Transnational Shipments of Nuclear Materials by Sea: Do Current Safeguards provide Coastal States a Right to Deny Innocent Passage?

David B. Dixon

Contact information:
215 8th Street SE,
Washington DC, 20003
Email: ddixon@law.gwu.edu
Phone: 617-763-4464
# Table of Contents

1. **Introduction** .......................................................... 1

2. **Recent Controversies in Maritime Shipping of Nuclear Material** ............... 2
   a. **Prohibition of innocent passage** ............................................. 4
   b. **Legitimate safety concerns of coastal states** ................................. 7
      i. **Responses to sinking** .......................................................... 7
      ii. **Boarding** ......................................................................... 8
      iii. **Falsified safety inspection record** ......................................... 9

3. **The “Precautionary Principle” in International Law** ............................ 10
   a. **Codification of the precautionary principle** ................................. 11
      i. **Hard law: international and regional conventions** ....................... 11
      ii. **Soft law: resolutions, declarations, agendas, and draft articles** .......... 14

4. **Safeguards for Maritime Shipping of Nuclear Materials** ......................... 18
   a. **IAEA Safeguards** .............................................................. 18
   b. **IMO Safeguards** .................................................................. 21

   a. **Innocent Passage** .................................................................. 23
   b. **Protection of the marine environment** ........................................ 26

6. **Discussion** ........................................................................ 30

7. **Conclusion** ......................................................................... 33
1. Introduction

The maritime transport of nuclear materials has created a conflict between two international law regimes: the United Nations International Law of the Sea\(^1\) (UNCLOS), and the developing customary law of the “precautionary principle” in international environmental law. This conflict became apparent in recent years when several coastal states denied passage to ships transporting nuclear materials arguing the shipments posed an environmental threat. This conflict has raised an issue which is currently unresolved: Do coastal states have a right to prohibit innocent passage to ships carrying nuclear materials if these ships fail to fulfill the requirements of the precautionary principle?

This paper will begin by examining the legitimate concerns of both shipping and coastal states by describing several of the recent controversies in the transnational shipment of nuclear materials leading to the current international legal dispute. Part Three will discuss the international legal basis for the precautionary principle and its several manifestations in both hard and soft law documents. The safeguards regime for ocean shipments of nuclear materials will be explored in Part Four. Part Five will explore the provisions of UNCLOS relating to innocent passage and environmental protection to decipher whether coastal States have a right to deny innocent passage to shipments of nuclear materials, and if so when. Lastly, Part Six will discuss several recommendations of how best to resolve this real and doctrinal conflict between states shipping nuclear materials and coastal states denying passage. The paper concludes by

finding the current nuclear safeguard regime does not require shipping states to provide notice to or authorization from transit states, therefore coastal states have no legal basis to deny innocent passage. This safeguard regime, however, is evolving and may adopt a precautionary approach in the future.

2. Recent Controversies in Maritime Shipping of Nuclear Material

The transnational shipment of nuclear materials by sea has encountered much resistance from coastal states and environmental organizations over the past decade. The controversy began in 1992 when Japan, France and England began conducting secret shipments of large quantities of nuclear material. Once news of these shipments was leaked to the public, many coastal states along possible shipping routes protested the possibility of nuclear materials passing through their coastal waters without their knowledge or approval. Some states refused these shipments the right of innocent passage through their territorial waters; seemingly in violation of UNCLOS. A few states even prohibited the passage of these ships through their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), an area extending 200 miles off of their shores. These coastal states have claimed a right to deny innocent passage because the existing safeguards regime for ocean shipments of nuclear material do not comply with the requirements of the “precautionary principle,” a relatively recent doctrine of international environmental law.

These controversies are not merely the result of the conflicting international law doctrines of innocent passage and the precautionary principle, but are in essence conflicting views of

---

3 See infra Part Five.
4 See UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art 57.
5 See infra Part Three
national security of shipping and coastal states. The shipping states have a security interest in maintaining secrecy for shipments of nuclear materials and have codified these concerns in international agreements.6 If the itineraries of these shipments were to be publicized, they fear the ships would be more susceptible to terrorist or pirate attack; potentially allowing nuclear materials to get onto the black market and/or be used in making a “dirty bomb,” or that they could be victim to a U.S.S Cole type terrorist attack.7 On the other hand, coastal states have security interests based on environmental concerns which have also been recognized in international agreements.8 An attack, wreck or sinking of a ship carrying nuclear material in a coastal state’s waters could have catastrophic effects on their coastal environment and industries;


7 See Physical Protection Convention, supra note 5, at art. 6(2); IAEA Information Circular 225, supra note 5, at sec. 8.1.1 & 8.1.2.

potentially devastating their economy, largely based on coastal resources, and crippling the health and welfare of its people.\(^9\)

In order to demonstrate the context of this controversy, this section will provide a summary of some of the most notorious events in the transnational shipments of nuclear material by sea. In particular it will highlight nuclear shipments where coastal states have prohibited innocent passage because of environmental concerns. It will also shed light on incidents where problems in shipping of nuclear materials have given coastal states legitimate reason to have safety concerns.

a. **Prohibition of innocent passage**

In 1992, the voyage of the *Akatsuki Maru* from France to Japan, carrying 1.7 tons of plutonium, was the first large shipment of nuclear materials to meet substantial resistance from coastal states.\(^10\) Despite the fact the route of the voyage was kept secret, many countries on the potential route publicly prohibited the ship from taking a route through their waters, including Argentina, Chile, Portugal, South Africa, and Malaysia.\(^11\) Furthermore, soon before the voyage the Caribbean island nations adopted a Declaration on Shipments of Plutonium, banning passage

---


of all shipments of nuclear materials through the Caribbean Sea and making the region a “nuclear-free zone.”

Despite the fact that Japan publicly stated the actions of these countries were contrary to international law, the Akatsuki Maru nevertheless stayed outside the EEZs of all protesting states except for a few Pacific island nations. The environmental organization Greenpeace also organized large demonstrations at both the French and Japanese ports sparking violent clashes between authorities and protesters. A Greenpeace ship also followed the Akatsuki Maru for much of its voyage, and was at one point rammed by a Japanese patrol boat. After this voyage, the Japanese announced that they planned to ship at least another 30 tons of plutonium in the coming years.

In 1995, the British vessel Pacific Pintail met even more dramatic protest before its voyage from France to Japan carrying 28 logs of high-level vitrified nuclear waste in glass blocks. Along with the Caribbean states who had already established a nuclear free-policy, Antigua, Barbuda, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and Uruguay refused to allow the shipment through their territorial waters. Furthermore, Brazil, Argentina, Chile,

---

14 Id.; see also Andrew Bell, Greenpeace Vessel Hit by Japanese, The Guardian (London), Nov. 9, 1992, at 7.
15 Id.
17 Id.
South Africa, Nauru and Kiribati expressly prohibited the ship’s passage through their EEZs.\(^{18}\) Due to the protest of the Latin American and Caribbean states, the *Pacific Pintail* abandoned its preferred route through the Panama Canal and charted a course around Cape Horn to avoid the waters of protesting states.\(^{19}\)

When passing Cape Horn, however, 30 foot seas and 60 mile-per-hour winds forced the captain to find calmer waters within Chile’s EEZ.\(^{20}\) The Chilean Navy and Air Force had been tracking the progress of the *Pacific Pintail*, and once it had entered Chile’s EEZ the Chilean authorities demanded that the ship leave their waters immediately.\(^{21}\) A Chilean Navy frigate and aircraft intercepted the ship and threatened it with military action if it did not change course.\(^{22}\) Once it became apparent that armed force was not prudent against a vessel carrying nuclear waste, the frigate then threatened to interfere with the ship's navigation by throwing ropes into the water to wrap around the its propeller.\(^{23}\) The captain of the *Pacific Pintail* conceded to the demand and returned to the high seas despite the grave risk posed by the rough waters.\(^{24}\) When addressing the legal principles for their actions against the *Pacific Pintail*, the Chilean Maritime


\(^{19}\) Atomic Ship Breaks Ban, Enters Brazil Waters – Greenpeace, Reuters News Service, Mar. 6, 1995; Plutonium Ship Will Not Go Through Panama Canal, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Mar. 6, 1995.


\(^{21}\) Helen R. McLeod, *UK Could Be Liable If Chile Takes Warlike Action vs. Ship*, Journal of Commerce, Mar. 21, 1995, at 7A.


  *Chilean Frigate: Pacific Pintail*, you could be "exposed to the use of weapons against you from navy vessels or air [planes] of the Chilean Navy."

  *Pacific Pintail*: "I hear your message and with the nature of our cargo I would not think that is a very sensible thing to do, to use arms . . ." *Id.*

\(^{23}\) *Id.*; See also *N-Waste Ship Forced Out of Chile's Waters*, The Advertiser, Mar. 22, 1995.

\(^{24}\) *Id.*
Authority cited the precautionary principle and declared that the duty to protect the marine environment took precedence over the right of innocent passage.25

b. Legitimate safety concerns of coastal states

Despite the fact that the practice of transnational shipment of nuclear materials by sea has never resulted in an accident or incident with radiological consequences causing serious harm to the environment,26 there is evidence that coastal states have legitimate safety concern from these shipments. Three incidents in particular have put into question the safety of these shipments, including: 1.) the lack of response of shipping states to the sinking of a vessel containing nuclear material; 2.) the unauthorized boarding of a ship containing nuclear material; and 3.) the falsification of safety records of a shipment of nuclear.

i. Responses to sinking

In 1997, the MSC Carla, a 25 year old Panamanian-flag cargo vessel, on a voyage from France to the United States broke-in-two in 30 foot seas 70 nautical miles off the coast of the Azores.27 The forepart of the ship sank to a depth of 3,000 meters carrying 11 tons of cesium, having a total radioactivity of 330 terabecquerels.28 As a comparison, the Chernobyl explosion

25 See Van Dyke I, supra note 18, at 387 (citing Chilean Maritime Authority Resolution 12600/76 of Mar. 16, 1995).
released 4,800 terabecquerels of cesium into the atmosphere.\textsuperscript{29} Neither the French or the US attempted to salvage these materials because of their depth, and because it was determined the potential for damage from a radiation leak was “negligible.”\textsuperscript{30} The United Kingdom’s Ministry of the Environment stated that though corrosion of the stainless steel cylinders containing the cesium will gradually wash the radioactive materials into the environment, because of the depth the contamination would be “horizontal” and should not affect the commercial species of fish.\textsuperscript{31}

\textit{ii. Boarding}

In 1998, the British-flag vessel the \textit{Pacific Swan}, sister ship to the \textit{Pacific Pintail}, was boarded by members of Greenpeace in the Panama Canal.\textsuperscript{32} In the darkness of the early morning, activists pulled a boat along side of the vessel and used ropes to climb onto the bow.\textsuperscript{33} Once on board, they then hoisted a banner with the words “No Plutonium” from the mast and chained themselves to the ship.\textsuperscript{34} At the time of the boarding the ship was carrying 30 tons of Mix-Oxide fuel (MOX), having enough plutonium to make 60 nuclear bombs.\textsuperscript{35} Greenpeace

stated the purpose of this demonstration was to protest the shipment of nuclear materials and to raise awareness of the threat these shipments pose to the people and environment of Panama and Central America.\textsuperscript{36} Despite its intent, the demonstration has proven that transboundary shipments of nuclear materials by sea are vulnerable to pirate or terrorist attacks.\textsuperscript{37} One can only imagine the devastation that could have occurred to the region if the boat which pulled along side of the Pacific Swan was controlled by al Qa’ida terrorists, such as the boat used to attack the U.S.S. Cole, instead of Greenpeace activists.

\textit{iii. Falsified safety inspection record}

In 1999, it was revealed that British Nuclear Fuels (BNF), the company that owns five nuclear transport ships including the \textit{Pacific Pintail} and \textit{Pacific Swan}, falsified cargo safety inspection records on at least 10 lots of MOX containers being shipped to Japan.\textsuperscript{38} BNF explained that the records were falsified in order to “save time.”\textsuperscript{39} After the questionable shipment of MOX arrived in Japan, the Japanese authorities discovered the inconsistencies and demanded the British to take the materials back.\textsuperscript{40} The MOX was then returned to the UK which agreed to pay Japan 6.4 billion yen (approximately 60 million dollars) for damages incurred due to the falsification.\textsuperscript{41} Now that shipping states have demonstrated that nuclear material safety inspection records can be falsified, coastal states could be justified for refusing passage to these

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{36}{Greenpeace, \textit{supra} note 32.}
\footnote{37}{Hall, \textit{supra} note 33.}
\footnote{38}{\textit{Inspectors Sent in as Sellafield Admits to Serious Safety Lapses}, The Independent (London), Sept. 14, 1999.}
\footnote{39}{\textit{New Shipment of Nuclear Fuel to Leave France for Japan}, Agency France Presse, Aug. 9, 2000.}
\footnote{40}{Alan Cowell, \textit{Nuclear Plant in Britain Admits Sabotage}, N.Y.\textit{Times}, March 27, 2000, at A8, col. 3 (nat’l ed.).}
\footnote{41}{\textit{Japan’s Plutonium Policy and MOX Program Full of Contradictions}, Nuke Info Tokyo, Sept/Oct. 2000, at 1.}
\end{footnotes}
shipments for not having adequate assurances that nuclear materials on board have been properly examined and authorized for shipping by competent inspectors.

3. The “Precautionary Principle” in International Law

Several scholars, most notably Jon Van Dyke of the University of Hawaii, claim that customary international law includes a “precautionary principle” which is applicable to shipments of nuclear materials.\(^42\) The precautionary principle is based on the maxim *sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedes* (use what is yours so as not to harm what is others’).\(^43\) Under the precautionary principle, shipping states have a duty to take several steps before shipments of nuclear materials may be undertaken. These include, *inter alia*: the duty to prepare an environmental impact assessment; duty to notify transit states of shipments in order for them to prepare contingency plans in case of an accident or emergency; duty to consult with transit states to jointly develop such contingency plans, and duty to mitigate all reasonably foreseeable damages.\(^44\) This paper will for the most part limit its discussion of the precautionary principle to the duty of notification for nuclear material shipping states and its implied or explicit subsidiary right of transit states to either give or withhold prior authorization for these shipments after notification.

Van Dyke asserts the precautionary principle allows transit states to require notification, before such shipments can pass through their territorial seas or EEZs, and that these states can

---


\(^{44}\) See Van Dyke I, *supra* note 18, at 380-83.
suspend the right of innocent passage to these shipments.\textsuperscript{45} He further asserts that international conventions and declarations, as well as the practice of states, provide evidence that the precautionary principle is currently customary international law.\textsuperscript{46} Several states have indeed adopted this principle into their laws, requiring either prior notification or prior authorization before passage of ships carrying nuclear materials is permitted, or prohibiting their passage altogether.\textsuperscript{47} Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the development of the precautionary principle in order to understand its status under international law with relation to the right of innocent passage.

a. **Codification of the precautionary principle**

i. **Hard law: international and regional conventions**

Though the origin of the precautionary principle can be traced to various international agreements,\textsuperscript{48} including UNCLOS,\textsuperscript{49} the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of

\textsuperscript{45} See Id., at 384-85.
\textsuperscript{46} See Id., at 379; but see Fidell, supra note 42, at 757 et. seq.
\textsuperscript{47} Kari Hakapaa and Erik Jaap Molenaar, Innocent Passage-Past and Present, 23 Marine Policy 131, 142 (1999); see also Law of the Sea Bulletin, No. 1, at 13 (July 1988) (7 countries requiring prior notification: Canada, Djibouti, Libya, Malta, Pakistan, Portugal, and the United Arab Emirates; 8 countries require prior authorization: Egypt, Guinea, Iran, Malaysia, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Yemen; 6 country prohibit passage altogether: Argentina, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, The Philippines and Venezuela).
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel Convention) has never the less been generally recognized as the first international convention codifying the precautionary principle for the prevention of pollution. The Basel Convention provides state parties with a basis for denial of passage of hazardous waste shipments if there has not been notification provided by the shipping state and prior authorization for the shipment by transit states. Van Dyke cites the Basel Convention as the primary basis for states to be able to require notification and prior consent of shipments of radioactive materials by sea.

There is, however, a major flaw in this reasoning. The Basel Convention does not apply to nuclear cargoes covered by other international agreements. Therefore, with regard to the shipment of nuclear materials, the Basel Convention is preempted by two international conventions, neither of which have requirements for notification or prior authorization: the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO’s) 1993 Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Flasks on Board Ships (INF

---

49 Van Dyke argues that UNCLOS article 221(1) in fact is a codification of the precautionary principle. UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art 221(1). This article authorizes state parties to: “take and enforce measures beyond the territorial sea proportionate to the actual threatened damage to protect their coastline or related interests, including fishing, from pollution or threat of pollution following a maritime casualty or acts relating to such casualty, which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful consequences.” Id.
The “acts relating to such casualty” language has given Van Dyke reason to believe that this language was intended to give states the right to deny passage to ships carrying ultra hazardous materials contrary to the requirements of the precautionary principle. Van Dyke II, supra note 9, at 105.

50 Basel Convention, supra note 8.

51 Id., at arts. 4(2)(f)&(h).

52 See Van Dyke I, supra note 18, at 382; See Van Dyke II, supra note 9, at note 66.

53 Id., at art. 1(3).

54 Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Flasks on Board Ships, Res. 748, IMO, 18th Sess. (Nov. 4, 1993) [hereinafter INF
Code), amended to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea\textsuperscript{55} (SOLAS) in 1999, and; the 1973 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter.\textsuperscript{56}

The precautionary principle has also been incorporated into two regional conventions: the Organization of African Unity’s 1991 Bamako Convention\textsuperscript{57} and the 1995 Waigani Convention\textsuperscript{58} between the Pacific island nations. Like the Basel Convention, both of these regional conventions require an exporting state to get prior written consent from a transit state party before passage of nuclear materials through their waters are deemed legal.\textsuperscript{59} These conventions, however, are different with regard to how they treat the transport of nuclear materials. The Bamako explicitly includes the transport of nuclear materials within its scope of obligations.\textsuperscript{60} The Waigani Convention, however, only addresses radioactive materials with regard to invoking a total ban on their import, export and dumping within the treaty area.\textsuperscript{61} The convention also advises member states to adopt the regulations found in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of


\textsuperscript{57} See Bamako Convention, supra note 8.

\textsuperscript{58} See Waigani Convention, supra note 8.

\textsuperscript{59} Bamako Convention, supra note 8 at art. 6; Waigani Convention, supra note 8, at art. 6.3.

\textsuperscript{60} Bamako Convention, supra note 8, at art. 2.2.

\textsuperscript{61} Waigani Convention, supra note 8, at art 4.1 & 4.3.
Radioactive Wastes, which will be discussed in the next section. The acceptance of these treaties by their member states does demonstrate state practice accepted as law. The small number of states involved, however, does not rise to the level of *opinio juris*.

**ii. Soft law: resolutions, declarations, agendas, and draft articles**

In 1990, the IAEA drafted a Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste which incorporated aspects of the precautionary principle including notice and prior authorization requirements for shipments of nuclear material. This code makes bold statements with regard to coastal state’s rights to suspend innocent passage, including:

“It is the sovereign right of every State to prohibit the movement of radioactive waste into, from or through its territory,” and; “every state should take appropriate steps to ensure that, subject to the relevant norms of international law, the international transboundary movement of radioactive waste take place only with the prior notification and consent of the sending, receiving and transit States in accordance with their respective laws and regulations.”

---

62 Waigani Convention, *supra* note 8, at art 4.5(a)
63 As of June 2004, there were twenty-one countries had become parties to the Bamako Convention through either ratification or accession: Benin, Cameroon, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Senegal, Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zimbabwe. See Basel Convention Regional Centre Pretoria, Status of Ratifications, at http://www.baselpretoria.org.za/ratifications.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
66 *Id.*, at annex I, sec. 3.
This language, however, is qualified earlier in the code where it states that the code is “advisory”66 and by a footnote that provides:

Nothing in this code prejudices or affects in any way the exercise by ships and aircraft of all States and maritime and air navigation in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and under other relevant international legal instruments.67

It is important to note the specialized agency that regulates safety of transport of nuclear materials by sea under UNCLOS is the IMO not the IAEA. In regulating shipments of nuclear materials by sea, the IMO does incorporate IAEA conventions and most of their regulations. The IMO, however, has not incorporated the IAEA Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste, but instead follows the INF Code to regulate nuclear shipments by sea.

Many believe that the genesis of the precautionary principle as an international custom began at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro.68 The Rio conference indeed was a groundbreaking event for the advancement of the precautionary principle. There, 172 state participants69 unanimously agreed to a Declaration on Environment and Development with an implementation agenda, Agenda 21, to put into action the Declaration’s principles.70 The Rio Declaration’s principles set out a framework for

---

66 Id., at annex I, sec. 1.
67 Id., at n.2.
economic development and environmental protection that states are called upon to adopt into their domestic legislation. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration calls for the use of a “precautionary approach” where there are “threats” to the environment, stating:

In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.71

Agenda 21 further provides more specific policy recommendations with regard to taking precautionary approaches to “prevent” degradation of the marine environment:

States, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on protection and preservation of the marine environment, commit themselves, in accordance with their policies, priorities and resources, to prevent, reduce and control degradation of the marine environment so as to maintain and improve its life-support and productive capacities. To this end, it is necessary to … [a]pply preventive, precautionary and anticipatory approaches so as to avoid degradation of the marine environment, as well as to reduce the risk of long-term or irreversible adverse effects upon it.72

Furthermore, the International Law Commission (ILC) has included the precautionary principle in its 2001 Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities.73 The Draft Articles have requirements for prior authorization,74 risk assessments,75

71 Rio Declaration, supra note 70, at Principle 15.
72 Agenda 21, supra note 70, at ch. 17.22(a).
notification,\textsuperscript{76} and consultation.\textsuperscript{77} It is important to note, however, that the Draft Article also have a provision for withholding information for “national security” reasons.\textsuperscript{78} This later provision quite possibly will be an opt out provision for countries transporting nuclear materials who have steadfastly maintained that their shipments require secrecy for security reasons.\textsuperscript{79} Since one of the ILC’s main duties is to codify customary international law,\textsuperscript{80} the existence of these draft articles reinforces the claim that the precautionary principle is in fact international custom. Due to the relative novelty of transport of nuclear materials, however, these draft articles most likely are a representation the ILC’s other mandate: to progressively develop international law.\textsuperscript{81}

Though the above agreements are a significant step towards the development of an international customary law of precaution, they are not binding international law since they are not in the form of a convention or treaty. Despite the fact that conference declarations, agendas and recommendations are not binding international law, they are “soft-law.” They are agreements made by the conference participants or international organizations that encourage countries to work in good faith towards the implementation of the goals of the agreements.

Countries therefore are at liberty to enact the principles into their domestic laws, thus making them binding within their own jurisdictions. If parties to these agreements ignore their

\textsuperscript{74} Id., at art 6
\textsuperscript{75} Id., at art 7
\textsuperscript{76} Id., at art 8
\textsuperscript{77} Draft Articles, \textit{supra} note 73, at art. 9
\textsuperscript{78} Id., at art. 14
\textsuperscript{79} See \textit{supra} notes 6 and 7.
\textsuperscript{80} Statute of the International Law Commission, arts. 1 & 15, GA Res. 174(II), 2 UN GAOR (Res.) at 296, UN Doc. A/519 (1948).
\textsuperscript{81} Id.
obligations, however, there is no penalty for a breach of a soft-law regime. Furthermore, these agreements by themselves are not evidence of an international custom since they are not legally binding. International customary law can only be found when there is a general practice of states accepted as law.\textsuperscript{82} Though the precautionary principle may not currently represent international customary law, it seems to be an area of “developing custom.”\textsuperscript{83}

4. Safeguards for Maritime Shipping of Nuclear Materials

The current safeguard regime for transporting nuclear materials on board ships is derived from a matrix of treaties and regulations developed and administered by the IAEA and IMO.

a. IAEA Safeguards

IAEA instruments cover the security of nuclear cargoes and the safety of packages containing nuclear materials.\textsuperscript{84} The origin of the IAEA’s nuclear safeguard regime is found in article 3 of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).\textsuperscript{85}


requires each state party “to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the […] IAEA’s] safeguards system.’”

Though NPT article 3 generally contemplates bilateral inspection and confirmation agreements, it also requires compliance with multilateral safeguard agreements. The 1979 Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material imposes the duty to safeguard radioactive materials loaded on vessels. Article 3 of the physical protection convention provides:

“Each State Party shall take appropriate steps … consistent with international law to ensure as far as practicable that, during international nuclear transport … on board a ship or aircraft under its jurisdiction insofar as such ship or aircraft is engaged in the transport to or from that State, is protected at the levels described in Annex I.”

Annex I provides requirements for physical protection of Category I nuclear material during transport. These include:

“prior arrangements among sender, receiver, and carrier, and prior agreement between natural or legal persons subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of exporting and importing States, specifying time, place and procedures for transferring transport responsibility; … [shipment must be] under constant surveillance by escorts and under conditions which assure close communication with appropriate response forces.”

The physical protection convention, however, does not require prior notification to or authorization from transit states during their voyage. Article 6 provides that:

---

86 Id. Though article 3 only explicitly requires non-nuclear-weapon State Parties to submit to safeguard agreements, all five nuclear-weapon State Parties have voluntarily submitted to these agreements.
87 Physical Protection Convention, supra note 5.
88 Id., at art. 3.
89 Category I nuclear materials are defined as 2 kg or more of Plutonium, 5 kg or more of Uranium-235, or 2 kg or more Uranium-233. Id., at Annex II.
90 Id.
“States Parties shall not be required by this Convention to provide any information which they are not permitted to communicate pursuant to national law or which would jeopardize the security of the State concerned or the physical protection of nuclear material.”91

Another IAEA convention which touches the issue of safeguards for transport of nuclear materials is the 1997 Joint Convention on Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.92 Providing the only guidance on the subject, article 27 of the convention provides: “transboundary movement through states of transit shall be subject to those international obligations which are relevant to the particular modes of transportation utilized.”

In addition to the above conventions, the IAEA also provides non-mandatory recommendations for the safeguarding transboundary shipments of nuclear material. The first of these is the above mentioned IAEA Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste.93 Though this code provides that every state has the right to deny passage to shipments of nuclear materials, it later states that the code is subject to the rules of the UNCLOS and customary international law. As discussed above in Section Three, these two statements are mutually exclusive.

91 Physical Protection Convention, supra note 5, at art. 6(2).
93 Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste, P 3, IAEA Res. GC(XXXIV)/RES/530 (Nov. 13, 1990), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf386.shtml (last visited Nov. 22, 2005) [hereinafter IAEA Code of Practice] (providing "it is the sovereign right of every State to prohibit the movement of radioactive waste into from or through its territory.")
Lastly, IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material provide detailed standards for packaging and shipping requirements in the transportation of radioactive materials.\(^{94}\) It establishes a complicated bilateral and multilateral approval system to determine which shipments of nuclear materials require prior authorization from transport states.\(^{95}\) Though these regulations do require prior notification and authorization for shipments of fissile material over a specified indexed amount, the standards for ocean shipments are much less strict than land shipments,\(^{96}\) and have many exceptions including the common national security exception.\(^{97}\)

b. IMO Safeguards

The IMO regulations that deal with the transport of ultra-hazardous materials on ocean going vessels are found in the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code).\(^{98}\) Within the IMDG Code are regulations that specifically deal with the transport of nuclear materials: the INF Code.\(^{99}\) Both of these codes are now mandatory and are found as amendments to the SOLAS convention.\(^{100}\)

---


\(^{95}\) Id., at annex I.

\(^{96}\) Id., at para 820(c). Paragraph 820 states “multilateral approval shall be required for: … (c) the shipment packages containing fissile material…. Excluded from this requirement shall be shipments of by ocean going vessels, if the sum of the critical safety indexes does not exceed 50 in each hold, compartment or defined deck area and the distance of 6 m between groups of packages or overpacks.” Id.

\(^{97}\) Id., at annex I.


\(^{99}\) INF Code, supra note 54.

\(^{100}\) SOLAS, supra note 55.
The INF Code incorporates many of the above IAEA regulations and provides mandatory safety regulations for the shipment of nuclear materials. Its primarily concern is the packaging of radioactive materials and the construction, design, and staffing of the ships that transport them. The INF Code does not, however, address notification or approval of coastal states of shipments or emergency response plans, though these topics are being considered for adoption. Several commentators have expressed concern that the INF Code’s reliance on design and packaging safeguards are not sufficient for the dangers these cargos present to coastal states.


With regard to all things related to the ocean, UNCLOS is nearly universally considered the controlling body of law. It is for this reason that the convention is often referred to as “the constitution for the oceans”. In this section, however, we will limit scope of the discussion to the laws regulating the right of innocent passage, including those specifically for ships transporting nuclear materials, and the coastal state’s right to protect their marine environment.

To begin with, it is important to note that “innocent passage” is somewhat different than “freedom of navigation” as defined in article 87 (freedom of navigation on the high seas) and

article 56 (freedom of navigation in the EEZ - which incorporates the definition of article 87). 104 Freedom of navigation on the high seas is one of the oldest and fundamental principles of customary international law. 105 Ships on the high seas have exclusive jurisdiction over their vessel and crew and thus their passage can not be suspended, except in certain limited circumstances where warships have the right to board vessels. 106

The right to freedom of navigation in the EEZ becomes somewhat murky, however, since these ships “shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State” with regard to environmental protection. 107 Therefore, within the EEZ there is somewhat of a jurisdictional conflict between a foreign-flag vessel’s freedom of navigation and a coastal state’s environmental concerns. Article 59 states that these conflicts should be resolved through principles of equity. 108 Nonetheless, it is without question that the right of ships to exercise freedom of navigation within the EEZ is no less than their right to innocent passage within a coastal state’s territorial waters. Thus, it is important to understand the law of innocent passage and circumstances when coastal states can deny this passage.

a. Innocent Passage

The right of innocent passage is articulated in article 17, stating, “subject to this Convention, ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent

104 UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts 56.1(a) & 87.
105 See Ian Brownline, Principles of Public International Law 191 (5th ed. 1998)
106 UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts 92.1(a) & 110.
107 Id., at art. 58.3.
108 Id., at art. 59.
passage.”

Furthermore, article 24 clearly sets out that coastal states are not to hamper the right of innocent passage, providing coastal states “shall not … impose requirements on foreign ships which have the practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage; or … discriminate in form or in fact against the ships of any State or against ships carrying cargoes to, from or on behalf of any State.”

The language in article 24 seems to be unequivocal. Article 25, however, provides that coastal states have the right to take measures to protect their coastline “to prevent passage which is not innocent.” Article 19 lays out a list of activities where passage of a foreign ship shall be considered non-innocent, of which the only mention of environmental concern is a provision making passage non-innocent for “any act of willful and serious pollution.” Seemingly, there is a presumption that peaceful shipping of nuclear materials would be considered an exercise of innocent passage as long as the intent to voyage was not to cause serious pollution.

Under article 25, however, a coastal state may “suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the

---

109 *Id.* at art. 17. Article 17 deal specifically with innocent passage in Territorial Seas. Article 45 sets out that the right of innocent passage in international straits, where “there shall be no suspension of innocent passage.” *Id.* at art 45. Article 52 provides for the right of innocent passage in archipelagic states, but provides that these states can “suspend temporarily in specified areas of its archipelagic waters the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security … [but] only after having been duly published.” *Id.* at art 52.

110 UNCLOS, *supra* note 1, at art 19.

111 *Id.*, at art 24.

112 *Id.*, at art 25.

113 *Id.*, at art 19.
protection of its security,” and only after such suspension has been “duly published.” 114 The qualifying language “in specified areas” in this article seems to contemplate limited zones of special environmental concern, or areas of military concern, and does not seem to provide a blanket right for coastal states to suspend innocent passage from the entire territorial sea as was seen in the controversies in part 2 of this paper.

Most relevant to the topic of this paper are the articles that specifically deal with ships carrying nuclear materials: articles 22 and 23. Article 22 provides that coastal states may require ships carrying nuclear materials to use “sea lanes and traffic separation schemes” when exercising the right of innocent passage through their territorial seas. 115 It does not, however, allow coastal states to suspend innocent passage for these ships. Article 23 states that “ships carrying nuclear … substances shall, when exercising the right of innocent passage … carry documents and observe special precautionary measures established for such ships by international agreements.” 116 (Emphasis added.)

Presumptively, under the provisions of article 23, as long a ship follows the “special precautionary measures” coastal states can not deny innocent passage. But what are these “special precautionary measures” and which “international agreements” does this article refer to? This language might suggest hope for the advocates of the precautionary principle in that they may contemplate international agreements incorporating it. This, however, is not the case. The

114 UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 25.  
115 Id., at art. 22.  
116 Id., at art. 23.

\textbf{b. Protection of the marine environment}

Part XII of UNCLOS deals with the protection of the marine environment. Article 194 provides that states shall take all measures necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from any source.\footnote{UNCLOS, \textit{supra} note 1, at art. 23.} Paragraph four of this article, however, conditions this right by providing that “States shall refrain from unjustifiable interference with activities carried out by other States in the exercise of their rights and in pursuance of their duties in conformity with this Convention.”\footnote{\textit{Id.}, at art. 194(4).}

Article 211 addresses the specific issue of measures to prevent pollution from vessels, providing:

“States, acting through the competent international organization or general diplomatic conference, shall establish international rules and standards to prevent … pollution of the marine environment from vessels and promote the adoption, in the same manner, wherever appropriate, of routeing systems designed to minimize the threat of accidents which might cause pollution.”\footnote{\textit{Id.}, at art. 211.1.}

In this provision, however, we once again find qualifying language stating that coastal states shall “not hamper innocent passage of foreign vessels.”\footnote{\textit{Id.}, at art. 211.4.} Notice that this article does not
provide that coastal states themselves may establish rules regarding prevention of vessel pollution, but instead specifically requires states to act “through the competent international organization or general diplomatic conference.” This language is a term of art and specifically contemplates states working multilaterally through the IMO to establish such rules and standards.\footnote{See Competent International Organizations, supra note 117, at 87.} Thus, one can presume that any enactment of the precautionary principle in domestic laws, as contemplated in Section Three of this paper, would be suspect under this provision.

Article 221 gives coastal states enforcement mechanisms to avoid pollution arising from maritime casualties. It provides:

“Nothing in [Part XII] shall prejudice the right of States, pursuant to international law, both customary and conventional, to take and enforce measures beyond the territorial sea proportionate to the actual or threatened damage to protect their coastline or related interests, including fishing, from pollution or threat of pollution following upon a maritime casualty or acts relating to such a casualty, which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful consequences.”\footnote{Id., at art. 221.1 (emphasis added.).} (Emphasis added.)

This article provides the most concrete example yet of a justification within UNCLOS of a coastal state to use measures to prevent a ship carrying nuclear materials from coming within its territorial waters or EEZ. Notice that authority for state action under this article is justified under both customary and conventional international law. What is meant by customary law here? Some scholars have suggested that this language is in reference to earlier conventions on
intervention on the high seas which use similar language as that found in article 221, and have achieved customary status.\textsuperscript{124}

For example, after the 1969 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas\textsuperscript{125} was negotiated, a 1973 protocol was adopted relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Marine Pollution by Substances Other than Oil.\textsuperscript{126} Article 1 of this protocol authorizes coastal states to protect coastal marine resources by taking any necessary measures on the high seas to prevent or mitigate “grave and imminent danger to their coastline or related interests from pollution or threat of pollution by substances other than oil following upon a maritime casualty or acts related to such a casualty, which may reasonably be expected to result in harmful consequences.”\textsuperscript{127} (Emphasis added.)

Notice also that article 221 deals with both actual or “threatened damage” by maritime casualty “or acts relating to such a casualty.” Commentators such as Van Dyke have suggested that this article give coastal states flexibility to prevent ultra-hazardous materials from passing through their waters without certain precautions. Van Dyke writes:

Concerned coastal nations might view “acts relating to such a casualty” as including foreseeable risks created by shipments of ultrahazardous cargoes without proper advance consultation, creation of emergency contingency plans, and liability regimes, and hence might view this provision as authorizing intervention to block such shipments. If nations with flag state jurisdiction do not fulfill their obligations to “take adequate steps to control and regulate sources

\textsuperscript{124} See R. R. Churchill & A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea 262 (2nd ed., Manchester University Press 1988); see also Nadelson, supra note 102, at 205 n. 68.
\textsuperscript{126} Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Substances Other than Oil, Nov. 2 1973, T.I.A.S. No. 10561, 13 I.L.M. 605.
\textsuperscript{127} Id., at art 1(1).
of serious environmental pollution or transboundary harm within their territory or subject to their jurisdiction,” then nations threatened by such lack of protective action will inevitably act to protect their threatened coastal resources.128

Lastly, the discussion in Section Two of this paper described the 1995 controversy of the voyage of the Pacific Pintail, in which it was stated that the Chilean Maritime Authority cited the precautionary principle as justification for denying the ship passage.129 According to Van Dyke, the Chilean Maritime Authority also cited UNCLOS article 234.130 This article states:

“Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance.”131

Article 234 provides strong support for coastal states to deny the right of innocent passage in these ice-covered areas. Thus, this is one of the very few exceptions to the general rule that states can not deny the right of innocent passage.

In summary, one can glean from the above UNCLOS provisions that despite the fact that coastal states have the right to take measures to protect their marine environment, this right generally does not supersede the right of foreign flag state vessels to exercise innocent passage though coastal state territorial waters or freedom of navigation within their EEZ. This

128 Boyle, supra note 84, at 269; see also Van Dyke II, supra note 9, at 102; Nadelson, supra note 102, at 206.
129 See supra notes 16 through 25 and accompanying text.
130 Van Dyke II, supra note 9, at 100 & n. 134.
131 UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art 234.
determination is supported by the writings of many scholars of the subject.\textsuperscript{132} The only exceptions to this right would seem to be if the ships passage was in fact non-innocent by intending to seriously pollute the waters of a coastal state, or if the ship was in violation of IMO regulations with regard to the storage and transport of nuclear materials, or if it posed an environmental threat to an ice-covered area. There is an interesting debate regarding Article 221’s customary rights to take measures in the case of maritime “casualty or acts related to such a casualty.” The language of this article, however, provides that states can only take measures against such ships if they are “reasonably … expected to result in major harmful consequences.” Thus, if a ship has satisfied the inspection regime of the IMO with regard to the transport of nuclear materials it most likely would not be reasonable to “expect” harmful consequences, even though a possibility of such consequences may exist.

6. Discussion

From the above analysis of the precautionary principle, IAEA and IMO safeguards regime, and the UNCLOS provisions on innocent passage and environmental protection, is it clear that there is a clash of international law doctrines. It would be difficult to argue that at this stage of development of the precautionary principle that its requirements are customary law or that they supersede UNCLOS or IMO regulation on the transport of nuclear materials at sea. Never the less, there is still the problem of state practice. There are more than a handful of states that prohibit the passage of these ships. Therefore, this last section will discus how this dispute can be equitably resolved.

\textsuperscript{132} See generally Fidell, supra note 42 (providing a thorough examination on the thoughts of scholars on this subject); see also Raul A. F. Pedrozo, Transport of Nuclear Cargoes by Sea, 28 J. Mar. L. & Com. 207 (1997).
To begin with, Jon Van Dyke, has provided a wellspring of valid suggestions for the international community to resolve this issue. His most pragmatic solution is for the IMO to adopt precautionary principles in the INF Code.133 This solution is consistent with the procedure set out in UNCLOS article 211 where coastal states would work through the IMO (“the competent international organization or general diplomatic conference”) to create new international rules for protecting the marine environment from the harm of ships. The positive aspect of this recommendation is that it is the method for changing the rules recommended by UNCLOS, and if (or when) the requirements of the precautionary principle are incorporated into the INF Code they become mandatory regulations. This would at one time change the rules for everyone in the shipping community, and thus would be a very efficient solution. The drawback of this approach is that change at an international organization is slow. Van Dyke made this recommendation in 1996, nearly 10 years ago, yet little progress has been made at the IMO to incorporate the precautionary principle.

Van Dykes second proposal is to create regional regimes to enforce the precautionary principle.134 This is an interesting option since this is what in fact is taking place as has been seen in the Bamako and Waigani Conventions and from the actions of the Caribbean nations in their declaration of a nuclear-free zone. The drawback to this approach is that it creates conflicting bodies of international laws and standards. This conflict would not only be between UNCLOS/IMO and the regional regimes, but would also be between the regional regimes themselves. This can already be seen in the different standards between the Bamako and Waigani Conventions with regard to nuclear materials. Carried to its logical end, this solution

133 Van Dyke I, supra note 18, at 388.
134 Van Dyke II, supra note 9, at 105-06.
would lead to inefficiencies in the shipping community which would have to comply with each of the different regimes’ rules as well as the IMO regulations. Furthermore, it is conceivable to suspect that this solution would lead to more legal (or actual) conflict between shipping and coastal states, not less.

Van Dyke also provides a third recommendation: coastal states should bring a case against the states shipping nuclear materials in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). This would be the most efficient solution for resolving the currently conflicting laws in that it would bring about the most clarity in the least amount of time. It could also be a double edged sword for proponents of the precautionary principle. One can imagine the judges ruling in favor of the laws as set out in UNCLOS and the INF Code since they are the more established and clearer standards of international law. On the other hand, ITLOS could use its equity power to require the IMO to adopt the precautionary principle in order to calm the valid security concerns of coastal states and end the controversy once and for all.

Another interesting suggestion is the creation of a “universal sea lane” for the shipment of nuclear materials. This solution would maintain the status quo regarding the lack of clarity in international law, but would also create an interim option to facilitate shipping while allowing coastal states to prohibit passage. Though this is a novel idea, in practice it would seem to be a difficult undertaking to negotiate such an agreement between shipping and coastal states. To begin with, where would this sea lane be located? Coastal states would likely all have the same opinion for such an agreement: we support it as long as the route doesn’t pass through our

135 Van Dyke II, supra note 9, at 106-07.
waters. This ‘not in my back yard’ mentality would likely stall such an agreement indefinitely. Furthermore, shipping states would most likely be wary of such an idea because of their interest in secrecy and unpredictability to protect national security. The use of a single sea lane would conceivably create predictable patterns of transport that could be exploited by pirates and/or terrorists groups.

7. Conclusion

In light of the recent controversies in the international shipping of nuclear materials, and upon reviewing the divergent hard and soft international law within this area, it is clear that there is a conflict between the quickly evolving field of international environmental law and the established system surrounding the international law of the sea. How to solve this problem, however, is not clear at present. The existing nuclear safeguards and law of the sea regimes provides binding legal provisions and a system of regulation for the shipment of nuclear materials. Furthermore, it seems apparent that the denial of the right of innocent passage by coastal states to ships carrying nuclear material is, except in limited circumstances, in violation of the existing law of the sea regime.

It also seems apparent, however, that the drafters of UNCLOS may not have foreseen the scale shipments would ultimately take or the potential danger that they pose. The tremendous amount of damage that would occur in the event that a ship like the Pacific Pintail were to be involved in a terrorist attack or major accident with radioactive effect is almost beyond imagination. In today’s energy starved world, however, these shipments are most likely going to be a permanent part of the landscape of international shipping, and thus will have to be dealt with in a safe and effective manner.
The requirements of the precautionary principle seem to be a sensible way to ensure the safety of nuclear shipments in the future, though opponents would likely argue that they would create inefficiencies. If the precautionary principle is indeed a “developing custom,” it is only a matter of time before these requirements will become standard practice. Therefore, it may be in the best interests of shipping states to embrace the requirements of the precautionary principle now and find ways to overcome the inefficiencies. If shipping states wait until being forced to comply with the requirements down the road, it will only come at greater expense.