CRITICAL RACE REALISM:
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATIVE MODEL OF CRITICAL RACE THEORY, EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY
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ABSTRACT: Critical Race Theory was founded as “a race-based, systematic critique of legal reasoning and legal institutions....” Critics argue that it struggles to define its substantive mission, methodological commitments, and connection to the world outside of academia. This article attempts to provide a specific methodology—empirical social science—that is consistent with Critical Race Theory’s overarching mission and that has both applied and academic components. This methodology should ultimately 1) expose racism where it may be found, 2) identify its effects on individuals and institutions, and 3) put forth a concerted attack against it, in part, via public policy arguments. This concept, Critical Race Realism, is drawn from a long and rich intellectual history. I explore this history as it started with the growth of interdisciplinarity in American legal education and traversed its way through intellectual movements at Columbia, Yale, Chicago, and Wisconsin law schools. I then look at the recent explosion in empirical legal scholarship and the New Legal Realism Project as contemporary efforts with which Critical Race Realism must square itself. I then systematically explore the growth of social science, race, and law scholarship as well as race and empirical legal scholarship over the past twenty years. I close by reconciling Critical Race Theory with this intellectual history and these contemporary movements and suggest ways in which Critical Race Realism might be developed.

INTRODUCTION

I. CRITICAL RACE REALISM: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF CONSTITUENT FEATURES
   A. INTERDISCIPLINARITY IN EARLY AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION
   B. HOLMES, BRANDEIS, CARDOZO AND POUND
   C. IVY LEAGUE ICONOCLASTS AT COLUMBIA AND YALE LAW SCHOOLS
      1. Legal Realism
      2. The Law Policy Science Movement
      3. Yale’s Divisional Studies Program
   D. LAW “AND” MOVEMENTS AND THEIR PROGENY
      1. Law and Economics Movement
      2. Law and Society Movement
         a. Critical Legal Studies
         b. Critical Race Theory

II. CRITICAL RACE REALISM: A DEFINITION AND DEVELOPMENT(S)
   A. CONTIGUOUS MODELS:
      EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES AND THE NEW LEGAL REALISM PROJECT
   B. CRITICAL RACE REALISM:
      CRITICAL RACE THEORY AND CONTEMPORARY MOVEMENTS
         1. A Systematic Analysis of Race, Social Science & Law Scholarship
         2. An Integrative Model
         3. Creating a Critical Race Realism

CONCLUSION
Like men we'll face the murderous, cowardly pack,
Pressed to the wall, dying, but fighting back!
--Claude McKay

**INTRODUCTION**

A historical account of American law shows a dramatic irony; the law has served as a
tool to both oppress and liberate African Americans. In the face of such oppression, a handful of
lawyers and law professors have used the law for progressive, social change. Among the latter,
Critical Race Theorists have been in the vanguard of providing “a race-based, systematic critique

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1 Claude McKay, *If We Must Die*, in *AFRO-AMERICAN WRITING: AN ANTHOLOGY OF PROSE AND POETRY* 344
(Richard A. Long & Eugenia W. Collier eds., 2d ed. 1985). In his poem, McKay encourages doomed resistance,
quite the way Critical Race Theorists contend that racism is part of the American psyche, the very fabric of America,
yet encourage resistance to such racism. For a critical race theorist’s perspective See Derrick Bell, *Racism Is Here to Stay Now What?*, in *THE DERRICK BELL READER* 85-90 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2005). Similarly, I
argue within this article that despite the fact that racism against black Americans will likely exist, in various forms,
into perpetuity, our interests would be best served by marshalling a systematic attack against it. This attack, from
the legal standpoint, necessitates the uses of (empirical) social science geared towards altering public policies affecting
blacks.

2 See, e.g., *DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW* 4th Edition (2000) (providing a general account of
a history of race and law during America’s colonial period); *A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM* (1996) (providing a general history of race
and law issues); *RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE* (1976)(providing a history of *Brown v. Board of Education*);
(providing an account of the NAACP’s efforts to end school segregation).

3 See, e.g., *GREENBERG, supra* note 2; *KLUGER, supra* note 2; *TUSHNET, supra* note 2; GENA RAE MCNEIL,
*GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS* (1983) (highlighting the
efforts of Houston as a civil rights lawyer).

4 See, e.g., *CRITICAL RACE THEORY; THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORM THE MOVEMENT* (Kimberle Crenshaw, Neil
Race Theory writings); *CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY* (Francisco Valdes, Jerome
McCristal Culp, and Angela P. Harris eds., 2002) [hereinafter CROSSROADS] (providing a future vision of Critical
Race Theory).
of legal reasoning and legal institutions....”

In 2002, Temple University Press published
Crossroads, Directions, and a New Critical Race Theory. The volume is comprised largely of
papers and speeches presented in 1997 at the Critical Race Theory Conference held at Yale Law
School, a commemoration of Critical Race Theory’s tenth anniversary. In one of the
commentaries on the book, Rachel Moran noted that it captures a discipline at a crossroads,
struggling to define its substantive mission, methodological commitments, and connection to the
world outside of academia. Almost ten years after the Yale conference and four years after
Crossroads’ publication, Critical Race Theory continues to grapple with these same issues.

Thus, this article sets forth a particular methodology called Critical Race Realism. Critical Race Realism is a synthesis of Critical Race Theory, empirical social science, and public
policy. This methodology has both academic and applied components. Furthermore, its mission
is to provide a systematic, race-based evaluation and critique of legal doctrine, institutions, as
well as actors (e.g., judges, juries, etc.). By employing social science Critical Race Realism

6 Valdes et al., CROSSROADS, supra note 4.
7 See id. at xi.
10 See Emily M. S. Houh, Critical Race Realism: Re-Claiming the Antidiscrimination Principle Through the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 66 U. PITTSBURGH L. REV. 455, 456-457 (2005). Houh argues that “critical race realism encompasses not only the goals and methodologies of the broader critical race...projects, but also some of the shared goals and methodologies of legal realism....”; See also Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992). Bell states that “Black people need reform in our civil rights strategies as badly as those in the law needed a new way to consider American jurisprudence prior to the advent of the Legal Realists.... Racial Realism— is a legal and social mechanism on which blacks can rely to have their voice and outrage heard.”
11 I do not propose that this piece is the first attempt to synthesize Critical Race Theory and social science. Recent Critical Race Theorists have put forth an effort to address issues at the intersection of Critical Race Theory and social science. See, e.g., Delgado & Stefancic supra note 4, at 129-179.
should 1) expose racism where it may be found, 2) identify its effects on individuals and institutions, and 3) put forth a concerted attack against it, in part, via public policy arguments.

Section I of this article provides a backdrop to understand Critical Race Realism. It explores the histories of the various actors who and movements that inform our understanding of Critical Race Realism. Section II defines Critical Race Realism by example and elaboration on those elements that comprise it.

I. CRITICAL RACE REALISM: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF CONSTITUENT FEATURES

There are a number of individuals and movements that inform us as to what Critical Race Realism is or could be. This section highlights those movements and individuals. Subsection A explores how early American legal education came to tolerate interdisciplinary study. Subsection B highlights the contributions of Supreme Court Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo and Harvard Law School dean Pound towards 1) the acceptance of social science within American jurisprudence, 2) the study of law in action, and 3) the use of law to advance public policy.

Subsection C explores the work of academics at both Columbia and Yale Law Schools and their efforts toward extending a new way of looking at the law—one that 1) is functional its approach, 2) debunks commonly held legal ideologies, and 3) integrates social science with the law, and law with public policy. Subsection D investigates the development of the law “and” movement and its progeny and how they too extended our understanding of 1) law and social science and 2) critiques of legal doctrine, institutions, and actors.

A. INTERDISCIPLINARITY IN EARLY AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION

Since its inception in the early 1700s, American legal education has evolved considerably; one such evolution is its interdisciplinary growth. At its beginning, there were two avenues to joining the bar. Young “men” could go to England and acquire legal training at the
Inns of Court, or they could read law in the office of an established practitioner. This latter model, ultimately the more popular, consisted of both an apprenticeship coupled with a formal examination. These apprenticeships gave birth to early, freestanding American law schools. The oldest, largest, and most influential was Connecticut’s Litchfield Law School, founded in 1784. By the early 1820s, many such proprietary law schools merged with local, established colleges. These mergers gave private law schools prestige and the ability to grant degrees and quite possibly provided colleges with greater influence among local lawyers, the powerful elite. Thirty years later, such institutionalized Eastern law schools as those at Columbia University, New York University, and the University of Pennsylvania were founded.

Harvard is credited with establishing the first modern, American law school. From 1870 to 1895, Christopher Columbus Langdell served as its dean. During his deanship, Harvard Law School shaped the early “structure and content” of other American law schools. Langdell shifted legal education from the undergraduate level to an eighteen-month, and then three-year, post-baccalaureate degree program. He also hired the first career law professor, instituted rigorous examinations and the college-degree requirement for admission, and developed a

14 Kronman, supra note 12, at 19-20; STEVENS, supra note 13, at 3.
15 MCKENNA, supra note 13, at 60; STEVENS, supra note 13, at 5. Colleges such as Columbia successfully mounted a take-over bid for a proprietary school operated at Hamilton College, and Harvard subsumed the Northampton Law School. Kronman, supra note 12, at 23.
16 MCKENNA, supra note 13, at 17.
17 STEVENS, supra note 13, at 5.
18 Id. at 21.
20 Id. at 20.
21 STEVENS, supra note 13, at 35.
22 SELIGMAN, supra note 19; STEVENS, supra note 13, at 36.
23 SELIGMAN, supra note 19.
24 Id.
system of teaching that focused on appellate case analysis\textsuperscript{25} and Socratic questioning.\textsuperscript{26} In 1873, James Barr Ames was appointed assistant professor of law at Harvard Law School, and it was Ames who turned the case method into “a faith.”\textsuperscript{27} By then, Harvard’s curriculum was largely professionally oriented, based on its 1852 curriculum and adapted during Langdell’s time.\textsuperscript{28} Harvard’s size and influence had a tremendous impact on other university-affiliated law schools.\textsuperscript{29} As such, many law schools emulated Harvard’s academic approach, and those that did not found it difficult to resist.\textsuperscript{30}

Few law schools deviated from Harvard’s approach. Nonetheless, the entire legal academic world during the late 1800s was not of one accord. Some believed that the law was insufficient in and of itself to answer legal questions and reached beyond the confines of the law to answer those questions. For example, in 1869, Yale law students were permitted to enroll in other departmental courses such as political science, economics, English history, and ethics.\textsuperscript{31} Yale Law School, from 1874 onward, attempted to develop a broad curriculum, which included courses with an interdisciplinary flavor.\textsuperscript{32} During the 1880s, the American Bar Association

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textit{Id.}; STEVENS, supra note 13, at 36.
\item SELIGMAN, supra note 19.
\item STEVENS, supra note 13, at 38.
\item ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPAL CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF THE CONDITIONS IN ENGLAND AND CANADA 458 (1921). By 1852, the curriculum consisted of Blackstone and Kent, Property, Equity, Contracts, Bailments and Corporations, Partnership and Agency, Shipping and Constitutional Law, Pleading and Evidence, Insurance and Sales, Conflicts, Bills and Notes, Criminal Law, Wills, Arbitration, Domestic Relations, and Bankruptcy.
\item Id. at 458. After 1870, the following were added: Torts, Jurisprudence, Federal Procedure, Trusts, Mortgages, Suretyship, Quasi-Contracts, Damages, Municipal Corporations, Restraint of Trade, Bailments had become Carriers, and Blackstone and Kent were dropped.
\item STEVENS, supra note 13, at 39.
\item John H. Langbein, Law School in a University: Yale’s Distinctive Path in the Later Nineteenth Century, in YALE LAW SCHOOL 65.
\item REED, supra note 28, at 302-303. Specifically, it offered such first-year courses as History of American Law, General Jurisprudence and Common Law, Medical Jurisprudence, and Methods of Study and Mental Discipline.
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indicated that legal curriculum needed more social science.33 At its founding in the late 1800s, Cornell Law School encouraged its students to take courses in the School of History and Political Science.34 In the 1890s, Catholic University Law School was housed within the School of Social Sciences.35 Columbian (George Washington) University’s President referred to Columbian Law School as the Columbian School of Comparative Jurisprudence.36 And Georgetown Law School offered such interdisciplinary courses as legal ethics, legal philosophy, and legal history.37

American legal education continues to resemble the model set forth by Langdell and extended by Ames at Harvard Law School between 1870 and 1910.38 However, significant strides were made in developing a curriculum that reached outside of the law. More than simply being interdisciplinary, social science became a growing part of legal education. Though its presence has ebbed and flowed over the decades, its influence is again on the rise.

B. HOLMES, BRANDEIS, CARDOZO AND POUND

Law schools, in the abstract, were not the only ones expanding the conceptual bounds of the law. Four men at the turn of the twentieth century advanced the idea that law is more than what is in books, argued for broader conceptions of law’s utility, and that extra-legal factors enhance our understanding of the law. These men were U.S. Supreme Court Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Louis Brandeis, and Benjamin Cardozo as well as former Harvard Law

33 STEVENS, supra note 13, at 69 n.49. “The 1881 [ABA] committee also agreed that ideally there should be more social science in the law school curriculum, to prepare the lawyer for his roles as lawyer, party leader, diplomat, director of finance or education, judge, legislator, and statesman.”
34 STEVENS, supra note 13, at 74.
School dean Roscoe Pound. Each man served as a harbinger of Legal Realism, an area of jurisprudence which dominated the mid-twentieth century.

Like the Realists who followed, Holmes highlighted the real world aspect of the law when he noted that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.” He also highlighted that extra-legal factors had tremendous bearing on the law. Whether it was “[t]he felt necessities of time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, [or] the prejudices which judges share with their fellow men,” law was at least in part governed by factors that fell outside the law. As such, Holmes did not simply contend that social science was important in order to understand the law but also contended that whereas the black-letter study of law is the present, “the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics.” In saying this, Holmes articulated a vision of what the law and legal profession was to, or should, become.

Brandeis’ contribution to the Realists was methodological, as he was the first lawyer to employ social science data as part of a litigation strategy and towards defending a social policy against constitutional attack. In his *Muller v. Oregon* brief, Brandeis utilized statistical support

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41 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
42 See *id.* at 1.
45 JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 270 (1930). Frank, one of the Realists, stated of Holmes, “[W]hatever clear vision of legal realities we have attained in this country in the past twenty five years is in large measure due to [Holmes].”
for his claim that long work hours were dangerous to the health of women who worked those hours in various Oregon industries. Furthermore, their working of those hours was also and ultimately deleterious to the community’s health.47

Cardozo also served as an “eminent pioneer of the ‘realist’ movement.”48 He was the first to speak to the various modes of judicial thinking that were not wholly consistent with sheer logic. Cardozo theorized that there were four approaches to judicial decision-making: philosophy, evolution, tradition, and sociology. The philosophical approach was analogous to adherence to precedent.49 The evolution approach emphasized the historical development of a field of law.50 The tradition approach referred to community customs.51 To Cardozo, the sociological approach was a gap-filler,52 insofar as he believed the judge should employ the law as a means to an end—for the “good of the collective body.”53 None but the latter was remarkable given the times in which Cardozo made this pronouncement, and it was readily seized upon by the Realists.

Pound became the immediate precursor to Realists.54 Generally, Pound believed in an interdisciplinary approach to understanding the law.55 In 1905, he called for a philosophy of law founded on social and political science.56 In 1910, he pled for law students to have training in sociology, economics, and politics to “fit a new generation of lawyers” to not simply render good

47 208 U.S. 412 (1908); See also Smith, supra note 39, at 61.
48 BERYL H. LEVY, CARDozo AND THE FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THINKING 19 (2000); See also Smith, William O. Douglas supra note XX, at 69-75.
50 Id. at 52.
51 Id. at 63.
52 Id. at 69, 71.
53 Id. at 72, 102.
56 Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law, COLUM. L. REV. 339, 344, 351 (1905).
service but “to lead the people.” That same year, he urged scholars to not simply study “law on the books” but also to study “law in action”—harkening back to Holmes’ thoughts about the life of the law. Thus, Pound called for an analysis of law not in theory only but in practice as well in order to ascertain how law impacted people’s lives. In the 1911 and 1912 issues of the Harvard Law Review, Pound announced and defined a vision of “Sociological Jurisprudence.” Among its elements, he argued for the realization of “the backwardness of law in meeting social ends”, insistence upon the social effects of the law; and a belief in “the equitable application of law”. Not surprisingly, Pound is described as one who did more than any of his contemporaries in the way of emphasizing the “social effects of law and to relate legal thinking to the social sciences.”

C. IVY LEAGUE ICONOCLASTS AT COLUMBIA AND YALE LAW SCHOOLS

The writings of Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo and Pound made way for new thinking in the legal academy. Their ideas—that law should be employed as a means to certain ends, the utility of social science to law, and that law is not logic but real world experience—resonated with professors at Columbia and Yale law schools. These professors seized upon the ideas of Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo and Pound, and set about divining a new American jurisprudence through the Realist and Law, Science, and Policy movements as well as the Yale Divisional Studies Program.

60 Pound, The Scope and Purpose (1912), supra note XX, at 510.
61 Pound, The Scope and Purpose (1912), supra note 59, at 514.
62 Pound, The Scope and Purpose (1912), supra note 59, at 515.
1. Legal Realism

In 1916, Thomas Swan assumed the deanship at Yale Law School, and by November of that year, he proposed, to Yale’s president, to expand the law school into the Yale School of Law and Jurisprudence. The proposal seemingly reflected the views of Arthur Corbin and possibly Karl Llewellyn—professor and student, respectively.64 Both of these men later became key architects of Legal Realism. Their work, and the work of others at Columbia and Yale law schools65 during the early to mid-twentieth century, helped to define a new agenda for legal education and practice.

Legal Realism was not a monolithic school of thought. There were, broadly, three types of Realists: 1) the critical oppositional variant that sought to expose the contradictions in classical legal formalism; 2) the social scientific variant that employed the insights and methods of the empirical sciences; and 3) the practical political variant that designed, made, and enforced reform policies.66 The Realist’s jurisprudence was known by many names, but probably the most appropriate was functionalism—“an attempt to understand law in terms of factual contexts and economic and social consequences.”67 Quite possibly, the major contribution of the Realists was to undermine the Langdellian idea that the law was an exact science based on objectively black-letter rules.68 Harkening back to Pound’s distinction between law in books and law in action, the

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64 STEVENS, supra note 13, at 134-135.
67 KALMAN, supra note 65, at 3.
68 STEVENS, supra note 13, at 156.
Realists sought to determine what the law actually does to people and for people. As a result, they saw law not simply as an end in and of itself but as a means to various ends.

The distinctive feature of the Realists was their methodological approach. The first approach was debunking, which was subjecting questionable judicial opinions to logical analysis in order to expose their inconsistencies, unsubstantiated premises, and tendency to “pass off contingent judgments as inexorable.” Debunking flowed from two methods of attack—rule and fact skepticism. Rule skeptics argued that case decisions do not necessarily flow from general legal propositions—that logic did not govern judicial thought processes. Other features are factored into the equation such as policy considerations. Fact skeptics either argued that the facts found by the judge or jury are inconsistent with the actual facts or that the reactions of judges and juries to facts are unpredictable.

The Realists’ second methodological approach was empirical social science. And though they were not alone in their attempts to integrate social science and law, the empirical

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69 Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism: Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1222-1224 (1931).
70 Id.
71 Later the Critical Legal Studies scholars revived debunking as deconstruction. See G. Edward White, From Realism to Critical Legal Studies: A Truncated Intellectual History, 40 SW. L. J. 819, (1986). Debunking is best exemplified by the works of realist Wesley Hohfeld and Karl Llewellyn. See Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied to Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913); Llewellyn, supra note 69, at 1238-1239.
72 White, supra note 71, at 819.
74 Smith, supra note 73, at 48-49.
75 Id. at 50, 54; Bruce Evans Pencek, The Political Theory of Legal Realism 1 (June 1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University) (on file with ). Before the Realists, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes noted that “[t]he felt necessities of time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow men, have a good deal more to do than the syllogisms in determining the rules by which men should be governed.” HOLMES, supra note 41, at 1.
76 RUMBLE, supra note 63, at 109-110.
77 Id. at 111.
78 White, supra note 71, at 823.
79 STEVENS, supra note 13, at 156. In 1937, the University of Chicago Law School developed an optional four-year curriculum. Part of the curriculum was reorganized to explore law’s social workings. A half a year course called
exploits of Realists such as Clark and Douglas at Yale,80 Moore at Yale,81 and Cook and colleagues at Johns Hopkins82 set them apart from other sociological jurispruders. Realists’ efforts towards integrating law with the social sciences ultimately failed for a number of likely reasons. Realists did not know how non-legal materials should aid law students.83 Realists asked the wrong questions of social science and expected too much from the answers.84 Furthermore, social science was ultimately less helpful to legal scholars than anticipated.85 Two post-Realist law professors, Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal, argued that lack of social science methodological sophistication on the part of those making those integrative efforts resulted in the Realism’s failure.86 Nonetheless, the Realists made a significant contribution towards integrating social science and the law and using the law in practical ways. Ultimately, they provided an early integration of law, social science, and public policy.87

Most of the canonical Realists, like adherents of other progressive reform movements, avoided the hot racial issues of their day.88 However, their efforts to tackle race issues were demonstrated in two ways. First, there were among them a few who tackled the race question

Law and Economic Organization “dealt with the distribution of income and the business cycle, economic theory, statistics, legal aspects of competition, control devises, and bankruptcy and reorganization.”

80 See JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 81-114 (1995)
81 See id. at 115-146.
82 See id. at 147-210.
83 KALMAN, supra note 65, at 73.
84 Id. at 73.
86 Harold Lasswell and Myers McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 53 YALE L.J. 204 (1943).
87 Harold Lasswell & Myres McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 53 Yale L.J. 203 (1943); White, supra note 71, at 823. Their involvement in the New Deal Era administration highlights their efforts to advance certain public policies. See N. E. H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND & KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 177, 238, 239, 338 (1997); RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE NEW DEAL (1995); SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMAN ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY 54-59, 79, 87, 89 (2005); KALMAN, supra note 65, at 60, 122, 130-136, 145, 148, 154, 159, 201, 230;.
head-on. Most notably, Karl Llewellyn,\textsuperscript{89} Morris Cohen,\textsuperscript{90} and Robert Hale\textsuperscript{91} attempted to create a “Realist critique of American race relations.”\textsuperscript{92} Moreover, Llewellyn was an active supporter of the NAACP during the 1920s and 1930s and was a self-proclaimed opponent of racial segregation.\textsuperscript{93} He was even asked, at one point, to lead the NAACP’s Legal Committee by the NAACP Board of Directors.\textsuperscript{94}

Second, Charles Hamilton Houston, architect of the NAACP’s strategy to end school segregation, was certainly a Realist. He provided not only a model for how social science could be employed to effectuate change in laws bearing on racial equality. He also provided a model for how racial policy could be changed and how both an academic and a practitioner could employ those means. As such, Houston embodied both Realist philosophy and practice.

While attending Harvard Law School, Houston was a student of Realists such as Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter.\textsuperscript{95} In fact, Frankfurter was Houston’s J.S.D advisor.\textsuperscript{96} Not surprisingly, Houston was well aware of Sociological Jurisprudence and Legal Realism. In fact, Houstonian Jurisprudence made Howard, like Columbia and Yale, a center of Realist thought and action.\textsuperscript{97} Houston believed that a lawyer was “either a social engineer or […] a parasite on

\textsuperscript{92} Bracey, supra note 88, at 1619.
\textsuperscript{93} WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 124 (1973).
\textsuperscript{94} HARVARD SITKOFF, A NEW DEAL FOR BLACKS 216-217 (1978).
\textsuperscript{96} McNeil, supra note 3, at 53.
\textsuperscript{97} TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 118.
He defined a social engineer as a “highly skilled, perceptive, sensitive lawyer” who understands the United States Constitution and knows how employ it in solving local, community problems and in bettering underprivileged citizens’ conditions. As noted by McNeil, between 1929 and 1948, Houston further refined his conception of a social engineer. This concept entailed five responsibilities for black lawyers. First, black lawyers had to be “prepared to anticipate, guide and interpret group advancement.” Second, they had to be the “mouthpiece of the weak and sentinel guarding against wrong.” Third, they had to ensure that “the course of change is…orderly with a minimum of human loss and suffering,” and when possible “guide…antagonistic and group forces into channels where they w[ould] not clash.” Fourth, black lawyers had to “use…the law as an instrument available to [the] minority unable to adopt direct action to achieve its place in the community and nation.” Fifth, they had to engage in “a carefully planned [program] to secure decisions, rulings and public opinion on broad principle[s whilst] arousing and strengthening the local will to struggle.”

Dating as far back as the 1947 Supreme Court cases Hurd v. Hodge, Urciolo v. Hodge, and Shelley v. Kraemer, Houston and his colleagues employed sociological and economic research in an effort to advance their cases. He created a viable litigation strategy...
out of an intellectual movement, which “manifested itself most famously in Brown.” In fact, one of the best ways to understand the Realists and their contribution to Brown is to see them as advocates of a policy-oriented or aware jurisprudence. As such, their jurisprudential thought was informed by developments in the behavioral and social sciences.

2. The Law Policy Science Movement

Lasswell and McDougal, advanced two elements of Realism—social science and law as well as law and public policy. McDougal was a Yale Law School graduate during the early 1930s and became a faculty member in 1934. While visiting at the University of Chicago, he met political scientist Harold Lasswell. The two became friends, and Lasswell was ultimately asked to join the Yale faculty as a professor of law and social science. As part of the general Realist milieu at Yale, McDougal and Lasswell viewed Realism as useful at debunking the law’s “old myths and lame theory,” but not offering much to take its place. They noted, in fact:

There is a limit beyond which the laborious demonstration of equivalencies in the language of the courts cannot go; eventually the critic must offer constructive guidance as to what and how courts and other decision-makers should decide the whole range of problems importantly affecting public order.

112 KALMAN, supra note 65, at 176.
114 Id. at 220.
Thus, they set out to develop an affirmative jurisprudence that would both incorporate law and the social sciences and embody “democratic values.”117 Together, they attempted to synthesize Legal Realism and empirical legal scholarship, which would be capable of formulating, promoting, and critiquing policy.118 McDougal valued the social sciences but felt that such scholarship in and of itself could not replace classical legal thought.119 Lasswell viewed himself as a “policy scientist” and brought to bear on the law all of the intellectual techniques and skills of a political scientist.120 Ultimately, they developed the Law, Science, and Policy movement.121

By 1943, they established part of the framework for Law, Science, and Policy in an article calling for the radical reform of legal education.122 Their main objective was a curricular reform movement within law schools, or more precisely, “elite” law schools. They contended that law schools’ role was to train policy makers.123 At its core, Law, Science, and Policy was concerned with authoritative decision-making. As such, policy scientists were concerned with how those with political authority (e.g., legislatures, courts, administrative agencies, city councils) made decisions.124 Another aspect of Law, Science, and Policy was value analysis, which consisted of analyzing the values held by participants in the decisional process.125 Law, Science, and Policy assumed that anyone applying its system of analysis was a rational actor who attempts to maximize value.126 With such an ambitious agenda, James Hergert and Robert

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117 Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 115, at 495. See also KALMAN, supra note 65, at 177.
118 HERGERT, supra note 113, at 220-221.
119 Id. at 220.
120 Id. at 220.
121 STEVENS, supra note 13, at 265.
122 Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 86, at 203.
123 STEVENS, supra note 13, at 265.
124 HERGERT, supra note 113, at 221.
125 Id. at 222.
126 Id. at 223.
Stevens, respectively, saw Law, Science, and Policy as “bring[ing] realism to its completion”\textsuperscript{127} and as a “remarkable, albeit ultimately unsuccessful, synthesis.”\textsuperscript{128} Numerous factors may have jettisoned the Law, Science, and Policy movement. The policy-science jargon, the formalism of the approach, or the dated social science it employed ultimately led to Law, Science, and Policy’s demise.\textsuperscript{129} However, their approach may have been “too elitist, too expensive, […] too academic” and ultimately too impractical for most American law schools.\textsuperscript{130}

3. Yale’s Divisional Studies Program

In the wake of the Realist and Law, Science, and Policy movements, Yale Law School embarked on a curricular reform effort.\textsuperscript{131} Yale’s 1946 Curriculum Committee Report echoed the sentiments of Laswell and McDougal.\textsuperscript{132} The report’s authors specifically noted that legal education should be “thoroughly” informed by the social sciences and that law students should be taught by social scientists.\textsuperscript{133} They stated, as part of the goal of this curriculum, that law students should be equipped “to analyze and assess the politics, economic and social, as well as the historical and doctrinal, factors in legal policy.”\textsuperscript{134} Furthermore, they needed “a critical and scientific understanding of the methods of study, analysis, and investigation which are used … in the various sciences … included in the scope of legal studies.”\textsuperscript{135} The report’s final, general recommendation was,

\textsuperscript{127} Id. at 224.
\textsuperscript{128} STEVENS, supra note 13, at 265.
\textsuperscript{129} Id. at 266.
\textsuperscript{130} Id. See also KALMAN, supra note 65, at 187.
\textsuperscript{132} Id. at 369.
\textsuperscript{133} Id.
\textsuperscript{134} Id. 369-370.
\textsuperscript{135} Id. at 370 (quoting Report of the Committee on Curriculum and Personnel 1-2 (May 6, 1946), Sterling Memorial Library (SML) 26A/449/III/66/87).
…for the institution of faculty seminars for intellectual cross-fertilization; the restoration of the requirement that second- and third-year students take small seminars; perhaps in conjunction with the Yale Law Journal; the funding of postdoctoral research at the law school by noted scholars from other disciplines; the recruitment of outside lecturers; and the integration of psychiatry into the study of law.136

The law school took no affirmative steps on this report but re-examined the curriculum in 1955. This time, the report’s goals were more focused on three issues: First, it sought to prepare its students for legal practice by teaching them how to specialize once in practice. Second, it sought to improve students’ critical thinking and writing skills by placing them in small groups focused on these areas. Third, and more germane to this article, the program sought to teach students how to integrate law and social science.137 The program was finally implemented during the 1956-57 academic year.138 However, by the early 1960s, the Divisional Studies Program had petered-out.139

D. LAW “AND” MOVEMENTS AND THEIR PROGENY

Just as Columbia and Yale law schools blazed a new trail in American jurisprudence during the first half of the twentieth century, so would Chicago and Wisconsin in the latter half. The law and economics movement took root at Chicago while the law and society movement and its progeny, Critical Legal Studies and Critical Race Theory, took shape at Wisconsin.

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136 Id. at 370.
137 Id. at 371-373.
138 Id. at 377.
139 Id. at 390-395.
1. Law and Economics Movement

The law and economics movement, premised on the notion that the law should be economically efficient,\(^{140}\) is one that has gained considerable momentum in recent decades. Its roots trace back to the 1700s with the work of David Hume, Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, and Jeremy Bentham.\(^{141}\) However, as an area of American jurisprudence, the movement took hold at the University of Chicago.\(^{142}\) In 1937, the Chicago Law School developed an optional four-year curriculum, part of which was reorganized to explore law’s social workings. A half-year course called Law and Economic Organization focused on the “distribution of income and the business cycle, economic theory, statistics, legal aspects of competition, control devises, and bankruptcy and reorganization.”\(^{143}\) Two years later, Chicago Law School appointed the first economics professor, Henry Simmons, to the law faculty.\(^{144}\)

The law and economics movement truly came to light with Ronald Coase’s research initiative at the London School of Economics, which gave rise to his 1937 essay, *The Nature of the Firm*.\(^{145}\) In 1964, Coase joined the Chicago Law School’s faculty where he remained until 1982. During his tenure at Chicago, he served as editor and then co-editor of *The Journal of Law and Economics*, which he used to advance the field.\(^{146}\) The writings of Coase\(^{147}\) and Guido Calabresi\(^{148}\) in the 1960s further catapulted the law and economics movement and spread its

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\(^{141}\) Id. at 3-8.

\(^{142}\) Id. at 12.

\(^{143}\) STEVENS, supra note 13, at 156.

\(^{144}\) Rowley, supra note 140, at 12. In 1949, Aaron Director was appointed as the second economics professor to a law school’s faculty. George L. Priest, *The Rise of Law and Economics: A Memoir of the Early Years*, in *The Origins of Law and Economics: Essays by the Founding Fathers* 352 (Francesco Parisi & Charles K. Rowley, eds. 2005) [hereinafter FOUNDING FATHERS].


\(^{146}\) Rowley, supra note 140, at 17.


methodological approach to torts, property, and contracts. The 1970s witnessed an ever-forward push of the movement with Calabresi’s *The Cost of Accidents* and Richard Posner’s *Economic Analysis of Law*. Through the latter half of the twentieth century and early portion of this century the law and economics movement has continued to flourish.

2. Law and Society Movement

In 1964, Harry Ball, coordinator of the University of Wisconsin’s Sociology and Law Program, took the lead in advancing what would come to be known as the Law and Society movement. During the American Sociological Association annual meeting, he invited all attendees who were interested in the intersection of sociology and law to a breakfast. Approximately ninety individuals attended the breakfast. From that effort, sociologists and law professors developed the Law and Society Association as a rigorous interdisciplinary study of law. Moreover, the development of the Law and Society Association seems to have had as much to do with legitimizing sociolegal studies as it had to do with an efforts towards an interdisciplinary exchange of ideas. Despite this interdisciplinary perspective, the locus of law and society scholarship is not legal scholarship and law schools. Felice Levine, first national President of the Law and Society Association, situates the locus at the interdisciplinary

151 RICHARD POSNER, *ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW* (1973) (arguing that the central feature of the common law is that its rules are designed to achieve efficiency.)
intersection of the social sciences, including but not privileging our law-trained colleagues attracted empirical inquiry and law-related matters.\textsuperscript{155}

Though, initially, the law and society movement never saw itself as political, its goals reflected the ideas of “people committed to moderate reform” and resonated among liberal lawyers.\textsuperscript{156} Thus, many who came to the law and society movement were committed to governmental intervention in the economy, moderate wealth redistribution, and governmental intervention to ensure social equality for the disadvantaged, racial minorities, the accused and mentally ill, as well as women.\textsuperscript{157} Not only were most law and society founders liberals; they were also “legalists.” As legalists, they had faith in the law as a tool for progressive social change. They believed in the liberalism of legal institutions and believed that through legal means most of the flaws in American society would diminish.\textsuperscript{158}

Generally, the law and society filed is the study of law in its social context.\textsuperscript{159} More specifically, the law and society movement’s goal is to employ a social scientific study of the law. However, if one is to study law as a social science, one must define law as more than a mere set of rules and principles. Thus, law and society sought to define law “as a social institution, as interacting behaviors, as ritual and symbol, as a reflection of interest group politics, [and] as a form of behavior modification.”\textsuperscript{160} David Trubek describes five types of law and society actors. The \textit{true scientist} was a scientist who wanted to study the law. The \textit{social problem solver} was a scientist with a social mission to participate in social reform. The \textit{technician} (e.g., statisticians and survey researchers) simply provided their technical skills to an expanding field of legal

\textsuperscript{155} Levine, \textit{supra} note 151, at 9.
\textsuperscript{156} Trubek, \textit{supra} note 153, at 8.
\textsuperscript{157} \textit{Id.} at 8.
\textsuperscript{158} \textit{Id.} at 9.
\textsuperscript{159} Munger, \textit{supra} note 154, at 25.
\textsuperscript{160} Trubek, \textit{supra} note 153, at 6.
studies. The *imperial jurist* believed social science would supplement legal doctrine and help the law understand its own powers and limitations. Finally, the *skeptical pragmatist* did not believe social science would replace legal studies but viewed it as a useful way to understand the legal process.\(^{161}\)

Conceptually, Trubek describes five elements that comprise the law and society movement. The doctrine of *systemicity* argues that society is a system that contains interacting elements comprised of individual and group behavior. The doctrine of *objectivism* argues that the objective knowledge of law governs the legal system’s operation, its constituent parts, and that its relation to other systems is realized through the scientific method. The doctrine of *disengagement* argues that in order to develop such objective knowledge, there needs to be scholarly institutions that disengage from the production of legal doctrine, education of legal professionals, and goals of any societal group. The doctrine of *univocality* argues that the law contains a set of normative standards available for critique and reconstruction. Finally, the doctrine of *progressivism* argues for liberal reform.\(^{162}\)

### a. Critical Legal Studies

Critical Legal Studies emerged as one of the leading jurisprudential schools in the second half of the 1970s through the 1980s.\(^{163}\) In 1976 Duncan Kennedy and David Trubek met and discerned that there were a number of legal scholars around the country engaged in similar scholarship. They decided to convene these individuals, and Mark Tushnet, then Dean of the University of Wisconsin Law School, organized an academic conference.\(^{164}\) Many of these early Critical Legal Studies scholars met at Yale. Of the nine organizing committee members, Duncan

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\(^{161}\) *Id.* at 24-27.

\(^{162}\) *Id.* at 28.

\(^{163}\) Laura Kalman, *The Dark Ages, in Yale Law School* 203.

Kennedy, Rand Rosenblatt, and Mark Tushnet graduated from Yale in the early 1970s. Richard Abel and Trubek taught at Yale. Roberto Unger was connected with Yale’s Law and Modernization Program, and after graduating from Yale, Thomas Heller was a fellow in the program. Only Morton Horowitz and Stewart Macaulay did not have Yale ties.165

Many of the Critical Legal Studies founders were formerly active in the law and society movement. However, they ultimately disagreed with their law and society colleagues on key issues. One of the factors that cleaved Critical Legal Studies from the law and society movement was the debate about the importance of empirical social science. In an article in the Law and Society Review,166 David Trubek assailed empirical social science.167 G. Edward White writes that Trubek implied two things. First, he suggested that empirical research legitimates the status quo in that it implies that research facts were objectively “there.” Second, he argued that a scholar could not separate ideology from methodology in any type of research, including empirical research. Ultimately, according to White, Trubek argued that “to be politically reformist and methodologically neutral was a contradiction in terms.”168

While Critical Legal Studies is a direct extension of Legal Realism,169 it is largely so through deconstruction of legal opinions and doctrine.170 Critical Legal Studies differs from Realism in two respects, however. As noted, while Critical Legal Studies scholars had little faith

165 Kalman, supra note 159, at 203.
167 White, supra note 71, at 834.
168 Id.
170 White, supra note 71, at 821. Critical Legal Scholars describe this methodological technique as “trashing.” In this approach, they 1) take legal arguments seriously in their own terms, discover that the arguments are “foolish”, and 3) look for some order in the “internally contradictory, incoherent chaos [they have] exposed.” Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STANFORD L. REV. 293, 293 (1984). Thus, Critical legal Scholars are Seen as having set out to wage a “full frontal assault” on modern jurisprudence. Allan C. Hutchison & Patrick J. Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STANFORD L. REV. 199,199 (1984).
in social science, the Realists endorsed social science and employed its methods. Additionally, the ethical relativism endorsed by most Critical Legal Studies scholars was different from and more coherent than that of the Realists. In the end, Critical Legal Studies has become associated with politically Left-leaning law faculty and is based on three propositions. First, law is indeterminate. Second, law is more accurately understood by paying attention to the context in which it is made. Third, law is politics. Critical Legal Studies ultimately lost much of its steam from cries that the movement was comprised of nihilists to critiques from women and racial minorities.

b. Critical Race Theory

Just as Realism was the precursor to the law and society movement, itself a precursor to Critical Legal Studies, Critical Legal Studies was a precursor to Critical Race Theory. However, before one can understand Critical Legal Study’s influence on the development of Critical Race Theory, it is important to understand the role of the seminal figure to its development. Derrick Bell is the forerunner of Critical Race Theory in two ways. Specifically, his departure from Harvard Law School’s faculty in 1981 prompted Harvard law students to wrangle with the Harvard’s dean over the marginalization of race in the curriculum. More

172 Tushnet, *supra* note 164, at 1516.
173 Id. at 1518.
175 See Robin West, Deconstructing the CLS-Fem Split, 2 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 85 (1986).
broadly, his resignation created an issue around which legal scholars could rally and develop intellectual relationships which grew over the course of a number of subsequent meetings.  

Bell also helped establish a scholarly agenda that placed race squarely at the center of intellectual legal dialogue. This is best exemplified by his path-breaking book *Race, Racism and American Law*. The aim of the book was to illustrate how laws help to systematically disempower African Americans. Additionally, Bell’s litmus test for the efficacy of civil rights laws was how well they contested the conditions of racial domination. As Crenshaw suggests, Bell was a realist in that he assessed legal rules in terms of how they function within a racist society. Furthermore, Bell was a Crit—a critical legal studies adherent—in that “he understood the indeterminate and frequently contradictory character of the law.”

The Harvard dean’s refusal to allow a race and law course into the curriculum prompted a group of students to organize an “Alternative Course.” Students of color initiated this class. They raised money and brought in academics of color to teach the course from chapters in Bell’s book. Among the scholars who participated were Charles Lawrence, Richard Delgado, Linda Greene, Denise Carty-Bennia, and Neil Gotanda. Many of these individuals became central figures in Critical Race Theory. Students Mari Matsuda and Kimberle Crenshaw played significant roles as did Harvard’s Critical Legal Studies faculty. The course served as an important precursor to Critical Race Theory in that it brought together a number of legal scholars and students to share ideas on race and law.

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179 Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, *The First Decade: Critical Reflections, or “A Foot in the Closing Door”*, in CROSSROADS 10 (Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp, and Angela P. Harris eds., 2002). Bell departed Harvard to assume the deanship at the University of Oregon’s law school. See http://www.answers.com/topic/derrick-bell (last visited November 18, 2006).
180 Crenshaw, *supra* note 179.
182 Crenshaw, *supra* note 179, at 12.
183 *Id.* at 14-15.
More directly, Critical Legal Studies had its impact as well. Generally, the cleavage of Critical Race Theory from Critical Legal Studies may have been, as described by Richard Delgado, an inevitable result of the different worldviews of whites and people of color. For example, many whites do not readily perceive racism. People of color, on the other hand, see and are on the receiving end of it daily. This has two effects: First, “even the most sympathetic, left-leaning whites” have to constantly be re-educated about racism. Second, it colors each group’s “legal and political theorizing,” causing members of the respective groups to take different stances on issues. As such, whites and people of color within the Critical Legal Studies movement had fundamental differences in what they wanted in a legal theory.

A more specific history shows that the 1985 Critical Legal Studies conference was organized by its feminist wing—the FemCrits. Women of color were called upon to discuss how they wanted to participate in the conference. Several invitees noted how they might discuss race at the conference, which resulted in a racism workshop. The question that launched the workshop was, “What is it about the whiteness of CLS that keep the people of color at bay?” Such a question was not well-received by the “white male heavies of CLS.” Two additional, specific, events served to drive people of color from the ranks of the Critical Legal Studies movement. First, during a visit at Stanford, white students complained of Derrick Bell’s approach to teaching constitutional law and arranged a series of supplemental lectures by other faculty. Given that Stanford was seen as a Critical Legal Studies stronghold, people of color within Critical

185 *Id.* at 409.
Legal Studies were gravely concerned. Second, in the Critical Legal Studies newsletter, *The Lizard*, there was a remark that bespoke a racial stereotype about Mexicans.\(^{188}\)

Finally, at the 1987 Critical Legal Studies conference, attendees hosted a panel entitled “The Minority Critique of CLS Scholarship (and Silence) on Race.” The panelists focused their comments on the “racially specific culture of CLS, the critique of rights, and on the silencing of voice[s] of color in the legal academy….”\(^{189}\) In 1988, Kimberle Crenshaw, Stephanie Phillips, and Richard Delgado began discussions on how to convene individuals interested in the intersection of Critical Legal Studies and race. At the time, Crenshaw was a visiting fellow, Phillips was a Hastie Fellow, and Delgado was a professor. Together, they approached David Trubek, director of the Wisconsin’s Institute of Legal Studies, for funds to support a workshop initially called “New Developments in Race and Legal Theory”\(^{190}\) but ultimately changed to Critical Race Theory.\(^{191}\) On July 8, 1989, twenty-four Critical Race Theory Workshop participants gathered in Madison, Wisconsin.\(^{192}\)

They defined Critical Race Theory as “a race-based, systematic critique of legal reasoning and legal institutions….”\(^{193}\) However, they created an area of jurisprudence that was more than just theory. Critical Race Theory, in addition to being “critical” is in part an activist agenda as it both tries to understand the plight of racial minorities and change it as well.\(^{194}\)

Delgado and Jean Stefancic indicate that Critical Race Theory has three basic tenets: First, 

\(^{188}\) *Id.* at 16-17.

\(^{189}\) *Id.* at 18.

\(^{190}\) *Id.* at 18.

\(^{191}\) *Id.* at 19. “We would signify the specific political and intellectual location of the project through “critical,” the substantive focus through “race” and the desire to develop a coherent account of race and law through the term “theory.”


\(^{193}\) DELGADO & STEFANCIC, *supra* note 5, at xix.

\(^{194}\) *Id.* at 3.
racism is normal—the way society operates and the common experience of people of color in the U.S. Second, white-over-color dominance serves important psychic and physical purposes. Thus, racism is difficult to remedy. Third, the concept of race is a social construction, a product of people’s thoughts and relations. However, despite this seeming coherence, Critical Race Theory is not merely a school of thought “with an overarching theoretical formulation.” It is more accurately a site of resistance and debate. Hackney argues that Critical Race Theory is better conceptualized as a project. Duncan Kennedy, as cited by Hackney, notes that “[a] project is a continuous goal-oriented practical activity based on an analysis of some kind … but the goals and the analysis are not necessarily internally coherent or consistent over time.”

II. CRITICAL RACE REALISM: A DEFINITION AND DEVELOPMENT(S)

Several intellectual movements, schools of thought, and individuals have contributed, in various ways, to what can be defined as Critical Race Realism. Here, Critical Race Realism consists of 1) a deconstructive element—a systematic, race-based evaluation and critique of the law and legal institutions and 2) a constructive element—a racially progressive policy agenda. Both elements rely heavily on empirical social science. With this in mind, there is a long history of liberal activism that has employed social science to end the racial status quo in America. There has also been a conservative effort to shore it up. The twentieth century provides a number of instances where the legal battle over racial equality in America has been fought employing social science. For instance, just as social science was employed to advance the aims of the

195 Id. at 6-8.
197 Id. at 141 n.1.
198 Id.
Brown v. Board of Education\textsuperscript{200} decisions to end school, racial segregation,\textsuperscript{201} there was also a scientific effort to reverse the legal gains of those decisions.\textsuperscript{202}

Charles Houston fought on the progressive side of that battle by employing social science and seeking to effectuate change in law and public policy. As such, Houston embodied and put into practice Realist philosophy; he was the exemplar of Critical Race Realism. Just as Houston and his efforts provide a template for Critical Race Realism, contemporary efforts and movements help situate it. Houston’s work and Brown’s effect was to create an increasingly interdisciplinary approach to the law.\textsuperscript{203} Contemporary court cases dealing with race issues such as Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,\textsuperscript{204} McCleskey v. Kemp,\textsuperscript{205} and Grutter v. Bollinger,\textsuperscript{206} reflects such interdisciplinarity.\textsuperscript{207} In addition to this interdisciplinary legacy, Houston and Brown also pointed a way toward a synthesis of social science and the law directed at changing public policy. It is this legacy that I rely upon in looking at how Critical Race Realism may currently be conceptualized. In this subsection, I focus on contemporary efforts towards integrating social science, law, and public policy. I then square Critical Race Realism with these contemporary movements.

A. CONTIGUOUS MODELS: EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES AND THE NEW LEGAL REALISM PROJECT

In light of efforts by the Legal Realists and the law and society movement, recent efforts to integrate law and social science are afoot. A new and rigorous empiricism has found its place

\begin{footnotes}
\item[200] 347 U.S. 483 (1945).
\item[201] See JACKSON, supra note 98.
\item[202] See JOHN P. JACKSON, JR., SCIENCE FOR SEGREGATION: RACE, LAW, AND THE CASE AGAINST BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (2005).
\item[204] 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
\item[207] Heise, supra note 203, at 312-314.
\end{footnotes}
within legal academia. This is likely because empirical legal scholarship has two substantial benefits. First, it arguably leads to objective knowledge, unfettered by personal prejudices.\(^\text{208}\) Second, it has incredible potential to affect public policy.\(^\text{209}\) As such, it is no surprise that empirical legal scholarship has taken firm root within legal academia in recent years. A number of indicators suggest this: For instance, the conference theme in 2006 for the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools was “Empirical Scholarship: What Should We Study and How Should We Study It?”\(^\text{210}\) Additionally, empirical legal scholarship is the “discernible emerging trend” in hires among law faculty, and law schools have hired an increasing number of JD/PhDs as faculty.\(^\text{211}\) Arguably, a significant number of these dual-degree hires are trained in economics, or psychology, or sociology, or political science and presumably trained in empirical methodologies. In addition to hires, recent legal academia trends suggest that law professors are increasingly interested in and producing more empirical scholarship.\(^\text{212}\)

Moreover, there is a growing infrastructure for producing and publishing empirical legal scholarship. Several law schools offer courses in empirical methods to train their students.\(^\text{213}\) A


number of institutions have “programs or initiatives” designed to increase the output of empirical legal scholarship. 214 Washington University in St. Louis has a Workshop on Empirical Research in the Law. 215 UCLA Law School has an Empirical Research Group. 216 Harvard Law School has a Program on Empirical Legal Studies. 217 Wake Forest Law School has a Center for Student Empirical Studies sponsored by its law review. 218 Additionally, the Institute for Legal Studies at the University of Wisconsin Law School, 219 The Center for the Study of Law and Society at Boalt Law School, 220 and the Baldy Center at the University of Buffalo 221 all support empirical and interdisciplinary scholarship.

Additionally, not only are traditional law reviews publishing more empirical scholarship. Faculty-edited, peer-reviewed journals such as the *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Journal of Legal Studies, Journal of Law and Economics, Law & Society Review, and Journal of Law, Economics & Organization* have emerged and rank among some of the most prestigious law


journals. The Social Science Research Network’s Legal Scholarship Network, a major disseminator of scholarship, includes a section on empirical legal scholarship. The recently launched Empirical Legal Studies blog serves as a website where empirical legal scholars discuss research and contemporary issues in the field. There has also been a growth in the number of conferences focused on empirical legal scholarship. These range from small conferences, such as the empirical legal scholarship conference at Northwestern Law School, to national conferences, such as the empirical legal scholarship conference at the University of Texas-Austin Law School. Beyond law schools, agencies such as the National Science Foundation’s Law and Social Science division and the National Institute of Justice aid in the development of empirical legal scholarship.

Recent efforts have attempted to create a formalized movement among empirical scholars—the New Legal Realism Project. How this movement differs from the law and society 222 Colleen M. Cullen & S. Randall Kalberg, Chicago-Kent Law Review Faculty Scholarship Survey, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1445, 1453 (1995) (noting that the Journal of Legal Studies is one of the most cited and prestigious journals among law faculty); Eisenberg, supra note 209, at 1742; Heise, supra note 211, at 825. 223 To access the Experimental & Empirical Studies section See http://www.ssrn.com/lsn/index.html (last visited November 5, 2006). Then click on “Subject matter eJournals” to the left of the page. 224 http://www.elsblog.org/about.html (last visited October 26, 2006). The ELS blog was developed to “advance productive and interdisciplinary discourse among empirical legal scholars.” 225 http://www.law.northwestern.edu/faculty/conferences/EmpiricalWorkshopBrochure.pdf (last visited November 9, 2006). 226 Beyond law schools, agencies such as the National Science Foundation’s Law and Social Science division and the National Institute of Justice aid in the development of empirical legal scholarship. 227 http://www.nsf.gov/funding/pgm_summ.jsp?pims_id=5422&org=SES&from=home (last visited November 9, 2006). 228 http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/ (last visited November 9, 2006).
movement seems unclear at this point. Nonetheless, for the past ten years, academics have debated the need for a “new legal realism.” Finally, in 2005, the American Bar Foundation and the University of Wisconsin Law School’s Institute for Legal Studies sponsored the first New Legal Realism symposium, which resulted in the publication of several articles. The New Legal Realism agenda consists of five points. First, it takes both a bottom-up and top-down approach. A bottom-up approach necessitates that empirical research must support assertions about the law’s impact on everyday people’s lives. Additionally, there must be a continued effort to study decision-makers and institutions at the top. Furthermore, this bottom-up approach requires an appreciation of “power arrangements and hierarchies” within our legal system. Second, new legal realists seek to facilitate some translation between law and social science—bridge the gap between “epistemology[ies], methods, operating assumptions and overall goals….” Third, new legal realists attempt to reconcile the issue that some believe that empiricism is not unfettered by researcher subjectivity. Fifth, New Legal Realism must broaden its horizon and focus on international as well as nation issues. Finally, New Legal Realism incorporates not only empirical research and legal theory, it must also address policy issues, too. In doing so, New Legal Realism cannot simply be a method of critique; it must also point the way towards “positive social change.”

229 See http://www.elsblog.org/the_empirical_legal_studi/2006/06/my_take_on_new/.html (last visited November 10, 2006), where a number of members of the Empirical Legal Studies blog indicate that they cannot readily discern how New Legal Realism differs from the law and society movement.
231 Id. at 337; http://www.newlegalrealism.org/ (last visited November 1, 2006).
233 Erlranger et al., supra note 230, at 339.
234 Id. at 340.
235 Id. at 336, 341-342.
236 Id. at 342-343.
237 Id. at 336, 343-344.
238 Id. at 345.
Over the past several years, the topic of race has taken some root within areas of empirical legal scholarship and social science and law literature. Maybe the clearest indication of this is the New Legal Realism symposium issue of the *Wisconsin Law Review*. Within the launching of this new effort to put forth a serious integration of empirical methods and legal scholarship, more than one-quarter of the articles focused on race issues.\(^{239}\) This suggests that there is at least some effort on the part of empirical legal scholars to substantively address issues of race.

**B. CRITICAL RACE REALISM: CRITICAL RACE THEORY AND CONTEMPORARY MOVEMENTS**

Narrowly conceptualized, Critical Race Realism is not new. As noted, Charles Hamilton Houston balanced being a law school administrator, an academic, and a civil rights lawyer, a practitioner. Moreover, law professors have engaged in social science, race and law as well as race and empirical legal scholarship for years. Below, in subsection 1, I highlight the growth of such scholarship as a way to 1) note who is actually engaged in this type of scholarship and 2) help define what issues Critical Race Realism might continue to tackle and what new issues need to be addressed. Subsection 2 further clarifies what Critical Race Realism is or could be and the benefits stemming from this perspective. Subsection 3 suggests some ways in which Critical Race Realism might be more firmly established.

**1. A Systematic Analysis of Race, Social Science & Law Scholarship**

To better clarify what I mean by Critical Race Realism, what follows is an analysis of social science, race and law as well as race and empirical legal scholarship over the past twenty years—since Critical Race Theory’s founding. My hope is that this will highlight the progression

of this area of scholarship. The first analysis investigated social science, race and law as well as race and empirical legal scholarship conducted by founders of Critical Race Theory. The second investigated social science, race and law as well as race and empirical legal scholarship conducted by law faculty at the most highly ranked law schools. The third investigated social science, race and law as well as race and empirical legal scholarship published in the top-twenty general law journals. The fourth investigated social science, race and law as well as race and empirical legal scholarship published in a select number of law journals focused on race or civil rights issues. The fifth investigated social science, race and law as well as race and empirical legal scholarship published in interdisciplinary social science and law journals. The sixth investigated unpublished social science, race and law as well as race and empirical legal scholarship.

**Analysis 1: Social Science, Race & Law and Race & Empirical Legal Scholarship Conducted by Critical Race Theory Founders**

For the first analysis, I selected the names of Critical Race Theory’s principle figures from *Crossroads, Directions, and a New Critical Race Theory* chapter on the history of Critical Race Theory as well as *Critical Race Theory: An Introduction*. Aside from the founding members, my focus was on African American principal figures. I then conducted a Westlaw search of each individual’s journal and law review articles. The search terms were $AU(\text{first name} /2 \text{last name}) \& \text{“social scien!“ empiric! quantitative /s race “African American”}$. The searches were restricted between the founding year of Critical Race Theory, 1987, and 2006. Final searches were conducted in October of 2006. In conjunction with this search method, results

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242 In addition to Alan Freeman and Charles Lawrence, for the principle members identified, *See* Crenshaw *supra* note 179, at 30 n.18.
from analyses two through four were also perused to cross-check and ascertain whether additional results were found not produced by this first analysis. Only those results that focused on race and with at least one-fourth textual content about social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship served as actual results for this analysis. Additionally, if any utilized result was part of a symposium, the other symposia articles were analyzed to determine if they too fit within the aforementioned criteria. If they did, they were included in this analysis. These results are listed below, journal articles with at least a designated section on social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship are footnoted.

This analysis only yielded two results. Between 1987 and 2001, principal Critical Race Theory figures published no social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship law journal articles. Between 2002 and 2006, they published two law journal articles. Thematically, both articles focused on race, law, and economics.

**Analysis 2: Social Science, Race & Law and Race & Empirical Legal Scholarship**

**Conducted by Faculty at Top Law Schools**

For the second analysis, I employed *U.S. News and World Report*’s “America’s Best Graduate Schools 2007” to identify the top twenty law schools. I then perused the websites for those law schools to identify faculty possibly engaged in social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship.

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244 One journal article had a section dedicated to social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship. See Isabelle R. Dunning, *Perceptions, Categorizations, and Impartiality: Arbitrators and Racial Equality in Arbitration*, 4 J. AM. ARB. 59, 72 n. 50, 51 (2005). Dunning discusses the social scientific assessment of racial bias and applies this research to the field of arbitration.


246 http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/grad/rankings/law/lawindex_brief.php (last visited October 1, 2006). I only include faculty at the top twenty law schools as a way to streamline this analysis. I realize that my methodological approach excludes many faculty who may be engaged in research relevant to topic of this article. However, to conduct an analysis of faculty at all law schools would be prohibitively burdensome given the scope of this article.

37
empirical legal scholarship. I only included full-time faculty teaching doctrinal courses in the analysis. Thus, I excluded emeritus faculty, visiting faculty, clinical faculty, adjunct faculty, and fellows from the analysis. I then perused the websites of identified faculty to determine whether they engaged in race scholarship. The terms race, antidiscrimination, civil rights, and employment discrimination were employed in the search. For faculty engaged in antidiscrimination, civil rights, or employment discrimination research, I also looked for additional information which might suggest that they are particularly interested in race discriminations scholarship. Specifically, this was determined by what type of scholarship they published since 2000 or by what their other research foci were. For some faculty, their research interests were clearly indicated on their website under Areas of Interest or Areas of Expertise. For others, their research interest was gleaned from the courses they taught, their scholarship since 2000, or identified on their Curriculum Vitae posted on their website. One hundred and one faculty members were identified via this method.247

247 The professors at the following institutions were identified: At Yale, the eleven faculty members were Bruce Ackerman, Ian Ayres, Richard Brooks, Harlon Dalton, Drew Days, III, John Donahue, Owen M. Fiss, Christine Jolls, Dan M. Kahan, Vicki Schultz, and Reva Siegel. At Stanford, the five faculty members were R. Richard Banks, Richard Thompson Ford, Pamela S. Karlan, Mark G. Kelman, and Alison D. Morantz. At Harvard, the five faculty members were Lani Guinier, Randall L. Kennedy, Kenneth Mack, Charles J. Ogletree, and David B. Wilkins. At Columbia, the seven faculty members were Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Elizabeth F. Emens, Jack Greenberg, Olatunde Johnson, James Liebman, Kendall Thomas, and Patricia Williams. At NYU, the four faculty members were Derrick Bell, Paulette Caldwell, Cynthia Estlund, and Deborah Malamud. At Chicago, the one faculty member was Tracey L. Meares. There were none at the University of Michigan. At U. Penn, the five faculty members were Regina Austin, Serena Mayeri, Anita L. Allen, Wendell Pritchett and David Rudovsky. At Boalt, the six faculty members were Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher Edley, Jr., Ian F. Haney Lopez, Angela P. Harris, Linda Hamilton Krieger, and Goodwin Liu. At U.V.A, the eleven faculty members were Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Kim Forde-Mazuri, Risa Goluboff, John C. Jeffries, Jr., Michael J. Klarman, Richard A. Merrill, George Rutherglen, James E. Ryan, Richard C. Schragger, J. H. Verkerke, and Ann Woolhandler. At Duke, the four faculty members were Mitu Gulati, Trina Jones, Charles Clotfelter and Karla F. Hollow. At Northwestern, the four faculty members were Dorothy E. Roberts, Leonard Rubinowitz, Mayer G. Freed and Charlton Copeland. At Cornell, the four faculty members were Valarie Hans, Barbara J. Holden-Smith and Sheri Lynn Johnson. At Georgetown, the eight faculty members were Dorothy E. Abernathy, Sherryl D. Cashin, Anthony E. Cook, Michael H. Gottesman, Emma Coleman Jordan, Charles R. Lawrence, III, Mari J. Matsuda and Elizabeth Hayes Patterson. At U.C.L.A, the seven faculty members were Gary Blasi, Devon W. Carbado, Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Joel F. Handler, Cheryl I. Harris, Jerry Kang and Russell Robinson. Professor Crenshaw was double counted, as she holds a joint-appointment with Columbia and
I then conducted a Westlaw search of each individual’s journal and law review articles. The search terms were AU(first name /2 last name) & “social scien!” empiric! quantitative /s race “African American”. The searches were restricted between the founding year of Critical Race Theory, 1987, and 2006. Final searches were conducted in October of 2006. In conjunction with this search method, results from analyses one, three and four were also perused to cross-check and ascertain whether additional results were found not produced by this analysis. Only those results that focused on race and with at least one-fourth textual content about social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship were included in this analysis. Additionally, if any utilized result was part of a symposium, the other symposia articles were analyzed to determine if they too fit within the aforementioned criteria. If they did, they also served as actual results for this analysis. These results are listed below, journal articles with at least a designated section on social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship are footnoted.

This analysis yielded twenty-seven results. Between 1987 and 1991, faculty at the top twenty law schools published two social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship law journal articles.248 These articles focused on how the intent standard works in racial discrimination cases249 and the role of unconscious racism in criminal law.250 Between

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1992 and 1996, faculty at the top twenty law schools published five social science, race and law or race and empirical scholarship law journal articles. These articles explore such topics as discrimination in employment law, bail setting, how mental heuristics lead to racism in legal contexts, and stereotyping and prejudice among legal decision-makers. Between 1997 and 2001, these faculty members published five social science, race and law or race and empirical scholarship law journal articles. The topics explored were racial attitudes about crime control and affirmative action. Between 2002 and 2006, these faculty members published sixteen social science, race and law or race and empirical scholarship law journal articles. See Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1781, 1829-1838 (1996) (providing cost-benefit analysis to narrow tailoring within the context of affirmative action).


See Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsi Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781 (1994) (describing, generally, how mental shortcuts or heuristics lead people to be racist within the legal context).

See Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733 (1995) (discussing how psychological research on stereotyping and prejudice may help legal decision-makers break such habits within legal contexts).

See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN L. REV. 1111, 1135-1146 (1997) (discussing the utility of social science research on unconscious bias and this research’s applicability to equal protection).


See Ian Ayres & Fredrick E. Vars, When Does Private Discrimination Justify Public Affirmative Action?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1577, 1587 (1998) (arguing that “the government can remedy shortfalls in private purchasing only when the firms disadvantaged by the government's affirmative action were likely beneficiaries of the private discrimination. This principle implies that the government cannot use affirmative action in one market to remedy discrimination in another. But when purchasing a particular product, the government should be able to remedy private discrimination against sellers of the same product. The but-for adjustment does just this to remedy shortfalls in government purchasing; the single-market justification expands the procurement remedy to correct for shortfalls in private purchasing”); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, A Critique of Instrumental Rationality: Judicial Reasoning About the “Cold Numbers” in Hopwood v. Texas, 16 LAW & INEQ. 359 (1998); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251 (1998) (exploring the implications of social cognition and social identity theory for the affirmative action debate).
These articles explore such topics as Law and Economics, unconscious racism, how lawyers may advocate against racism, affirmative action in law school admissions, and school desegregation. The results for this analysis are reported in Table 1. Only those law schools with at least one result are tabled.


260 See Ian Ayres, Fredrick E. Vars, & Nasser Zakariya, To Insure Prejudice: Racial Disparities in Taxicab Tipping, 114 YALE L.J. 1613 (2005) (providing an empirical analysis of racial discrimination in consumer economic behavior—taxicab tipping); Carbado & Gulati, supra note 8 (discussing how workplace discrimination may be understood from the intersection of law & economics and critical race theory); Ayres, supra note 8 (2003) (arguing that race-contingent behavior is not undefined but actually knowable); Culp et al., supra note 8 (providing some closing analysis on the continuing existence of racism in light of empirical scholarship on its pervasiveness).


263 See Ian Ayres & Richard Brooks, Does Affirmative Action Reduce the Number of Black Lawyers?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1807 (2005) (providing an empirical rebuttal to the argument that affirmative action in law schools serves to reduce the number of black lawyers).

Table 1. Law Faculty Engaged in Race/Social Science Research

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Note. The number of faculty at each law school is indicated in parentheses next to each school’s name.

**Analysis 3: Social Science, Race & Law and Race & Empirical Legal Scholarship**

*Published in the Top-twenty, General Law Journals*

In the third analysis, I employed Washington & Lee Law School’s journal ranking system to identify the top, general law journals.265 My search query was for *U.S., General* journals. I searched the most recent database update, 2005, by impact-factor (IF) and selected the top twenty journal.266 I then conducted a Westlaw search of each journal. Under “Search these databases”, I input each journal, separately. Then for each journal, the search terms employed were “social scien!” *empiric! quantitative /s race “African American”*. The searches were restricted between 1987 and 2006. Final searches were conducted in October of 2006. In conjunction with this search method, results from analyses one, two and four were also perused to cross-check and ascertain whether additional results were found not produced by this analysis.

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265 http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/ (last visited October 1, 2006). I only include the top twenty general law journals in my analysis as a way to streamline the analysis. I realize that my methodological approach excludes many articles that are published in various other general law journals. However, it would be prohibitive to conduct an analysis of all general law journals given the scope of this article.

Only those results that focused on race and with at least one-fourth textual content about social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship served as actual results for this analysis. Additionally, if any utilized result was part of a symposium, the other symposia articles were analyzed to determine if they too fit within the aforementioned criteria. If they did, they also served as actual results for this analysis. These results are listed below, journal articles with at least a designated section on social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship are footnoted.

This analysis yielded forty-four results. Between 1987 and 1991, the top twenty, general law reviews published three social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship law journal articles. These articles focused on how the intent standard worked in racial discrimination cases, the role of unconscious racism in criminal law and an empirical analysis of how employment discrimination litigation has changed. Between 1992 and 1996, the top twenty, general law reviews published seven social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship law journal articles. These articles explore such topics as


268 See Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 249 (providing an empirical analysis of the intent standard).

269 See Johnson, supra note 250.


271 Two journal articles included sections on social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship. See Ayres, supra note 251 (providing cost-benefit analysis to narrow tailoring within the context of affirmative action); Michael John Weber, Immersed in an Educational Crisis: Alternative Programs for African-American Males, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1099, 1102-1121 (1993) (discussing empirical support for African American male public schools).
discrimination in employment law, bail setting, and lending. They also explore how mental heuristics lead to racism in legal contexts, economic analysis of racial discrimination, and stereotyping and prejudice among legal decision-makers. Between 1997 and 2001, the top twenty, general law reviews published five social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship law journal articles. These articles focused on affirmative action and racial attitudes about crime control. Between 2002 and 2006, the top twenty,
general law reviews published twenty-nine social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship law journal articles. These articles explore such topics as Law and Economics, unconscious racism, racial disparities in medical care, racial profiling, and

Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1997) (demonstrating, through empirical methods, that affirmative action is likely needed to maintain a diverse law student body).

See Brooks, supra note 257 (providing an empirical analysis of minority communities’ perceptions of police criminal enforcement).

Twelve journal articles included sections dedicated to social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5-10 (2006) (discussing the relevance of implicit bias to employment discrimination law); Blume et al., supra note 259, 329-331 (indicating that Brown and Miranda both employed extra-legal materials (i.e., social science and police manuals) to broaden their legal arguments); Jennifer C. Braceras, Killing the Messenger: The Misuse of Disparate Impact Theory to Challenge High-Stakes Educational Tests, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1111, 1186-1187 (2002 (critiquing the notion that disparate impact theory should be employed to minimize ‘statistical discrimination.” “[S]tatistical discrimination in the employment context occurs when employers, lacking perfect information regarding a job applicant's potential for success on the job, rely upon proxies [high-stakes test scores] that are closely correlated with race and only loosely correlated with productivity”); Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 M. L. REV. 18, 25-42 (2005) (describing the social scientific rationales for why discrimination claimants need to be protected); Charles, supra note 259 (employing social psychology towards understanding the relationship between individual and group racial identity); Daniel M. Filler, Silence and the Racial Dimension of Megan’s Law, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1535, 1578-1581, 1582-1587 (2004) (suggesting that the lack of racial data and social scientific explanations help clarify why there is no racialized critique of Megan’s Law); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Does a Diverse Judiciary: Attain a Rule of Law that is Inclusive?: What Grutter v. Bollinger Has to Say About Diversity of the Bench, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 101, 131-137 (2004) (describing empirical studies exploring the relationship between judges’ personal attributes such as race, political affiliations and their rulings); Joy Milligan, Pluralism in America: Why Judicial Diversity Improves Legal Decisions About Political Morality, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1206, 1212-1230 (2006) (describing how social science aids in our understanding of how political morality varies among U.S. racial groups and how such variation relates to judicial decision-making); Radha Natarajan, Racialized Memory and Reliability: Due Process Applied to Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identifications, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1821, 1834-1839 (2003) (describing psychological studies on cross-racial eye witness testimony); Yoav Sapir, Neither Intent Nor Impact: A Critique of the Racially Based Selective Prosecution Jurisprudence and a Reform Proposal, 19 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 127, 130-133 (2003) (providing empirical evidence of race and prosecutorial discretion); Siegel, supra note 259 (discussing resistance to footnote 11 of Brown v. Board of Education where social scientific studies were employed to advance the arguments for school integration).

See Ayres, Is Discrimination Elusive, supra note 8 (arguing that race-contingent behavior is not undefined but actually knowable); Ayres et al., supra note 260 (providing an empirical analysis of racial discrimination in consumer economic behavior—taxicab tipping); Carbado & Gulati, supra note 8 (discussing how workplace discrimination may be understood from the intersection of law & economics and critical race theory); Case, supra note 8 (describing “first, the need to examine and articulate far more precisely the victim’s preferences and concerns in shaping remedies for many kinds of discrimination…; and second, the relationship of anecdote to data); Culp et al., supra note 8 (providing some closing analysis on the continuing existence of racism in light of empirical scholarship on its pervasiveness); Freshman, Prevention Perspectives, supra note 8 (exploring how one prevents various forms of discrimination); Freshman, Revisioning the Constellation, supra note 8 (setting the stage for a discussion about Critical Race Theory and Law & Economics); Haynes, supra note 8 (describing the pervasiveness of racism in light of empirical research); Moran, supra note 9.

See Banks et al., supra note 261 (describing how implicit racial bias relates to racial bias, generally, and in the criminal justice system, specifically); Blasi & Jost, supra note 261 (describing how system justification theory may be understood in light of implicit racial bias); Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 261 (describing the social scientific underpinnings of implicit or “unconscious” racial bias); Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 261 (describing the relations between implicit racial bias and antidiscrimination law); Kang, supra note 261(describing the ways in which
how lawyers may advocate against racism.\textsuperscript{286} Other articles focused on education issues: \textit{Brown v. Board of Education}\textsuperscript{287}, education finance reform,\textsuperscript{288} affirmative action in law school admissions,\textsuperscript{289} and how well the LSAT predicts racial differences in educational attainment.\textsuperscript{290} The results of this analysis are in Table 2. Only those journals with at least one published article on social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship are tabled.

\textit{Communication Law},\textit{ Cognitive Psychological Research}, and implicit racial bias intersect); Kang & Banaji, supra note 261 (describing how affirmative action can be approached in light of implicit racial bias); Krieger & Fiske, supra note 261 (describing the relationship between implicit racial bias and employment discrimination law); Michael S. Shin, \textit{Redressing Wounds: Finding A Legal Framework to Remedy Racial Disparities in Medical Care}, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 2047, 2049 (2002) (exploring how “implicit cognitive bias, in the form of implicit attitudes and stereotypes, significantly contributes to these racial disparities in medical treatment”).\textsuperscript{286}

\textit{See} Shin, supra note 283.


\textit{See} Sanjay Mody, \textit{Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science and the Supreme Court’s Quest for Legitimacy}, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 793 (2002) (discussing \textit{Brown v. Board of Education}’s social science footnote and its impact on legitimizing the United States Supreme Court’s controversial decision).\textsuperscript{286}


\textit{See} Blasi, supra note 262, at 1241 (providing “a brief overview of the rapidly developing science regarding stereotypes and prejudice, and … the implications for lawyers and other advocates”); Blasi & Jost, supra note 261 (describing how system justification theory may be understood in light of implicit racial bias).\textsuperscript{286}

\textit{See} Ayres & Brooks, supra note 263, (providing an empirical rebuttal to the argument that affirmative action in law schools serves to reduce the number of black lawyers); David L. Chambers, Timothy T. Clydesdale, William C. Kidder & Richard O. Lempert, \textit{The Real Impact of Eliminating Affirmative Action in American Law Schools: An Empirical Critique of Richard Sander’s Study}, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1807 (2005) (providing an empirical rebuttal to the argument that affirmative action in law schools serves to reduce the number of black lawyers); Daniel E. Ho, \textit{Why Affirmative Action Does Not Cause Black Students to Fail the Bar}, 114 Yale L.J. 1997 (2005) (providing an empirical rebuttal to the argument that affirmative action in law schools serves to reduce the number of black lawyers); Richard H. Sander, \textit{A Reply to Critics}, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1807 (2005) (providing an empirical rejoinder to critics of his argument that affirmative action in law school admissions serves to reduce the number of black lawyers); Richard H. Sander, \textit{A Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools}, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 367 (2005) (providing an empirical critique of affirmative action in law school admissions and arguing that it serves to reduce the number of black lawyers); Richard H. Sander, \textit{Mismeasuring the Mismatch: A Response to Ho}, 114 Yale L.J. 1997 (2005) (providing commentary on Ho’s empirical rebuttal to the argument that affirmative action in law schools serves to reduce the number of black lawyers).\textsuperscript{286}

\textit{See} William C. Kidder, \textit{Does the LSAT Mirror or Magnify Racial and Ethnic Differences in Educational Attainment?: A Study of Equally Achieving “Elite” College Students}, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1055, 1058 (2001). Kidder “provide[s] empirical answers to the question of whether students of color with the same undergraduate grades systematically score lower on the LSAT than white students, even when controlling for factors such as which college they attended and what undergraduate major they selected. I also compare differences in law school grades to differences in LSAT scores.”
Table 2. Race/Social Science Scholarship in General Law Journals

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Note: An asterisk denotes a period where more than one noted journal article was part of a symposium. Two symposia were identified for the Stanford Law Review291 and one for the California Law Review.292

Analysis 4: Social Science, Race & Law and Race & Empirical Legal Scholarship

Published in Race and Civil Rights Law Journals

In the fourth analysis, I employed Washington & Lee Law School’s journal ranking system to identify law journals on race or civil rights.293 My first search was for civil rights journals; the search query was for U.S., Human Rights, Civil Rights journals. My second search was for journals on race; the search query was U.S., Minority, Race and Ethnic Issues journals. For both searches, I searched for the most recent database update, 2005, by impact-factor (IF). Additionally, I only selected those journals which were above the mean rank to focus on the top journals in both categories. This search yielded seven journals: Michigan Journal of Race & Law (founded in 1996); Boston College Third World Law Journal (founded in 1980); Law and Inequality (founded in 1983); Journal of Gender, Race and Justice (founded in 1997); Harvard Blackletter Law Journal (founded in 1984); N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change (founded

293 http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/ (last visited October 1, 2006).
in 1971); and Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review (founded in 1966). I then conducted a Westlaw search of each journal. Under “Search these databases”, I input each journal, separately. Then for each journal, the search terms employed were “social scien!” empiric! quantitative /s race “African American”. The searches were restricted between 1987 and 2006. Final searches were conducted in October of 2006. Since In conjunction with this search method, results from analyses one, two and four were also perused to cross-check and ascertain whether additional results were found not produced by this analysis. Only those results that focused on race and with at least one-fourth textual content about social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship served as actual results for this analysis. Additionally, if any utilized result was part of a symposium, the other symposia articles were analyzed to determine if they too fit within the aforementioned criteria. If they did, they also served as actual results for this analysis. These results are listed below, journal articles with at least a designated section on social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship are footnoted.

This analysis yielded four results. Between 1987 and 1996, the top race/civil rights law journals published no social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship law journal articles.294 Between 1997 and 2001, they published one social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship law journal articles. This article critiqued reliance on cold numbers in law school admissions.295 Between 2002 and 2006, the top race/civil rights law journals published three social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship law journal articles.

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295 See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, supra note 258 (critiquing over-reliance on rigid LSAT scores in law school admission in the context of affirmative action).
journal articles. These articles focused on affirmative action, the degree to which inmates’ Afrocentric features impacts the length of their sentences, and unconscious racism.

**Analysis 5: Social Science, Race & Law and Race & Empirical Legal Scholarship**

**Published in Interdisciplinary, Social Science & Law Journals**

In the fifth analysis, I employed the methodology Tracey George utilized in *An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship* to identify interdisciplinary journals. I selected journals based on the following criteria: The journal’s subject matter must be law and a social science. The journal must be peer-reviewed. Both law professors and social scientists must publish in the journal. Both law professors and social scientists must serve as editors and referees. The journal must also be part of a legal citation index or legal database. Each edition of each journal between the years 1987 and 2006 was searched via e-journals. Where an edition of the journal was not accessible electronically, I manually searched the journal. The search terms were *race*, *African American* and *black*. Where an abstract was provided, only the abstract was searched. Only those results that focused on race and with at least one-fourth textual content about social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship served as actual results for this analysis.

Additionally, if any utilized result was part of a symposium, the other symposia articles were analyzed to determine if they too fit within the aforementioned criteria. If they did, they also served as actual results for this analysis. Only studies that focused on the United States and

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296 One journal article included a section dedicated to social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship. See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, *Does a Diverse Judiciary Attain a Rule of Law that is Inclusive?: What Grutter v. Bollinger Has to Say About Diversity of the Bench*, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 101, 131-137 (2004) (describing empirical studies exploring the relationship between judges’ personal attributes such as race, political affiliations and their rulings).


300 See George, *supra* note 212, at 153-156.
Canada were included in the analysis. The results are noted below. Journal articles with at least a
designated section on social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship are
footnoted.

This analysis yielded one hundred thirteen results. Between 1987 and 1991, the
interdisciplinary social science and law journals published nine social science, race and law or
race and empirical legal scholarship articles. These articles focus on criminal justice,\(^{301}\) social
control,\(^{302}\) and voting.\(^{303}\) They also explore issues related to the judiciary,\(^{304}\) social science in
Supreme Court decisions,\(^{305}\) and affirmative action.\(^{306}\) Between 1992 and 1996, the
interdisciplinary social science and law journals published twenty-three social science, race and
law or race and empirical legal scholarship articles. These articles focus on social science, race,
and law, generally.\(^{307}\) They also focus on antisocial behavior,\(^{308}\) juries,\(^{309}\) police,\(^{310}\) sentencing,\(^{311}\)

\(^{301}\) See Noval Morris, *Race and Crime: What Evidence is There that Race Influences Results in the Criminal Justice System?*, 72 JUDICATURE 111 (1988) (assessing the role of race within the criminal justice system).


\(^{308}\) See Dorothy L. Taylor, Frank A. Biafora, Jr., & George W. Warheit, *Racial Mistrust and Disposition to Deviance Among African American, Haitian, and Other Caribbean Island Adolescent Boys*, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291 (1994) (testing whether racial mistrust relates to a willingness, among black boys, to engage in delinquent behavior).

and capital punishment. Furthermore, these articles also address issues such as affirmative action, employment discrimination, hate crimes, and dispute resolution. Lastly, they also tackle parental rights issues, development issues for poor women, politics, and regulation within the trucking industry. Between 1997 and 2001, the interdisciplinary social science and law journals published forty-two social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship articles. These articles focus on the judiciary, juries, eye-witness

310 See Linda Gottfredson, Racially Gerrymandering the Content of Police Tests to Satisfy the U.S. Justice Department: A Case Study, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 418 (1996) (analyzing how the effect of lowering the merit relatedness of police tests in the service of race-based)
314 See Ramona L. Paetzold, Multicollinearity and Use of Regression Analysis in Discrimination Litigation, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 207 (1992) (discussing the difficulty of analyzing regression models of employment discrimination).
316 See E. Allan Lind, Yuen J. Hou, & Tom R. Tyler, …And Justice for All: Ethnicity, Gender, and Preferences for Dispute Resolution Procedures, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269 (1994) (analyzing racial differences in dispute resolution preferences).
318 See Hope Lewis, Women (Under)Development: The relevance of “The Right to Development” to Poor Women of Color in the United States, 18 LAW & POL’Y 281 (1996) (discussing how various forms of development may be relevant to poor women of color, quite like it is to non-western people).
They also explore criminal behavior, policing, sentencing, capital punishment, assessing truthfulness, and perceptions of the justice racial disparities in sentencing); Roger E. Hartley, *A Look at Race, Gender, and Experience*, 8 *JUDICATURE* 4 191 (2001) (analyzing how race may impact time to judicial confirmation); Doris Marie Provine, *Too Many Black Men: The Sentencing Judge’s Dilemma*, 23 *LAW & SOC. INQUIRY* 823 (1998) (analyzing how judges wrestle with the dilemma of the mass incarceration of black men) 


Lisa Frohmann, *Convictability and Discordant Locales: Reproducing Race, Class, and Gender Ideologies in Prosecutorial Decisionmaking*, 31 *LAW & SOC’Y REV.* 531 (1997) (analyzing how race is reproduced during prosecutors’ discourse about sexual assault defendants’ convictability)

See R. Barry Ruback & Paula J. Vardaman, *Decision Making in Delinquency Cases: The Role of Race and Juveniles’ Admission/Denial of the Crime*, 21 *LAW & HUM. BEHAV.* 47 (1997) (analyzing racial differences in juvenile admission to crimes and how harshly admitters and deniers were treated); Eric Silver, *Race, Neighborhood Disadvantage, and Violence Among Persons with Mental Disorders: The Importance of Contextual Measurement*, 24 *LAW & HUM. BEHAV.* 449 (2000) (analyzing whether race is a significant predictor of violence among the mentally ill when accounting for neighborhood disadvantage)


See Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey, & Martin T. Wells, *Forecasting Life and Death: Juror Race, Religion, and Attitude Toward the Death Penalty*, 30 *J. LEGAL STUD.* 277 (2001) (examining how race impacts jurors’ decisions about capital sentencing)

Moreover, they explore issues such as affirmative action, law student career outcomes, and law firm diversity. Between 2002 and 2006, the interdisciplinary social science and law journals published thirty-nine social science, race and law or race and empirical legal scholarship articles. These articles focus on discrimination, generally, unconscious racism, intelligence testing, Brown v. Board's legacy, affirmative action, and success.


in law school.\textsuperscript{339} They also focus on the judiciary\textsuperscript{340} and juries.\textsuperscript{341} In addition, these articles address sentencing,\textsuperscript{342} capital sentencing,\textsuperscript{343} psychopathy,\textsuperscript{344} perceptions of justice and crime control,\textsuperscript{345} and hate crimes.\textsuperscript{346} Lastly, they cover racial passing,\textsuperscript{347} politics,\textsuperscript{348} and tort awards.\textsuperscript{349}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item See Max Schanzenbach, \textit{Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentences: The Effect of District-Level Judicial Demographics}, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 57 (2005) (analyzing the effect of judicial characteristics, such as race, prison sentencing ); Christopher E. Smith \& Thomas R. Hensley, \textit{Decision-making Trends of the Rehnquist Court Era: Civil Rights and Liberties Cases}, 89 JUDICATURE 161 (2005) (analyzing the Rehnquist Courts rulings in civil rights and civil liberties cases).
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### Table 3. Race Scholarship in Interdisciplinary Social Science & Law Journals

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**Note:** An asterisk denotes a period where more than one noted journal article was part of a symposium.

The collective results of these analyses indicate several things: Despite some interest in recent years, Critical Race Theory founders have not employed much social science or empirical methods in their scholarship. Much of the research in this area has been conducted by non-

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critical race theorists. In fact, it also seems that most of this scholarship is produced by white law faculty, though this is admittedly mere speculation. These faculty members are largely at nine of the top twenty law schools. In particular, Ian Ayres and Richard Brooks at Yale, Linda Hamilton Krieger at Boalt, and Gary Blasi and Jerry Kang at UCLA have published multiple articles in this area. As such, the social science, race, and law scholarship as well as the race and empirical legal scholarship of professors currently at these nine law schools has grown considerably in the past five years.

When comparing law journals, much of this scholarship appears in the top general law reviews as opposed to specialized race and law or civil rights journals. This could be due to the hierarchical nature of legal academic publishing. Within these journals, there has been a progression in the number of articles published with a significant up-tick in the past five years. This is in part due to several symposia on social science, race and law issues during this period. Thus, the symposia on affirmative action in law school admissions and book reviews of *Pervasive Prejudice* and *Crossroads, Directions, and a New Critical Race Theory* in the *Stanford Law Review* and the symposium on behavioral realism in the *California Law Review* account for the drastic jump in the number of articles that intersect social science, race, and law or explore race and law issues empirically over the past five-year period.

Despite the noticeable growth in social science, race, and law scholarship as well as race and empirical legal scholarship published in law reviews, the real impact in this area is seen in interdisciplinary social science and law journals. Three times as many articles have been published in these journals when compared to law reviews and journals. Within interdisciplinary journals there has been a steady progression in the number of articles published, particularly during the past ten years. Psychology and law journals—*Psychology, Public Policy & Law* as
well as *Law and Human Behavior*—have been the biggest outlets. The latter publishes articles across multiple disciplines but is the official journal of Division 41, the American Psychology-Law Society, of the American Psychological Association. This is partially accounted for by the symposia in *Psychology, Public Policy, & Law* on race, juries, and eye-witness testimony as well as one on race and intelligence testing.

The articles published by these academics and within these journals cover an array of topics. Some of the more popular issues addressed include antidiscrimination law, *Brown v. Board of Education*’s legacy, and affirmative action especially within the context of law school admissions. What I term legal actors and participants—judges, juries, and eye witnesses—were also well covered vis-à-vis other topics. Two fairly new topics also emerged. Law and economics applied to race issues as well as unconscious racism as assessed by the Implicit Association Test were two areas of growing interest.

2. **An Integrative Model**

As I noted, Critical Race Realism is a synthesis of Critical Race Theory, empirical social science, and public policy. Such an integrative approach is nothing new. Charles Houston employed social science in a litigation strategy as a means to legally end school segregation which in turn had policy reverberations. Contemporarily, law professors have also demonstrated growing interest in the intersection of race and social science. Thus, my contention is simply that critical race theorists should employ empirical modes of understanding race and racism among legal actors and within legal institutions and doctrine more often. Quite possibly, it should be the dominant strand of critical race scholarship.
Critical race theorists may argue any of the conventional points against engaging in empirical research. Additionally, they may also make arguments, more particular to Critical Race Theory, against synthesizing Critical Race Theory and empirical legal scholarship. First, quite like their Critical Legal Studies predecessors, Critical Race Theory scholars insist that facts are irrelevant, maybe even pretextual, to judicial decision outcomes. Employing statistical data supports the idea that such data is neutral and objective. This is fundamentally antithetical to Critical Race Theory doctrine. Second, privileging numbers undermines the power of narrative, a central Critical Race Theory methodology.

My attempt is not to cast aside one of the dominant strands of critical race scholarship—narrative. I concur wholeheartedly with Richard Delgado’s analysis that, [t]he stories of outgroups aim to subvert the ingroup reality. In civil rights, for example, many in the majority hold that any inequality between blacks and whites is due either to cultural lag, or inadequate enforcement of currently existing beneficial laws—both of which are easily correctable. For many minority persons, the principal instrument of their subordination is neither of these. Rather, it is the prevailing mindset by means of which members of the dominant group justify the world as it is, that is, with whites on top and browns and blacks on the bottom.

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350 See Peter H. Schuck, Why Don’t Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 323, 331-333 (1989) (indicating that inconvenience, lack of control, tedium, uncertainty, ideology, resources, time, tenure, and training may all be arguments law faculty use against engaging in empirical legal scholarship).

351 Id. at 326.

Stories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are powerful means for destroying mindset—the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared understandings against a background of which legal and political discourse takes place.353

In a nutshell, narrative is a rich descriptive method. When engaged in, it may serve as a cathartic tool for the narrator.354 It may also allow “the other” to gain a sense of perspective,355 maybe even empathy.356

However, narrative has its share of weaknesses—ones that would be substantially buttressed if employed in conjunction with empiricism. As noted by Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry, there are concerns about the validity of narratives.357 This is likely to be particularly so among those naïve about issues of race or those who are outright antagonists to the Critical Race Theory agenda—racial progress. Farber and Sherry cite four validity concerns. The first is that fictional narrative creates a “spurious aura of empirical authority.”358 The second deals with the degree to which the narrative is truthful.359 Similarly, the third focuses on the difficulty of actually discerning if truth is being spoken—a methodological issue.360 Finally, the fourth concern is the degree to which the narrative account is representative of any population of people.361

354 Id. at 2437.
355 Id. at 2437-2438.
358 Id. at 831-832.
359 Id. at 832-835.
360 Id. at 835-838.
361 Id. at 838-840.
Indeed it is quite possible to be both critical and empirical. Moreover, the benefits of synthesizing Critical Race Theory with empirical legal scholarship are manifold! First, empirical legal scholarship methods allow for theory development, empirical testing, and theory refinement. Furthermore, employing empirical research methods leads to “fairly” objective knowledge, which is “relatively” unfettered by personal prejudices. Additionally, empirical methods have the “propensity to sharpen our focus on the normative questions that may be concealed by factual complexity and by the willingness of [some] to avoid responsibility for [their] value choices.” For example, though empirical research may impact powerful people’s attitudes and actions, such individuals also have “defenses to ward off offensive or inconvenient knowledge.” However, when an individual or an institution can no longer employ empirical uncertainties to continue to engage in conscious or unconscious racist conduct, they must ultimately state their normative preferences.

Second, it has long been noted that empirical legal scholarship is of value to Critical Race Theory. Derrick Bell noted that “empiricism is a crucial aspect of Racial Realism. By taking into consideration the abysmal statistics regarding the social status of black Americans, their oppression is validated.” As such, empirical legal scholarship can be a more useful tool in highlighting racial disparities in the law’s application vis-à-vis traditional case analysis. As such, it allows critical race theorists to reach out to individuals who are less willing to accept a

365 Schuck, supra note 350, at 335.
367 Schuck, supra note 350, at 335.
368 Derrick Bell, supra note 10, at 365.
central principle of Critical Race Theory—that people of color are subordinated in America. This is done by revealing that although blatant racism may be significantly diminished in America, unconscious racism exists and still adversely impacts the lives of African Americans and other people of color.370 As Karl Llewellyn noted, “[W]e need improved machinery for making the facts about such effects – or about needs and conditions to be affected by a decision – available to the courts.”371 Empirical social science is just such machinery.

With these factors in mind, an empirical analysis of race and law issues has some general yet substantive benefits. These benefits are evinced whether empirical methodology is employed alone or in conjunction with the narrative approach. Furthermore, these benefits speak directly to the concerns raised by Farber and Sherry. First, empiricism bolsters claims made by theory or personal narrative. Second, empiricism provides a method to determine how true a theory or narrative is. This may be less so in determining how accurate an individual’s personal account of racism is, but it speaks to Farber and Sherry’s final validity concern. Empiricism allows one to test the degree to which theory or a personal account of reality is true for others. Where it is generalizable, especially for a vast number of similarly situated individuals, public policy may be implicated.372

Thus, the third benefit of synthesizing empirical legal scholarship and Critical Race Theory should be concerned with, what Robert Summers described as pragmatic instrumentalism—a means-end relationship to law.373 Legal scholarship, more readily than any

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371 Llewellyn, *Some Realism About Realism*, supra note 69, at 1254.
372 Farber & Sherry, *supra* note 357, at 838.
373 Summers, *supra* note 39, at 20. Summers’ theory of Pragmatic Instrumentalism is quite analogous to Legal Realism and argues three points: “First, it conceives the primary task of legal theory to be the provision of a coherent body of ideas about law which will make law more valuable in the hands of officials and practical men of affairs… Second, a theory of this type is instrumentalist in its view that legal rules and other forms of law are most essentially tools devised to serve practical ends… Third, the type of legal theory treated and developed here is also distinctive in its focus on the instrumental facets of legal phenomena, including: the nature, variety, and complexity
other type of research, has the potential to shape public policy. In this vein, the benefit of Critical Race Theory’s employment of social science is that social science may help shape courts’, legislatures’, and administrative agencies’ policy decisions. Policy goals, and the best methods for pursuing them, necessitate data about the “policies and about empirical assumptions underlying the policies and about the likely effect of various routes for achieving them.”

Social science can provide those data. As such, law must be seen as both a response to social needs and as having an impact on social issues. Charles Houston’s efforts at Howard Law School, to create a “laboratory for civil rights and a nursery for civil rights lawyers,” demonstrates an effort to create such policy-changers—social engineers. Both practicing attorneys and law professors have demonstrated a long history of serving as such social engineers. Thus, legal policy may be shaped by a number of actors, involve substantive or procedural law, and relate to public or private law. The legal scholar, legal policymaker, or practicing lawyer may shape public policy. A legal academic may employ social science through his research, by providing a more systematic approach to understanding the role of race within the legal system. A legal policy-maker may employ social science in two ways either of the goals law may serve; law’s implementive machinery; the kinds of means-goal relationships in the law; the variety of legal tasks that officials must fulfill to translate law into practice, the efficacy of law; and its limits.”

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375 Richard Lempert, “Between Cup and Lip”: Social Science Influences on Law and Policy, 10 LAW & POLICY 167, 170-175 (1988). See also Warren, supra note 209, at 7 (highlighting “the growing number of corporations and lobbying groups paying to produce such data for use in lobbying legislatures and influencing public opinion”).
377 Id.
379 AUERBACH, supra note 57, at 212.
381 Id. at 83-126.
382 STUART NAGEL & LISA BIEVENUE, SOCIAL SCIENCE, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5-6 (1992)
383 Id. at 35.
384 Id. at 40-41.
procedurally or substantively. Procedurally, she may employ social science to get the legislature or courts to function in a more racially fair manner. Substantively, the policy-maker may employ social science to look at the underlying racial-fairness of a rule of law. A practicing lawyer may employ social science by introducing it into evidence to advance certain arguments in a case.

Ultimately, the challenge to the broader goal of using social science to shape public policy with regards to race may not be whether it would be effective but where it would be most effective. For example, judges may not be well-suited to understand the significance of the social science evidence. Courts are not well-equipped to respond to changes in the social science literature. Social science evidence, once accepted as persuasive by courts, becomes precedent. Such precedent becomes difficult to alter when additional research alters the conclusions of previous social science. Compared to courts, however, legislatures can adapt to changes in social science quicker. Legislatures can also act without there being a live controversy before them.

3. Creating a Critical Race Realism

A number of legal actors could be deemed critical race realists. However, law professors may be in the best position to actually formulate a Critical Race Realism agenda. This is largely because they can actually produce Critical Race Realism scholarship. What is problematic is that their training likely makes them ineffective empirical legal scholars. First, law schools are not particularly good at teaching its students, some of whom go on to be law professors, how to

385 Id. at 38-39. Procedurally, the authors actually focus on the efficiency and effectiveness of the policy-making entity. Substantively, the authors focus on the underlying soundness of a rule of law.
386 Id. at 35-36.
388 Id. at 287.
389 Id. at 285-289 (noting that employing social science to shape policy may be most effective with legislatures).
390 Id. at 287.
systematically “find, interpret, prove, and rebut” facts. Second, social scientists are taught to subject their hypotheses to “every conceivable test and data source,” in attempt to disconfirm the theory. However, lawyer attempts to marshal all possible evidence in support of her hypothesis and “distract attention” from any possible contradictory information. A critical race realist should utilize the best of both of these approaches. Third, legal scholars largely do their academic work isolated from their social science counterparts and suffer from such a failure to dialogue. Fourth, law professors, unlike their social scientist counterparts, do not have a stable group of graduate students trained in empirical methodology and statistical analysis. Thus, legal academics are likely at a handicap in developing an empirical agenda.

Thus, to develop a Critical Race Realism, law schools might consider offering not only courses in empirical legal scholarship but also empirical legal scholarship courses focused on Critical Race Theory topics. Critical race theorists may also take any of three steps to advance Critical Race Realism. First, they might retool. Several universities offer programs to train faculty in empirical research methodology. For example, the University of Michigan, through its Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) Summer Program in Quantitative Methods, offers courses in basic and advanced quantitative analysis. Harvard

391 Schuck, supra note 350, at 325.
392 Epstein & King, supra note 374, at 8.
393 Epstein & King, supra note 374, at 8.
394 Epstein & King, supra note 374, at 45-48.
398 http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/training/summer/about.html (last visited October 26, 2006). The mission of the program is: “To offer instruction for the primary development and "upgrading" of quantitative skills by college and university faculty and by nonacademic research scholars[,] To extend the scope and depth of analytic skills for graduate students, college and university faculty, and research scientists from the public sector[,] To furnish training for those individuals who expect to become practicing social methodologists[,] To provide opportunities for social scientists to study those methodologies that have special bearing on specific substantive issues[,] To create an
University, through its Institute for Quantitative Social Science, offers a variety of degree and training programs, conferences, and seminars and workshops.\textsuperscript{400} Northwestern recently offered an Empirical Scholarship Workshop.\textsuperscript{401} Second, Critical Race theorists could also collaborate with social scientists in other departments\textsuperscript{402} or the growing number of social scientist law professors.\textsuperscript{403} An additional source of collaboration could be social science graduate students interested in the intersection of race and law issues. Critical Race theorists might also actively recruit graduate students engaged in social science, race, and law scholarship to law school. Such an approach would possibly add to the pool of minority law students and provide law professors with a research assistant, trained in research methodology, for three years. Finally, Critical Race theorists could simply import social science and empirical scholarship into their own work.

**CONCLUSION**

Critical Race Theory was founded as “a race-based, systematic critique of legal reasoning and legal institutions….”\textsuperscript{404} It has been critiqued, however, as struggling to define its substantive mission, methodological commitments, and connection to the world outside of academia.\textsuperscript{405} This article attempts to provide a specific methodology that is consistent with Critical Race Theory’s overarching mission and that has both applied and academic components. Empirical social science is this methodology which should ultimately 1) expose racism where it may be found, 2)
identify its effects on individuals and institutions, and 3) put forth a concerted attack against it, in part, via public policy arguments. I call this concept as Critical Race Realism.

Critical Race Realism is drawn from a long and rich intellectual history. This history started with the growth of interdisciplinarity in American legal education and traversed its way through intellectual movements at Columbia, Yale, Chicago, and Wisconsin law schools. The recent explosion in empirical legal scholarship and the New Legal Realism Project provide contemporary efforts with which Critical Race Realism must square itself. Ultimately, the intersection of social science, race, and law or race and empirical legal scholarship is not a new nexus. The efforts of Charles Hamilton Houston in ending school segregation point to this fact. Furthermore, there has been growing interest in these areas within recent years. However, given this history and contemporary movement, I advocate that Critical Race Theory incorporate more empirical social science. I do not think that there is an incompatibility between being critical and being empirical. Furthermore, I do not think that such an approach need supplant Critical Race Theory’s narrative approach. I do, however, think empirical social science can greatly enhance critical race theorists’ arguments and advance Critical Race Theory’s goals. Thus, I hope critical race theorists take steps to indeed make Critical Race Theory more systematic.