not initiate paternity proceedings until the pending adoption jeopardized their access to the child, suggesting they were more interested in the rights to visitation than in the symbolic parental status.

103 See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
relationship but rather the wish to protect the family, and not necessarily a particular family but more a specific ideal—that of the nuclear family. Quilloin is a telling example.

In Quilloin, the mother’s husband, Walcott, wanted to adopt her son, who was then approximately twelve years old and had an established relationship with his biological father. Although the child expressed a desire to be adopted by Walcott, he also clearly indicated that he wished to continue visitations with Quilloin. The mother, however, argued that “these contacts were having a disruptive effect on the child and on [the]… entire family.” In denying Quilloin paternal status and affirming the adoption, the Supreme Court of Georgia also succinctly denied the continuation of Quilloin’s visitations based on the mother’s claim, and this decision was upheld in the Supreme Court. Although the denial of Quilloin’s rights of visitation was seemingly meant to protect the child from the visits’ disruptive effect, the son still expressly indicated he wished them to continue. Obviously, had the mother and Quilloin been married and divorced before the child’s birth, Quilloin would have been the legal father and the mother’s claim to deny visitation could not have been heard. In the typical case of a divorce followed by adoption, the

---

104 Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 251.
105 Id.
106 Id. Allegedly that was an inevitable result of allowing the adoption. Id. note 11. However, it was already noted that terminating original parents' rights following a child's adoption is a decision and not a given. Supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
by the mother’s remarriage, the potential harm to the children from incompatible male authority figures, persistent conflictual relationships, or disrupting the relationship with the custodian could not be considered grounds for denying visitation. Had the mother not remarried, it is also improbable that the Court would have been receptive to such a claim.

A more explicit instance of denying visitation through denial of paternal status in order to protect the ideal of the nuclear family is Michael H. v. Gerald D. Michael H. reached the United States Supreme Court after Stanley, Caban, Quilloin and Lehr—four cases in which the Court had seemed to have established clear conditions for recognizing an unwed biological progenitor as a father. As in Quilloin, Michael’s immediate concern was to ensure visitation rights with his daughter and thus protect his relationship with her. The right to visitation thus stood at the heart of the legal proceedings for paternity. Unlike Quilloin, Michael’s claim seemed quite strong, since he seemed to satisfy all the conditions set in the precedents for legal recognition as a father. He had lived with the child, had recognized her as his daughter, had a close and loving relationship with her, and had clearly demonstrated

107 See e.g. Pierce v. Yerkovich, 80 Misc. 2d 613, 622-624 (N.Y. Misc., 1974); Ireland v. Ireland, 246 Conn. 413, 442-443 (Conn., 1998).
110 At least according to the Court. Michael H. 491 U.S. at 118.
full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood—all shown to be key factors in establishing legal fatherhood in prior cases. The Court nevertheless denied Michael’s claim for paternal status, knowing that this would end his attempts to establish visitation.111 The underlying reason was the mother’s marriage to another man and the Court’s motivation to protect the family unit, which might be jeopardized were Michael’s claim admitted. In dismissing Michael’s claim, Justice Scalia explicitly stated that the motivation behind this decision was to protect the unit “typified by the marital family,” which in this case consisted of the child, her mother, the mother’s husband and two other children born to the couple.112

Both Quilloin and Michael H. epitomize the centrality of protecting nuclear families in visitation laws.113 Not only did the biological father and the child

111 Theoretically, Michael could have sought visitation as a “non-parent.” Section 4601 of the California Civil Code Annotated (West Supp. 1989) provided that “[i]n the discretion of the court, reasonable visitation rights may be granted to any other person having an interest in the welfare of the child.” Michael H. 491 U.S. at 144 (cited by Justice Stevens concurring). This provision was indeed the basis for Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion, finding that the California statute had provided sufficient protection to Michael’s relationship with Victoria. Id. at 132-135. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, however, this provision did not provide a real option for Michael to obtain visitation with Victoria since, as interpreted by the California courts, a putative parent who cannot establish paternity would not be able to obtain discretionary visitations as a non-parent. Id. at 148 – 150 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

112 Michael H. 491 U.S. at 123 n. 3.

113 Though Michael H. is perhaps the most extreme example of how far the Court will go to protect the nuclear family, the motivation of protecting nuclear families
have an established relationship (in Quilloin for twelve years!), but it was also argued that continuing the relationship was meaningful for the children as well (in Michael H. by the guardian ad litem and in Quilloin by the child himself), but the courts did not view this as sufficiently important.

My argument is not that Quilloin and/or Michael should have been awarded visitation rights. Maintaining relationships with the biological father might indeed have been harmful to the child in either or both these cases, through exposure to conflict or disruption of the primary relationship with the custodial parent, as noted. These are genuine and valid concerns that the courts could address. What remains unexplained is the complete absence of these considerations, insofar as the legal system perceives them as valid, in post-divorce situations. Divorced fathers who had been legally married would not find their visitation rights denied following the mother’s 

underlies all the unwed fathers cases. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies 85 (1995). The rule that seemed to emerge from the Court as to the paternal status of unwed biological fathers allegedly focused on the relationship of the child and the biological father. The Court stated that a biological father who has established a substantial relationship with his children is legally a father, but the real focus was on the relationship between the biological father and the mother and their resemblance to the marital relationship. Fineman argues that in fact, only when the biological father had maintained a social relationship with the mother that resembled a traditional conjugal relationship in a nuclear family was he recognized as a legal father. For a similar argument, see Dolgin, supra note 20, at 654.

Nor do I challenge or endorse the decision that, legally, they are not fathers. My interest in this article is not in legal parenthood and how it should be determined.
remarriage were the mother to claim that visitation has a disruptive effect on the child and on her new family. In fact, mothers who would dare to make such a claim in the name of the child may find they are accused of alienating the child from the father and risk losing custody.\footnote{See e.g., Ritch v. Ritch, 195 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio 1946); Ellis v. Ellis, 2006 WL 3199289 (Miss.App.,2006); Clark v. Smith, 130 Ohio App.3d 648, 654-655, 720 N.E.2d 973 (1998).} The reason is that marriage, just like the nuclear family, is a sacred institution whose protection is an important goal of the law. Hence, marriage guarantees its parties rights and parental status, which includes strong parental rights such as visitation.

The motivation to preserve the ideal of the nuclear family can account for other common aspects of visitation rules, which may appear baffling when examined from the perspective of children’s interests. Thus, for instance, a non-parent stands a better chance of having standing and being awarded visitation rights if the child with whom visitation is sought was born out of wedlock, if the child’s parents are divorced, or if one of the child’s parents has

\footnote{Martha Fineman has challenged the stereotype of mothers as vindictive and has called to recognize their misogynous basis: “Most mothers love their children and would not willfully deprive them of contact with a caring and responsible father. In fact, if the children are old enough to assert their own interests, it is unlikely that mothers could deprive them of contact with their fathers even if they wanted to. By making these observations, I do not mean to suggest that abuses never occur, but rather to point out that they are not typical, or even common…” Martha Fineman, \textit{Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking}, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 727, 766 – 767 (1988).}
died.\textsuperscript{116} When a child is part of an intact nuclear family, the likelihood that a non-parent will be awarded visitation rights declines significantly.\textsuperscript{117} This distinction was endorsed and promoted by Katharine T. Bartlett, one of the first scholars to advocate recognition of visitation rights to non-parents.\textsuperscript{118} This distinction between intact nuclear families and other family patterns cannot be explained by reference to children’s needs—be it the need for a stable unconditional relationship with the custodial parent, the need for continued attachment in the children’s lives, or any other relational values.

As for children’s need for uninterrupted relationships with their parents, the rules resulting from the legal distinction between intact nuclear families and families that have undergone a crisis are the opposite of the rules we might expect. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit claimed that children’s need for stability is greater following situations of family crisis.\textsuperscript{119} A child raised in an


\textsuperscript{117} Even in states where legislation is broad enough to award visitation when a nuclear family is intact and state courts recognize their authority to award visitation over objection of parents in intact traditional nuclear families, the actual chances of a non-parent to be awarded visitation are significantly lower. See e.g., \textit{Doe v. Smith}, 595 N.Y.S.2d 624, 625 (Fam. Ct. 1993); \textit{Coulter v. Barber}, 632 N.Y.S.2d 270 (App. Div. 1995).

\textsuperscript{118} Bartlett, \textit{supra} note 3.

\textsuperscript{119} Their critics did not challenge them on this point or on the destabilizing effect of court ordered visitation, only on the weight they attributed to this matter.
intact nuclear family is part of a stable set of relationships, and thus seems subject to a smaller risk from exposure to a conflicting relationship outside the nuclear family. By contrast, when the child’s relationship with the custodial parent is already suffering due to death or a break in the family relations, maintaining a relationship with an individual who is in conflict with the custodian seems to pose greater risk to the child.120 The legal distinction between different family patterns remains confusing when considered according to children’s need for continuity of relationships as well. If this is the underlying rationale for awarding visitation rights, children’s meaningful relationships should be protected whether or not they live in a nuclear family. Here again, however, it seems that what motivates the legal policy is not the children’s interests but rather upholding nuclear families as the preferred family pattern. Intact nuclear families are entitled to legal protection from outsiders, and visitation rights are perceived as interferences.121

120 Beyond the Best Interest of the Child, supra note 71, at 118.
121 Troxel v. Granville may seem to rebut the legal distinction between the nuclear family pattern and others. Indeed, the Supreme Court presented the case as one involving an attempt to supersede a (single) mother’s decision. Nevertheless, during the proceedings the mother, Tommie Granville, married Mr. Kelly Wynn, and he legally adopted the two children, Natalie and Isabelle. The girls, then, had two legally recognized parents raising them in an ostensibly traditional nuclear family. Despite the Court’s attempt to play down the significance of this fact, it cannot be ignored. In fact, Ms. Granville herself believed that her husband’s adoption of the two girls would undermine the grandparents’ claim (though for different reasons). In re Visitation of Troxel, 940 P.2d 698, 701 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
D. The Shadow of the “Children as Property” Conception

As noted, the debate within the social sciences suggested that, insofar as visitation rights are to be recognized, their main justification from the perspective of the children’s interests is to maintain continuity in the children’s relationships. Nonetheless, parents are entitled to visitations even without any previous relationship with the child. The legal distinction based on parental status, as I have argued, probably implies that visitation rules do not seek to protect children’s meaningful attachments or their primary relationships with their custodial parents, and rest instead on other considerations.122 My focus so far has been on social considerations, mainly

122 The famous case In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) provides a telling example. In Baby M., Mary Beth Whitehead entered into a contract with William Stern whereby she agreed to be artificially inseminated with Stern’s sperm, relinquish her parental rights, and deliver the child to Mr. and Mrs. Stern. After the baby was born, however, Mrs. Whitehead refused to relinquish her parental rights. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined that Mrs. Whitehead’s parental rights could not be terminated based on the surrogacy contract alone. Thus, her entitlement as a mother to the companionship of Melissa was taken as evident. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1236. Being a mother and absent custody of the child, which was awarded to the father, Mr. Stern, Mrs. Whitehead was entitled to visitation, securing her interest in a continued relationship with Melissa. The New Jersey Supreme Court remanded the case to the lower court to determine Mrs. Whitehead’s rights of visitation. On remand, the Superior Court determined that Melissa’s best interests were served by “unsupervised, uninterrupted, liberal visitation with her mother.” In re Baby M, 542 A.2d 52, 53 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988). Note that no argument of harm to Melissa from breaking up an existing attachment she already had could be adduced to justify
the preservation of the traditional model of the nuclear family and the institution of marriage, but other interests also seem to play a key role in constructing the laws of visitation: the parents’ private interests. Protection of the parents’ private interests also seem to embody remnants of the notorious conception of children as their parent’s property. Contrary to this award of visitation. Absent from the court’s decision is also a concern of possible harm to the relationship Melissa shared with her custodial father. The courts’ utter disregard for this concern is particularly strange in the circumstances of surrogacy in general, and in particular those that surrounded the Baby M. case.

Unlike the circumstances that typically surround divorce, Stern and Whitehead had never chosen to have an intimate relationship, and yet the court imposed a shared (familial) relationship on them. Not surprisingly, this relationship was characterized by animosity and high conflict. A 1994 story in Redbook, which featured Baby M. and Mrs. Whithead’s family, vividly illustrated some of the complications that followed from this determination. Mrs. Whitehead emphasized the contrast between her home and that of the Sterns. She compared her own health with Mrs. Stern’s worsening physical condition as a result of multiple sclerosis. She also found the eating, conversation, and recreation patterns in the Stern’s home seriously wanting in comparison to her family’s. She complained about the child following the “frumpy, old” model set by Mrs. Stern. The child clearly knew, and apparently frequently heard, that her birth had brought and continues to bring great sadness to her mother. Janet L. Dolgin, Suffer the Children: Nostalgia, Contradiction and the New Reproductive Technologies, 28 Ariz. St. L.J. 473, 526-527 (1996), citing Susan Squire, Whatever Happened to Baby M.?, Redbook, Jan. 1994, at 60.

123 Thus, for example, father’s rights groups highly influence custody and visitation laws. See e.g., Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 95 at 462. But parents are not the only adults whose interests influence family politics and laws. Thus, third party visitation statutes, and particularly statutes awarding grandparents’ visitation, were pushed by powerful grandparents lobbies. See supra note 40.
I do not find that incorporating and protecting adults’ interests in relation to children is inherently objectionable, but adults’ proprietary interests in children should be eliminated from current jurisprudence.

The disturbing history of children construed as chattels and as their parents’ property is well known. This perception has definitely been abandoned at the declaratory level and all—courts, legislators, and legal scholars—today vehemently reject any such characterization. But although we would like to think that the conception of children as property belongs only in legal history textbooks, many child advocates have shown that it still

---

124 James G. Dwyer is probably the most vehement current critic of parents' and other adults' rights in relation to children. See e.g., James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 1371 (1994).


casts its shadow.127 Barbara Bennet Woodhouse, for example, demonstrated how doctrines of parental rights developed at a time children were still treated as quasi-property embody and perpetuate this conception.128

When visitation is treated as a parental right, visitation laws show traces of this view of children that are manifest, above all, in the language of entitlement that accompanies parental visitation rights, regardless of whether parents have an established relationship with the child.129 The proprietary roots of this parental entitlement are further evident in the quid pro quo approach that accompanies parents’ rights in general and parental visitation rights in particular.130 The common reasoning whereby the payment of child

127 See e.g. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995, 1042-1043 (1992); Dwyer, supra note 124.
128 Woodhouse, supra note 127.
129 See e.g., Dwyer, supra note 7 at 938-939. The apparent consensus in the social sciences is that, in the absence of a relationship, visitation undesired by the custodial parent may expose children to the risk of conflicting loyalties. In these circumstances, arguments about offsetting benefits lack validity. Theoretically, the relationship with the non-custodial parent may indeed be beneficial to the child, but it is just as likely that it may not. The question is whether we want to gamble at children’s expense. Cf. Dwyer, ibid, at 934-935.
130 About the quid pro quo approach that characterizes parenthood and parental rights, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 Yale L. J. 293, 297-298 (1988).
support entitles the father to a certain amount of visitation is an expression of this approach.\textsuperscript{131}

The strength of parents’ visitation rights and the reluctance to deny them, even if the parents are abusive, as well as the traditional exclusivity of parental rights regarding visitation, attest to the parents’ proprietary interests in their children. Exclusive possession and right of use characterize traditional conceptions of private property. According to this exclusivity rule, then, children are depicted as property and access to them is a private good to which only the owners-parents should have access.\textsuperscript{132} The proprietary roots of visitation rights as parental rights can also account for the fact that grandparents have been much more successful than other non-parents in ensuring recognition to their claims for visitation. Special provisions included in many state statutes ensure the grandparents’ visitation rights upon the death of their child, their grandchild’s parent. Grandparents thus inherit from their child, as it were, right of access to their grandchild.\textsuperscript{133}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Woodhouse} Woodhouse, \textit{supra} note 127, at 1113. As I note infra, in section 6, exclusivity may also serve worthy goals.
\bibitem{Grandparents} The grandparents’ easier access as opposed to that of other non-parents could be explained through their greater political power. The parental proprietary interest in children reflected in visitation conception and laws, however, could also account for the grandparents’ preferred position. In cases of parental death, some courts have explicitly recognized the visitation rights of grandparents as “based upon a ‘derivative rights’ theory which permits the grandparents to stand in the shoes of a
\end{thebibliography}
5. Reformulating Visitation—Reformulating Parenthood

A. The Two Faces of Visitation

My survey of visitation jurisprudence reveals two different and conflicting subtexts in this right. The first emphasizes that underlying this right are relational values, and visitation is thus meant to secure the continuation of meaningful relationships between children and adults. The second subtext of visitation is less overt and seems to embody remnants of the perception of children as their parents’ property, which usually goes together with an ideology upholding the nuclear family as a legally superior family model and deceased parent so that the child is not completely cut-off from one side of the family.” Preston v. Mercieri, 133 N.H. 36, 42-43 (N.H. 1990). This rationale was more common before the statutory era of grandparents’ visitation. Elaine D. Ingulli, Grandparent Visitations Rights: Social Policies and Legal Rights, 87 W. Va. L. Rev. 295, 311 (1985). Most courts currently reject this line of reasoning. See e.g., Verbatim Report of Proceedings in In re Troxel, No. 93-3-00650-7, at 215 (Wash. Super. Ct., Dec. 14, 1994), cited in Sally F. Goldfarb, Visitation for Nonparents After Troxel v. Granville: Where should States Draw the Line?, 32 Rutgers L. J. 783, 817 n.196 (2001). Generally, it is used to support the more limited extent of visitation rights awarded to grandparents as compared to parents, or to protect the grandparents’ visitation rights following the grandchild’s adoption by a stepparent. When courts adhere to a derivative rights theory of grandparents’ visitation rights, an adoption that terminates the rights of the biological parent is generally also held to end the status of the grandparents upon which the right to visitation rests, thereby divesting the grandparent of visitation privileges. Denying this theory enables courts to continue grandparents’ visitation despite the adoption. See e.g., Preston, 133 N.H. at 43.
marriage as a sacred institution. The co-existence of these two subtexts of visitation thwarts the development of a coherent theory of visitation.

Endorsing the relational understanding of visitation requires that the right to visitation be detached from the cluster of rights associated with legal parenthood and be constructed as a separate relational right. Such a step would convey that our society values and rewards nurture and care for children, making the interest of children in the continuity of relationships a central consideration of visitation laws.

On this point, however, my criticism may be misplaced. Parenthood could be merely a proxy for the values of preserving continuity of relationships and attachments in children’s lives. Parents and children, it is assumed, generally share intimacy as well as strong attachments. Thus, insofar as visitation laws aim to secure children’s attachments, parenthood could indeed be a useful and valuable proxy, especially given the justified reluctance to grant judges discretion to inquire into the quality and strength of particular attachments. Since the use of proxies is based on generalizations, it can be expected to be both over and under-inclusive. This is an inevitable cost of the reliance on proxies, which may seem acceptable in light of their benefits. Furthermore, the recognition of non-parents visitation rights in statutes and in case law has rectified the under-inclusiveness of parenthood as a proxy for meaningful relationships in children’s lives.

My argument, however, states that parenthood is an inadequate proxy for the values that should underlie visitation rights, and that extending visitation
to non-parents based on a conception of visitation as a parental right is flawed. Historically, parenthood may have been considered a good enough proxy for the nurture and care of children as well as for the creation of significant attachments in a child’s life. Although there are reasons to doubt whether this was indeed so, I do not address this question. In today’s reality, however, many legal parents do not care for their children, while an ever-growing number of children are nurtured and cared for by non-parents. Moreover, given the current malleability of legal parenthood, it cannot function as a good enough proxy for strong and meaningful relationship in children’s lives.

B. Reconceptualizing Parental Rights

Detaching visitation from the cluster of rights associated with parenthood will transform not only the right to visitation but legal parenthood per se, and will contribute to the ongoing endeavor of liberating legal parenthood from its proprietary remnants. Reshaping legal parenthood so as to eliminate the disgraceful notion of children as property is a long-term project that has been proceeding for over a century. Parenthood is an activity as well as a certain stance vis-à-vis a child. As an activity, parenthood means caring for, educating, assuming responsibility for, and playing a supervisory role in a

134 See e.g., Mason, supra note 125. In this respect, this paper joins a series of articles published over the last two decades, each proposing a specific reform of legal parenthood. See e.g., Bartlett, supra note 130; Woodhouse, supra note 20.
child’s life. As a stance, parenthood emphasizes mainly biological, genetic, or formal legal ties. I argue that the caretaking activity should take priority in shaping legal doctrines of parental rights, thus contributing to the eradication of parenthood’s proprietary legacy.\footnote{Cf. Woodhouse, supra note 20.}

An examination of the rights accorded to parents will reveal that all the rights and entitlements that accompany parental status are associated with the raising of children, except for visitation, which is the only parental right that is not dependent on any prior care for the child.\footnote{Woodhouse, however, argues that even parental rights associated with child rearing reflect this notion of children because they were developed at a time children were still treated as quasi-property. Woodhouse, supra note 127.} Detaching the right to visitation from the cluster of rights associated with legal parenthood, therefore, strengthens the connection between parental rights and parents assuming responsibility for their children. The stronger the connection between parental rights and child rearing, the greater the justification of these rights and the greater the chances of formulating a better definition of legal parenthood.\footnote{Although my argument calls for strengthening the connection between parental rights and the activity of parenthood, it does not advocate changing the definition of legal parenthood to one determined on a functional basis. Legal parenthood could indeed be reformed by changing its very definition rather than merely by detaching visitation rights from the bundle of rights associated with this status. Thus, for instance, legal parenthood can be defined functionally, focusing on parenting activity rather than on biology and genetics, or it can be defined from the children’s}
The proposition that parental rights are connected to the activity of child rearing has received some support in Supreme Court cases, most notably the unwed fathers cases noted above,\textsuperscript{138} and also in other courts’ case law.\textsuperscript{139}
Eliminating the remnants of the “child as property” conception in the definition of legal parenthood thus requires that, as far as possible, parental legal entitlements be made dependent on parents assuming daily responsibility for the children’s upbringing.¹⁴⁰

C. Without Unbundling Parenthood

My proposal, though it may appear so at first glance, is not a call for unbundling the cluster of parental rights. Unbundling legal categories into the respective claim-rights, privileges, powers, and immunities that comprise them was a project that occupied various legal theorists, particularly following Hohfeld’s work.¹⁴¹ Private property was probably the central target


¹⁴⁰ Scholars such as James G. Dwyer would probably argue that parents should have no Hohfeldian rights whatsoever, whether or not related to their child rearing activity. See e.g. Dwyer, supra note 124. Eliminating parental rights and entitlements altogether may appear at first glance as the best way of eradicating proprietary remnants from legal parenthood. But the practical effect of parents’ rights, and particularly parents’ rights to raise their children as they see fit, is to raise the threshold for state involvement in child rearing decisions and in children’s daily lives. Denying these rights would actually increase state involvement in child rearing, to the children’s detriment. See e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, Hey, Christians, Leave Your Kids Alone!, 16 Const Commen 149 (1999).

of such a project. The “unbundling of property” theorists wished to emphasize—what today seems obvious—that property is a human artifact rather than a natural institution. As such, property is not an inevitable bundle of entitlements and, therefore, legal disputes cannot be resolved simply by reference to the institution of property through application of internal deductive reasoning. According to this line of reasoning, each element in the bundle of entitlements called property—that is, each claim-right, privilege, immunity, and so forth—must be justified separately in the specific context where it arises.

My proposal regarding visitation rights has some similarities with the project of “unbundling property.” It also emphasizes the artificiality of legal parenthood, which is an artificial rather than a natural (or even a “God given”) status. Hence, I reject the idea that legal decisions can be made

---


143 Locke, for example, attempted to show that property rights could arise in the “state of nature” apart from government and positive law. For an explication of Locke’s theory of property, see e.g., Waldron, ibid, at 137 – 251; Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1533, 1540-1572 (1993).


145 Whereas property is now obviously regarded as a created institution, the perception of parenthood and parental rights as a human creation is not as solid. See e.g. Bartlett, supra note 3, at 887 – 890; Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 835, 845-848 (1985); Smith v.
Rethinking Visitation

through internal deduction from the concept of parent.\textsuperscript{146} I also call for a critical examination of the specific claim-rights, immunities, powers, and duties that comprise parental status, and specifically challenge the right of visitation that parental status entails. Nonetheless, although I seek to detach the right to visitation from the cluster of rights associated with parenthood, I do not call for unbundling legal parenthood altogether.

Legal institutions, categories, or statuses such as parenthood, however artificial and fictitious they may be, perform an important role in conveying the notions and ideals intended by the law.\textsuperscript{147} They express, support, and


\textsuperscript{146} I do not suggest that this approach presents a naturalistic fallacy, moving from “is” (the fact of being a parent) to “ought” (the judgment that a parent has a special right to visitation). Since parenthood is a moral term, this “fact” itself is not devoid of moral import, and moving from “is” to “ought” thus poses no problem. Cf. A. I. Melden, \textit{Rights and Right Conduct} (1959) (discussing the right of a parent to “special consideration” from his children and suggesting this right is related to the moral fact of parenthood). But recognizing a moral relation such as parenthood and making a judgment about what is due to a person by other individuals are two separate issues. Philippa Foot, \textit{Book Review}, 70 The Philosophical Review 260, 261 (1961) (Reviewing A. I. Melden, \textit{Rights and Right Conduct} (1959)).

\textsuperscript{147} As widely recognized, the law can convey ideas and ideals through its categories, statuses, and rules. On the expressive role of law, see e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, \textit{On the Expressive Function of Law}, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021 (1996). This view usually encompasses two related accounts. The first concerns the symbolic aspect of law, and the second concerns the law’s ability to direct and affect human behavior. See e.g. Lewis A. Kornhauser, \textit{No Best Answer?}, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1599, 1636 (1998);
enhance social goods and ideals. Whether we think of the expressive role of law in terms of its concrete social effect or merely in its symbolic meaning, the law needs to convey its messages and ideals in ways visible to the individuals in the society. Since it is unlikely that individuals will know the particular details of specific legal obligations or entitlements, what is visible to them are the more fundamental and familiar legal concepts. Parenthood as a popular symbol, then, may achieve desired social effects by leading to the internalization of ideals of intimacy, care, and responsibility toward children

---


---

148 For this argument regarding property, see Dagan, *supra* note 144. For the specific expressive role of *marital property* see also Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, *Properties of Marriage*, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 75, 97-98 (2004).

in ways impossible to attain through the legal details and elements that construct this status. Dissolving parenthood, therefore, hinders its crucial expressive function. When parenthood is perceived as just a bundle of duties, obligations, privileges, claim-rights, powers, and immunities, it loses its powerful connotations. Parenthood has historically implied a dominating and patriarchal status expressing proprietary interests in children, whose traces are still evident today. And yet, maintaining parental status as a legal category is still worthwhile because, as a fragmented bundle of obligations and entitlements, it is unlikely to convey any message at all—neither one of proprietary interest in children, nor one of commitment, responsibility, and care. If parenthood is to perform any expressive role, desirable or not, it cannot become a mere “laundry list” of independent duties, obligations, claim-rights, immunities, and powers, with an infinite number of potential combinations for bundling them together. A certain measure of stability is also required for the law to have any effective influence, which is

\[150\] Supra note 125 and accompanying text.
\[151\] For the theorists’ claim on the “unbundling of property,” see Dagan, supra note 144, at 1534.
\[152\] Dagan, ibid, at 1562-1563. But deconstructing legal concepts and addressing each element separately also sends a false message concerning the expressive role of law. The specific bundle of obligations and entitlements is not a random event lacking any integrity; rather, a normative ideal unifies the various obligations and entitlements, and this ideal is what the law attempts to express. Id. The legal concepts, statuses, and categories, then, represent the ideals that unify the different obligations and entitlements.
unattainable when the status of parenthood is unbundled and its various constituent elements are capable of regroupment in numberless ways. My argument that the right to visitation should not be thought of as a parental right, then, is not meant to unbundle legal parenthood altogether but to claim that the right of visitation is unfit for inclusion in the cluster of elements comprising parental status.

Detaching visitation from parental status would not signal the onset of a process of disintegrating parenthood. The difference between visitation and other parental rights has two aspects. First, as noted, all the rights and entitlements that accompany parental status, except for visitation, are associated with the activity of raising and taking care of children. Visitation is the only right that neither accompanies child rearing nor depends upon prior caring for a child. A second point is related to the justification and the role of parental rights. Conventional wisdom justifies parental rights as a shield against state involvement in everyday child rearing decisions. According to this argument, debates about parental rights boil down to one issue: parental vs. government authority over child rearing – which one do we fear less?153

The reasoning in this case is that of a zero-sum game: abolishing parents’ rights means more power to the state to make day-to-day decisions on child

153 The issue is not parents’ rights versus children’s rights, for even if our paramount concern is the best interest of children we should decide who is more competent to determine what would serve it best: the parents or the courts. Supra note 140.
rearing, whereas preserving the rights of parents means less power to the state. Here again, this analysis applies to most parental rights except for the right of visitation. Awarding visitation rights becomes the state’s “admission ticket” to involvement in the day-to-day rearing of children. The issue at stake is not only the decision about who will be allowed to associate with children, but the state’s intervention in decisions concerning the child’s upbringing when a holder of visitation rights requests state involvement in order to protect these rights.154

6. The Role of Parental Exclusivity

My recognition of the significant role of parental status is also at the heart of my argument concerning the significance of this status' exclusivity. As long as visitation is understood as a parental right, recognizing non-parents’ visitation rights challenges the idea of parenthood as an exclusive status, a principle that should not be easily abandoned. By contrast, if visitation is

154 Thus, for example, non-custodial parents may, in order to preserve their visitation rights, interfere with some of the custodian’s decisions concerning the child and the custodian’s place of residence. This enables non-custodial parents to affect the financial opportunities of the custodial parent and the child, the familial and social support available to them, and many other important aspects of their lives. See e.g., Ramirez-Barker v. Barker, 418 S.E.2d 675 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992); In re Marriage of Sheley, 895 P.2d 850 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); In re Marriage of Eckert, 518 N.E2d 1041 (Ill. 1988) (denying the custodial mother’s request to move).
understood as an independent relational right detached from parental status, the visitation rights of non-parents can be recognized while preserving the principle of parental exclusivity.

The exclusivity of parental status, stating that only a child’s legal parents have rights and duties considered parental and non-parents cannot acquire them, has been a well-established principle in American legal tradition.\textsuperscript{155} Parental exclusivity is mainly evident in the idea that the child’s parents rather than the state or other individuals make decisions concerning the children’s upbringing. Various scholars have criticized the idea of parental exclusivity and the notion that only parents can have rights, duties, and obligations with respect to children.\textsuperscript{156} Their critique was largely triggered by the changes in family structure and the law’s failure to respond to them. Since legal definitions of parenthood appeared inadequate and unable to reflect the current reality of parenthood, arguments were raised in support of enabling individuals who are not legally recognized as parents to acquire parental rights as non-parents. The issue of contact between children and non-parenting adults involved in their lives was one of the prime settings highlighting the inadequacy of parenthood as an exclusive status.\textsuperscript{157}

Though I agree that contact between children and non-parents may at times be accorded legal recognition and protection, challenging parental

\begin{footnotes}
\item[155] Bartlett, \textit{supra} note 3, at 883-889.
\item[156] See e.g., Bartlett, \textit{ibid}; Young, \textit{supra} note 27; Kavanagh, \textit{supra} note 27.
\item[157] See e.g. Bartlett,\textit{ibid}; Garrison, \textit{supra} note 83.
\end{footnotes}
exclusivity is the wrong course for addressing this issue. Critics of parental exclusivity fail to recognize the value and the role of this idea. Exclusivity is part of what defines legal parenthood; parents have a unique relationship with their children. Undermining parental exclusivity thus erodes the very meaning of legal parenthood. Diluting the parents’ unique status may lower the threshold for non-parents to supersede the judgment and decisions of fit parents through state intervention giving standing and rights to other individuals to make claims concerning a child. It may even ease the removal of children from their parents by non-parents, without necessarily meeting a high standard such as parental unfitness.

Few, I believe, support easy removal of children or the substitution of fit parents’ judgment. On the issue of visitation, the call for recognizing not only the parents’ rights but also those of others has gained some support, but an argument that non-parents (be it grandparents, parents’ partners, or other relatives) should have rights to make decisions regarding children’s lives is, barring rare circumstances, much more objectionable. Most adhere to the parents’ exclusive role as decision-makers and caregivers for their children.158

But relinquishing parental exclusivity to allow for visitations undermines the very idea of exclusivity, and explaining why visitation should be recognized as the sole exception to parental exclusivity becomes hard. If non-parents can gain some rights considered parental, why not allow them all

---

158 Young, for example, recognizes the need to preserve core authority, though she does not recognize it as parental authority. Young, supra note 27.
parental rights? Indeed, Katharine Bartlett, the scholar most closely associated with the idea that parenthood should not be an exclusive status, applied her argument not only to visitation rights but to all parental rights, duties, and obligations, including custody.\footnote{Bartlett, supra note 3.} Notions such as de facto parentage blur the line between parents and non-parents since they are used to confer rights considered parental upon those who are not legally recognized as parents. Yet these notions are also not limited to conferring rights of visitation and enable recognition of non-parents’ custody rights.\footnote{See e.g., \textit{Clark v. Wade}, 544 S.E.2d 99, 106 (Ga. 2001); \textit{Painter v. Bannister} 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966).}

On these grounds, Bartlett and other scholars who advocate non-exclusive parenthood have been criticized for diluting the legal significance of parenthood. Parents from marginalized groups such as the poor, or gays and lesbians, have particular cause for concern from this possible detraction and even severance of their parental status.\footnote{Painter again serves as a good example. See supra note 137. In the context of gay and lesbian parents this fear was expressed, e.g., by Nancy D. Polikoff, \textit{This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families}, 78 Geo. L. J. 459, 473 (1990); Sears, \textit{supra} note 62, at 573-574.}

What would be the best strategy for addressing the problem of contact between children and non-parental adults who are part of their lives while also preserving the uniqueness of parental status? The answer to this question
reveals a further advantage of the right to visitation as formulated in my analysis. According to my view, visitation is an independent right resting on relational values above all, so that both parents and non-parents can make a claim for visitation based on an existing meaningful relationship with a child. My understanding of parental rights encompasses only those rights that are an adjunct to the rearing and caring for children. Decision making and caretaking rights are thus exclusive to parents. My proposal would enable recognition of non-parents’ visitation rights while maintaining parenthood as an exclusive status and preserving the parents’ unique authority.162

162 My proposal is thus also a partial solution to the dilemma faced by lesbian and gay parents, as it was presented by Nancy Polikoff. On the one hand, lesbian and gay parents seek to strengthen the uniqueness and exclusivity of parental status to combat threats from homophobic relatives claiming to raise their children (who should not, according to them, be raised by gay parents), or otherwise try to interfere in the children’s upbringing. Nancy D. Polikoff, The Impact of Troxel v. Granville on Lesbian and Gay Parents, 32 Rutgers L. J. 825, 825-827 (2001). On the other hand, in a growing number of cases, a lesbian legally recognized mother has used her exclusive legal status to sever the child’s relationship with her ex-partner, who was not legally recognized as a parent. Parental exclusivity may therefore foreclose the claims of legally unrecognized lesbian and gay parents. Ibid. Above all, a solution is obviously called for to enable recognition of parenthood in same-sex families. This, however, is not the subject of this article. Until legal definitions of parenthood adapt to parenthood in same-sex families, my understanding of the right to visitation and of parental right enables advocates of lesbian and gay parents to maintain parental exclusivity and safeguard their parental status against homophobic relatives. At the same time, it also enables legally unrecognized parents to claim at least visitation rights with children. Though this solution is not ideal, it enables to preserve two ostensibly contradictory claims.
7. Conclusion

Understanding the right to visitation as an independent right based on relational interests of nurture and care does not answer many difficult questions that occupy both lawmakers and legal scholars. Crucially, since talking about relational values does not mean that any relationship should be the basis for a claim of visitation rights, this approach does not explain what relationships should give rise to such a claim. Furthermore, it does not explain how to reconcile the authority of the custodial parent making child rearing decisions with the recognition of others’ visitation rights, whether parents or non-parents. These and other issues remain open for future discussion.

My proposal is not intended to foreclose the debate on visitation rights but to break new ground. The reading of visitation rights outlined here enables to redirect visitation laws toward a legal model based on the relational interests of both children and adults, making visitation rules coherent at the level of principle and pursuing questions pertaining to adults’ relationship with children within an adequate conceptual framework. In this respect, approaching these difficult dilemmas outside the parental status scheme and focusing on relational values is invariably better than the current status-based rules that seem to ignore the interests and needs of all the parties involved.
Rethinking Visitation

Once visitation is understood as an independent right rather than part of the parental status cluster, the remaining challenge is to transcend the slogan that it should flow from relationships and translate it into concrete rules. A detailed proposal for new rules of visitation as they seem to emerge from my analysis of visitation rights exceeds the scope of this paper, but I will offer some broad guidelines toward such an undertaking.

The first reform concerns the primary question that should be asked in visitation litigation, namely, whether or not the claimant has an existing relationship with the child. A distinction should be drawn, then, between claims to maintain an already existing relationship and claims to create a relationship that does not yet exist. The longer and more intense the relationship between the child and the claimant, the stronger should be the legal presumption that terminating the relationship would be harmful to the child. Indeed, to avoid subjective judicial assessment of the quality of the relationship between the child and the claimant (an inquiry potentially suspected as prejudiced and probably necessitating “experts”), legal rules should rely on objective criteria such as the duration and intensity of the relationships as proxy for their quality. Biology, genetics, marital status, or a relationship with the child’s parents should not be utterly ignored, but they should have only a secondary or supplementary role in visitation legal rules and decision-making.

This understanding of visitation rights will probably not entail vital practical changes in the legal outcomes of visitation disputes. But although
most legal parents would still be entitled to visitation rights and many non-
parents would not, my analysis would entail changes in some cases that, even
if minor, are still relevant. The more significant element concerns the reasons
and justifications for awarding or denying such rights. Since these would be
crucially different, they would constitute a change in the results because two
radically different frameworks of analysis cannot reach the “same” result.”163
The way of expressing visitation rights and the reasons adduced for denying
them or recognizing them, therefore, are no less important than the end result.

163 Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849, 1878 – 1887