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Courts require discretion in appointing guardians. Oftentimes, the legislature prevents the courts from exercising discretion when statutes are enacted that prohibit felons from serving as guardians under any circumstances. Yet, the need for guardians is increasing and will continue to do so due to the exponential growth in the aging elder population.

At the same time, however, the pool of potential guardians is shrinking in size. Additionally, the same reducing pool of eligible guardians is being attenuated further by having a disproportionate amount of felonies.

The groups most impacted by these trends are the indigent and the minorities. The indigent do not have the resources to hire guardians and often, the only persons eligible and available to serve as guardians are family members. The minorities may be impacted if they are of a race that has historically possessed a disproportionate amount of felons. If poverty and race are considered, along with an increasing number convicted felonies, a significant problem develops in finding eligible guardians.

Persons convicted of felonies should be scrutinized closely to determine whether it is in the ward’s best interest to have said person appointed as a guardian, but certain statutes completely prevent the court from making such a consideration.

The alternatives available to the convicted felon to mitigate against the complete restraint are woefully inadequate. The remedies of dismissal, annulment, expungement, and pardon are not feasible for most felons. The signing of a durable power of attorney is not available to many indigent and elderly persons, or to children who have been developmentally challenged since birth.

Other considerations, such as extending full faith and credit, comity or the best interest standard are equally inadequate to resolve the needs for guardians. Finally, the uniform codes and proposed standards do not address the issue sufficiently.

This article promotes allowing the judiciary discretion to appoint felons in certain situations where it would be in the best interest of the ward. The article further discusses the inadequacies of the uniform codes and proposed standards in this area of concern.
The Convicted Felon as a Guardian: Considering the Alternatives of Potential Guardians with Less-Than-Perfect Records

By

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INTRODUCTION

The pool of potential guardians is shrinking and the demand for guardians is increasing.² Considering that the proportionate number of felonies in the United States is increasing, along with the demand for additional guardians, more and more often convicted felons may be placed in situations where they will be the only persons feasible to act as guardians. This is especially true in situations where the ward is indigent or is in a minority race that has a disproportionate amount of convicted felons.³

The problem of disqualifying all felons from serving as guardians will most likely negatively impair the indigent and minority groups in comparison to those wards who

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² Symposium, Creating the "Portable" Guardianship: Legal and Practical Implications of Probate Court Cooperation in Interstate Guardianship Cases, 13 QUINNIPAC PROB. L. J. 351, 352-53 (1999) (“The increase in the proportion of elderly relative to the total population and corresponding increases in the life expectancy of the elderly and their assistance needs suggest that the volume of probate caseloads is likely to expand accordingly--and, in fact, may already have begun to do so.”).

³ Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, The Political Consequences of Felon Disfranchisement Laws in the United States 6 (2001). The impoverished are the most in need of guardians as the economic incentives to serve as their guardians are absent where the incapacitated lacks assets. Felons are proportionately more likely to be living in poverty.
possess estates with significant assets.\(^4\) In situations where the estates are small or non-existent, it is difficult to find people willing to serve as guardians, especially since the guardian’s responsibilities are significant and the estates are not sufficient to provide adequate compensation.\(^5\) Such cases present special legal challenges to both courts and practitioners. This article will address the special legal challenges of felons as guardians, discuss different approaches or solutions that jurists may wish to consider when selecting possible guardians that may have less-than-perfect records, and expose deficiencies in the uniform codes, statutes and standards concerning felons seeking appointments as guardians.\(^6\)

The first section of this article briefly discusses the basics of guardianship law and describes the issue in more detail. The second section addresses certain legal implications of past felony convictions on the appointment of a guardian, and (1) how to reduce the effects of a prior felony conviction through annulment, expunction and pardon, and (2) alternatives to guardianship, such as the durable power of attorney, if available. The third section

\(^4\)Hetherington v. State Pers. Bd., 82 Cal. App.3d 582 (Ct. App. 1978); Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp. 802 (D.Tenn.1985) (the case discusses the disenfranchising of voting blacks due to the disproportionate number of felons within the group, and the court finds that the voting rights statute did not unlawfully dilute their vote under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, notwithstanding statute's disproportionate impact on blacks, i.e., it did not deprive blacks of equal protection). See also Taja-Nia Y. Henderson, New Frontiers in Fair Lending: Confronting Lending Discrimination Against Ex-Offenders, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1237, 1270 (Oct. 2005).

\(^5\)Alison Patrucco Barnes, Beyond Guardianship Reform: A Reevaluation of Autonomy and Beneficence for a System of Principled Decision-Making in Long Term Care, 41 EMORY L. J. 633, 713 (Summer 1992) ("Similarly, a proxy decision-maker who is not serving the ward's interests should be replaced. With unpaid proxies, however, there is seldom anyone willing to undertake the task. There is, therefore, a need for a public guardian who can serve as a guardian of last resort. In England, the Court of Protection, under the Public Trustee, provides such a service. A number of states in the United States have public guardians to serve the indigent, although Florida, for example, has public guardians in only two court circuits.").

\(^6\)It is beyond the scope of any such article to address in detail all of the issues and possible solutions in all jurisdictions in the United States. Such issues can only be addressed in general; adapting the suggestions for local law and practice will be necessary.
discusses decisions that policy makers may have to consider, including: (1) whether a forum state court must provide full faith and credit to a foreign judgment or decree of guardianship, (2) whether legislation that deprives a court of discretion of whether to appoint a guardian violates separation of powers or equal protection, and (3) whether there are needs of having standardized uniform legislation regarding the appointment of felons as guardians. Furthermore, this article will explore the idea of the "best interest standard" for the ward, specifically whether the modern guardianship system truly utilizes a best interest standard, and whether there is a need for reform. For example, the increase in interstate travel raises jurisdictional, venue, and conflict of laws issues inherent in the present guardianship system.7 This paper will address two of the resulting dilemmas from the present structure, which includes the possibility of encouraging forum shopping, and the extent full faith and credit pertains to guardianship eligibility in interstate guardianships.

General Demographic Information

In the past century, the United States’ population has significantly increased in the median age.8 In the 1860s, the median age was nineteen years of age and in 2050, the median age is projected to be forty-five years.9 In 1900, the life expectancy for males was forty-six and roughly forty-eight for females.10 Today, the life expectancy for males and


9 Id.

10 Id.
females ranges between 73.8 (males 1998) and 79.5 (females 1998).  

At the same time the elder population rapidly ages, every year in the United States, over one million people are convicted of felonies, a statistic that continues to increase. Not all felonies are for dishonesty, theft or exploitation. Currently about a third of felony convictions are for drug offenses, while theft and burglary offenses constitute about a third of felony convictions, with approximately one third of these being fraud related. The remaining convictions are for violent offenses, weapon offenses and nonviolent crimes.

These statistics have remained relatively constant since 1998. As of 2001, one in thirty-seven adults in the United States had served time in prison. Six and a half percent of persons born in 2001 will go to prison in their lifetime if current rates of incarceration remain unchanged. This statistic has increased from a little over five percent of persons born in


14 Id.

15 Id.


18 Id.
The rate of increasing felons requires contemplation when we consider the pool of persons available to serve as guardians over those who are incapacitated due to infirmity, dementia or physical ailments. The differences in how the states define eligibility for potential guardian applicants ranges from states that exercise little restraint in the appointment of guardians to those that completely prohibit felons as guardians.

The birth rate has declined dramatically since the 1950’s. As a result, incapacitated people may have fewer, or perhaps no, children who would be eligible to act as their guardians. Further limiting the potential pool of eligible guardians by precluding felons from serving in that capacity acts as a major disadvantage to the incapacitated with few or no children.

These statistics indicate an increasing likelihood that persons with felony convictions in their history may seek the appointment, or have already received an appointment, as guardians of incapacitated spouses, parents or children. Furthermore, as our society

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19 *Id.* Please note that this is rate of incarceration, and may not reflect the rate of conviction.

20 Symposium, *Creating the "Portable" Guardianship: Legal and Practical Implications of Probate Court Cooperation in Interstate Guardianship Cases*, 13 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L. J. 351, 652-53 (1999) (“More critically, probate courts are likely to face significant problems . . . with legal considerations of jurisdiction, venue, full faith and credit, comity, and conflicts of laws.” For example, . . . “If a court of competent jurisdiction in another state appointed a guardian for an incapacitated person, should a probate court give full faith and credit to the guardianship order if the incapacitated person moves to the new jurisdiction? What if the existing guardianship order grants rights or powers to the guardian that, as a matter of public policy, would not be granted in the new state?”).

21 Http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/statab/t991x01.pdf.

22 The words “Guardian” and “Guardianship” as used in this article include all types of guardianships of the person or estate of an incapacitated person, even though defined differently in state law, unless otherwise indicated in the article. “Guardianships” as used in the article are considered the same as conservatorships and tutorships of the person or estate, whether limited or plenary. Additionally, although the Uniform Probate Code and various state statutes distinguish between the definitions of conservator and guardian, i.e., a conservator means a person appointed by the court to manage the estate of the ward, whereas a guardian is a court-appointed person responsible for the care, custody, and control of the ward. This article will use the term “guardian” in a generic manner as the person responsible under court order for both the person and the property of the ward. The issue raised herein does not uniformly distinguish between guardianships established for adults versus
guardianships established for minors in age. Oftentimes, states have different requirements for the different guardianship categories.

23Florida Coastal School of Law’s Elder Law Clinic represented the mother of a developmentally disabled child in 1999. The mother, as natural guardian in Florida, had the right to make decisions for her son and to obtain medical and dental care. When the son turned eighteen years of age, however, under Florida law he was presumed competent and his legal disability was removed as a matter of law. The mother sought assistance from the Clinic to obtain a guardianship over her son whom she had been taking care of for eighteen years so that she could continue to make decisions for her son’s welfare. The mother was disqualified since Florida statutes prevent a felon from serving as a guardian regardless of the circumstances. Nineteen years earlier, the mother had a felony conviction for accessory to robbery. It was her only conviction or trouble with the law. The court felt compelled under the statute to disqualify the mother from acting as her son’s guardian. The court interpreted the statute as a total disqualification for eligibility. The court further denied eligibility despite arguments that the conviction may be eligible for expungement, or that the mother may be eligible of a pardon, or that her rights might be restored. No alternative would have persuaded the court to allow the mother to act as guardian since the statute was unambiguous that felons are not eligible to serve as guardians in Florida.

removed due to the prescription expiring by operation of law, the child will be presumed competent. 25 Only upon a showing of incapacity will the court appoint a guardian or guardian advocate. In the case where the natural parent is the only feasible person to act as the child’s guardian, and the parent has been convicted of a felony, even if it is from an event that happened two decades earlier, courts in some states lack discretion to appoint the parent-guardian regardless of the circumstances, the nature of the felony, the age of the felony, the severity of the felony, and the ward’s best interest. 26

Likewise, in addition to incapacitated children, the elderly are also at risk. 27 For instance, assume that an elderly husband becomes incapacitated after years of marriage, there are no children able to serve as guardians, and the only feasible person able to serve is the wife, who has a prior felony conviction. 28 In certain states, the wife is completely precluded


26 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.309(3) (West 2006).

27 Caroline W. Jacobus, Legislative Responses to Discrimination in Women's Health Care: A Report Prepared for the Commission to Study Sex Discrimination in the Statutes, 16 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 153 (Spring 1995) (“New Jersey has the second oldest population of all 50 states, after Florida. . . . By the year 2000, one in every five [citizens] will be 65 years or older. The over-60s group will double in the early decades of the 21st century. The very old population (over 85) more than doubled between 1970 and 1990, and will nearly double again by 2010. Demographic and related income factors have a significant impact on women’s access to health services and their consequent health. Two-thirds of women aged 65 and over are widowed, divorced or single, compared to only a third of men aged 65 and over. Poverty is a major issue for elderly women. Nationally, the median income for women over 65 is $9,400. Median incomes for elderly women of color are even lower. One in four New Jersey women aged 65 or older lives at or near the poverty level. The incidence of poverty among men aged 65 and over is half that for women. The incidence of poverty is highest for women of color and those who live alone. The incidence of poverty increases with age.” (referring to Peter M. Cicchino, The Problem Child: an Empirical Survey and Rhetorical Analysis of Child Poverty in the United States, 5 J.L. & POL. 5 (1996)).

28 In re Estate of Roy v. Roy, 265 Ill.App.3d 99 (Ill.App. Ct. 3rd Dist. 1994) (noting that the Illinois statute that prohibited convicted felons from serving as guardians was not a bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or violation of equal protection clause on its face, and holding that the statutory minimum criteria for guardian was not inconsistent with statute that allowed the ward to express a choice of guardian, and the statute could violate fourteenth amendment as applied, but a hearing would be necessary to determine whether rational basis for a statutory
due to a prior felony conviction from serving as her husband’s decision-maker. The indigent population is greatly affected since they do not have estates sufficient to hire professional guardians, and their likely pool of potential guardians will be family members that volunteer to assist in an unpaid and uncompensated capacity. Even if a professional guardian is retained, the guardian may not be appointed to make health care decisions, as would a spouse. However, if the felon spouse is unable to make temporal decisions, they would also be precluded under guardianship statutes from serving over the person’s healthcare as well.

Under guardianship principles, should a court have autonomy to make a decision in appointing a guardian for the best interest of the ward, on a case by case basis, or should legislation that prohibits the felon from serving as guardian take priority over court discretion?

I. The Purpose of Guardianship and the Appointment of a Guardian

A. Historical Analysis

Before delving into the deficiencies present in the modern guardianship system, it is important to understand the historical blueprint of the system. The modern guardianship system is derived from early English common law, and founded on the doctrine of parens patriae. Originating in medieval England, this doctrine focused on the incapacitated and empowered the Crown to protect and care for individuals who could not do so for

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See also, W. W. Allen, Mental Incompetency of one Spouse as Affecting Transfer or Encumbrance of Community Property, Homestead Property, or Estate by the Entireties, 155 A.L.R. 306 (1945).


themselves.\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Parens patriae} was first introduced to America during the colonial period and has since been fully adopted in the states.\textsuperscript{32}

In the United States, the doctrine of \textit{parens patriae} has been transferred to each individual state and codified in state-specific guardianship statutes delineating its primary purpose of protecting the best interest of the ward.\textsuperscript{33} This power was first recognized by the Supreme Court in \textit{Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Chris of Latter-Day Saints v. United States}, where the Court held “that it is indispensable that there should be a power in the legislature to authorize a sale of the estates of infants, idiots, insane persons and persons not known, or not in being, who cannot act for themselves.”\textsuperscript{34} Since this recognition by the Supreme Court, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted the doctrine of \textit{parens patriae} and implemented guardianship statutes.\textsuperscript{35} Although its benevolent purpose of the ward’s best interest is undeniable, it is questionable whether the guardianship system, in its present non-uniform stature, is succeeding in the appointment of persons to serve as guardians.\textsuperscript{36}

\textbf{B. Guardianship Process}

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Parens patriae} is a power inherited from English law where the Crown assumed the "care of those who, by reason of their imbecility and want of understanding, are incapable of taking care of themselves." Phillip Tor, \textit{Finding Incompetency in Guardianship: Standardizing the Process}, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 739, 749 (1993) (quoting NICHOLAS N. KITTRIE, \textit{THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT} 59 (1971) (quoting L. SHELFORD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW CONCERNING LUNATICS, IDIOTS, AND PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND 6 (1833)).


\textsuperscript{34} Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890).


The term “guardianship” refers to the legal relationship established when a person (the “guardian”) is given legal responsibility for another person (the “ward”), and/or the property of the person, when the person is incapable of handling his or her affairs due to minority or incapacity.37 Procedurally, the court operates in a protective manner, similar to that of a parent, monitoring and managing the ward’s personal and property affairs.38 Although the best interest of the ward is the fundamental principle of the guardianship system, the appointment of a guardian can be rather intrusive, as it generally results in the ward losing most, if not all, basic civil rights.39

Although the probate courts have jurisdiction over guardianship proceedings, the courts’ judicial discretion in the selection of guardians is often limited by statutes.40 As will be illustrated later, the selection of the guardian can be problematic as the courts struggle to balance the best interests of the ward with the statutory requirements enacted by the state legislators.41 The competing tension between the probate courts and the legislature can result in injustice throughout the system.42

C. Lack of Continuity in State Statutes

Although all fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted guardianship


41 In re Estate of Roy, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 104 (holding that the selection of a guardian is subject to the statutory criteria, and where such criteria is clear and unambiguous, the courts must act accordingly).

42 In re Lagrange, 274 N.Y.S. 702 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
the lack of continuity between the states has created many problems in the guardianship arena, most notably in relation to felons’ guardianship eligibility. For instance, there are at least three distinct categories of State laws concerning the eligibility of individuals with past felony convictions to serve as guardians, i.e., the (1) complete disqualification of the felon, (2) requirement of the disclosure of the prior felony with consideration given to the ward's best interest, and (3) silence on the restraint on a felon's eligibility not addressed in the state's statute. As a result of these legal variations and society’s increase in mobility, the guardianship system is plagued with troubles concerning forum shopping and deference under full faith and credit. More specifically, to what extent should a forum court give full faith and credit to a foreign court's guardianship order and/or

43 See Table in Appendix A, and http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/probate.html.


46 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5311 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-5-311(d) (2006); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11a-5 (West 2006); REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.059 (West 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A: 4 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.03 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 30, § 4-105 (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.210(1) (West 2006); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 678 (Vernon 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-1-8(a) (West 2006).

47 ALA. CODE § 26-2A-104(a) (LexisNexis 2006); ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.145 (2005); CAL. PROB. CODE § 2650 (West 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-311 (2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-676(f) (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 12, § 3901 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 29-5-2 (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560: 5-310 (LexisNexis 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-5-4 (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.559 (West 2006); KAN. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59-3067(e)(1) (West 2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 387.600 (West 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 18 § 5 (2006); MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS § 13-206 (West 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201, § 6 (West 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1628 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.5-309 (West 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-13-121 (2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 475.050 (West 2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-312 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2627 (LexisNexis 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:12-25 (West 2006); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.19 (McKinney 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35A-1290 (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-11 (2005); 20 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5511(f) (West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-410 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-5-110 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-3-103 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-311 (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 3072 (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.13 (2006).
II. May a Felon Still be a Guardian?

Because there are three categories of state law concerning the eligibility of persons with past felony convictions to become guardians, the lack of judicial discretion begs the question of whether total legislative prohibition of a felon serving as a guardian will withstand constitutional scrutiny, and whether there are alternatives to such a strict prohibition.\(^{49}\)

The second category includes states that require either divulgence upon the application to become a guardian or require the court to inquire into any past convictions of the proposed guardian.\(^{50}\) The states may require the court to consider such convictions when appointing a guardian, or the states may require automatic disqualification absent proof that appointment is in the best interests of the incapacitated person.\(^{51}\) Finally, the third category includes the states whose statutes are silent on this issue.\(^{52}\) Presumably, the silent states


\(^{50}\)That is, Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and West Virginia.

\(^{51}\)ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5311 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-5-311(d) (2006); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11a-5 (West 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.059 (West 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A: 4 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.03 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 30, § 4-105 (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.210(1) (West 2006); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 678 (Vernon 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-1-8(a) (West 2006).

\(^{52}\)That is, Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia.
would allow the court to consider past convictions in relation to the fitness of the guardian or the best interests of the incapacitated person.

Thus, the effect of a potential guardian’s prior felony conviction ranges from an outright disqualification of the felon, to a mere legal inconvenience. This lack of uniformity may create legal quagmires for those guardians appointed in foreign jurisdictions who relocate the wards to forum jurisdictions that strictly prohibit felons from serving as guardians. It may also impair those groups where indigency may impact the available guardianship eligibility pool.

As the demand for eligible guardians increases, and society becoming more mobile, there will likely be an increase in the factual situation where a potential guardian will not be appointed in one state, but will be eligible to be appointed in a different state, or vice versa. There may also be the situation where the guardian has been appointed in a foreign state, and upon relocating finds himself ineligible to continue to serve as the guardian in the new forum state. This scenario may create possible forum shopping in situations where the supply of available guardians is limited. As discussed below, without a uniform guardianship scheme that considers court discretion, the application of full faith and credit may be inadequate to overcome the problem.

The prohibition of a felon from serving as a guardian may also impact guardians when the ward turns the age of majority. What happens in the situation when the only available guardian is a parent and the parent has a past felony conviction? Is the ward protected? Typically the public guardianship states have failed to provide adequate resources for implementation of sufficient guardians to protect the indigent and minority classes.53

53 Alison Patrucco Barnes, Beyond Guardianship Reform: A Reevaluation of Autonomy and Beneficence for a System of Principled Decision-Making in Long Term Care, EMORY L. J. (Summer 1992) (noting that unpaid proxies are difficult to find as there is seldom anyone willing
Once an existing guardian is prohibited by statute from continuing to act as guardian, or the felon is the only available guardian, the practitioner must consider whether alternatives to the appointment of the felon as a guardian are available. Some of the alternatives to be discussed include minimizing the felony conviction through annulment, dismissal, pardon and expungement. Other alternatives may include the utilization of durable powers of attorney.

Outside of forums such as Arkansas, Florida, Rhode Island and Washington that prohibit felons from serving as guardians, certain steps, taken both inside and outside the guardianship proceedings may reduce the impact of a prior felony conviction on the appointment of a guardian.

A. Reducing the Effect of a Prior Felony Conviction: Annulments, Dismissals, Expunctions and Pardons

Most states have procedures whereby a person may, if certain conditions are met, have a felony conviction dismissed or annulled, or have the records of the conviction expunged or sealed. In addition, the executive branches of the various states have the power to “pardon” and/or restore convicted felons to their civil rights.

1. Dismissal/annulment of the felon’s record:

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If the felon can “un-do” the felony, may he then be appointed as a guardian? It is uncertain what effect a dismissal or annulment of felonies may have for the proposed guardian. Since the remedies of dismissal, expunction or pardon must generally be applied for in the state or jurisdiction where the conviction was entered, there is no guarantee that once obtained, they will be given deference in that, or other, jurisdictions to make the felon eligible to serve as a guardian.

If relief from a felony through dismissal or annulment is obtained, however, it is at least arguable under the state statutes that are silent as to the effect of the pardon or annulment, that the relief may qualify a previously ineligible petitioner for guardianship. In

57Fed. R. Evid., 609(c) states that the effect of a pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation is not admissible "if (1) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence." Even though the conviction may not be admissible, does it have to be disclosed to the court upon filing an application of guardianship? Candor is very important in guardianship proceedings. If disclosed on the application, is this "evidence" that is not admissible to the court to consider in its decision whether to appoint the person as a guardian?

58State ex rel. Gains v. Rossi, 716 N.E.2d 204 (Ohio 1999)(finding that the expungement of a felony conviction under R.C. 2953.32 and 2953.33 restores a person's competency to hold an office of honor, trust, or profit). See also La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 893 D(1)(b)(2) (2006)("Upon motion of the defendant, if the court finds at the conclusion of the probationary period that the probation of the defendant has been satisfactory, the court may set the conviction aside and dismiss the prosecution. The dismissal of the prosecution shall have the same effect as acquittal, except that the conviction may be considered as a first offense and provide the basis for subsequent prosecution of the party as a multiple offender, and further shall be considered as a first offense for purposes of any other law or laws relating to cumulation of offenses. Dismissal under this Paragraph shall occur only once with respect to any person.").

59A notable exception to this is Ohio, which allows a petitioner to obtain expunction of Ohio’s records of a conviction in another state or federal court. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.32 (West 2006); Barker v. State, 402 N.E.2d 550 (Ohio 1980).


the four states who disqualify those with felony convictions from serving as guardians, the felon who obtained a pardon or an annulment may be eligible to serve as a guardian in three of the four states.\textsuperscript{62}

For example, Arkansas allows a person to be a guardian who is “not a convicted and unpardoned felon . . .”\textsuperscript{63} The use of the current tense, “not a convicted and unpardoned felon,” suggests that only currently extant felony convictions would disqualify the potential guardian.\textsuperscript{64} The type of felony is not limited in Arkansas, and arguably, the law would apply to any "pardoned" felony, regardless of its nature.

Likewise, Washington law disqualifies a potential guardianship, “who is … convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.”\textsuperscript{65} Again, it is not the fact of past conviction but the state of current conviction that disqualifies. Thus, in jurisdictions where a dismissal is effective to treat the felony as if it never occurred,\textsuperscript{66} a petitioner who has had a conviction dismissed upon completion of a successful probation\textsuperscript{67} or who obtains a pardon\textsuperscript{68}...
would arguably not be disqualified from serving as a guardian in these states.\textsuperscript{69}

In comparison, the language of the Florida statute disqualifies anyone who “has been convicted of a felony.”\textsuperscript{70} Under Florida law, a subsequent dismissal of the conviction upon completion of probation, expunction or sealing of records, or pardon would not eliminate the fact that the person “has been convicted of a felony.” In fact, similar reasoning has been employed by the Florida Supreme Court to disqualify the felon from serving, regardless of the pardon, the annulment or restoration of rights.\textsuperscript{71}

Between these extreme positions lies Rhode Island, which requires a court, before appointing a guardian, to “find that the individual … [h]as no criminal background which bears on suitability to serve as guardian,”\textsuperscript{72} and disqualifies any person convicted of theft related offenses from serving as a conservator.\textsuperscript{73} As previously implied, a person who has successfully achieved a dismissal may not have a “criminal background which bears on suitability to serve as guardian” since he could argue that he is no longer “convicted of” a theft-related offense.\textsuperscript{74}

In many situations, the attorney can not forget that there are several possible impediments to the feasibility of the felon obtaining the remedy of dismissal, expungement

\textsuperscript{69}\textit{LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.} art. 893 D(1)(b)(2) (2006).

\textsuperscript{70}\textit{FLA. STAT. ANN.} § 744.309(3) (West 2006).

\textsuperscript{71}\textit{R.J.L. v. State}, 887 So.2d 1268 (Fla. 2004) (“A pardon does not eliminate the adjudication of guilt, creating a fiction that the crime never occurred.”).


Several states impede the dismissal of a felony conviction by requiring the felon to complete certain rehabilitative prerequisites. This includes that the dismissal is limited to first time offenses. Even if the felon may be eligible for a dismissal or annulment, the state statutes may still prevent certain felons, even if first time offenders, from serving as guardians. For example, in several states, the type of felony conviction is important and such offenses are excluded from the framework eligible for dismissals or

75 U.S. v. Vertel, No. 1:91-CR-162, 2006 WL 250672 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 31, 2006)(quoting United States v. Smith, No. 87-3837, 1988 WL 19174, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 8, 1988) (no expunction of valid conviction for which defendant was subsequently pardoned)); United States v. Janik, 10 F.3d 790, 792 (7th Cir. 1993) (no expunction for soldier concerned about effects on future career of conviction overturned on Speedy Trial Act grounds, where appellate court held that there existed constitutionally sufficient evidence to support the conviction); Schwab v. Gallas, 724 F.Supp. 509, 510-11 (N.D.Ohio 1989) (expunction of valid felony conviction not warranted by the fact that movant had fulfilled the requirements of the sentence and since led a law-abiding life)). See also United States v. Crowell, 374 F.3d 790, 796 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that court has no authority to expunge a record of a valid conviction absent a legal ground for setting aside that conviction); United States v. Wiley, 89 F.Supp.2d 909, 911 (S.D.Ohio 1999) (denying expungement of valid conviction despite the fact that defendant was depressed at the time of the offense, had been law-abiding since, and was experiencing significant hardship because of past conviction); United States v. Gallas, 771 F.Supp. 904, 909-10 (W.D.Tenn. 1991) (denying request for expungement of valid conviction and finding no extraordinary circumstances in argument that defendant had been law-abiding since the conviction and that his professional opportunities continued to be hurt by his past conviction)). See also Ex parte Gray, 109 S.W.3d 917 (Tex.Crim. App. 2003).

76 Included in this analysis are only states that either disqualify as guardians persons with felony convictions or require consideration of such convictions in appointing guardians, and that also have a statutory framework for annulling or dismissing a felony conviction upon demonstrating rehabilitation. This limitation is important, because these frameworks for dismissal or annulment of a felony conviction apply only in the state in which the conviction occurred.

77 See ARK. CODE ANN. §16-93-303 (West 2006)(allowing court to not enter judgment or pronounce sentence upon first time offender).
annulments, e.g., felonies of sexual offenses, crimes of violence, or other categories of criminal conduct.

Additionally, the time to apply for an annulment may be very restrictive. Generally, the person convicted must qualify for annulment or dismissal at the time of sentencing by convincing the court to withhold judgment or sentence, i.e., a lack of proof. Furthermore, time is of concern when the eligibility requires that the convicted person successfully complete probation or other rehabilitative programs, and he remain crime-free for a period of time thereafter.

Although dismissal of the conviction has the highest likelihood of removing barriers to guardianship, the procedures are very limited in application. The states that allow the dismissal or annulment restrict the remedy in application both as to the types of crimes and

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83 La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 893 D(1)(b)(2) (2006) ("Upon motion of the defendant, if the court finds at the conclusion of the probationary period that the probation of the defendant has been satisfactory, the court may set the conviction aside and dismiss the prosecution. The dismissal of the prosecution shall have the same effect as acquittal, . . . ").
as to the procedural qualifications. Of course, these procedures will not benefit a potential guardian outside of the rather small minority of persons with criminal convictions entitled to dismissal.

Assuming that the felon qualifies in the rare instance for an annulment or dismissal of the felony conviction, under a portion of state statutes, the dismissal of the conviction will be automatic. The question in the subject states that forbid the appointment of felons as guardians is whether the dismissal or annulment “automatically” lifts a restraint against being appointed as a guardian. Some statutes explicitly indicate that the dismissal of the conviction will result in removal of all legal disabilities that arose out of the felony conviction. In other states, the legal effect of dismissal is to make the conviction “as if it never happened.” Will that be sufficient to remove the disqualifications of being appointed

84See, e.g., Baker v. State, 884 S.W.2d 603 (Ark. 1994) (defendant who otherwise qualified for dismissal who failed to object to entry of judgment at time judgment was entered was not entitled to dismissal of conviction).

85R.J.L. v. State, 887 So.2d 1268, 1280 (Fla. 2004). Even though a pardon does not eliminate the adjudication of guilt, creating a fiction that the crime never occurred for guardianship purposes, the question is unanswered whether a dismissal or annulment may allow the applicant to become eligible.


87Each state will make its own independent decision without the adoption of a uniform standard that applies to this situation.

88ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-907(A) (2006); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 5(c) (Vernon 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.640(3) (West 2006).

89N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 651:5(X) (2006). See also Tembruell v. City of Seattle, 392 P.2d 453 (Wash. 1964)(the defendant argued that a deferred sentence coupled with dismissal of the charge did not constitute conviction of a felony, and the court held there being neither an adjudication of guilt nor a sentence, that the defendant was not convicted of any felony within the meaning of that phrase in the police pension statute).
as a guardian?

2. Expungement and the Sealing of the Felon’s Record

Another option, different than dismissal, is to have the record of the conviction expunged or sealed. Unlike the argument that dismissal or annulment makes the conviction as if it never happened, the effect under most state statutory schemes of an expungement is that it does not remove the conviction. An expungement is simply a request by the defendant seeking the court destroy or seal the records of the conviction; it does not absolve the conviction itself.

a. The Process of Obtaining Expunction or Sealing of Record of Conviction

If the felon is otherwise qualified to apply for an expungement of record, he may be

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90 The scope of this Article is limited to expunction or sealing of records of felony convictions; it does not address expunction or sealing of related records, such as arrest records.

91 “Expunge” means to erase or destroy, and to expunge a criminal conviction is to remove it from the record. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 621 (8th ed. 2004).

92 Some statutes use expunction and sealing interchangeably. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.3-1(2) (2005).

93 Most state guardianship statutes are silent about felony convictions, and say very little about annulled, dismissed, expunged or pardoned felonies or the effects of the mitigated conviction. What little reference is made in state statutes is inferred, i.e., "a guardian who is not a convicted and unpardoned felon (emphasis added). . ." ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-203(a) (West 2006); This seems to imply that a "pardoned" felon will be eligible to seek the appointment as a guardian. On the other hand, in the case of U.S. v. Rowlands, 451 F.3d 173 (3rd Cir. 2006), the general rule appears to be that when a defendant moves to "expunge" records, she asks that the court destroy or seal the records of the fact of the defendant's conviction, but she is not removing or vacating the conviction itself. See also U.S. v. Crowell, 374 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-907 (2006); LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts in the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 255 (2001).

required before requesting expungement from a court, to notify appropriate law enforcement or prosecutor agencies. Similar to the requirements for dismissal and annulment of the felony conviction, expungement may have significant impediments to the feasibility of receiving relief from the conviction. For example, as in Minnesota, if the defendant pleads guilty, he may not receive an expungement of records due to the guilty plea.

Additionally, expungement is typically a legislative prerogative, rather than a judicial decision. The expungement in most states is limited to a single incident of criminal

96 U.S. v. Rowlands, 451 F.3d 173 (3rd Cir.2006)(finding that a federal court has jurisdiction over petitions for expungement of criminal records in narrow circumstances: where the validity of the underlying criminal proceeding is challenged). See also Ex parte M.R.R., No. 07-05-0294-CV, 2006 WL 1547764 (Tex. Crim. App. June 7, 2006) (where the court was found to have no inherent or equitable power to expunge criminal records, but any authority was dependent upon expunction statutes); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01 (Vernon 2006). But see State v. A.C.H., 710 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that the district court has the authority to grant expungement of criminal records statutorily and through its inherent power); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.02 (West 2006).

97 See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609A.02 (3) (West 2006).

98 State v. L.W.J., No. A05-207, 2006 WL 1985491 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). See also State v. H.A., 716 N.W.2d 360 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006)(noting that a district court's authority to issue expungement orders affecting court records is limited to: (1) when the petitioner's constitutional rights may be seriously infringed by retention of petitioner's records; and (2) when a petitioner's constitutional rights are not involved, but the court determines that expungement will yield a benefit to the petitioner commensurate with the disadvantages to the public from the elimination of the record and the burden on the court in issuing, enforcing and monitoring an expungement order); Jones v. St. Louis County Police Dep’t, 133 S.W.3d 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that courts have limited power to equitably expunge records to cases involving illegal prosecution, acquittal, or extraordinary circumstances).

99 Toia v. People, 776 N.E.2d 599 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (stating an individual is eligible for expungement only where the legislature has authorized expungement). See also People v. Thon, 746 N.E.2d 1225 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (finding the Governor is constitutionally empowered to grant pardon, but the power to expunge is controlled by statute; an individual is eligible for expungement only where the legislature has authorized expungement); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT.
As in dismissals of felony convictions, certain convictions related to crimes, including sex offenses, domestic violence and other crimes of violence, are not eligible for expunction of the conviction record.

Another impediment on the ability of the proposed guardian to obtain an expungement is that the applicant for expunction may have to wait a certain period of time after final discharge related to the conviction before he is eligible to apply for an expungement, the logic being that the existence of pending criminal matters will also disqualify an applicant for expunction under some expunction statutes, as the felon would not be able to enjoy the expungement of the first felony, to in turn only be convicted of a subsequent felony.

Finally, a common sense restraint, if not expressed, at least implied, is that the expungement statutes also require a balancing approach and the weighing of the interests of the state against the interests of the applicant. Hence, like the dismissal of felony convictions,
expungement is not easily obtained, and there are many impediments to achieving the expungement.

b. The Effect of Expunction or Sealing upon Requirement to Report Conviction or Qualification for Guardian Status

Once the felon obtains the expungement, is he automatically eligible to serve as a judicially appointed guardian? The effects of an expunction may vary from state to state.\textsuperscript{105} In some states, the expunction of the felony means that the conviction must legally be treated as never having occurred.\textsuperscript{106} Other state statutes do not specify what effect expunction or sealing of the conviction has on the person’s ability to seek appointment as a guardian.\textsuperscript{107} If the felony is treated as having never happened, do the state’s guardianship statutes automatically allow the person to serve as a guardian if that is the only impediment to eligibility?

In the jurisdictions that treat expungements as procedures for sealing records only, arguably, an expungement will not make an otherwise disqualified guardian qualified since the expungement is only the sealing of the record, and not the erasing of the conviction.\textsuperscript{108} In certain jurisdictions, the felon’s conviction must not only be expunged in order to make him


\textsuperscript{106}\textsc{Ohio Rev. Code Ann.} \S 2953.32(C)(2) (West 2006) (treat as if conviction never occurred), \textsc{Ohio Rev. Code Ann.} \S 2953.33(B) (West 2006) (person restored to all rights and may generally not be questioned about conviction); \textsc{R.I. Gen. Laws} \S 12-1.3-4(b) (2005) (person may state that they have never been convicted); \textsc{State v. Davisson}, 624 N.W.2d 292 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (finding of guilty is equivalent to a plea of guilty for purposes of expungement); \textsc{Minn. Stat. Ann.} \S 609.02, subd. 5, 609A.02 et seq (West 2006).


\textsuperscript{108}\textsc{U.S. v. Crowell}, 374 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2004).
eligible to act as guardian, but he will need to have his "citizenship" rights restored too.  

The more difficult question is whether the guardian applicant has to disclose the "expunged" conviction on his guardianship application in order to show good faith and candor before the court?

3. **Obtaining a Pardon from the Felony Conviction**

The governors or panels within the executive branches of the various states have the power to fully or partially pardon those convicted of felonies. Pardon is an executive act reserved for the governor or some other agency in the executive branch. Application must usually be made to the governor, a board, or a commission. Many states grant the pardoning power through statutes, while other states argue it’s a decision that may be made in conjunction with the courts after balancing the interests of society and law enforcement’s

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109 State v. Hanes, 137 Idaho 40, 44 P.3d 295 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002)(defendant's conviction resulted in the loss of the defendant's civil rights because of the operation of Article VI, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution. A defendant who has been convicted must seek the expungement of his conviction , which is an extraordinary remedy, and is denied to probationers who have been adjudicated to be in violation of the terms of their probation. Section 3.disqualifies persons from acting as guardians who been convicted of a felony, and have not been restored to the rights of citizenship. When the court withholds the imposition of judgment and places the defendant on probation, the defendant has not lost his rights of citizenship under Article VI, Section 3 because the defendant has not been convicted of a felony. It is clear that upon completion of probation the suspension of the defendant's civil rights is lifted and the defendant is automatically "restored to the full rights of citizenship" upon satisfactory completion of probation).


112 *See, e.g.,* ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-607(b)(1) (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 940.03 (West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-10-1 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.885(1) (West 2006).
need for the information.\textsuperscript{113} The typical statutory scheme that allows for the consideration of a pardon requires the felon's rehabilitation,\textsuperscript{114} a waiting period,\textsuperscript{115} and the pardon to be in harmony with Constitutional law.\textsuperscript{116}

a. The Process of obtaining a Pardon

The process generally used in obtaining a pardon requires the felon to provide notice to the victims and the prosecuting and law enforcement agencies that obtained the conviction.\textsuperscript{117} Because pardons are usually exclusively executive decisions, the executive

\textsuperscript{113}U.S. v. Sutton, 521 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1975)(holding that "...Congress has the power to accord a state pardon differing in effects that are in differing contexts, depending on its objectives in creating the disqualification. Neither the inherent nature of a pardon nor full faith and credit require that a state pardon automatically relieve federal disabilities." in Thrall v. Wolfe, 503 F.2d 313, 316 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S.Ct. 1392, 1(975)).

\textsuperscript{114}Alan Ellis & Peter J. Scherr, Federal Felony Conviction, Collateral Civil Disabilities, 11 CRIM. JUST. 42 (Fall 1996). See also People v. Ansell, 108 Cal. Rptr.2d 145 (2001); Dixon v. McMullen, 527 F.Supp. 711 (N.D. Tex. 1981)(noting that a pardon implies guilt, Texas courts may forgive, but they do not forget, the fact is not obliterated and there is no "wash").


\textsuperscript{116}Barbour v. Democratic Executive Comm.of Crawford County, 269 S.E.2d 433 (Ga. 1980). See also People v. Ansell, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 (2001) (rejecting the suggestion that absent section 4852.01(d), a certificate of rehabilitation was necessarily available to any convicted felon who claimed to meet the minimum statutory requirements and was otherwise eligible to apply, and stating that under the California procedure, the superior court conducts a thorough inquiry into the applicant's conduct and character from the time of the underlying crimes through the time of the certificate of rehabilitation proceeding and affirms that the standards for determining whether rehabilitation has occurred are high. The decision whether to grant relief based on the evidence is discretionary in nature.); William J. Violet, Presidential [sic] Pardo Relief and its Relationship to Federal Firearm Disability, 77 N.D. L. REV. 419, 420 (2001).

\textsuperscript{117}See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-607(b)(1) (West 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §9.94A.885(1) (West 2006).
branch may be vested with the complete discretion of granting or denying the request.\footnote{118}{J. C. W., \textit{Pardon as Affecting Previous Offenses or Punishment Therefor}, 57 A.L.R. 443 (1928).} If the decision is purely under the control of the executive branch, the determination may turn on political considerations rather than on the merits.\footnote{119}{See \textit{Plemmons, “Lobbying Activities” and Presidential Pardons: Will Legislators’ Efforts to Amend the LDA Lead to Increasingly Hard-Lined Jurisprudence?}, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 131, 148-49 (2003) (discussing President Clinton’s pardon of Marc Rich after extensive lobbying by Rich’s wife).}

\textbf{b. The Legal Effect of a Pardon}

Because a pardon does not consummate in a finding of absence of guilt, a pardon does not necessarily erase a conviction.\footnote{120}{See generally Gary L. Hall, \textit{Pardon as Restoring Public Office or License or Eligibility Therefore}, 58 A.L.R.3d 1191 (1974 and Supp.). \textit{See also}, U.S. v. Matassini, 565 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1978). In \textit{Fields v. State}, 85 So.2d 609, 610-11 (Fla. 1956), the court squarely held that a felony conviction for which the offender has received a full and unconditional pardon cannot be counted as a prior felony conviction under the provisions of our habitual offender laws. . . The court was careful to note, however, that its opinion did not preclude the legislature from making pardoned convictions the basis for punishment under habitual offender statutes. Rather, the court stated that inasmuch as the Legislature did not expressly include pardoned convictions in the Act, it is taken as evidencing an intention on the part of the Legislature of this State that pardoned convictions not be counted as prior "live" felony convictions. See R.J.L. v. State, 887 So.2d 1268, 1281 (Fla. 2004) (“While a pardon removes the legal consequences of a crime, it does not remove the historical fact that the conviction occurred; a pardon does not mean that the conviction is gone.”). \textit{See also} Laura Dietz, et al., \textit{Effect of Pardon, Commutation, or Probation}, 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 882 (2006).}

A pardon may, however, make an individual eligible for expunction of records of convictions\footnote{122}{See, \textit{e.g.}, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605(a) (West 2006).} or restore that person to the same rights as if the conviction had not
occurred. If they are available, as in the discussion above under expungement of records, certain states may find the pardoned felon eligible to serve as a guardian, while others will not.

4. Summary for the Mitigation of the Conviction

Although the above remedies are options that may be explored in jurisdictions where a past felony conviction will either disqualify a person from serving as a guardian or must be considered by the appointing court, review of the authority allowing these procedures shows the potential mitigations to be of limited application and utility.

Pursuing a dismissal, expunction or pardon may not be a feasible option to many. The possibility of actually obtaining the dismissal, expunction or pardon is questionable, as these are extraordinary remedies in most states. The remedy may require legislative

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123 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 940.05 (West 2006). See also People v. Ansell, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 (2001) (California Section 4853 states, in pertinent part, "In all cases in which a full pardon has been granted by the Governor of this state . . .shall operate to restore to the convicted person, all the rights, privileges, and franchises of which he or she has been deprived in consequence of that conviction or by reason of any matter involved therein."). Note, however, that CAL. PENAL CODE § 4852.15 (West 2006) provides that a certificate of rehabilitation does not compel reinstatement of any license, permit, or certificate needed "to practice or carry on any profession or occupation," including the practice of medicine or law).

124 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605(c) (West 2006) (no expunction of records of conviction where victim under age 18, for sex offenses, or for offenses resulting in death or serious injury).

125 Supra. generally.

126 State v. Tumblin, 868 So.2d 902 (5th Cir. 2004)(holding the trial court was not authorized to expunge defendant's felony conviction since his sentence was "imposed," not deferred, and thus, he was not eligible to have his sentence dismissed, which was a prerequisite to expungement); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:9(E)(1)(b) (2006).

approval under statutory authority,\(^{128}\) and may be required to be pursued in the state where the conviction was entered, which may be different than the current residence of the potential guardian and the state where the guardianship is sought.\(^{129}\) Finally, even if relief is obtained through one of the remedies, it is not a guarantee that the probate court will view the dismissed, expunged or pardoned felony as removing the barriers to appointment, since the act of expungement or pardoning does not remove the conviction; rather, the defendant is seeking that the court destroy or seal the records of the conviction and not the conviction itself.\(^{130}\)

Despite the potential remedies a felon may attempt to pursue, taking into consideration whether the felon possesses the resources to pay the legal costs of seeking said remedies, to become an eligible guardian, the feasibility of using the alternatives of dismissal, annulment, expungement, sealing, or pardon are not realistic to the general

\(^{128}\)United States v Salleh, 863 F Supp. 283 (E.D. Va. 1994) (finding that Virginia did not have a statutory basis for allowing the expungement of the felony records and it did not find other circumstances warranting such relief).

\(^{129}\)See generally Vitauts M. Gulbis, Judicial Expunction of Criminal Record of Convicted Adult, 11 A.L.R.4th 956 (1982). See also United States v Noonan, 906 F2d 952 (3rd Cir. 1990) (Even though the defendant had received a presidential pardon, he was not entitled to expunction of his court records relating to his conviction, since the court found that any attempt by the President to pardon the defendant and to compel expunction of the judicial records would violate the separation of powers doctrine. The court also found that the presidential pardon would not eradicate a defendant's guilt so as to justify expunction of his criminal record.)

\(^{130}\)Most state guardianship statutes are silent about felony convictions, and say very little about annulled, dismissed, expunged or pardoned felonies or the effects of the mitigated conviction. What little reference is made in state statutes is inferred, i.e., "a guardian who is not a convicted and unpardoned felon (emphasis added) . . . " ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-203(a)(West 2006). This seems to imply that a "pardoned" felon will be eligible to seek the appointment as a guardian. On the other hand, in the case of U.S. v. Rowlands, 451 F.3d 173 (3rd Cir. 2006), the general rule is that "expunged" records, do not remove or vacate the conviction itself; U.S. v. Crowell, 374 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2004); ARIZ REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-907 (2006); LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts in the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 255 (2001).
population. This is especially significant to the indigent and vulnerable groups. Hence, groups, such as those with a higher percentage of felonies, and/or the impoverished, may need to seek other, more affordable alternatives. What other alternatives may be available? Hopefully, if the ward was competent at some point of his or her life, he or she executed a “durable” power of attorney.

**B. Seeking Alternatives to Guardianship: The Durable Power of Attorney**

Many states, under statute, allow a person who possesses capacity ("the prospective ward" or "the principal") the ability to chose a person to make temporal decisions for them under a power of attorney ("the attorney-in-fact"). Generally, the attorney-in-fact, as an agent, acts on behalf of the principal to accomplish the principal’s purposes. The agent's authority and ability to act is limited to what the principal may undertake. If the principal is unable to act due to incapacity, under a “general power of attorney,” the agent's ability to act is likewise restrained.

Many states, however, have expanded the ability of the agent to act, and therefore, not only allow a general power of attorney, but provide for a specialized power of attorney that is “durable." The “durability" of a durable power of attorney enhances a general power of attorney and allows the agent of the principal to continue acting in the principal's name.

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131 See infra Table in Appendix A.


even in the situation where the principal has subsequently become incapacitated and unable to make important decisions.\textsuperscript{135}

Since a validly executed durable power of attorney allows the agent to continue acting on the principal's behalf after the principal becomes incapacitated, the written grant of authority is a substitute for appointing a guardian under guardianship statutes.\textsuperscript{136} The durable power of attorney, if valid, is an exceptional alternative to a guardianship in most situations. As discussed below, however, there is an increased ability by dishonest attorney-in-facts to exploit the agency authorization given under a durable power of attorney.

1. Advantages of a Durable Power of Attorney over a Guardianship Appointment

The durable power of attorney has many advantages over a guardianship, including the ability of the agent to act quickly and without pre-judicial scrutiny.\textsuperscript{137} The significant impediments to the utilization of the durable powers of attorney tend to originate from the financial and brokerage institutions' reluctance to honor the agency, and not due to limitations on its use through statutes, common law or inadequate drafting.\textsuperscript{138} Due to the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{135}Anne E. Meley, Powers of Attorney 3 AM JUR 2D Agency § 26 (May 2006); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5604(b) (West 2006).
\item \textsuperscript{137}Robert Craig Waters, Florida Durable Power of Attorney Law: The Need For Reform, 17 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 519, 522-23 (Spring 1990).
\end{itemize}
advantages of expediency, the use of the durable power of attorney is also subject to a greater risk of abuse and exploitation by the agent than in a traditional guardianship that is supervised by the court.  

One advantage of a written power of attorney is that the principal or ward decides, while having capacity, who will be the principal's surrogate decision-maker rather than said decision being made after incapacity by a statute or a court. In contrast, a petition for the appointment of a guardian places the duty to make the decision of appointing an agent on the judicial body pursuant to a petition and statutory requirements rather than at the principal's discretion. The court accepts evidence and makes a determination of who should be the guardian based on statutory prerequisites. Furthermore, state statutes may establish the priority of surrogate decision makers, and such a person appointed under a statutory priority may not be the principal's first choice. Another advantage of a durable power of attorney is that it is not subject to the regular and statutorily required judicial review that a court

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140 Elaine Hightower Gagliardi, Estate Planning Goals, 3-36 MODERN ESTATE PLANNING § 36.15 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2006).


appointed guardian is subject to. Most state statutes require the guardian to prepare an inventory and to make an appearance or an accounting on an annual basis.

Additionally, the agent under a power of attorney is typically not required to provide accountings or reporting of the disposition of the principal's assets. In contrast, a guardian is under a statutory duty to make such reportings, obtain prior court approval before dissipating assets, and to possibly post a bond. Furthermore, the attorney-in-fact has more discretion to make decisions quickly, and also on matters that a guardian may not be allowed to make, due to court supervision and statutory restraints. Typically, guardianships are more restricted and receive more scrutiny from the courts as compared to an attorney-in-fact acting independently of the judiciary's observations.

2. The Risks Inherent in a Durable Power of Attorney

Perhaps at the risk of stating the obvious, the disadvantage of a durable power of attorney is that the agent may more easily abuse or exploit the principal since the agent under a power of attorney may act quickly, with less statutory restraints, and without judicial review. As a result, the temptation and opportunity to exploit and abuse the principal and


145 Id.

146 FLA STAT. ANN. § 744.3215(4), 744.3725 (West 2006).


the principal's assets are more accessible.

3. **Distinguishing Characteristics**

In most, if not all jurisdictions in the United States, the guardianship is commenced when the proposed guardian initiates the proceedings with a petition.\textsuperscript{149} The potential guardian provides personal information with the petition for the court to consider before appointing the applicant as the guardian.\textsuperscript{150} The petition may inquire as to the guardian's fitness, including whether the guardian has been convicted of a felony.\textsuperscript{151}

One of the most significant differences between a court appointed guardian and an attorney in fact selected by the principal is that when choosing a surrogate decision maker, the principal will generally not do a “background” check, or require an application prerequisite for the selection of the attorney-in-fact.\textsuperscript{152} Anyone who qualifies under the power of attorney statutes may serve as an attorney-in-fact, regardless of their criminal history.\textsuperscript{153} Such process is not typical for a guardianship appointment.\textsuperscript{154}

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\textsuperscript{149}See generally infra. Appendix A.


\textsuperscript{151}See infra Appendix A.

\textsuperscript{152}Id.

\textsuperscript{153}The statutes are generally silent on whether a criminal may be an attorney-in-fact, but have instead adopted a "best interest of the principal requirement" as consistent with the fiduciary duties that courts have historically imposed on attorneys-in-fact. "[A] power of attorney ... is clearly given with the intent that the attorney-in-fact will utilize that power for the benefit of the principal." Mantella v. Mantella, 268 A.D.2d 852 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). Because "[t]he relationship of an attorney-in-fact to his principal is that of agent and principal, ... the attorney-in-fact must act in the utmost good faith and undivided loyalty toward the principal, and must act in accordance with the highest principles of morality, fidelity, loyalty and fair dealing." Semmler v. Naples, 166 A.D.2d 751 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).

\textsuperscript{154}Bailey v. Maxwell, No. CA 05-700, 2006 WL 476982 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that the appellant had not shown that she was qualified to serve as guardian because she offered
The durable power of attorney is also problematic in many situations since it may not be feasible for the ward to have prepared the document. In certain instances, it is not available, like when the ward has not enjoyed capacity, or when the power of attorney was not timely executed before incapacity. Again, the classes most affected and impacted are the indigent, because of their lack of financial resources to have such instruments prepared, and those who do not have capacity to prepare the document, i.e., those with marginal capacity.

In such cases where powers of attorney are not executed, and the ward does not have an estate, it may be difficult to exercise the guardianship alternative. If the proposed guardian, frequently a family member, has a felony conviction, in certain states, the ward may be denied adequate choices of substitute decision-makers.

When the power of attorney is not a feasible alternative, and assuming that being

155 VALERIE J. BRADLEY & NANCY SULLIVAN, THE FORGOTTEN GENERATION-1999 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION 4 (1999)("The fact that access to specialized mental retardation/developmental disabilities services remain so very inadequate for individuals with lifelong disabilities who live in lower socioeconomic households--which includes disproportionately people from racial and ethnic minorities--can be traced to assumption in the 1960s about conquering the social ills of poverty.")

156 Id. at 15. "However, this older generation remains vulnerable to poverty, often not being able to afford adequate health care just when health needs increase dramatically. . . .With the current anti-welfare mentality, people with mild developmental disabilities are most vulnerable to being abandoned by governmental agencies that search for less inclusive definitions of what constitutes need. How many people fall into this hidden population? the truth is that we have no idea. . . . without action, the situation will continue."

157 Alison Patrucco Barnes, Beyond Guardianship Reform: A reevaluation of Autonomy and Beneficence for a System of Principled Decision-Making in Long Term Care, 41 EMORY L. J. (Summer 1992)("With unpaid proxies, however, there is seldom anyone willing to undertake the task.")

158 Florida has an absolute ban for appointing a felon as a guardian, regardless of the circumstances.
appointed the guardian was accomplishable, if the guardian relocates the ward, and transfers
the guardianship matter, it is questionable whether the courts in the forum jurisdiction will
exercise full faith and credit of prior adjudications of incapacity and the appointment of a
guardian. Certain states, some of which contain high concentrations of our elderly
population, may choose the alternative that denies felons the right to be guardians under any
circumstances. Which alternative is best suited for an aging population or the indigent ward?

III. Should Legislation be Uniform Among the States?

A. Generally

In response to the lack of consistency in the implementation of statutory guardianship
schemes among the states, federal legislators and independent organizations have created and
promoted various uniform guardianship models and standards in an attempt to bring
consistency among the different guardianship statutes.159 Although not binding or
mandatory, they serve as guides for state legislatures and encourage uniform application
among the states.160 In all cases, the uniform schemes that have been presented are
insufficient as they do not provide for judicial discretion when determining whether the
appointment of the guardian is in the ward's best interest. The states' statutory regiments are
inconsistently applied and each state ranges from little or no consideration of the felony to
complete restraints against the felon's eligibility to serve as a guardian.

1. Uniform Standards

Although all fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted guardianship

http://www.guardianship.org/ See also Symposium, Creating the “Portable”
Guardianship: Legal and Practical Implications of Probate Court Cooperation in Interstate

160 Legal Encyclopedia, Uniform Probate Code, http://www.answers.com/topic/uniform-
probate-code (last visited Aug. 17, 2006).
statutes, most states have been reluctant in adopting a national uniform standard.\textsuperscript{161} For example, currently only eighteen of the fifty states have adopted the Uniform Probate Code ("UPC"), while the majority have adopted statutes inconsistent with other states' statutory schemes.\textsuperscript{162}

This article does not discuss the tensions that inherently exist between the federal system and its interaction with the states’ sovereignty, but it is not unusual for states to adopt uniform laws and adapt them to the state's individual needs.\textsuperscript{163} If a uniform statutory scheme has not been adopted, or if the “uniformity” fails to address particular issues, such as whether felons may be eligible guardians, will forum states give deference to a foreign state’s judgments and decrees under the United States Constitution or other legislative provisions?

2. Full Faith and Credit

The question remains, to what extent must the forum state honor a prior guardianship order where a guardianship has already been established in one state and the ward moves to a different jurisdiction?\textsuperscript{164} Jurisdictions appear to provide different levels of full faith and credit\textsuperscript{165} when honoring and giving deference to the enforcement of the foreign jurisdiction’s

\textsuperscript{161}See infra Table in Appendix A.


\textsuperscript{163}For example, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Uniform Probate Code and the Uniform Guardianship and Protective Placement Act. See infra Table in Appendix A.

\textsuperscript{164}Anne M. H. Foley, \textit{Collateral Attack}, 39 AM. JUR. 2D Guardian and Ward § 74 (2006)("...the appointment of a guardian cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding, (cites omitted) unless the proceedings show upon their face that the court was without jurisdiction to make the order of appointment. (cites omitted)). Thus, the title of the guardian cannot be collaterally attacked because of mere irregularities in the appointment or in the underlying proceedings. Board of Children's Guardians of Marion County v. Shutter, 34 N.E. 665 (Ind. 1893).

\textsuperscript{165} Symposium, \textit{Creating the “Portable” Guardianship: Legal and Practical Implications of Probate Court Cooperation in Interstate Guardianship Cases}, 13 QUINNIPIAC. PROB. L. J. 351,
order. Some states appear to honor the foreign judgment *carte blanche*, while other jurisdictions enforce the foreign judgment with conditions and considerations of the forum state’s guardianship requirements.

a. Full Credit

In the case of *Pulley v. Sandgren*,166 Bryan Pulley had been living with his father, Mr. Pulley in Boonville, Missouri when, in November 1993, at age seventeen, Bryan was involved in a serious automobile accident and suffered a permanent brain injury.167 A few weeks after the accident, Bryan moved to Michigan with his mother, Mrs. Sandgren, to allow Bryan to be eligible for medical rehabilitation treatments in Michigan.168 In 1994, the Michigan probate court appointed Mrs. Sandgren as Bryan's guardian following his eighteenth birthday. Bryan continued to live with his mother for several years and she served as the payee for Bryan’s social security benefits.169

In 1998, Mrs. Sandgren and Bryan moved to Virginia. In Virginia, Mrs. Sandgren was unhappy with Bryan's rehabilitative progress, and thereafter, Bryan returned to live with Mr. Pulley in Missouri. In October 2003, Mr. Pulley petitioned the Missouri court to register the foreign Michigan guardianship order, and the guardianship case was transferred to Missouri on August 24, 2004.170 On December 9, 2004, the Missouri court entered a

fn12 (1999).


167 Id. at *1.

168 Id. at *1.

169 Id.

170 Id.
judgment that removed Mrs. Sandgren as Bryan's guardian and the court appointed Mr. Pulley as Bryan's successor guardian. Mrs. Sandgren appealed Mr. Pulley's appointment in the Missouri court.\textsuperscript{171}

The Missouri Court of Appeals held that the trial court was obligated to give full faith and credit to the Michigan order that had appointed Mrs. Sandgren as Bryan's guardian.\textsuperscript{172} Generally, in Missouri, and similar jurisdictions, the states interpret the United States Constitution, Article 4, § 1, as making it mandatory for the forum jurisdiction to give full faith and credit to a foreign state’s guardianship orders, absent allegations of fraud or the foreign jurisdiction’s lack of personal or subject-matter jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{173}

The Missouri court not only gave the Michigan order deference, but held that with respect to a foreign order or judgment, the courts in Missouri must presume that the foreign court had jurisdiction and that it rendered a valid judgment in accordance with its laws.\textsuperscript{174}

In such jurisdictions, as Missouri, that provide complete deference to the foreign jurisdiction’s orders and decrees, the forum state is precluded from making any inquiry into the merits of the underlying case, but is instead, required to accept the order “free from questioning the logic or consistency of the decision, or the validity of the legal principles

\textsuperscript{171}Id.

\textsuperscript{172}FLA. STAT. ANN. §§744.306, 744.308 (West 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §764-A:44 (2006); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §881 (Vernon 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-11-117(b)(1) (West 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-1-12(a) (West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS, §29A-5-114 (2006); MO. ANN. STAT. §475.055(3) (West 2006).

\textsuperscript{173}Pulley v. Sandgren, No. WD 64966, 2006 WL 1222734 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). See also 4 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2006) (Missouri courts are obligated to give full faith and credit to a foreign state's judicial proceedings unless the order or judgment was obtained by fraud or was void for lack of jurisdiction.).

upon which it is based.”

Arguably, if a foreign jurisdiction allowed a felon to be appointed as a guardian, and the guardian then relocated to the State of Missouri, the Missouri courts would not question the guardian’s eligibility or appointment under Missouri’s standards, absent allegations of fraud or lack of jurisdiction. One may question whether without an uniform application of guardianship laws, such a policy is always in the best interest of the ward or whether such a policy encourages forum shopping.

b. Partial Credit

Yet, how much deference must the forum court allow? In the case of In re Guardianship of Replogle, Elizabeth Replogle, the ward, a 41-year-old developmentally challenged adult, resided in Indiana for most of her life. Elizabeth’s mother, Ms. Zierer, had been appointed Elizabeth’s guardian under an Indiana guardianship order. After the appointment as guardian, Ms. Zierer moved Elizabeth to Ohio. Several years later, in January 2004, Elizabeth’s sister, Nancy Smith, filed a petition in the Indiana court seeking to have Zierer removed as Elizabeth's guardian. Ms. Smith’s petition alleged that Ms. Zierer abused Elizabeth, and Elizabeth was moved to a nursing home facility in Ohio without notice to, or approval of, the Indiana court.

Following Elizabeth Replogle's removal to Ohio, proceedings were initiated in Indiana seeking her return to that state. On May 25, 2004, the Indiana court, after holding a

\[175\] Id.


\[177\] Id.

\[178\] Id.
hearing, entered an order requiring Ms. Zierer to return Elizabeth to Indiana. Immediately thereafter, Jennie Lee Clark filed the guardianship action in Ohio. Clark asked the court to appoint her as Elizabeth’s guardian.\(^{179}\) The court appointed Clark as the emergency guardian of Elizabeth for a limited time. Ms. Smith then filed a motion with the Ohio court, seeking to have the court give full faith and credit to the Indiana guardianship and seeking the termination of the Ohio guardianship. The Ohio trial court, pursuant to Ms. Smith’s request, entered an order terminating the Ohio guardianship.\(^{180}\)

On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, despite the fact that the Indiana guardianship order could be modified in Indiana, Ohio was not required to give the foreign judgment more preclusive effect than would be consistent under Ohio law.\(^{181}\) Hence, in Ohio, the full faith and credit clause did not require the Ohio court to give the Indiana order carte blanche deference and enforcement, but the Ohio court required the full faith and credit deference in enforcing the Indiana order with no more preclusive effect than the order would have had in Ohio.\(^{182}\)

Consider further the case of *Teresa L. v. Sauk County*,\(^ {183}\) where the Wisconsin court

\(^{179}\) *Id.* at 332-333.

\(^{180}\) *Id.* at 333.

\(^{181}\) *Id.* at 334 (Smith argued that the trial court was required to give preclusive effect to the Indiana judgment under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Section 1, Article IV of the United States Constitution. The court found that the forum state was not required under the Clause to give the foreign judgment more preclusive effect than it would have in the rendering state.); Kovacs v. Brewer (1958), 356 U.S. 604 (1958) (because a guardianship order is obviously modifiable in the rendering state, it is necessarily modifiable in the forum state).


found that the judiciary may modify a foreign order appointing a guardian despite the full faith and credit clause.\textsuperscript{184} Teresa and Jimmie were divorced in the summer of 1992, and in January 1993, Jimmie was hospitalized in Miami after an accident. The Guardianship Program for Dade County, Florida, was appointed as Jimmie’s guardian.\textsuperscript{185} On October 6, 1993, Teresa petitioned the Wisconsin Circuit Court to appoint her guardian of Jimmie's person and estate. Sauk County gave notice that it would move to dismiss Teresa's petitions for lack of venue in that Jimmie was not a resident of or physically present in Sauk County, Wisconsin. However, before the hearing was held Teresa transported Jimmie to Wisconsin.

On October 20, 1993, the Wisconsin circuit court directed Teresa to transport Jimmie back to Florida. It dismissed Teresa's petitions after finding that Jimmie was not a resident of Wisconsin, and held that the Wisconsin circuit court was required give full faith and credit to the factual findings of the Florida court. The next day, Teresa moved the Wisconsin circuit court to grant her petition for guardianship on the alternative statutory ground that Jimmie was in Wisconsin under extraordinary circumstances requiring medical aid or the prevention of harm to his person.\textsuperscript{186}

The Wisconsin court found that Teresa was legally capable of discharging her duties as established by the court in Florida. The court held that the Wisconsin circuit court erred in its application of the full faith and credit clause when it treated as binding the Florida court's finding that Jimmie resided in Miami. The court found that the error was one of law and resulted in the erroneous exercise of the Wisconsin circuit court's discretion. The Wisconsin appellate court found that the trial court was not required to extend full faith and

\textsuperscript{184}FLORIDA STAT. ANN. §§ 744.467 and 744.474 (West 2006).

\textsuperscript{185}Teresa L. v. Sauk County, 514 N.W.2d. at 425.

\textsuperscript{186}Id.
credit to the Florida order since a "judgment has no constitutional claim to a more conclusive effect in the state of the forum than it has in the state where rendered." Hence, the Wisconsin court was not required to give the Florida order full faith and credit without scrutiny from the forum court. Under scrutiny, the Wisconsin court found that "the State of the forum has at least as much leeway to disregard the judgment, to qualify it, or to depart from it as does the State where it was rendered."\textsuperscript{187}

Since a Florida court could modify an order appointing a guardian (in that the guardian may resign or be removed), the Wisconsin court did not have to honor the Florida guardianship order with full faith and credit in this situation. Consequently, the court held that the state may ignore the residency findings in the Florida order without offending the full faith and credit clause.\textsuperscript{188}

By limiting the deference given to foreign judgments, arguably, if felons could serve as guardians in Indiana, the Ohio court may not be required to give the foreign decree carte

\textsuperscript{187}Consider also In re Kassler, 19 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1940). New York does not require recognition of the foreign guardianship under full faith and credit, in that foreign guardians can not assert authority outside of the jurisdiction governing the appointment of the foreign state. Note, that in New York, the guardian may apply for authority through an ancillary proceeding to act as a guardian within the State of New York pursuant to a foreign decree or order.

\textsuperscript{188}State ex re.l Kern v. Kern, 116 N.W.2d 337, 340 (Wis. 1962). See also, In re Erhardt, 27 A.D.2d 836, (N.Y.App. Div. 1967) (children were in the custody of both the paternal grandparents and the paternal aunt. The New York court found that the paternal grandmother maintained lawful custody of the children under New York law and that while the paternal aunt argued that the Federal Constitution required that full faith and credit be given to a Florida custody and guardianship order, the New York court found that at the time of the entry of the Florida order, that the children's aunt did not have lawful custody and that she had not been appointed their guardian by the New York court. Hence, the trial court held that the Constitution did not require the extension of full faith and credit to either the Florida guardianship or custody order since the aunt was not in legal custody of the children when the Florida court entered the order); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, \textit{Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees: Law and Reason v. the Restatement}, 51 Mich.L.Rev. 345, 346 (1953); Morgan v. Potter, 157 U.S. 195 (1895); Bachman v. Mejias, 136 N.E.2d 866 (N.Y, 1956); New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
deference in the guardian’s appointment. On the other hand, could the felon-guardian arguably serve in Ohio, even if Ohio otherwise objected to felons serving as guardians since it would be more “preclusive” than the Indiana eligibility requirements for the appointment of a guardian? The question that still remains is, "how much deference must a forum state give to a foreign jurisdiction's orders and decrees?"

**c. Comity**

As noted in the *Replogle* case, not all jurisdictions provide full faith and credit automatically without a level of review in the forum jurisdiction. If the court limits full faith and credit, or if full faith and credit is not applicable, will the forum court give deference to the foreign jurisdiction's orders under principles of comity? The decision of whether to extend comity may be discretionary, with the ward’s “best interest,” being considered.189

In the *Hilkmann v. Hilkmann* case, the court explored the concept of “comity” in deciding whether to extend deference to a foreign court’s guardianship order.190 On July 14, 1999, Leila Hilkmann filed a guardianship petition with the Israeli family court to become

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189 *Guardianship of Enos*, 670 N.E.2d 967 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (the Massachusetts court enforced a Florida guardianship order after daughter removed her 90 year old incapacitated mother to Massachusetts in violation of the Florida decree. The court acknowledged that some states have declined to give full faith and credit to guardianship decisions issued by other states, but noted that "Massachusetts courts have declined to give another jurisdiction's valid guardianship order full faith and credit only when the best interest of the ward required otherwise). Woodworth v. Spring, 4 Allen 321, 325 (Mass. 1862) (Hence, the Massachusetts court declined to grant habeas corpus writ to the daughter, which allowed Florida to continue with enforcing criminal charges against the daughter in Florida, when the guardian failed to proffer a reason not to accord the Florida orders full faith and credit. The court considered the ward’s best interest, and despite the fact that Florida had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction, that it was the more convenient forum, that all of the potential witnesses resided in Florida, and that the guardian had submitted herself to that jurisdiction, the paramount consideration was the well-being of the ward, and whether travel would be an unacceptable risk to her).

the guardian of her son, Daniel. The mother attached a medical opinion by the son’s pediatrician to the guardianship petition that gave an opinion of Daniel's mental incapacity. On October 27, 1999, the Israeli family court temporarily appointed Ms. Hilkmann the guardian for six months. The father, Dirk H. Hilkmann, received the mother's petition but failed to immediately respond. The Israeli court, after noting Mr. Hilkmann’s failure to respond, found Daniel incapacitated and recommended that Mrs. Hilkmann be appointed Daniel's permanent legal guardian.\footnote{Id. at 60-62.} Subsequently, Mr. Hilkmann responded on February 8, 2000, protesting the Israeli court's grant of permanent guardianship.

In July 2000, the Hilkmann children flew to the United States to see their father for a previously scheduled visit. While Daniel’s sister returned to Israel, Daniel remained with his father. In August, Mr. Hilkmann enrolled Daniel in a local community college program for persons with special needs and on September 5, 2000, Mrs. Hilkmann registered the Israeli guardianship order in a Pennsylvania court. Additionally, she filed a petition requesting that Pennsylvania enforce the Israeli guardianship order by forcing Daniel to return with her to Israel.

The Pennsylvania appellate court considered whether the trial court satisfied due process rights by enforcing the Israeli foreign guardianship order without making an independent evaluation of the subject of the order or receiving evidence to support the Israeli order. The Pennsylvania court found the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution was inapplicable to a foreign country's decree.\footnote{Id. at 64-65.} Despite not apply full faith and credit, the Pennsylvania court considered whether the principle of comity supported its enforcement of a foreign guardianship when the court did not have statutory (or other
authority) to give deference to the Israeli order. The court noted that the Israeli order was not tainted by fraud, that it would not outrage the court's sense of justice, and it was not obtained for the purpose of contravening the state’s laws or public policy, when it considered its enforcement.\textsuperscript{193}

Mr. Hilkmann disputed that the Israeli court correctly found his son to be "incompetent." He argued that the Israeli court's reliance upon the common law principle of mental competency was limited to that local jurisdiction, and should not to be extended by full faith and credit. Mrs. Hilkmann, on the other hand, argued that the court should give deference to the Israeli order under the principle of comity.\textsuperscript{194}

The court considered that comity had been extended to non-guardianship matters when domesticating foreign money judgments, enforcing sentences imposed by other sovereigns, and accepting foreign adoptions. Nonetheless, the appellate court found that the trial court abused its discretion when it violated Pennsylvania’s public policy and the court’s sense of justice in this case. The Pennsylvania court was concerned that the trial court's "decision would establish a precedent whereby any foreign citizen could enforce any guardianship decree and commensurate finding of incompetency, regardless of the manner in which it was issued."\textsuperscript{195} The Pennsylvania court did not extend carte blanc deference under principles of comity, but it looked behind the foreign judgment and exercised its "sideline quarter-backing" and discretion. The Pennsylvania court was concerned that the Israeli court failed to hear sufficient evidence of Daniel’s competency and that Daniel's interests were not

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{193} \textit{Id.}
\item\textsuperscript{194} \textit{Id.}
\item\textsuperscript{195} \textit{Id.} at 247.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
represented at the Israeli proceeding by a guardian ad litem. Therefore, deference was not given under principles of comity.

Had the circumstances been different in the foreign jurisdiction, would a sister state enforce the foreign order under principles of comity? Arguably, the courts may extend comity; however, generally the courts more closely scrutinize a foreign order under principles of comity than they might under full faith and credit.196

Likewise, in the case of *Kulekowskis v. DiLeonardi*,197 the court found that there was an element of discretion when determining whether to grant comity to a foreign judgment.

Anthony DeSilva and Tammy Lynn Wright ("Tammy") were married in October 1986, and bought a home together in Winnipeg, Canada.198 In December 1987, DeSilva and Tammy were involved in a serious automobile accident in Illinois, and although Tammy survived, she was left a quadriplegic with permanent and extensive brain damage. On March 24, 1988, despite Tammy’s parent’s (Mr. and Mrs. Wright) objections, the Illinois court appointed Mr. DeSilva as sole guardian of his wife's estate and person with no restrictions.199

In July 1989, Mr. DeSilva transferred Tammy back to their home in Winnipeg, Canada so she could receive the socialized health care services for which she was eligible.200 After the move, and without Mrs. Wright’s approval, Mr. DeSilva took Tammy to Chicago for further testing. After Mrs. Wright’s failed attempt to keep Tammy in the United States,
her attorney represented to the Winnipeg Police Department that Tammy's husband had kidnapped Tammy from her home in Winnipeg. The attorney did not inform the Winnipeg Police Department of Mr. DeSilva's legal guardianship over Tammy. The Winnipeg Police Department arranged for Mr. DeSilva and his companions to be stopped at the border by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Ontario Provincial Police, on Mr. DeSilva’s way back to the United States.

The Canadian police stopped Mr. DeSilva and his companions at the border and charged Mr. DeSilva with kidnaping. At Canada's request, the United States Attorney sought the extradition of Mr. DeSilva and the other participants. Faced with imminent removal to Canada, Mr. DeSilva brought before the Illinois court a writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from the outstanding extradition order.\textsuperscript{201} In support of their habeas petition, Mr. DeSilva and the other participants claimed among other things, that the dual criminality element mandated by the Treaty of Extradition between the United States and Canada (the "Treaty") was lacking.

The Illinois court granted Mr. DeSilva’s habeas relief since the dual criminality requirement of the Treaty had not been complied with. The court reasoned that it would be necessary to examine Mr. DeSilva’s conduct under the reverse fact scenario required by the dual criminality element of the United States - Canada extradition treaty. If the facts were reversed, the court found that Illinois would be unable to successfully prosecute Mr. DeSilva for kidnaping because it would not require DeSilva to register his Canadian guardianship in Illinois. Because Illinois would recognize a valid Canadian guardianship under principles of comity, a Canadian guardian, like an Illinois guardian, would not be capable of kidnaping his ward from Illinois. Thus, since the guardians’ conduct would not be criminal in Illinois, the

\textsuperscript{201}Id. at 744.
dual criminality requirement of the Treaty was not satisfied.\textsuperscript{202}

In reaching its ruling, the court confirmed that recognizing a foreign decree under comity is more relaxed and subject to closer judicial scrutiny than under full faith and credit. The court stated, “[i]t is not a rule of law, [and] more than mere courtesy and accommodation, [but it] does not achieve the force of an imperative or obligation.” Comity is extended by the United State’s courts as an “expression of understanding [with regard] to international duty and convenience and the rights of persons protected by its own laws [as opposed to those of other nations].”\textsuperscript{203} The court found that in order to extend comity, that the moving party must establish a prima facie case that the judgment was entitled to recognition.

The Illinois court required four criteria for the recognition of a foreign judgment: (1) that the rendering court had jurisdiction over the person and subject matter; (2) that there was timely notice and an opportunity to present the defense; (3) that there was no fraud involved; and (4) that the proceedings were according to a civilized jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{204} The court held that giving the tribunal discretion, that such an interpretation of comity was “fallacious insofar as it casts the decision of whether to accord recognition to a foreign judgment in an arbitrary and whimsical light.”\textsuperscript{205} Comity, the court found, required not an arbitrary decision, but a decision based on the recognition that the court’s authority is conditioned on the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{202}{Kulekowskis, 941 F.Supp. at 744.}
\footnote{203}{\textit{Id.} at 744-45.}
\footnote{204}{\textit{Id.}}
\footnote{205}{Kulekowskis, 941 F.Supp. at 747.}
\end{footnotes}
application of the four-part test. In this case, the court found that under the federal test for comity, that the guardian met the necessary threshold criteria to invoke the doctrine of comity.

If full faith and credit is recognized, how much comity or credit should or must be given? Arguably, under full faith and credit, and furthermore, under principles of comity, the court may conditionally accept the foreign order and make inquiries and modifications.

3. **Best Interest/Judicial Discretion:**

Rather than extend comity or full faith and credit, may a court provide deference to a foreign decree based on a balancing test performed under judicial discretion, rather than pursuant to a statute or a constitution? For example, Texas requires that the courts of that jurisdiction grant applications to accept foreign guardianships if the transfer of the guardianship from the foreign jurisdiction is in the best interest of the ward. Under

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206 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 166-68 (1895) (establishing the original four-part federal comity test).

207 Kulekowskis, 941 F.Supp. at 748. Guardianship decisions have occasionally been denied full faith and credit in some jurisdictions, e.g., Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 749-751 (Md. 1993) (and cases cited therein). Massachusetts courts give a foreign jurisdiction's guardianship orders full faith and credit only when it would be in the best interest of the ward. Woodworth v. Spring, 4 Allen 321, 325 (Mass. 1862).

208 Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U.S. 613 (1880) (quoting Justice Story, "The rights and powers of guardians are considered as strictly local; and not as entitling them to exercise any authority over the person or personal property of their wards in other states, upon the same general reasoning and policy which have circumscribed the rights and authorities of executors and administrators."); Barnett v. Equitable Trust Co. of New York, 34 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1929) (upholding Hoyt v. Sprague); Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 749-51 (Md. 1993) (holding that full faith and credit does not apply to foreign guardianship orders).

209 See infra Appendix C.

judicial discretion, will the state court be able to take this approach when considering whether a felon may be appointed as a guardian in the forum jurisdiction?

In the jurisdictions that allow judicial discretion in extending full faith and credit, the court may consider the ward’s best interest, which would allow the court the ability to redetermine the ward's capacity and the rights, powers, and duties of the guardian. This policy could be argued to allow the foreign jurisdiction’s guardianship appointment, regardless of whether the Texas court would have appointed the guardian under its laws. It may be read to restrain the Texas court from giving deference if the court may “go behind the foreign jurisdiction’s appointment” and set its own eligibility standards. Under either argument, the matter has not been decided and therefore, creates ambiguity.

B. Preservation of Checks and Balances

Borne from the United States Constitution, the doctrines of “separation of powers” and “checks and balances” were designed to separate the branches of government and ensure each branch is free from the control and coercion of the others. Accordingly, these doctrines encompass two fundamental prohibitions: (1) no branch may encroach upon the powers of another, and (2) no branch may delegate to another its constitutionally assigned power. Precisely at issue is whether the first fundamental prohibition delineated by the

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Constitution is violated where statutes enacted by the legislature deprive the court of its discretionary powers to make case-by-case decisions for the ward’s best interest.

Although Article III of the Constitution is silent on the judiciary’s power, the Supreme Court in *Marbury v. Madison* established the judiciary’s fundamental power of judicial review.\(^{215}\) Judicial review is the judiciary’s separate and independent power, and serves as the judiciary’s checks and balances on the other two branches of government. While the Constitution is clear that no branch may encroach upon the power of another, the separation of powers has continuously been challenged by statutes attempting to remove the court’s discretionary powers. For example, in *State v. Curtin*, a Florida court found the Sexual Predator Act violated the separation of powers doctrine because it eliminated the court’s discretionary function.\(^{216}\)

Four states’ guardianship statutes, as well as the majority of uniform models and standards, explicitly prohibit the appointment of felons as guardians, which effectively removes the judiciary’s decision making ability concerning felons’ guardianship eligibility. Although it has resulted in injustices, many courts have been unable to redress the situation simply because of the construction of their states’ guardianship statutes. For instance, the court in *The Matter of the Petition of Frances Lagrange* held, “[i]n the face of this absolute disqualification by statutory enactment, the court possesses no discretion whatsoever. . . The remedy is, however, a legislative and not a judicial function, and until it has been supplied, the courts at times [become] the unwitting instruments of hardship and even downright

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Rather than infringing on or effectively eliminating the judiciary’s discretionary power by an outright prohibition against certain individuals serving as guardians, the legislature should create statutes that allow for judicial discretionary interpretation and the consideration of the ward’s best interest in determining the eligibility of the guardian.

When the legislature removes the court discretion to determine whether a felon may be an eligible guardian, the balance of powers established as early as *Marbury v. Madison* are again challenged and the judiciary’s “checks and balances” are again eroded. The separation of the powers of government encompasses both the state and federal constitutions. Arguably, when a statute removes judiciary discretion, the statute violates the separation of powers between the branches of the government.

Compare however, in the case of *Reyes v. State*, the Florida Fourth District Court

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**Note:**


218 The fundamental role of the judiciary as articulated in *Marbury v. Madison* “. . . is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. 137, 177, (1803). *See also*, King v. Finch, 428 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970); Bandy v. Mickelson, 44 N.W.2d 341 (S.D. 1950); *In re* Mann, 154 S.E.2d 860 (W. Va. 1967). Under the separation of powers provision of the Massachusetts Constitution, the legislature may modify, enlarge, diminish, or abolish the jurisdiction of all courts subordinate to the Supreme Judicial Court but, having established statutory courts, the legislature has no authority to abrogate the inherent powers of the courts or to render them inoperative. *Gray v. Comm’r of Revenue*, 665 N.E.2d 17 (Mass. 1996).

219 The constitution of the State of Florida provides that the powers of the government of the state are divided into three branches--legislative, executive, and judicial--and prohibits any person properly belonging to one of the departments from exercising any powers appertaining to either of the others except as expressly provided for in the constitution. *Dade County Classroom Teachers Ass'n, Inc. v. Legislature*, 269 So.2d 684, 686 (Fla. 1972).


221 *Reyes v. State*, 854 So.2d 816 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003). Reyes also argued that the Act violated the separation of powers clause of Article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution because it made the sexual predator designation mandatory for all defendants who meet the
of Appeal held that the Sexual Predator Act, which effectively removed any discretion from the trial court, did not violate separation of powers clause of the Florida state constitution, even though it made the designation of offenders as sexual predators mandatory for all offenders who met the statutory criteria. But not all Florida courts agreed. In *State v. Curtin*, Florida’s First District Court of Appeals held that the Sexual Predator Act, which required the sentencing court to impose sexual predator designation on a defendant that met the statutory criteria, violated the separation of powers because it removed court discretion. The court noted that by removing the court's discretion, the Sexual Predator Act appeared to violate the separation of powers clause.

Recognizing the limitations imposed on the judiciary by restraining its case-by-case decision making, the policy makers may consider further the removal of court discretion, especially in this area where the demand for eligible guardians may outstrip the supply of statutory criteria, thus, removing from the trial court any discretion in making this determination. In *Kelly v. State*, 795 So.2d 135, 137 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001), the Fifth District rejected this argument as did the Second District in *Milks v. State*, 848 So.2d 1167, 1169. *Cf. State v. Cotton*, 769 So.2d 345 (Fla. 2000)(holding that Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act, although removing all discretion from trial court and transferring to state attorney, did not violate separation of powers clause).

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222 FLA. STAT. ANN. Const. Art. 2, § 3 (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21(4)(a)1, (5)(a)1 (West 2006).


224 *Id.*

225 Whatley v. District of Columbia, 447 F.3d 814 (D.C. Cir. 2006). On November 27, 2002, appellants filed a motion asserting that they were entitled to recover their entire fees despite the statutory cap because if the court construed § 140 to apply indefinitely, the application would be an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers. Appellants claimed that § 140 raised separation of powers concerns, because it effectively removed from the courts’ discretion to award reasonable attorneys' fees under IDEA, that Congress encroached on the judiciary's exclusive domain.
available guardians.\textsuperscript{226} If the legislatures adopt a “best interest of the ward test,” even though it may be more subjective and not as judicially efficient, the significant role of judicial interpretation is preserved, and the ward’s best interest preserves the balance that is required for a rational basis.

C. Considerations of Policy-Makers

Two growing demographic trends, the increasing age of society and the increase in numbers of felony convictions,\textsuperscript{227} are currently on a collision course. Although the increasing number of felony convictions will disqualify only a small percentage of the pool of potential guardians, it will do so at a time when more guardians will be needed. It is easy to conceive of situations where a loving and otherwise qualified spouse or child will be disqualified from serving as a guardian due to a past indiscretion. Policy-makers may wish to re-think the policies that absolutely exclude persons with past felony convictions before it becomes more common for wards to be denied assistance.

Other uniform statutes balance the interests of affected categories of individual rights versus the states’ interests. The legislatures may wish to borrow from other statutes with similar interstate concerns, i.e., the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, or the prototype Uniform Adult Guardianship Jurisdiction Act. For example, Maryland’s proposed Section

\textsuperscript{226}In October 2003, the Florida Legislature passed a law that gave Gov. Jeb Bush the authority to order that Terri Schiavo's feeding tube be reinserted. However, in the fall of 2004, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that this law was an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers because it permitted the executive branch to "interfere with the final judicial determination in a case." Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004) The court also held that the law constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the governor, in that it gave the governor "unbridled discretion" to make a decision about a citizen's constitutional rights.

13-105(b)(3) provides for full faith and credit of foreign guardianship orders if the foreign orders were issued in compliance with that state's guardianship procedures. How does the court determine if the foreign order was entered in compliance with its own procedures without an independent review of the foreign state's guardianship procedures? Perhaps the forum state would give deference to the foreign state’s order absent a challenged by an interested party.

Adopting the notice procedures found in other uniform acts, as in the prototype Uniform Adult Guardianship Jurisdiction Act, which provides that “[a]ll decrees rendered by a state . . . would be binding against all parties who received notice of the proceeding, and would be conclusive as to all issues of fact or law . . . .” If every interested party received notice in the forum state, and there were concerns about the eligibility of the proposed guardian, the forum state’s courts would be able to consider the ward’s best interest, and at the same time, provide due process notice to all concerned. Who should receive notice, however? Who is entitled to standing?

1. **Rational Basis Challenges**

When the policy makers determine that felons are excluded from serving as guardians

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228 For example, see Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 746 (Md. 1993). The Circuit Court for Baltimore County held that the appointment of a guardian by the Florida court was not entitled to full faith and credit. (footnotes omitted). It appointed a temporary guardian and reserved judgment on the guardianship issue until a later hearing. The Florida guardian argued in her pretrial memoranda that the circuit court "should order withdrawal of Ronald's feeding tube." After a full hearing on this issue, the circuit court determined that "absent either a living will or a power of attorney for health care, the decision to withhold sustenance should be based on what intent Ronald had, or would have, as determined under a clear and convincing standard of proof." The court found insufficient evidence that Ronald would have desired to terminate his life support systems rather than exist in a permanent vegetative state. See also, William S. Heyman, Survey, Development in Maryland Law, 1992-93, 53 MD. L. REV. 908 (1994).

carte blanche, thus depriving the courts from making case-by-case decisions, many wards may be underserved. Does the state’s interest in protecting the potentially vulnerable ward outweigh the ward’s right to have a guardian appointed that will serve the ward’s best interest, despite the proposed guardian’s past criminal record?

Under the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution, in order for the government to impose different standards between classes of persons, i.e., felons versus non-felons, it must have a rational basis for making such a distinction. In order to challenge a state statute under the rational basis test, the challenger is first required to identify the purpose for which the statute was designed. After identifying the intended purpose of the statute, the more difficult challenge under rational basis is that the challenger must show that there is no rational basis for which the legislative body could have concluded that the statute would have served its intended purpose. When dealing with vulnerable groups, such as the elderly and the developmentally disabled, the possibility of a statute prohibiting "felons" from serving as guardians being found to violate the Constitution's rational basis test is difficult, if not impossible.

Statutes such as Florida Statute § 744.309, however, may actually prevent needy wards from finding anyone eligible to serve as their guardian, especially when there is no estate funds. Granted, felons are not the most empathetic classification to curry favor, yet the statutes that preclude felons from serving as guardians more dramatically affect the incapacitated and indigent that require a guardian. As a class, developmentally incapacitated

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232 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.309 (West 2006).
persons who are in need of a guardian are not only innocent victims, but also are
detrimentally affected by a statute that has as its basis, the protection of said classes.

As discussed, an incapacitated person who is widowed may not under some states’
restraining-type statutes, have the benefit of a spouse to serve as a guardian. A long-time
spouse is not only a natural candidate to serve as a guardian but is also given substantial
legislative priority with respect to the hierarchy of potential appointees. Yet, the
prohibitionary statutes are too broad when they prevent an indigent person, in need of a
guardian, from appointing a spouse or the ward's son or daughter.

Similarly, divorcees also do not have the benefit of a spouse to assume a guardianship
role in the event of incapacity, and may be limited to an adult son, daughter or sibling. The
number of divorce filings has risen dramatically since 1950. Furthermore there is a
significant elder population living without spouses, either due to divorce, death, or lifestyle
choices.

Under guardianship statutes, one governmental interest is to protect the ward from
exploitation and abuse. Presumably, the legislature considered felons as "presumptively"

236 "To this end, guardianship and conservatorship for disabled persons shall be utilized only as is
necessary to promote their well-being, including protection from neglect, exploitation, and
abuse; shall be designed to encourage the development of maximum self-reliance and
independence in each person; and shall be ordered only to the extent necessitated by each
person’s actual mental and adaptive limitations.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 387.500(3) (West 2005).
prone to exploit or abuse the vulnerable group of incapacitated wards, and therefore, made felons ineligible to serve as guardians, regardless of the nature of the felon, the age of the felon, the relationship between the felon and the ward, and the circumstances. Such a blanket prohibition may be both under-inclusive and over-inclusive.\textsuperscript{237}

The rational basis standard of review does not require the basis to be the least restrictive means of achieving the permissible end so long as the state can rationally further its goal.\textsuperscript{238} Yet, the absolute prohibition against felons serving as guardians violates the "over-inclusive test."\textsuperscript{239} Not all felons are prone to be exploitative or abusive. Consider the adults existing with marginal capacity who have been taken care of by parents before reaching the age of majority. In such cases, the parents have taken care of the children, especially in cases where both the children and the parents are indigent. With indigency, where it is difficult for the ward to find a guardian to serve, the prohibition against felons serving as the guardian regardless of the relationship between the ward and the guardian, and the ward’s lack of an estate, the basis for the rule is over-inclusive and may fail the rational basis test.\textsuperscript{240}


\textsuperscript{238}Tolchin v. Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey, 111 F.3d 1099 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 435, 139 L. Ed. 2d 334 (U.S. 1997); Scariano v. Justices of Supreme Court of State of Ind., 38 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 1994), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied, 47 F.3d 173 (7th Cir. 1995) and cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1144, 115 S. Ct. 2582, 132 L. Ed. 2d 831 (1995).

\textsuperscript{239}The ward is not stripped of protection by allowing felons to serve as guardians. Wards may be protected by other statutes too. For example, Michael G. Walsh, Homicide as Precluding Taking Under Will or by Intestacy, 25 A.L.R.4TH 787 (1983); Hatcher v Aetna Life Ins. Co., 105 F Supp. 808 (D. Or. 1952); In re Estate of Klein, 378 A2d 1182 (Pa. 1977).

The absolute prohibition may also be under-inclusive to protect vulnerable wards from exploitation and abuse. Many elderly indigent wards fall victim to abuse and exploitation. The blanket prohibition of felons from serving as guardians does not protect the vulnerability of the indigent elderly or the "new adult" indigent, and is therefore under-inclusive to accomplish the legislature's goals.\textsuperscript{241}  

2. \textit{Should Adoption of Uniform Models and Standards be Mandatory?}  

Because reducing the effect of a felony conviction via annulment, expunction, or pardon is not overly effective, another viable solution is the states’ mandatory adoption of a uniform standard, statute, or code. Federal legislators and independent organizations have drafted numerous uniform standards and models, including the Uniform Probate Code, the Uniform Guardianship and Protective Placement Act, and the National Probate Court Standards,\textsuperscript{242} to help aid the states in adopting more cohesive guardianship statutes.\textsuperscript{243} These unified standards are designed to improve interstate cooperation to “avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict between states, [in order] to protect the [ward’s] best interest, and to discourage forum shopping.”\textsuperscript{244}


\textsuperscript{242}Commission on National Probate Court Standards, \textit{National Probate Court Standards} 1 (1993). The National Probate Court Standards are reprinted with the consent of the National Center for State Courts, Interstate Guardianship Project Staff, Paula L. Hannaford, Esq., Project Director, 300 Newport Avenue (23185), P.O. Box 8798, Williamsburg, Virginia 23187-8798 [Telephone no. (757) 253-2000; FAX no. (757) 220-0449].


As will be discussed in greater detail hereafter, the Uniform Probate Code does not mention *felony* and the disqualification to act as a felon. The National Guardianship Standard explicitly prohibits felons from being guardians absolutely. Hence, should a uniform system move towards a “best interest” model for the ward with the requirement of disclosure of the prior felony? If disclosed, the court may then consider the felony as one element of determining the eligibility of the proposed guardian. In a case-by-case analysis, the court may exercise the best interest of the ward.

a. Uniform Probate Code and the Uniform Guardianship and Protective Placement Act

The Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”) was proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”)\(^{\text{245}}\) in 1969. The UPC was the product of a collaborative effort of the NCCUSL and the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of the American Bar Association. In 1991 the UPC was replaced by a revised version, which was derived from a study of the UPC conducted by the Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code, an organization representing the NCCUSL, the ABA, and the American College of Trust and Estate Lawyers.\(^{\text{246}}\)

The UPC commissioners formed the national conference to discuss, draft and propose laws, codes, guidelines, and recommendations to the states that should be uniform and

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\(^{\text{245}}\)The NCCUSL was formed in 1892, and since that time has drafted over 200 uniform laws. It is a non-profit unincorporated association, comprised of state commissions on uniform laws from each state, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. There are over 300 commissioners that are appointed by each state. Each state determines the number of commissioners and the method of their appointment, and most states provide for such measures by statute. Conference members must be lawyers, qualified to practice law. Most commissioners are practicing lawyers, judges, legislators and legislative staff and law professors.

\(^{\text{246}}\)Uniform Law Commissioners, www.nccusl.org (follow About NCCUSL; then follow Introduction to the Organization).
consistent in the treatment of said laws.\textsuperscript{247} Each proposed act is investigated, and a report is prepared for the Executive Committee as to whether the area of law is one where uniformity is desirable. Once the Executive Committee approves a recommendation a drafting committee is appointed, and proposed laws that are drafted are submitted for initial debate at the National Conference’s annual meeting. Once the draft is approved, it may be officially adopted as either a uniform or model act. Once receiving approval by the requisite number of states it is then officially promulgated for consideration by the states.\textsuperscript{248}

The Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act ("UGPPA") was developed from implementation of the UPC by several states. While the UGPPA can be considered either a separate act or a subpart of the UPC,\textsuperscript{249} it is derived from Article 5 of the UPC and addresses guardianships and conservatorships. Not every state has adopted the

\textsuperscript{247}Id.

\textsuperscript{248}Id. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws (NCCUSL) has also provided a framework for transferring the jurisdiction of guardians. See Section 107 of the Uniform Guardianship and Protective Placement Act (1997) (UGPPA). Under the UGPPA, a foreign guardian may petition for appointment in the new state if venue is or will be established. To date, the UGPPA has been adopted by Alabama, Colorado, Hawaii, Minnesota, and Montana. We note that NCCUSL is beginning the process of considering whether a revision to the UGPPA or a stand-alone jurisdictional provision should be proposed. See Sally Balch Hurme, \textit{Mobile Guardianships: Finding Solutions to Interstate Jurisdiction Problems}, J. Nat’l College Prob. Judges 12 (Fall 2004). \textit{See also} Uniform Law Commissioners, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ (follow About NCCUSL; then follow Constitution and Procedures); \textit{In re} Guardianship of Jane E.P., 700 N.W.2d 863 (Wis. 2005).

\textsuperscript{249}Uniform Law Commissioners, http://www.nccusl.org. In 1997 revisions to the UGPPA were proposed after a two year study by the ABA Senior Lawyers Division Task Force on Guardianship Reform. The Task Force consisted of representatives of the ABA Senior Lawyers Division, the ABA Real Property Probate and Trust Law Section, and the Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly and Mental and Physical Disability Law. Other groups interested in guardianship, such as AARP and the National Senior Citizens Law Center also contributed heavily to the study.
Both the UPC and the UGPPA are silent on the issue of whether felons may serve as guardians. The UPC and UGPPA’s treatment of the issue of felons’ guardianship eligibility is not sufficient to maintain uniformity among the states with respect to the issue. Even if such uniform acts were adopted by every state, uniformity could not be achieved under principles of statutory construction. For example, Florida’s statute § 744.309 expressly makes felons ineligible to serve as guardians. If Florida adopted the UPC or UGPPA, which are both silent on the issue of felons’ eligibility to serve as guardians, statutory construction that requires specific statutes to take precedence over broadly worded statutes, would undercut the uniformity created by nation-wide adoption of such uniform acts.

Also, although later adopted statutes generally prevail over formerly adopted statutes, a former statute will prevail where it is more specific than the latter. Florida Statute § 744.309 is more specific with respect to felons eligibility than is the UPC or UGPPA, both of which are silent on the issue. States enacting statutes similar to Florida Statute § 744.309 will undermine the uniformity sought in enacting the UPC or UGPPA, as the more specific statutes will prevail in statutory construction over the UPC and UGPPA with respect to the

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251 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974) (holding that “where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment”).

252 Principles of statutory construction suggest that the standard prescribed in later-enacted legislation should control. The legislature is presumed to know the existing law. State ex rel. Tomasic v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas, 955 P.2d 1136, 1152 (Kan. 1998). If two statutes addressing the same subject are inconsistent, the later in time prevails to the extent of any inconsistency. Id., See also, Public Employees Retirement Ass'n v. Greene, 580 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1978). In addition, a specific statute controls over general legislation. Id., See also, Motor Vehicle Division v. Dayhoff, 609 P.2d 119 (Colo. 1980).
eligibility of felons. 253

i. Interstate Guardianships

Guardianship orders are largely creatures of state statutes. 254 Each state possesses its own rules for the creation, regulation, reporting and accounting of the guardianship estate and the ward. For example, Minnesota may provide a guardianship order that is effective in the State of Minnesota, but what happens if the ward relocates to Florida? Many wards have connections to relatives, assets and property in more than one state. The ward may find the availability of different health care resources or caregiving services by relocating to a different forum. Also, the caregivers may relocate for personal reasons and wish to move the ward with them.

When the ward relocates, the responsibility for the transition falls upon state courts. 255 The new forum will be responsible for monitoring and enforcing guardianship orders that may have been issued outside of their jurisdiction. 256 How much deference should the new forum provide to the foreign venue's orders and decrees? In most cases, excepting guardianship of minor cases, “to which interstate compacts or agreements may be applicable, no agreements to cooperate in the handling of interstate guardianships currently exist.” 257

b. National Probate Court Standards: 258

251 Id.


255 Id.

256 Id.

257 This does not consider principles of comity and full faith and credit.

258 Commission on National Probate Court Standards and Advisory Committee on Interstate Guardianships, a Project of the National College of Probate Judges and the National Center for State Courts.
The interstate or international relocation of the ward after the guardianship has been established is not a new concept. The issue is how much credit should be given to foreign judgments or decrees.259 The National Probate Court Standards ("NPCS") are additional uniform standards that were designed to address, in part, the deficiencies inherent in the modern guardianship system concerning interstate relocations of the ward.260

The NPCS were developed by a commission ("the commission") comprised of members of the National Court Probate Judges and the National Center for State Courts to provide commonality and cooperation between the states in the guardianship system.261

The comments to the National Probate Court Standards ("the Standards") “require probate courts to be accommodating and responsive to the wishes of the respondent as well as convenient and accessible. A guardianship is not intended to restrict freedom unreasonably or to limit the flexibility, choices, and convenience available to the ward.”262

How do the Standards protect the ward’s choices, and yet provide the judiciary with the discretion it requires to act in the ward’s best interest, especially in light of the absolute prohibition of certain persons from serving as guardians?

Although the Standards ideally would not unnecessarily limit the ward’s choices and preferences, each state supports its own criteria of eligibility for the appointment of


260 Standard 3.3.11, National Probate Court Standards (1993).


guardians that may conflict with the forum state’s requirements and the ward’s choice of

guardian. Should courts be free to adopt the Standards, regardless of their own legislative
restrains, to allow the appointment pursuant to full faith and credit, or under principles of
comity, in order to remove the barriers that impede the ward’s wishes? The commentary
to the Standards suggest that the guardian be familiar with the laws and requirements of the
forum jurisdiction, but offers little guidance as to what the guardian should do if the
eligibility requirements between the jurisdictions differ. Although the Standards do not
require a hearing on the transfer of the guardianship, a hearing is generally required by the
court or legislature, or is requested by the ward or interested persons named in the original
petition. If the court does not require a hearing and no interested party sets the

263 Standard 3.5.3 Transfer of Guardianship. The Commentary for this Standard

. . . is consistent with . . . the provisions of Standard 3.3.14, Reports by Guardian, . . . It is
based on the assumption that most guardians are acting in the interest of the ward and
that the notice and reporting requirements, and the opportunity to bring objections to the
transfer to the attention of the court, are sufficient checks on the appropriateness of the
transfer of the guardianship. Generally, receiving courts should allow the guardianship to
be “imported,” giving full faith and credit to the terms and powers of foreign
guardianship orders. However, enforcement and necessary administrative changes (e.g.,
periodic reporting requirements, appointment of guardian ad litem or court visitor, bond
requirements) of the guardianship may be made to bring the guardianship into
compliance with the requirements of the receiving jurisdiction (italics added). Ideally,
such changes should be made in accordance with the receiving court's monitoring and
review schedule and requirements. . . .

The commentary to this Standard fails to address whether the “full import” of the foreign
order should be consistent with the forum state’s eligibility requirements.

264 Even under Standard 3.5.1 that requires that the different probate courts “communicate and
cooperate to resolve guardianship disputes and related matters,” said standards do not overcome
the obstacles propounded by state legislatures through statutes. The ideals of the Standards
would require the individual state legislatures to prepare accommodating and more consistently
uniform legislation.

domestication of the guardianship order for a hearing, then it is possible that an ineligible 
person could act as a guardian, either to the benefit or to the detriment of the ward’s best 
interests.\textsuperscript{266}

When the Standards addressed deference to existing orders, the commission prepared 
Standard 3.3.11, titled “Qualifications and Appointment of Guardians,” and its subsequent 
commentary. The commission recommended that the Standards adopt the “best interest of 
the ward” approach in the appointment of a guardian.\textsuperscript{267}

While a sliding “best interest scale” preserves judicial discretion, the Standards are 
insufficient as they remain silent on the issue of felons’ guardianship eligibility. The 
adoption of a uniform standard must adequately address all issues, or risk being trumped by 
the individual states’ statutes that may address the issue with more specificity.\textsuperscript{268} For 
instance, depending on the state, the mother of the disabled child may still be disqualified 
under the Standard’s best interest test since the uniform scheme does not specifically address 
the issue and the specific state statute may exclude her as a prior felon.\textsuperscript{269} Arguably under 
the construction of enforcing the more specific statute over the general statute, the uniform 
Standards do not alleviate the jurisdictional issues inherent in the proposed scheme.\textsuperscript{270} If the


\textsuperscript{267}Standard 3.3.11, National Probate Court Standards (1993).

\textsuperscript{268}A specific statute controls over general legislation. Motor Vehicle Division v. Dayhoff, 609 P.2d 119 (Colo. 1980).

\textsuperscript{269}See note 23, FCSL Elder Law Clinic Matter.

\textsuperscript{270}\textit{Supra} at 268.
Standards addressed the specific issue of whether courts may consider appointing felons as guardians, when combined with the best interest approach, the uniform standards would then have the potential to resolve interstate guardianship issues on this point.

The Commission of NPCS addressed the deference that a forum jurisdiction may be given to the foreign order. Should the state legislatures or courts consider adopting the Standards of the NPCS Commission? If the Standards were adopted, would the Standards resolve the issue of the eligibility of the guardian appointment in interstate situations?

The commentary to Standard 3.5.3 provides that the Standards are intended to extend to interstate guardianships. For example, under Standard 3.5.3, certain provisions of the guardianship procedures are intended to be universally consistent, i.e., report requirements by a guardian, requirements for annual reports, and accountings by the guardian. The

271 Interstate Guardianships
Standard 3.5.1 Communication and Cooperation Between Courts
Standard 3.5.2 Screening and Review of Petition
Standard 3.5.3 Transfer of Guardianship
Standard 3.5.4 Receipt and Acceptance of a Transferred Guardianship
Standard 3.5.5 Initial Hearing in the Court Accepting the Transferred Guardianship
Filings Trusts, Wills, Estates, Guardianship, and Mental Health Cases, 1984-1990
Trends in Guardianship Filings: This standard is consistent with and extends to interstate guardianships the provisions of Standard 3.3.14, Reports by Guardian, and state requirements for annual reports and accountings by the guardian. Its intent is to facilitate the transfer of a guardianship to another state in cases in which the court is satisfied that the guardianship is valid and that the guardian has performed his or her duties properly in the interests of the ward for the duration of his or her appointment. It is based on the assumption that most guardians are acting in the interest of the ward and that the notice and reporting requirements, and the opportunity to bring objections to the transfer to the attention of the court, are sufficient checks on the appropriateness of the transfer of the guardianship.

Generally, receiving courts should allow the guardianship to be "imported," giving full faith and credit to the terms and powers of foreign guardianship orders. However, enforcement and necessary administrative changes (e.g., periodic reporting requirements, appointment of guardian ad litem or court visitor, bond requirements) of the guardianship may be made to bring the guardianship into compliance with the requirements of the receiving jurisdiction.

272 Standard 3.5.3, National Probate Court Standards (1993).
drafters intended the Standards to facilitate the transfer of guardianships to another state in cases in which the court is satisfied that the guardianship is valid and that the guardians have performed their duties properly in the interests of the ward for the duration of their appointment. The Standards are based on the presumption that most guardians are acting in the interest of the ward, and that the notice, reporting requirements, and the opportunity to bring objections to the transfer to the attention of the court, are sufficient checks on the appropriateness of the transfer. Specifically, the Standards indicate that “notice” is important because the drafters view the transfer of a guardianship as an “administrative procedure that does not require a determination by the foreign court of the ward's incapacity or the appropriateness of the guardian's appointment and assigned powers and responsibilities.”

If the transfer of the guardianship is considered primarily administrative, should the forum court that is considering using the Standards as a guide provide complete deference to the foreign state’s guardianship order? If yes, should complete deference be extended without the forum jurisdiction verifying the guardian’s qualifications and eligibility under the forum state’s laws? Based on the discussions above, it is unlikely that the forum court would provide such a level of deference.

The Commentary to the Standards indicates that the forum court should allow the guardianship to be imported, “giving full faith and credit to the terms and powers of foreign guardianship orders.” However, the Commentary is silent as to how much scrutiny the forum court may give the existing order. Specifically, the Commentary states that “enforcement and necessary administrative changes (e.g., bond requirements, periodic

\footnote{Supra at 271.}

\footnote{In re Guardianship of Jane E.P. 283 Wis.2d 258, 700 N.W.2d 863 (Wis. 2005). See also, Standard 3.5.3, National Probate Court Standards (1993).}
reporting requirements, appointment of guardian ad litem or court visitor) of the guardianship may be made to bring the guardianship into compliance with the requirements of the receiving jurisdiction.”

Does that mean that the forum court should scrutinize the guardian under the forum’s state’s eligibility requirements? If yes, does that also preclude an existing guardian from continuing to serve in a jurisdiction like Florida, when the existing guardian has a prior felony, regardless of the reason for the felony conviction? To what extent will the forum court be able to scrutinize, even under the adoption of the Standards?

Under Standard 3.5.4, the forum court “should recognize the appointment and powers of the guardian and accept the guardianship under the terms as specified in the transferred guardianship order.” Again, the Standards have not addressed what the guardian is required to do, or should do, in the situation where the guardian is eligible in the foreign jurisdiction, but not in the forum jurisdiction.

c. National Guardianship Association Standards

In 1991, the National Guardianship Association (“the NGA”), a non-profit corporation comprised of guardians, conservators, representatives, social workers, and

275 Id.

276 In re Guardianship of Jane E.P. 283 Wis.2d 258, 700 N.W.2d 863 (Wis. 2005). “Cooperation and communication, and a proper distribution of responsibilities among states, should facilitate the movement of guardianships and should be such that the parties would see it in their interests to comply with the requirements.” Id.

277 Note that Standard 3.5.5 mandates that “no later than ninety (90) days after acceptance of a transfer of guardianship, the probate court should conduct a review hearing of the guardianship during which it may modify the administrative procedures or requirements of the guardianship in accordance with local and state laws and procedures.” Again, such a review will not resolve an inconsistency in guardian eligibility requirements. The Commentary to this Standard states that “Unless specifically requested to do otherwise by the ward, the guardian, or an interested person because of a change of circumstances, the court should give full faith and credit to the terms of the existing guardianship concerning the rights, powers and responsibilities of the guardian.” (Italics added).
attorneys, developed and adopted “The Model Code of Ethics for Guardians,” and an accompanying set of standards to serve as guidelines for providing guardianship services.\textsuperscript{278}

The NGA, in response to continued abuses inherent in the guardianship system, revised its model standards in 2003 (“Model Standards”). Although the initial Model Standards did not denote specific qualifications for potential guardians and their eligibility, the revision included a detailed list of qualifications that a candidate must satisfy to be eligible to be a court-appointed guardian as set forth by the National Guardianship Foundation (“the NGF”).\textsuperscript{279} Persons with felony convictions were discussed and included in the class of persons that were ineligible to be considered registered guardians.\textsuperscript{280}

Although the qualifications set forth by the NGA and NGF in the Model Standards were designed to benevolently screen potential guardians, the Standards are overreaching as they eliminate many potential candidates from serving as guardians. For example, under the Model Standards, the mother of the disabled child would still be disqualified to serve as her child’s guardian simply because she was convicted of a felony nineteen years earlier.\textsuperscript{281}

Rather than allowing the court to be the decision-maker in consideration of the ward’s best interest, the Model Standards restrain the court from appointing a guardian that may adequately represent the ward’s welfare. Once the discretion is removed from the court, the groups most subject to deprivation are the indigent and those races that possess a disproportionate number of felony convictions. Again, is disenfranchisement the goal of the Model Standards or should the courts be the responsible decision makers?


\textsuperscript{280}Id.

\textsuperscript{281}See note 23 FCSL Elder Law Clinic Matter.
d. The American Bar Association

In addition to the above-cited uniform models and standards governing the guardianship process, the American Bar Association ("the ABA") also proposed positions on the issue.\textsuperscript{282} In 2002, the ABA’s Commission on Law and Aging developed guardianship guidelines for state and local governments to consider for adoption.\textsuperscript{283} The recommendations are intended to guide states through policy-making decisions, including the establishment of uniform qualifications of eligibility for the appointment of guardians.\textsuperscript{284} Specifically, Recommendation 3b suggests states should adopt the NGA’s \textit{Standards of Practice} and \textit{Model Code of Ethics for Guardianships} when determining whether a potential guardian is qualified.\textsuperscript{285}

The ABA proposes a \textit{carte blanche} prohibition on appointing felons as guardians, much like the position adopted in Florida. The ABA took this position, in part, because it was concerned about the elderly being a vulnerable group and subject to abuse.\textsuperscript{286} While the ABA’s concerns for elderly abuse are valid, its \textit{non-discretionary} prohibition on the appointment of felons as guardians is overreaching and inadequate. A blanket prohibition


\textsuperscript{283}Wingspan, The Second National Guardianship Conference was convened November 30 through December 2, 2001, more than a decade after the original 1988 Wingspread Symposium, to examine the progress made in the interim, and the steps that should be recommended for the future with respect to guardianship law, policy, and practice.:B5:B5” A. Frank Johns & Charles P. Sabatino, Wingspan--\textit{The Second National Guardianship Conference}, 31 Stetson L. Rev. 573 (Spring 2002).

\textsuperscript{284}Id.


against felons serving as guardians fails to adequately address and prevent elder abuse and it may deprive the indigent from having loving representation by family members.

CONCLUSION

With the demand for eligible guardians significantly increasing, and society becoming more mobile, certain groups of people have tremendous needs to consider and whether felons should be excluded as potential guardians, regardless of the circumstances. It is ultimately up to the legislatures or the courts to make the decision of whether a person is appointed as a guardian. When the legislature removes the court’s discretion in determining the appointment of a guardian, the balance of power has been impaired. Should uniformity exist between the states and should the "full faith and credit" clause of the Constitution control? What other alternatives exist for potential guardians with felonies, if any?

As discussed above, relying on alternatives, such as removing or nullifying a prior felony conviction is improbable in most situations. Having a conviction dismissed upon rehabilitation is limited in scope, and generally only applicable at the time of conviction. Expunging or sealing a record is rarely available, and obtaining a pardon depends more upon the politics and tradition of a state than upon legal procedures. Furthermore, because the remedies of dismissal, expunction, and pardon must generally be applied for in the state or jurisdiction where the conviction was entered, there is no guarantee that once obtained,

\[287\] Whipple v. Dep’t of Corrs., State of Fla., 892 So.2d 554 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005). The Florida Third District Court of Appeal referenced the Bush v. Schiavo case that held that a legislative enactment unconstitutionally encroached upon the power of the judiciary where the act effectively reversed a properly rendered final judgment. Also, in Moore v. Pearson, 789 So.2d 316, 319 (Fla. 2001), the court found that the Department of Corrections violated the separation of power doctrine when it refused to implement an otherwise lawful coterminous sentence; Hudson v. State, 682 So.2d 657 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Slay v. Singletary, 676 So.2d 456, 457 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).

An A notable exception to this is Ohio, which allows a petitioner to obtain expunction of Ohio’s records of a conviction in another state or federal court. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.32 (West 2006); Barker v. State, 402 N.E.2d 550 (Ohio 1980).
they will be given deference in other jurisdictions. However, if such relief is obtained, it is at least arguable that it may qualify a previously ineligible petitioner for guardianship in the four states that disqualify those with felony convictions from serving as guardians.

Nonetheless, pursuing a dismissal, expunction, or pardon may not be a feasible option to many. The possibility of actually obtaining one of these remedies is questionable, as these are extraordinary remedies in most states. These remedies are, therefore, of limited use and probably only effective in a few situations where guardianships are sought by those with past felony convictions.

The deference a forum court should provide under of "full faith and credit" to a foreign order or decree is not clear from state to state. In some states, the deference appears almost absolute so long as the foreign state had jurisdiction and there was no fraud in obtaining the judgment. In other states, full faith and credit is either denied or the foreign judgment or decree may be modified by the forum state. Hence, there is the unanswered question in many states as to whether a guardian who would be ineligible to serve as a guardian in a restraint state, but who has been appointed in a foreign state, may continue to act within the forum state under principles of full faith and credit, or comity.

Another alternative limited in scope is the durable power of attorney. This remedy requires the ward to have, at some point, enjoyed capacity and designated a guardian as the attorney-in-fact. The obvious limitations are, (1) the power of attorney can be challenged in court and (2) the ward must enjoy capacity to execute a power of attorney.

The failure of the above alternatives leaves many unanswered questions. Have the states adopted the uniform standards as proposed by the National Probate Court? If so, do

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the standards adequately address the "portability" of the guardianship appointment from state to state? Should the courts have the case-by-case discretion to make decisions in furtherance of the ward's best interest, or should the legislation control whether a guardian may be appointed?
## APPENDIX A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Statute</th>
<th>Surrogate Decision Makers, including Durable Powers of Attorney</th>
<th>Guardianship statutes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ala. Code § 12-13-21</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Ala. Code § 26-9-1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Alaska Stat. §13.26.090</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cal. Prob. Code § 1500</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Del. Code Ann. tit. 12 § 3901</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Idaho Code § 15-5-301.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Illinois</strong></td>
<td>405 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-102.</td>
<td>405 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-110.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indiana</strong></td>
<td>Ind. Code § 30-5-1-1.</td>
<td>Ind. Code § 29-3-1-1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Ind. Code § 12-26-16-2.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Iowa</strong></td>
<td>Iowa Code § 144B.1.</td>
<td>Iowa Code § 229.23.</td>
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<td>Iowa Code § 633B.1.</td>
<td>Iowa Code § 633.552.</td>
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<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Statute</td>
<td>Statute</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Minn. Stat. § 524.5-301.</td>
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<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Statutes and Codes</td>
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<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Code Reference 1</td>
<td>Code Reference 2</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX B

At the same time the demand for potential guardians for the elderly is increasing, the potential pool of eligible applicants is decreasing dramatically and will continue to decrease. For example, notice the following demographic trends:

### TABLE ONE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2000 Census Figures</th>
<th>total in group</th>
<th>per cent of total population</th>
<th>Americans of 20-64 years old/every American 65 + years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Americans 65 +</td>
<td>35,061,000</td>
<td>12.42%</td>
<td>4.75/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Americans 20-64</td>
<td>166,515,000</td>
<td>59.02%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 2020 Census Figures (projections) | |
|---------------------------------|----------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| 65 + | 54,632,000 | 16.26% | 3.52/1 |
| 20-64 | 166,515,000 | 57.26% | |

| 2030 Census Figures (projections) | |
|---------------------------------|----------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| 65+ | 71,453,000 | 19.65% | 2.76/1 |
| 20-64 | 197,027,000 | 54.19% | |

Table One shows that the eligible “younger” persons per elderly person that are possibly qualified to act as a guardian, reduces almost 50% between 2000 and 2030. This table does not differentiate between elderly persons capable of acting as guardians for other elderly persons or account for the under “64” age category being eligible to act as guardians based purely on chronological age.

If the projections are accurate, the potential guardians applicants for the population segment
65 and older will be significantly reduced within the next twenty-five years. In 2000 there were 4.75 Americans between the ages of 20 and 64 for every American aged 65 and older. This figure will decline by 2020 to 3.52 Americans aged 20-64 for every American aged 65 and older and will continue to decline to 2.76 Americans aged 20-64 for every American aged 65 and older in 2030.

The age distribution categories in 1900 versus the 2004 distributions, show that the “younger generation” has decreased significantly while the “older generation” has increased exponentially. If this trend continues, the possible demand for guardians will increase and the pool of eligible guardians (assuming that guardians will be from chronologically younger generations) will decrease.

TABLE TWO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1900 Age Distribution</th>
<th>% of population as a whole</th>
<th>2004 Age Distribution</th>
<th>% of population as a whole</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 5</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>Under 5</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-19</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
<td>5-19</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-44</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
<td>20-44</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>65+</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Life Expectancy Increases: The life expectancy for Americans in 1900 was 49.2. In 1900, the younger population of the United States was dramatically larger by proportion than it is today. Those aged 19 or under, comprised 44.4% of the population. In 2004, the younger population comprised 27.7% of the population and the life expectancy increased to 77.85 years (2006).

Aging Demographics and the Population as a Whole: In 1900, 51.4% of the US population was between the ages of 20 and 64 and 4.1% of the population was aged 65 and older. There were 12.5 Americans aged 20-64 per every American aged 65 and older.

The population in the United States in 2004 aged 45-64 comprised 24.1% of the population. In 1900, the same population segment accounted for 13.7% of the total population. Whereas, at the turn of the 20th century, 44.4% of the population approached the age of majority as the population approached senior citizen status. The 45-64 age population segment comprised 13.7% of the population in 1900, and in 2004, only 27.7% of the population approached the age of majority as the population approached senior citizen status.
status, i.e., 24.1%.

Those figures illustrate that there is a significantly greater proportion of Americans aged 65 and older (12.3 % in 2004) as compared to 1900 (4.1 %). The younger population is declining proportionately as compared to the overall population and the older population is dramatically increasing in size.

Reviewing the projections for the immediate future, we observe that the population of Americans over 65 will increase between 2000 and 2030 by 7.23 %, while at the same time the population of Americans aged 20-64 is projected to decrease by 4.83 %.

In the same time period, the projected amount of Americans aged 65 and older will increase from 35 million in 2000 to over 71 million in 2030, more than doubling that population category. The total US population is projected to increase from 282 million to 363 million between 2000 and 2030. The increase is a population increase of nearly 81 million, and of that projected increase in total population, Americans aged 65 and older represent over 36 million of that increase figure. That represents a 44.68 % increase of the estimated population increase between 2000 and 2030.

When considering that the life expectancy is now nearly 29 years older as compared with 1900 and that there is a significantly smaller list of potential applicants for guardians for those who have reached the age of senior citizen status, certain groups will be disproportionately affected if felons are ineligible to serve as guardians over their loved ones.

Decline in Household Populations: As the older population, relative to the overall population, continues to increase, there has been a decline in the population per household and the population per family. In 1955 the population per household was 3.33 and the population per family was 3.59. Those figures have declined and in 2005 the population per household and per family were 2.57, and 3.13, respectively.

Marriage: The rate of marriage has also declined. In 1900, there were 9.3 marriages per every 1000 people. The marriage statistic rose to 11.1 marriages per every 1000 people in 1950, but it has steadily declined since 1950. In 2005 the figure had declined to 7.5 marriages per every 1000 people. The decline in the marriage rate is corroborated with a rise in the divorce rate. In 1900 there were .7 divorces per 1000 people, which raised to 2.6 per 1000 people in 1950. In 2005 that figure has reached 3.6 divorces per every 1000 people.

20.6% of men aged 65-74 were either divorced, widowed, or never married in 2004. For men in the age category of 75-84, that figure raises to 27.5%, and it increases further to 41.7% for men over the age of 85. For women, the figures are even more staggering. In 2004, 43.4% of women in the ages of 65-74 were divorced or widowed, and 63.7% of women in the age group of 75-84, and 84.9% of women over the age of 85 were either divorced, widowed, or never married.
Americans living alone: The changes in demographics show an increase in older Americans living alone. In 2004, 18.8% of men, and 39.7% of women over 65 years of age lived alone. The number of older Americans living alone increased as the age of the individual increased, as well. In 1970, 11.3% of men 65 to 74 years, and 19.1% of men 75 and older lived alone. Those figures rose to 15.5% and 23.1%, respectively, by 2004. For women the statistics are even more alarming. In 1970, 31.7% of women 65 to 74 years of age, and 37% of women 75 and older lived alone. By 2004, the percentage of women between the ages of 65 to 74 living alone had actually decreased to 29.4% but the percentage of women 75 and older living alone had risen to 49.9%.

Decrease in the size of eligible guardians: As the size of families and households decline, divorce rate increase, and the age of the older population increase at their projected rates, the number of potentially eligible guardians per person will also decline.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCE INFORMATION

   2006 Life Expectancy = 77.85

2. www.efmoody.com/estate/lifeexpectancy.html
   1900 Life Expectancy = 49.2

3. www.demographia.com/db-uspop1900.htm
   1900 United States population

   2004 United States population

5. www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0110384.html
   Age distribution from 1900 to 2004

   Age distribution projections for years 2020 and 2030

   Population per household, population per family 2005-1955

   2005 divorce rate, 2005 marriage rate

    http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005044.html
    1900 divorce rate and marriage rate; 1950 divorce rate and marriage rate

    Percentage of older Americans living alone by sex 1970-2004; percentage of older Americans divorced, widowed, or never married
### TABLE THREE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Older Americans Living Alone</th>
<th>Indigency level per 1000</th>
<th>Size of Households and Families</th>
<th>Felonies per 1000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian men = 19%,</td>
<td>2.54 persons per</td>
<td>4.63 Caucasian male</td>
<td>4.63 Caucasian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian women = 41%</td>
<td>2.54 persons per</td>
<td>household for Caucasian</td>
<td>male prison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290 Caucasians in poverty =</td>
<td>household for Caucasian</td>
<td>households, 3.08 persons per</td>
<td>inmates per 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86 per 1000</td>
<td>3.08 persons per family</td>
<td>family for Caucasian families</td>
<td>Caucasian males.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>291 2.54 persons per household for Caucasian households, 3.08 persons per family for Caucasian families</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>292 Caucasians in poverty =</td>
<td>86 per 1000</td>
<td>4.63 Caucasian male</td>
<td>4.63 Caucasian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hispanic men = 16%</th>
<th>Hispanic Americans in poverty = 219 per 1000</th>
<th>3.32 persons per household for Hispanic households, 3.69 persons per family for Hispanic families</th>
<th>12.20 Hispanic American male prison inmates per 1000 Hispanic American males</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The pool of eligible guardians will dwindle for indigent wards very fast, especially when indigent levels are considered for different races.

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### APPENDIX C

| **Ga § 29-4-88.** | (a) The court may grant a petition for receipt and acceptance of a foreign guardianship provided the court finds that: (1) The guardian is presently in good standing with the foreign court; and (2) The transfer of the guardianship from the foreign jurisdiction is in the best interest of the ward. 
(b) In granting the petition, the court shall give full faith and credit to the provisions of the foreign guardianship order concerning the determination of the ward's incapacity. (enacted in 2004, effective July 1, 2005). |
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Md Code, Family Law § 5-305.</strong></td>
<td>(b) In accordance with the United States Constitution, this State shall accord full faith and credit to: 1) an order of another state as to adoption or guardianship in compliance with the other state’s laws; and (2) termination of parental rights in compliance with the other state's laws.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MD Code, Family law, § 5-3A-05 and § 5-3B-04</strong></td>
<td>(a) In this section, &quot;order&quot; includes any action that, under the laws of another jurisdiction, has the force and effect of a comparable judicial order under this subtitle. “Order of another state” (b) In accordance with the United States Constitution, this State shall accord full faith and credit to: (1) an order of another state as to adoption or guardianship in compliance with the other state’s laws; and (2) termination of parental rights in compliance with the other state's law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N.H. Rev. Stat. § 463:32-a</strong></td>
<td>Any person who has been appointed guardian of the person of a minor by a foreign court of competent jurisdiction, for a minor who is temporarily in this state, shall be accorded the powers of guardianship as reflected in the order appointing the guardian, with full faith and credit, for a period of time not exceeding 120 days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N.H. Rev. Stat. § 463:32-b</strong></td>
<td>I. Any person who has been appointed guardian of the person or estate or both, by a foreign court of competent jurisdiction, for a minor who has become a resident of this state, or who intends to move to this state, shall be accorded the powers of guardianship as reflected in the order appointing the guardian, with full faith and credit, for a period of time not exceeding 120 days following the date of the ward's residence in this state. . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N.H. Rev. Stat. § 464-A:44</strong></td>
<td>II. Any person who has been appointed guardian of the person for a person who is temporarily in this state by a court of competent jurisdiction in any other state shall be accorded the powers of guardianship as reflected in the order appointing the guardian, with full faith and credit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N. H. Rev Stat. 464-A:45</strong></td>
<td>I. Any person who has been appointed guardian of the person or estate or both by a foreign court of competent jurisdiction, for a person who has become a resident of this state, or who intends to move to this state, shall be accorded the powers of guardianship as reflected in the order appointing the guardian, with full faith and credit, for 120 days following the date of the ward's residence in this state or until an order is issued on a petition for transfer of the guardianship filed within 120 days of the date of the ward's residence in this state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ohio</strong></td>
<td>The judgment of another state's court as to the imposition of a guardianship is entitled to full faith and credit under the Constitution of the United States.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| V.A.T.S. (Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated)  
Probate Code, § 892 | f) The court shall grant an application for receipt and acceptance of a foreign guardianship if the transfer of the guardianship from the foreign jurisdiction is in the best interests of the ward. In granting an application under this subsection, the court shall give full faith and credit to the provisions of the foreign guardianship order concerning the determination of the ward's incapacity and the rights, powers, and duties of the guardian. |
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 892(f)</td>
<td>The court must grant an application for receipt and acceptance of a foreign guardianship if the transfer of the guardianship from the foreign jurisdiction is in the best interests of the ward. In granting an application, the court must give full faith and credit to the provisions of the foreign guardianship order concerning the determination of the ward's incapacity and the rights, powers, and duties of the guardian.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>