This essay analyzes emerging trends in entrapment law, and is the first to describe the declining numbers of reported cases that involve the entrapment defense. This phenomenon is attributed to decreasing levels of uncertainty in the rules pertaining to the defense, and to discreet procedural issues. The shifting degrees of certainty in penal rules, which have become increasingly mechanical and mathematical over time, are shown to disfavor certain defendants inherently, to the point of being a snare or source of “entrapment” themselves for these individuals.

Most articles about entrapment discuss the competing legal tests used to approach the problem, typically arguing in favor of one rule as opposed to the other.¹ This essay focuses instead on how the entrapment defense is currently functioning in our legal landscape, and highlights some important emerging trends.

As the rules for entrapment become increasingly well-defined and established, the defense itself becomes less relevant. The proportion of cases where entrapment arises as a

¹ See Paul Marcus, The Entrapment Defense 104 (3rd 2002) (noting that “the vast majority of legal scholars regard the objective test favorably.”); Gregory Deis, supra note 1, at 1218 (Deis himself does not favor the objective test but acknowledges that he is in the minority in the academy); Park, supra note 12, at 167. When Park wrote in 1975, he could only find one lone article from the previous twenty-five years criticizing the objective test, and that article proposed abolishing the entrapment defense completely. See id at 167 n. 13, citing Michael De Feo, Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its History, Theory, and Application, 1 U.S.F. L. REV. 243 (1967). Park in the same footnote remarks that there had been over one hundred student notes from the same period almost uniformly advocated for the objective test (my own research indicates that this continues to be a disproportionately popular subject for student comments and case notes). Justice Stewart noted the clear tilt of the academy to his side when he dissented in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 445 n.3 (1973)(Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Model Penal Code Comment § 2.13, subs. (1) n. 3 for a list of influential early articles on the subject.
defense appears to be decreasing in almost every state, as well as in the federal courts. In most states, the raw number of reported cases has dropped off in recent years, or has leveled off in comparison with the mushrooming criminal dockets, meaning entrapment cases are a diminishing proportion of the overall criminal caseload. This is especially true of drug cases, which constitute the vast majority of entrapment claims. Entrapment as a defense seems to have peaked in the 1980’s and early 1990’s, correlating roughly to the unprecedented explosion of drug-related cases, and has since fallen to a fraction of the levels during this period, even though drug convictions continue to rise. It is also surprising that the defense most closely related to undercover police work and sting operations would not keep pace with the growth of its attendant police activity.

Across jurisdictions, this leveling-off of the defense appears to be unrelated to the legal test used – there are two leading contenders, the so-called “objective” and “subjective” approaches. The cases that do occur seem disproportionately concentrated in certain jurisdictions, some using one test, and some using the other. This waning of a particular criminal defense is interesting not only for the study of that defense itself, but also for understanding our legal system overall. We normally study defenses as element-based, formalistic concepts, rather than as a social phenomenon that goes in or out of style.

A second emerging trend, previously overlooked in the relevant literature, is the disproportionate number of entrapment cases that arise as post-sentencing appeals, often couched as ineffective assistance of counsel claims, or challenging a judge’s refusal to give any entrapment instructions to the jury. In either case, the defense really functions as a “second bite

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2 See infra Section III.A.
3 See infra Section III and sources cited therein.
4 See infra Section II for discussion and history of the two tests.
5 See infra Section IIID and sources cited therein.
at the apple,” a last-resort defense used only after others have failed. Framing entrapment in an “assistance of counsel” appeal rarely works, due in part to the defendant’s burden of showing that his lawyer’s shortcomings determined the outcome of the verdict. Entrapment appeals based on jury instructions generally fare better (the defendant’s burden is functionally much lighter), but is still far from a safe bet for the defendant. The procedural posture of these cases suggests that entrapment now functions less as a means of second-guessing the aggressive activity of the police (which was the defense’s genesis) and more as a way of second-guessing the attorneys and judges.

A third trend is the shift from cases about the classic elements of the defense, such as “inducement” or “predisposition,” to newer variations such as “sentencing entrapment” (manipulation of sentencing factors by savvy undercover agents) or “entrapment by estoppel” (where the defendant relied upon official assurances about the legality of the activity charged as an offense). Both of these variations operate under special rules and have yet to be accepted in most jurisdictions. While conceptually related to traditional entrapment, they really function as separate defenses. There is currently a split among the federal circuits about whether to recognize “sentencing entrapment,” meaning the Supreme Court is likely to address the issue at some point. Most of the literature to date frames “sentencing entrapment” as a problem of excessive investigative/prosecutorial discretion resulting from the adoption of mechanical sentencing guidelines, designed to limit judicial discretion. This article proposes, modestly,

\[ \text{See infra notes 75-89 and accompanying text.} \]
\[ \text{See infra Section IV.A and sources cited therein.} \]
\[ \text{See infra Section IV.D and sources cited therein.} \]
\[ \text{The Eleventh Circuit has rejected it entirely, the Seventh Circuit “disparages” it, but several other circuits recognize it. See infra notes 94-119 and accompanying text.} \]
that both “sentencing entrapment” and “entrapment by estoppel” might better be understood as a function of varying levels of “Knightian” uncertainty in legal rules and the effects of disparate ex ante legal knowledge.  

Understood within this framework, the practice of setting up defendants for stiffer sentences during the sting operation may not seem so nefarious as most commentators have asserted thus far.  

The increasingly rigid, mathematical nature of penal rules, whether
graded levels of offenses or sentencing guidelines, do not confer discretion or allow more room for abuse, but they do allow state agents to plan the outcomes of their cases before an investigation even begins.

Not surprisingly, the last few years have also seen a spate of cases about entrapment via the Internet, particularly in online chat rooms trawled by pedophiles. Agents are able to exploit the anonymity of the Internet to impersonate young adolescents (usually females) supposedly willing to meet up with strangers for a sexual rendezvous (where the defendant’s arrest occurs). These cases proceed under traditional rules for entrapment in the given jurisdiction (and generally result in upheld convictions), but the classic entrapment rules do not account for the lack of face-to-face contact in criminal activity conducted entirely through a computer, and how this significantly changes the nature of both crimes and sting operations.

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13 See infra Section V and sources cited therein.
15 See generally Donald S. Yamagami, Prosecuting Cyber-Pedophiles: How Can Intent Be Shown In A Virtual World In Light Of The Fantasy Defense? 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547 (2001) (arguing for legislative changes to facilitate greater law enforcement against online pedophiles, specifically to deal with newfangled defenses that the online environment has generated); William R. Graham, Jr., Uncovering And Eliminating Child Pornography Rings On The Internet: Issues Regarding and Avenues Facilitating Law Enforcement's Access To 'Wonderland,' 2000 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 457 (2000).
16 See, generally, Jarrod S. Hanson, Entrapment In Cyberspace: A Renewed Call For Reasonable Suspicion, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 535 (1996) (arguing that entrapment no longer provides adequate safeguards for civil liberties in cyberspace, and should have an added element of reasonable individualized suspicion prior to commencement of online sting operations); Jennifer Gregg, Caught In The Web: Entrapment In Cyberspace, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 157, 170 (1996) (arguing that traditional entrapment rules provide inadequate safeguards against abuses by law enforcement in the cyberspace arena). Both of these student comments take the position that online law enforcement activities should be more circumscribed, somewhat contrary to the position taken in this article. The strength of these two pieces of scholarship is the way in which they highlight the obsolescence of certain traditional rules and defenses pertaining to computer crime and computer-based law enforcement. See discussion infra Section V.
While all these trends may at first glance appear unrelated, together they form a realist’s picture of the entrapment defense and its evolving shape within our legal system. As a whole, the defense is in a state of decline, as indicated by both the decreasing number of cases and the procedural weakness in which they arise (post-sentencing). Newer areas such as sentencing entrapment and entrapment by estoppel have not produced a boon for questionably-convicted defendants, but probably need to be re-formulated in terms of legal uncertainty, which really drives these niche cases. Newer cases introducing novelties such as Internet chat room stings illustrate the obsolescence of the traditional rules because of the cumbersome application of the traditional rules to modern online communication.

Part II of this essay provides a very brief description of traditional entrapment rules and the issues that have created perennial controversy. The purpose of this section is to provide background for the reader. Part III describes the decline in entrapment cases in recent years and offers possible explanations for this phenomenon, as well as an assessment of its significance for our legal system. This section also includes a discussion of the weak procedural posture of many of the cases. Part IV discusses sentencing entrapment and entrapment by estoppel as a manifestation of uncertainty about legal rules, and offers the modest proposal that these two areas could be understood differently than most commentators have suggested. Part V discusses online chat room sting operations, and how they reflect on the current state of entrapment rules. Part VI offers a brief conclusion.

II. BACKGROUND
Entrapment is a creature of American Law, recognized nowhere else in the world.\textsuperscript{17} It is entirely a function of undercover operations\textsuperscript{18} (there is no entrapment from private individuals, only agents and informants).\textsuperscript{19} Undercover operations are a function of a special type of criminal

\textsuperscript{17} See Dru Stevenson, \textit{Entrapment and the Problem of Deterring Police Misconduct}, 37 CONN. L. REV. __ , __ (2004) (FORTHCOMING), discussing the origins of the defense in this country and its absence elsewhere. For a thoughtful comparative-law analysis of entrapment, contrasting the approaches used in Europe with the United States, see generally Jacqueline Ross, \textit{Tradeoffs in Undercover Investigations: A Comparative Perspective}, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1501 (2002) (explaining that in Europe the general rule is for the defendant to be found guilty but for the police to be charged as accessories to the crime in situations that would be analogous to entrapment in the U.S.). Ross discusses the fact that entrapment is a defense to criminal liability nowhere outside the United States. She adds: “Most Western European legal systems instead treat entrapment as a mode of complicity that fails to excuse targets but implicates the investigator in the crime... European systems treat such conduct as criminal unless a law expressly exempts the investigator from liability for specified acts.” Id. at 1521-22. Ian Walden & Anne Flanagan, \textit{Honeypots: A Sticky Legal Landscape?} 29 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH L. J. 317 (comparing entrapment rules for the U.S., England, Canada, and Australia, particularly with regards to computer-crime decoys known as “honeypots”).

Canada has taken an approach that resembles this (but it is a more stark variation). In \textit{Queen v. Mack}, 2 S.C.R. 903 (1988), the Supreme Court of Canada defined its rule on entrapment in light of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a Constitutional Act passed in 1982. The Canadian high court does not recognize entrapment as a defense to a crime, in the sense that the defendant can obtain a complete acquittal; nonetheless, it empowered the judiciary to use its discretion in rejecting “the spectacle of an accused’s being convicted of an offense which was the work of the state.” Id. at 81. When a court finds, \textit{after the defendant is convicted,} that the “authorities provide an opportunity to persons to commit an offence [sic] without reasonable suspicion or acting mala fides...”, the judge can issue a “stay of proceedings,” which puts the case on hold indefinitely without sentencing the defendant at all.

The entrapment defense may have emerged in this country and not elsewhere because both versions of the defense allow the courts to appropriate for themselves the power to supervise the criminal justice system, even though that power of the judiciary is not clearly present in the Constitution. For an argument along these lines, see Nancy Y. T. Hanewicz, \textit{Jacobson v. United States: The Entrapment Defense and Judicial Supervision of the Criminal Justice System}, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 1163 (1993) (arguing that both tests for entrapment serve the same basic purpose of giving the courts a self-appointed monitoring position over the police and sting operations). The subjective test enables courts to achieve this supposed goal less explicitly—and therefore is less likely to rankle the populace or the other branches of government—than the objective test. The enhanced power of the courts through the entrapment defense comports overall with the greater policy-making power of the judiciary in the United States than most other countries. Of course, another explanation may lie in the fact that many other countries have not regulated vices like sex crimes and addictive substances to the extent that the United States has, and thus have less need for sting operations. See William J. Stuntz, \textit{The Pathological Politics Of Criminal Law}, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 572-73 (2001). Many countries also simply lack the resources for elaborate sting operations.

\textsuperscript{18} See Stevenson, \textit{supra} note 17, at __:

Not all sting operations would constitute entrapment; but entrapment almost definitionally involves sting operations. No discussion of entrapment could have much depth without touching on public policy about government stings. Sting operations are but one method of law enforcement; police can also focus on investigating crimes that have already been committed, or engage in more monitoring and surveillance to catch would-be offenders in the nick of time.

\textsuperscript{19} See MARCUS, \textit{supra} note 1, at 334 (“Simply stated, there is no defense of private entrapment when the individual who induces the defendant is acting purely as a private citizen, not on behalf of the government. This rule is accepted by virtually every court in the United States, with little challenge.”). Private entrapment may, however, constitute criminal solicitation, subjecting the entrapper to criminal liability. See id. at 335, n. 21. Government agents are generally immune from this risk. For examples of failed attempts at raising “private entrapment” as a defense, see U.S. v. Turner, 2003 WL 22056405 at *2 n.3 (D.Mass. Sep 04, 2003) (“There is simply no defense of private entrapment as Turner’s hypothetical seems to suggest.”); U.S. v. Squillacote,
law, those focusing on “willing party” activities, like sexual impropriety with minors, sales of contraband and firearms, bribery, etc. 20 These consensual crimes naturally go unreported and are notoriously difficult to detect without excessive surveillance (which many would find over-intrusive). 21 Using stings and setups becomes the most feasible and efficient way to catch lawbreakers under these circumstances.

Stings and setups, however, can ensnare almost anyone if taken far enough. American courts began, therefore, to draw lines to separate true criminals (albeit gullible ones) from those

20 For more discussion of the historical correlation between entrapment and these transactional-type crimes, see Michael DeFeo, Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its History, Theory, and Application, 1 U. S. F. L. Rev. 244, 250-251 (1967); MARCUS, supra note 1, at 12. For a very thoughtful discussion of the prevalence of vice-related crimes in American law, and some of the unintended consequences, see Stuntz, supra note 17, at 573-76. Stuntz notes the ironies inherent in such legislated morality, but also notes that such crimes do indeed create costly externalities that concentrate in the neediest sectors of society:

Gambling, sex for hire, and intoxicants are all things that a large portion of the public wants, and these goods and services are sufficiently cheap, at least in some forms, that people of all social classes can afford them. At the same time, these things generate both intense disapproval among another large slice of the population, and substantial social costs that tend to concentrate in poor communities. The result is complicated: anti-vice crusades tend to have strong public support, but only so long as the crusades are targeted at a fairly small subset of the population. Our tradition of giving police and prosecutors basically unregulated enforcement discretion makes that targeting easy, which in turn permits legislatures to define criminal liability in ways that might otherwise be politically impossible.

Id. at 573.

21 Justice Rehnquist observed this point with eloquence:

The illicit manufacture of drugs is not a sporadic, isolated criminal incident, but a continuing, though illegal, business enterprise. In order to obtain convictions for illegally manufacturing drugs, the gathering of evidence of past unlawful conduct frequently proves to be an all but impossible task. Thus in drug-related offenses law enforcement personnel have turned to one of the only practicable means of detection: the infiltration of drug rings and a limited participation in their unlawful practices. Such infiltration is a recognized and permissible means of investigation.

Russell, 411 U.S. at 21.
who appeared to be simply victims, regular citizens dragged into activity they would never have done without police inducement.22 These lines were drawn in two ways. The Supreme Court crafted a rule focused on defendants’ “predisposition” to commit crime.23 Because its rule was binding on all federal courts and influential on many states, this approach became the majority rule, commonly called the “subjective test.”24

22 The first federal court to uphold an entrapment defense (at least with a published decision) was Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915), in which an immigration enforcement officer (in the nascent days of immigration restrictions) had lured the defendant into a scheme for smuggling Chinese illegal aliens into the country. The recruitment process had taken eighteen months; the court focused on the lack of evidence that the criminal intention had originated in the defendant’s mind. Id. at 415. There are a few English cases, starting in the late eighteenth century, that considered the defense, but English courts never accepted it, and the House of Lords officially disavowed it for the last time in the 1970’s. Some of the English cases did include dicta or dissenting opinions sharply criticizing police overreaching, but they did not acquit the defendant. There are also three or four (perhaps more) American cases from the nineteenth century, but the courts did not begin to recognize the defense until the early 1900’s. Perhaps the most frequently cited is Board of Comm’rs v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1864), with its memorable but disdainful commentary:“Even if inducements to commit crime could be assumed to exist in this case, the allegation of the defendant would be but the repetition of the plea as ancient as the world, and first interposed in Paradise: ‘The serpent beguiled me and I did eat.’” The first known state court to grant an acquittal based on entrapment was the Texas Court of Appeals in O’Brien v. State, 6 Tex.App. 665 (1879).

See Marcus, supra note 1, at 2-14; for a discussion of recent material from the House of Lords, see Andrew Ashworth, Re-Drawer the Boundaries of Entrapment, 2002 CRIM. L. REV. 161 (U.K. 2002).

23 The Supreme Court cases are as follows (listed in chronological order for readers’ convenience): Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210 (1932); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958) (holding that entrapment was established as a matter of law because petitioner was induced to commit the crime); U.S. v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 (1973) (the “defendant’s concession that there was evidence to support the jury’s finding that he was predisposed to commit the crime was fatal to his claim of entrapment.”); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (holding that the defense of entrapment was unavailable to the defendant because he was predisposed to commit the crime); Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 108 S.Ct. 883, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988) (denying the entrapment defense because defendant failed to meet all of the elements); and Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992) (reversing the defendant’s conviction because the government failed to establish that defendant was independently predisposed to commit the crime for which he was arrested).

The first Supreme Court case was Sorrels, where a federal agent posing as a tourist/fellow war veteran enticed his host, a hospitable farmer, to sell him some liquor during the Prohibition years. The lower courts had denied the availability of the entrapment defense; the Supreme Court reversed, stating that the defense should be available, at least in a pre-trial hearing. Justice Roberts wrote a concurrence arguing that no trial should occur at all where the police instigated the offense, whereas the majority focused too much on the defendant’s predisposition.

24 See Marcus, supra note 1, at 55 (“The overwhelming concern is with the ‘otherwise innocent’ person, not with the nature of the government activity.”); Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163 (1976) (hereinafter “Park”), for an exhaustive survey of cases up to that date. Park takes the position of defending the approach used in the federal courts, and he was one of the first two commentators to do so. Park attempted to change the terminology from “subjective test” to “federal entrapment defense,” because he felt that the word “subjective” was confusing, given its different meanings in different areas of law. Id. at 166 n. 4. His nomenclature did not catch on, however; to this day courts and commentators universally use the original terms.

The Supreme Court’s position on entrapment takes on special pragmatic importance for three reasons: 1) the increasing federalization of criminal law in the United States means that federal rules have an ever-greater relevance for law enforcement; 2) the federal criminal code comprehensively covers many of the so-called “victimless crimes” that lend themselves to enforcement via sting operations, and hence would naturally give rise to more entrapment claims; and 3) entrapment remains a common-law defense in the federal courts, meaning that the
A dissenting and vocal minority of the Supreme Court, however, insisted over the course of several decades that the rule should focus instead on the police activities themselves. This would allow more rules could be made about exactly which tricks were acceptable and which were not. The drafters of the Model Penal Code (MPC) agreed, as it fit better with the more progressive agenda of having juridical (and more mechanical) regulation of law enforcement. As states adopted portions of the MPC into their own statutes, several included in the MPC’s...
“objective test” for entrapment. 28 A few states, most notably Florida, have attempted to use both approaches simultaneously. 29

Both approaches present problems. The subjective test’s focus on the predisposition of the individual defendant opens the door for evidence of past crimes, which is prejudicial for many juries. 30 Also, given the defendant cannot deny having committed the crime itself (stings

28 See Note, “The Government Made Me Do It”: A Proposed Approach to Entrapment Under Jacobson v. United States, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 995, 1002 (1994) (listing thirteen; but the rules are constantly changing in the state courts and legislatures, with sometimes the courts adopting a different rule than appears to be in the statute, making it difficult to get a precise count). Alaska was the first jurisdiction to officially adopt the test in 1969, although it had won the hearts of innumerable commentators and dissenters on courts before then. See Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226 (Ala. 1969).

For more explanation and criticism of the “objective test” see Stevenson, supra note 17, at __:
The objective test is so named because it purports to look at what a hypothetical “average person” would have done if confronted with the same police come-on used in the defendant’s case. In this sense it resembles a “reasonableness” standard from torts, albeit not exactly, because the “reasonableness” in torts is more or less synonymous with “socially desirable,” while no one would claim that the defendant’s commission of a crime, which has always occurred in an entrapment case, would be “socially desirable” or something courts would want to encourage. Courts using the objective test actually focus less on what the imaginary average person would do than what the actual police did in the case before them.
The name “objective test” is sometimes used interchangeably with a defense called the “outrageous government conduct test,” but the latter refers to a constitutional due process violation as opposed to a common-law affirmative defense. In the federal system, it appears to have been put to rest by recent Supreme Court cases. For discussion, see Daloia, supra note __ (arguing that such a test, although currently not used anywhere, should be mandated legislatively for sexual enticement in sting operations); Buretta, supra note __ (suggesting merging entrapment and outrageous government conduct into a single constitutional due process test); Lord, supra note __.

29 Florida, Indiana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and New Mexico have variations on the objective test that appear to be hybrids. See Fla. Stat. Ann.777.201 (West 1992); Ind. Code. Ann. 35-41-3-9 (Burns 1985); State v. Little, 435 A.2d 517 (N.H. 1981) (holding that the burden is on the defendant to prove the defense of entrapment); N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:2-12 (West 1982); Baca v. State, 742 P.2d 1043 (N.M. 1987) (ruling that the defendant proved entrapment as a defense because he was improperly induced to commit the crime); see discussion in MARCUS, supra note 1, at 180-84 (“A misreading of the objective test can cause inclusion of the predisposition element.”). A few commentators have proposed hybrid approaches, but the idea has not gained widespread acceptance. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Klar, The Need for A Dual Approach to Entrapment, 59 WASH. U. L. Q. 199 (1981); see generally Note, supra note 17; Lord, supra note 63 (arguing for both a hybrid entrapment defense to be available as well as a separate due process type defense).

30 See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 458 (Roberts, J. dissenting); LAFAVE, supra note 12 at § 5.2(d). Such evidence may often be admissible anyway, to impeach the character of the defendant if she testifies on her own behalf, and to impeach the reliability of other character witnesses for the defense (“Did you know your “trusted friend” had three felony convictions? Are you sure you know this person very well?”). This, in turn, can provide enforcement too much latitude in targeting people with previous convictions, rather than looking for actual perpetrators of the latest unsolved crimes. Laurie Levenson notes a similar phenomenon in the context of “three-strikes-you’re-out” rules, claiming that defendants with previous convictions will not risk life imprisonment and therefore plead guilty easily. When the defendant enters a plea agreement instead of going to trial, there is no opportunity to raise the exclusionary rules or claim that there were Fourth or Fifth Amendment violations. Thus, Levenson argues, police can afford to be much more cavalier about the exclusionary rules in cases where they know the suspect has two
usually set up the defendant to be caught in the act), denying the disposition to do it sounds contradictory to the jury.\textsuperscript{31}

The objective test purports to avoid these pitfalls,\textsuperscript{32} but instead allows the awkward situation of acquitting some obviously dangerous criminals simply because the judge feels squeamish about the undercover agent’s aggressive tactics.\textsuperscript{33} There is also doubt about whether the objective test is effective in deterring police misconduct, given that police tend to measure their success in terms of the number of arrests they make rather than the number of convictions to which they contribute.\textsuperscript{34} The fact that arrestees may eventually end up going free is a less

\textsuperscript{31} Justice Stewart put it this way in his dissent in \textit{Russell}: “The very fact that he has committed an act that Congress has determined to be illegal demonstrates conclusively that he is not innocent of the offense.” \textit{Russell}, 451 U.S. at 442 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

In addition, the term itself can be confusing for juries. See, e.g., Deis, \textit{supra} note 1, at 1209 (stating that “predisposition” is defined as “one who would have likely committed the same crime, without government inducement, only in circumstances that would have made police detection more difficult and more costly”); Posner, \textit{supra} note 30, at 1220. This begs the question, of course. Does “likely to commit the crime” mean more than 50% (i.e., “probable”)? Or could it mean likely enough to be “not remote” (i.e., 25%)? It is an unanswered question how much “likelihood” is enough to make the person dangerous enough to be a burden to society.

Some critics contend that the subjective approach seems to give law enforcement \textit{carte blanche} to employ any form of trickery or even coercion to get the defendant to commit a crime; no one can feel safe in such a society. See \textit{LaFave, Criminal Law} at 458 (§ 5.2(d)) (“A second criticism of the subjective approach is that it creates, in effect, an ‘anything goes’ rule for use against persons who can be shown by their prior convictions or otherwise to have predisposed to engage in criminal behavior.”).

\textsuperscript{32} Paul Marcus put it nicely: “The greatest strength of the objective test may simply be that it avoids the problems of the subjective test.” \textit{Marcus}, \textit{supra} note 1, at 104.

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{See LaFave, Criminal Law} §5.2(e), p. 459; \textit{Marcus, supra} note 1, at 108. Paul Marcus observes that many object that the test is rather unworkable in its application, which seems to be another way of saying the same thing: “The second major criticism of the objective test deals with its practical application. Because the standard involves the hypothetical ‘average person,’ or ‘reasonable person,’ or ‘normally law-abiding person,’ it may be difficult to apply. The conceptual difficulty is that such individuals generally do not commit crimes.” \textit{Marcus, supra} note 1, at 109. See also \textit{Pascu v. State}, 577 P.2d 1064 (Alaska 1978) (complaining that the test in unmanageable for the same reason). Justice Scalia stated in his concurrence in \textit{Matthews} that “the defense of entrapment will rarely be genuinely inconsistent with the defense on its merits,” which perhaps hinting that he views the defense as mostly unnecessary. \textit{Matthews}, 485 U.S. at 67 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{See Stevenson, supra} note 17 at __. There seems to be a growing consensus among commentators that police maximize arrests, not convictions. For a review of the relevant literature, \textit{see Stuntz, supra} note 17, at 538 n. 133. Stuntz himself concludes:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Police differ from prosecutors in (at least) two critical ways. Their focus is on a different stage of criminal proceedings. With some qualifications, prosecutors maximize convictions; police are more likely to maximize arrests. And they are more culturally distinct from the rest of the population than are prosecutors, so that departmental culture is a more powerful force in police conduct than it is in prosecutorial behavior.
\end{itemize}
urgent concern than catching the perpetrator in the first place. In addition, the objective test creates a type of legal certainty that is more likely to favor the state than potential defendants. Jurisdictions using the objective test (nearly a third of the states, according to some authorities) generate clear precedents about the lines undercover agents cannot cross. The agents are more likely to have ex ante legal knowledge of these specific parameters than the general population (which knows very little about the law) or even potential criminals. The state actors therefore are in a superior position to find loopholes in the rules, to plan around them, and to make sure their tactics fall just shy of the line. This is true in general; greater specificity in legal rules favors the parties that are more established in society and have greater resources for obtaining legal counsel beforehand.35 Thus, even though the objective test seems on the surface to be more

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pro-defendant – it scrutinizes the police rather than the accused – the ultimate effect may be to make the state’s sting operations almost invincible and the defendant’s conviction more certain, due to the greater certainty in the rules.

The nature of the entrapment defense creates some problems with accumulating reliable data. Defendants who assert the defense successfully are acquitted (or have charges dismissed), and there is usually no written decision issued in such a case that would appear on Westlaw or Lexis or in the published reports. The written opinions – especially the appellate opinions, due to double jeopardy concerns—usually reflect only the cases where the entrapment defense failed. It is therefore difficult to determine exactly how often the defense is raised or how often it succeeds, although the reported cases do provide helpful clues. The conventional wisdom is that it is rarely raised (probably due to the risks of self-incrimination that go along with it) and that it rarely succeeds, but this assertion seldom comes supported by empirical data or even survey evidence.

than any over-deterrent effect, given that aversion to uncertainty outweighs aversion to risk. See generally Dru Stevenson, Toward a New Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. ___ (2004) (publication forthcoming); see also Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 279, 299 (1986) (“Our analysis shows that if the uncertainty created by the legal system is distributed normally about the optimal level of compliance, and if the uncertainty is not too large – two seemingly plausible assumptions – then the result under normal damage rules will be too much deterrence rather than too little.”); Ehrlich & Posner, supra this note, at 263 (“Those costs [of overdeterrence through uncertainty] must be compared with the costs in reduced prevention of socially undesirable activity as a result of loopholes that must arise when the legislature reformulates the statutory prohibition in more specific terms.”); Ferguson and Peters, supra this note, at 7 (“More complex rules provide a greater advantage to those skilled in creating loopholes.”).

36 See, e.g., Carrie Casey & Lisa Marino, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 577, 599 (2003) (“The entrapment defense is also only rarely successful.”); Raphael Prober & Jill Randall, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 571, 593 (2002) (“The entrapment defense is also only rarely successful.”); Beth Allison Davis & Josh Vitullo, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 777, 803 (2001); Bruce A. Green, There But For Fortune: Real-Life Vs. Fictional "Case Studies" In Legal Ethics, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 985 (2000); Keri C. McGrath & Jennifer L. Pfeiffer, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 661, 681 (1999); John D. Lombardo, Causation and Objective Entrapment: Toward A Culpability-Centered Approach, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 209, 213 (1996), citing Park's article, supra note 12 at 272; LaFave also mentions this problem in his section on the procedural aspects of the defense, noting that it is perceived to be a minefield for defendants wherein their character is put at issue; some consider it a defense of last resort. See LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 460 (§ 5.2 (f)).
III. CONCENTRATION & DECLINE

A. Introduction

Entrapment cases are disproportionately concentrated in a few states; they are declining almost everywhere, including these concentration points. Many factors could account for this, but my thesis is that both these phenomenon are largely dependent on levels of uncertainty and knowledge of the relevant legal rules.

The data supporting these conclusions is more survey-oriented than scientific or statistical. True scientific mapping of the entrapment defense, if possible in spite of the limitations already mentioned, could be the subject of future research. Even though the nature of written judicial opinions restricts a survey to cases where criminal defenses failed, we can draw some useful inferences from the numbers such a survey provides.

The numbers indicate that in both the federal and state systems, entrapment cases are on the decline. This is particularly striking because the number of criminal cases, especially drug

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37 California, Florida, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Washington are among the states with far more entrapment cases than other states with large populations and significant crime rates.

cases, generally increases over time with the population and with the ongoing advances of the War on Drugs.\textsuperscript{39} There is no reason to think, for instance, that undercover or sting operations themselves are decreasing. For example, a Westlaw search comparing drug-related entrapment cases with the overall number of drug related cases in a given year shows that the ratio of reported entrapment cases to the larger body of cases for the same substantive offense has dropped to single digits (usually five or less) in almost every state. The same ratio was well into the double-digits almost everywhere approximately fifteen years ago. These are not precise figures or even categories, of course, but the trends are remarkable. Westlaw searches are not perfect—they turn up many false positives—but one would expect similar numbers of false positives for the same search conducted for different years (but perhaps not across jurisdictions).

Yet almost every jurisdiction saw a spike in the ratio of entrapment cases around 1988, and a smaller surge in the early 1990’s, and then a steady decline since then to numbers half the size of the peaks figures, or even less.

\textsuperscript{39} There is evidence that interpersonal crime (murder, assault, rape, etc.) and larceny decreased noticeably in the 1990’s, and there are competing explanations for this phenomenon (changes in gun laws, economic conditions, etc.). For a thought-provoking survey of the various explanations, see Steven D. Levitt, \textit{Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990’s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not}, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163 (2004). Levitt does not discuss the types of crimes that are typically the subject of sting operations, however; it is difficult to find data on these crimes in particular. The numbers of reported cases on Westlaw continue to grow, of course. Another recent publication by Levitt, reviewing the work of others, discusses the War on Drugs and notes that the number of those incarcerated on drug charges grew from 30,000 nationwide in 1980 to 400,000 by 1996, the period during which entrapment cases peaked and then began to decline. Steven D. Levitt, \textit{Review of Drug Way Heresies by MacCoun and Reuter}, 41 J. ECON. LIT. 540, 541 (2003).

Levitt offers a way to reconcile these disparate trends (increases in drug convictions, decreases in violent crimes):

\ldots [V]iolent and property crime are 1-3 percent lower as a result of the incarceration of drug offenders. This result may seem counterintuitive since increased drug prisoners have crowded out punishments for other offenders. Empirically, however, incarcerating a drug criminal yields almost as large a reduction in violent and property crime as locking up someone convicted of those crimes. As a consequence, the net effect of increasing drug punishment is to reduce other crimes. \textit{Id.} at 544.
Given that the written decisions reflect mostly losing defenses,\(^{40}\) one explanation for the decline might be that more defendants are winning now when they raise entrapment; this might

seem to explain the drop in entrapment-related appeals. This explanation, however, is inadequate for the following reasons.

First, the opinions we do have, although representing cases where the defense failed at trial (or failed to arise procedurally), describe in vivid detail the facts and circumstances under which entrapment defenses lose. These fact summaries can leave the reader wondering if any defendant could ever win under such strict rules – many of the failed entrapment claims seem plausible. Entrapment is an “affirmative defense,” meaning the defendant bears the burden of offering some evidence of entrapment before the prosecution must respond as part of proving the state’s case (the level of proof required of the defendant varies somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but is lower than a burden of proof). Courts regularly find insufficient evidence of entrapment where the stipulated facts record a complex, heavy-handed sting operation. In other words, the cases we have leave no reason to believe that other defendants easily prevail with the entrapment defense.

Second, if a decline was due to more defendants winning, one would expect this, in turn, to be explained by some sudden shift in the rules to favor defendants. This has not occurred. The rules of entrapment in almost all jurisdictions have been the same since the early 1980’s, if not earlier.

Third, even if the rules had become more lenient (or the courts had found some other mechanism to accomplish the same thing), a rise in acquittal rates from the entrapment defense would presumably increase its popularity with more marginal defendants, especially given the existence of a defined set of local defense attorneys. An easy acquittal technique would be

v. Cox, 242 F.3d 368 (Table, Text in WESTLAW), 2000 WL 1761884 (2nd Cir. 2000)(defendant’s entrapment defense unsuccessful because government proved he had the predisposition to sell cocaine).

adopted by everyone, even those with marginal claims to the defense. This would reduce the number of plea agreements and increase the number of defendants losing at trial, at least for a short time period. In fact, one might expect the numbers of losing cases to rise along with the numbers of wins, until the real boundaries became clear. This observation could also apply in reverse: a spike in the number of entrapment appeals, even though they were loser defenses, could reflect more unreported acquittals for the same period.

For these reasons, it is reasonable to glean some tentative, general conclusions from the reported entrapment cases, even if they do prove only a partial picture. The partial picture we have indicates that entrapment is on the decline as a defense everywhere. In addition, the cases tend to be concentrated in a few states: California, Florida, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee,

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42 See, e.g., Delice v. State, 2004 WL 1103543 (Fla.App. 4 Dist., May 19, 2004); State v. Blanco, 2004 WL 86646, (Fla.App. 4 Dist., Jan 21, 2004) (the celebrated “hottie defense” case); Perez v. State, 856 So.2d 1074 (Fla.App. 5 Dist., Oct 17, 2003) (holding that evidence of prior convictions showed defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime); Concepcion v. State, 857 So.2d 299 (Fla.App. 5 Dist., Oct 03, 2003) (holding that jury instructions and the use of the word “or” constituted reversible error); Worley v. State, 848 So.2d 491 (Fla.App. 5 Dist., Jul 03, 2003); Marreel v. State, 841 So.2d 600 (Fla.App. 4 Dist., Apr 02, 2003) (ruling that the entrapment defense is denied because law enforcement agents did not properly induce the defendant).


Texas,\footnote{45} and Washington\footnote{46} are states with the highest numbers of entrapment cases. The large criminal dockets of these cases helps explain the larger number of cases for a certain criminal defense, but states like New York,\footnote{47} Pennsylvania,\footnote{48} New Jersey,\footnote{49} and Illinois\footnote{50} are surprisingly absent from the list. These latter states have large populations and large criminal dockets, but their numbers of reported entrapment cases are less than five or ten per year.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{47}{See infra notes \_\_ for a list of recent cases.}
\footnotetext{48}{See infra note \_\_ listing recent cases.}
\end{footnotes}
There are, therefore, two parallel phenomena operating in tandem: the concentration of entrapment cases in certain places, and the overall decline in every jurisdiction. Both merit discussion.

B. Concentration & Uncertainty

One might expect that the difference in legal rules between jurisdictions would explain the concentration of cases in certain areas. Such a view would have an inherent appeal to those who believe in the rule of law as the causal factor for legal outcomes. The appeal is heightened, naturally, where there are two rival rules at play, a subjective and objective approach.

Regardless of the relative merits of the rules, they do not appear to affect the relative number of entrapment cases that arise. Pennsylvania, for example, uses the objective test, but has had only five reported entrapment cases in the last three years;\(^{51}\) it had only three in the three years before that.\(^{52}\) New York uses the subjective test,\(^{53}\) and its number of entrapment cases for

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\(^{53}\) By comparison, covering the exact same time period as the preceding footnotes, see People v. Moulttrie, 5 A.D.3d 241, 773 N.Y.S.2d 287 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept., Mar 18, 2004) (denying the defendant’s request to charge the affirmative defense of entrapment because there was no evidence that defendant was improperly induced to commit the crime); People v. Coleman, 4 A.D.3d 677, 773 N.Y.S.2d 146 (N.Y.A.D. Feb 26, 2004) (holding that the entrapment defense was neither raised nor preserved); People v. Delaney, 309 A.D.2d 968, 765 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y.A.D. Oct 23, 2003) (rejecting the defendant’s entrapment defense because there was no evidence that the officer actively persuaded the defendant to engage in the transaction); People v. Otto, 2003 WL 21974317, 2003 (N.Y. 2003)(administrative entrapment case); People v. Arias, 303 A.D.2d 592, 756 N.Y.S.2d 487 (N.Y2003); People v. Missrie, 300 A.D.2d 35, 751 N.Y.S.2d 16 (N.Y. Dec 05, 2002) (granting a new trial because of erroneous jury instructions on entrapment); People v. Castro, 299 A.D.2d 557, 750 N.Y.S.2d 510 (N.Y. 2002) (rejecting the defendant’s entrapment defense because he was predisposed to commit the offense); People v. Dover, 294 A.D.2d 594, 743 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. 2002) (denying the defendant’s claim of ineffective counsel based on his counsel’s failure to raise the entrapment defense); People v. Chou, 292 A.D.2d 199, 738 N.Y.S.2d 210 (N.Y. 2002) (rejecting
the last three years was little more than Pennsylvania’s; but the numbers are still paltry for a state with such an active and interesting criminal docket. Ohio\textsuperscript{54} and Texas,\textsuperscript{55} in contrast, each had over twenty-five entrapment cases in the last three years – their numbers are close, yet Ohio uses the subjective test and Texas the subjective test. Numerous other comparisons could be made to illustrate the same phenomenon: the test used by courts in a given jurisdiction is not very predictive of how many entrapment cases will arise, and therefore the effect of the rules on more causal factors (like the activities of police or the acquittal rates for defendants) is also in doubt.

The concentration of entrapment cases in certain jurisdictions is more likely to result from a combination of three factors other than the rule of law: 1) undercover or sting operations being favored by local law enforcement chiefs; 2) peer influence among the local defense bar, and 3) a state of uncertainty about the legal rules in a given jurisdiction. I contend that the first two factors are largely dependent on the third, but not vice-versa, making the third the most important variable.

There is no question that undercover operations are unevenly distributed across the United States. Certain law enforcement agencies embark on undercover or sting operations as part of a discreet project targeting a particular crime. Ohio, for example, recently deployed enforcement officers to pose as decoys in Internet chat rooms to catch pedophiles,\textsuperscript{56} imitating a job often done by federal agents; this led to a few Internet-entrapment cases in Ohio that are not typical for most states. Such projects depend on available resources, local political pressure to respond to crime waves, etc. Undercover activities may also react to legal rules, although police

\textsuperscript{54}See supra note __.
\textsuperscript{55}See supra note __.
are generally more focused on making arrests than obtaining convictions. Bright-line rules are conducive to planning operations ahead of time, so as to work around the rules or to find loopholes.\(^{57}\) For example, if police know that certain types of sting operations are expressly rejected by local courts, the police can simply resort to alternative schemes to sidestep the rules. Clarity and specificity in legal rules create legal loopholes.\(^{58}\) Those with good ex ante legal knowledge and time to plan ahead are in the best position to take advantage of loopholes in the rules. In other words, legal certainty favors entities that are established, endowed with resources, and able to afford legal counsel (or get it for free somehow). Few entities fit this profile better than the state itself, including its enforcement arm.\(^{59}\) Legal certainty disfavors small or less-enfranchised parties, such as individual defendants, who are unwary of the stronger party’s strategy (designed around the rules). Weaker parties also face less recourse or redress when the case is in court, because the inflexibility of bright-line rules determines the outcome.\(^{60}\) This is not to say bright-line rules are wrong or right; they are efficient to the extent that they yield predictable, consistent results, but predictable results are most beneficial to those with the knowledge ahead of time. Legal foresight is not evenly distributed.

Conversely, small parties or individual defendants are sometimes favored by uncertainty in the law, which allows for windfall benefits in individual cases that would otherwise be unavailable – the legal equivalent of “profits” in Frank Knight’s use of the term.\(^{61}\) Thus, one would expect to find more undercover or sting operations in jurisdictions with clear, specific

\(^{57}\) See, e.g., Ferguson & Peters, supra note 35.  
^{58} Id.  
^{59} Id. at __.  
^{60} Id.  
^{61} See generally KNIGHT, supra note __; ELLSBERG, supra note __, at 131-43 (explaining “uncertainties that are not risks”).
rules about entrapment, just as ex ante sentencing manipulation by agents occurs in the presence of mechanical sentencing guidelines.

The opportunities for entrapment cases depend on the number of undercover operations – or rather, the number of undercover operations conducted at the margins of legality. Entrapment cases are necessarily a subset of the number of sting operations; factors that encourage more sting operations, like bright-line rules about what tactics are permissible, will also be factors that can increase the number of entrapment cases in that area. At the same time, as more entrapment cases come, challenging various undercover tactics, more lines are drawn, or the lines become clearer, which makes subsequent attempts at pleading entrapment futile – the outcome will be predictable.

Peer influences among criminal defense lawyers also affect the proliferation of certain defenses or trial strategies. If a few defendants succeed with the entrapment defense, this will quickly become known to other lawyers working in that courthouse, who will consider adopting it for their own clients. This, too, is dependent on uncertainty in the legal rules. Uncertain outcomes will encourage defendants and their attorneys to take their chances at trial, but this becomes futile as the outcomes become a sure thing; plea agreements replace trials as certainty increases.62 Uncertainty is the most important variable determining where entrapment cases will concentrate.

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62 Obviously bright-line rules are more efficient for moving cases on the judicial docket, and generally lower transaction costs for all the parties. Criminal defendants, however, do not always benefit from an efficient, predictable prosecutorial system as much as they do from a system allowing for some unpredictable results.
C. Declines and Uncertainty

The overall rise and fall of the entrapment cases over the last twenty years also relates to the varying levels of uncertainty in the legal rules. The first real spike in the entrapment cases (for example, where they went to double-digit percentages of the overall drug-crime docket) occurred in almost every state in the three years between 1988 and 1991, followed by a second large spike in the three years between 1991 and 1995. There was a significant drop-off after 1995, and a continuing decline to the present, where the levels have returned to their pre-1998 state.

The temporary surge in entrapment cases in the late eighties and early nineties was due to two contemporaneous (and related) events: the War on Drugs (there was a huge increase in drug convictions and undercover endeavors in the late 1980’s) and a pair of entrapment decisions by the Supreme Court. The War on Drugs generated far more undercover operations than ever before, not only for narcotics but also for related crimes, such as firearm offenses and money laundering. These ensnaring tactics were new to many defense attorneys and defendants alike; it would have been easy to see a possible entrapment claim in every case. The defense had been relatively rare prior to this time, but so were undercover operations (at least compared to the present time) so it is unsurprising that many of those caught in the new abundance of sting operations would try the defense created to address this very form of law enforcement, even though it must have been only vaguely familiar to many of those using it. As the courts

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63 The reported cases from earlier decades, such as the 1960’s and 70’s, reveal rare instances of the entrapment defense, which could be explained in terms of predating the War on Drugs (which made undercover operations much more commonplace) and the modern Supreme Court cases on the subject. The problem with drawing any sort of conclusions from these early periods is that older cases are less likely to be available on Westlaw and Lexis – especially unpublished opinions.

64 The first Supreme Court cases from the Prohibition Era contain similar comments that the defense, unknown at common law, was turning up everywhere as undercover operations to enforce prohibition and Comstock laws were becoming more widespread. There is no available data to draw a comparison to the present time, but one may surmise that the present era has far surpassed any earlier periods in this regard.
addressed the cases and the rules and outcomes became more predictable, the defense would have become less useful. Prosecutors would not bother to take cases to trial where it was clear that the defendant had a strong case for entrapment, and defendants with weaker arguments would tend to enter plea bargains. Legal uncertainty is likely to last for only a certain number of cases (a dozen or two in a jurisdiction would probably cover enough fact patterns to have something relevant for most new cases).

A 1988 ruling by the Supreme Court, *Mathews v. United States*, also seemed to spur the increase in entrapment cases everywhere. The defendant was an employee of the Small Business Administration and was caught accepting a bribe as part of a sting operation. He was denied a jury instruction on entrapment because he refused to admit to certain elements of the charges. The Court held that defendants are entitled, as a matter of law, to jury instructions regarding entrapment whenever there is sufficient evidence to indicate the possibility of entrapment. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on entrapment is naturally very influential even in states using other tests. Even though this case was not an obvious expansion of the entrapment defense, its subtle tinkering created uncertainty about how to apply the rules to various fact patterns, allowing more fodder for litigation.

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66 *Mathews*, 485 U.S. at 60.
67 *Id.* at 61.
68 *Id.* at 62.
The second of the pair of Supreme Court cases from this period was the 1992 case *Jacobson v. United States*, in which the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the defendant in a child-pornography case. The government agents in this case had spent two years sending increasingly provocative (and increasingly focused on underage subjects) pornography, until the defendant succumbed to the pressure to order some explicitly illegal material, which prompted his arrest. This case led to a flurry of speculation in the academic journals about the rules being relaxed, because the defendant won in this given case. *Jacobson* also generated a spate of new attempts to use the entrapment defense by hopeful parties. The rules were uncertain. As the

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71 See generally id.
first few rounds of new cases were litigated, however, it became clear that any change in the entrapment rules would be applicable to only a narrow set of circumstances or facts, and the furor subsided. In fact, by raising the uncertainty temporarily (because of the narrowness of its ruling), the Supreme Court’s somewhat confusing ruling probably contributed to an eventual decrease in the number of entrapment cases. The temporary uncertainty would have spawned new attempts at entrapment claims; the new surplus of cases provided opportunities for more judicial holdings on more fact patterns, regarding various subtleties of the rules; and once the new batch of cases was resolved, the rules would be clearer than ever. This would make entrapment claims in the trial context more and more unfruitful. The Jacobson ruling was narrow enough to result in uncertainty for only a short time; it did not require a wholesale reassessment of the defense.

It should be noted that simply creating a definitive rule does not equal legal certainty. For example, several legislatures have codified their test for entrapment (whether subjective or objective), perhaps to pre-empt the courts from choosing a test for themselves. Changed rules cause a surge in related cases until the courts have time to apply the new rules to various sets of facts. Once a number of fact patterns have been adjudicated, the certainty effect sets in, and the cases that are tried or appealed diminish.

73 The main uncertainty resulting from Jacobson was whether the government would thereafter have to show some individualized reasonable suspicion of the defendant before commencing the “inducement” phase of a sting; no courts subsequently adopted this approach, however, and the issue has subsided.

D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The procedural posture of a defense can be another signal of decline. In the context of entrapment, procedural posture reaches the level of paradox.

Entrapment is an “affirmative defense,” which means the defendant does not deny the allegations but rather asserts some extenuating circumstances that should cancel out any culpability. Affirmative defenses are supposed to appear early in the drama of the criminal trial; many states require that defendants notify the court and prosecution of a contemplated entrapment defense (and other affirmative defenses as well) before a trial is set, often so that

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76 Generally speaking, unless a defense that goes to the merits of the prosecutor’s allegations, affirmative defenses involve shifting the burdens of proof in a criminal case from the prosecution to the defendant, usually temporarily and to a lesser degree, and then back to the prosecutor. Regarding entrapment, “The courts have split as to which parts of the entrapment defense must be proven by whom. In addition, questions are raised as to the standards of proof and the allocation of burdens.” Marcus, supra note 1, at 216. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has not defined the burden of proof issue precisely for the subjective test used in federal courts. Id. Most jurisdictions require the defendant to make a prima facie case for entrapment – most use a “preponderance of evidence” burden of proof at this point – before the burden shifts back to the prosecutor to disprove the allegations or to show that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. Id. at 216-23. The prosecutor carries the normal burden of proof on this point. Id. at 226. States using the objective test almost always place the burden on the defendant to show that the police activity was outrageous. Id. at 227-28.

77 See, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. § 46-15-323 (2) (2004) (“Within 30 days after the arraignment or at a later time as the court may for good cause permit, the defendant shall provide the prosecutor with a written notice of the defendant's intention to introduce evidence at trial of good character or the defenses of alibi, compulsion, entrapment, justifiable use of force, or mistaken identity”) State v. Dezeew, 297 Mont. 379, 382, 992 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Mont., Dec 27, 1999); People v. Day, 665 N.E.2d 867, 870 (Ill. App. 1996) (“he gave the state notice of his intent to use the entrapment defense at trial”). See also New Mexico Rules §5-508; Fla. R. Crim. P. Rule § 3.200.

Such pre-trial notice does not necessarily bind the state or the defense to bring the defense up at trial, depending on the jurisdiction. See State v. Davis, 14 Or.App. 422, 512 P.2d 1366 (Or.App. 1973). The pre-trial notice rule has been challenged, sometimes successfully. See, e.g., State v. Lane, 2002 WL 1299771 (Ohio App. 2002) (successful challenge to such a rule by defendant).
the court can weigh the claim in a preliminary hearing. In some states (especially those using the objective test) a decision in the defendant’s favor at this stage results in a complete dismissal of the charges, rather than an acquittal (which has both pros and cons for the defendant).

Even in states where entrapment is a question for the jury to decide after trial (the majority rule), the entrapment defense is intended or designed to arise early in the case.

Yet that is not how the cases always play out. In fact, a surprising number of the cases – possibly a third to half of all entrapment claims in recent years – occur in the context of post-trial, post-sentencing appeals. Some of these appeals are complaints against the trial judge for refusing to let the jury consider an entrapment defense. More interesting is the large number of cases couched as appeals for ineffective assistance of counsel, where the defense attorney did not

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79 See, e.g., Hernandez v. State, 2004 WL 1403706 at *6 (Tex.App. 2004) (defendant successful where “The proper remedy when the state fails to disprove the entrapment defense at a pretrial hearing is dismissal of the prosecution with prejudice.”); Taylor v. State, 886 S.W.2d 262, 266 (Tex.Crim.App., 1994) (holding that the defense was successful because the pretrial determination was in the nature of an acquittal and did not impact the charging instrument); State v. Turner, 805 N.E.2d 124 (Ohio. App. 2004) (defendant unsuccessful at obtaining dismissal); West v. Com., 2004 WL 68524 at *4 (Ky.App., Jan 16, 2004).

80 A dismissal of criminal charges can be beneficial to the defendant in that it eliminates the legal costs of going through a trial (as required to obtain an acquittal), and can avoid trial evidence and testimony that would generally tarnish the defendant’s reputation. On the other hand, dismissal does not trigger double jeopardy protections, meaning the defendant could face revamped charges relating to the same events if the prosecutor wishes to try again.


But see U.S. v. Gurolla, 333 F.3d 944 (9th Cir 2003) (reversing where defendant was forbidden to submit entrapment evidence to jury); U.S. v. Garcia, 1 Fed.Appx. 641, 2001 WL 30043 (9th Cir. 2001) (trial court’s refusal to give entrapment instructions held to be error, cases reversed and remanded).
Either the trial attorney encouraged defendants to accept a plea agreement, which they regret once they receive their sentence, or an alternative trial strategy, like defeating the charges on the merits, made the entrapment defense untenable. In other words, the defendant opted for another strategy besides entrapment the first time around (a plea bargain or a denial/alibi), and used entrapment either as an afterthought or a backup plan. These are notoriously difficult appeals to win.

Even the appeals about jury instructions often involve the defense being raised too late, procedurally, for the judge to include it in the instructions without creating confusion or bias. In

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these cases, the feeling comes through again that the defense was an afterthought or “plan B” when the trial itself started to go badly.\footnote{The remaining instructions-related appeals are almost always cases where the defense was asserted half-heartedly (i.e., no supporting evidence was proffered) or contradicted the defendant’s other arguments.} Entrapment was not the dominant theory of the defendant’s case in the first place.

There is a paradox, then, between entrapment’s official procedural (to arise at the beginning of the case) and the posture it often takes in practice. There are, of course, strategic reasons for saving entrapment as a last resort. It usually requires the defendant to admit the allegations,\footnote{The entrapment defense usually includes an admission that the defendant committed the acts charged, with full intent, but should be excused due to entrapment; a regular defense (not one of the “affirmative defenses”) means denying either the actions alleged or the requisite criminal intent. Most courts impose restrictions on inconsistent defenses. See MARCUS, \textit{supra} note 1, at 261-65. The Supreme Court opened the door for some inconsistent defense in \textit{Matthews}, 485 U.S. 58 (1988), but many courts still impose some restrictions. \textit{Id.}} and to have one’s “rap sheet” come in for the jury’s review;\footnote{See \textit{supra} note _ and cases cited therein. “When the entrapment defense is raised, the prosecution may produce evidence concerning relevant prior acts of the defendant to show predisposition.” MARCUS, \textit{supra} note 1, at 149. Such evidence would normally be inadmissible and can prejudice the jury against the defendant.} both of these can backfire, making this a gamble. If the defendant believes the prosecution’s case is weak on the merits, entrapment would not be the first choice, regardless of what the undercover agents did. Once the defendant loses and is in prison, however, there is little to lose by adding entrapment to the appeal.

The fact that so many of the entrapment cases arise after conviction, however, highlights the image of a defense in decline. The paltry numbers of cases in recent years would be even smaller if one excluded those that are truly desperate attempts at an “ineffective assistance” appeal. The weaker posture of the defense in this context contributes to the result that the majority of reported entrapment claims are losers. The appeals for ineffective assistance of
counsel lose almost invariably, due to the appellant’s special burden of showing that the neglected strategy would have affected the outcome. 87

In hindsight, courts feel that the entrapment defense would have failed even if it had arisen at trial. Of course, these cases are self-selected to be the ones with the worst facts for claiming entrapment. The effect on precedent for future defendants can only be deleterious, because they include a recitation of a fact sting-operation fact pattern and then a dismissive conclusion: the defendant did not show that an entrapment defense would have mattered in this case. 88 Although the holding strictly means only that the defendant failed to submit enough evidence, the subtle effect is to hint that similar facts in future cases would make an entrapment defense a waste of time. The challenges to the jury instructions fare better 89 but this is still not a “silver bullet” for defendants – many such appeals fail, and those remanded sometimes express doubt about the likelihood of convincing the jury on the second try.

Entrapment, then, is often a second-best defense, as indicated by its continuing place as a backup plan. As mentioned above, asserting entrapment can be very risky, so the numbers are not terribly surprising in this sense. It seems that many of the affirmative defenses would present similar strategic risks, as many involve admission of the alleged actions, a burden of production

87 In federal courts, the defendant must show “that but for counsel's failure to request an entrapment instruction, "the result of the proceeding would have been different." Cunigan v. Hurley, 2004 WL 540446 (6th Cir. 2004); “The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); "[A] defendant must show that [trial] counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's representation. People v. Pickens, 446 Mich. 298, 303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).


88 See, e.g., Tse v. United States, 290 F.3d 462, 465 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[T]he evidence at trial did not come close to demonstrating the sort of government overreaching that would warrant an entrapment instruction.”); People v. Anderson, 2004 WL 103189 *2 (Mich.App., Jan 22, 2004) (“Although counsel's trial strategy ultimately failed, it did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, an entrapment defense would have been unsuccessful because defendant was not entrapped; thus, defendant has failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel.”).

89 See, e.g., U.S. v. Gurolla, 333 F.3d 944 (9th Cir 2003) (reversing where defendant was forbidden to submit entrapment evidence to jury); U.S. v. Garcia, 1 Fed.Appx. 641, 2001 WL 30043 (9th Cir. 2001) (trial court’s refusal to give entrapment instructions held to be error, cases reversed and remanded).
or persuasion, and a relaxing of evidentiary protections. To the extent this is true, many of the “affirmative defenses” must be second-best strategies, and would tend to appear frequently as appeals. We might refer to these as “secondary defenses,” given their strategic and procedural weaknesses.

To summarize, the numbers of cases indicate that the entrapment defense is declining, that the cases are concentrated in a few areas, and that many of the cases have a weak procedural posture that decreases the likelihood of success. Legal uncertainty seems to drive the entrapment numbers; as the rules become well-defined and the odds of prevailing or losing become more quantifiable, the number of cases goes down. Figure 1 illustrates the numbers of reported cases for both federal and state courts for the last eleven years, and shows the relative proportion of ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to the defense.

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**Fig. 1**

Federal and State

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90 See supra note __ at sources cited therein.
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**IV. SENTENCING ENTRAPMENT AND ENTRAPMENT BY ESTOPPEL**

Sentencing entrapment provides a poignant illustration of the decline in entrapment as a defense as well as the role of uncertainty in this area of law. Entrapment by estoppel, which is a more established defense but less common, also sheds light on the determinative effects of legal certainty on certain behaviors and cases.

**A. Sentencing Entrapment**

The advent of mechanical sentencing guidelines (and, to a lesser extent, codified gradations of felonies and “aggravating factor” categories) allows undercover agents to “ratchet up” a crime by design. For example, those planning a sting operation can decide the amount of drugs to be bought or sold – or the substance sold, as different drugs carry different punishments – in

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91 See MARCUS, supra note 1, at 353-59.
92 See id. at 47-49.
93 The phrase “ratchet up” seems to have first been used by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Richardson, 925 F.2d 112, 117 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1237 (1991) in a money laundering case.
94 See United States v. Lenefesty, 923 F.2d 1293, 1300 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that the defendant argues that the undercover agents only motive in repeatedly purchasing from her was to increase her sentence); United States v. Stuart, 923 F.2d 607, 614 (8th Cir. 1991) (recapping the defendant’s contention that he was entrapped by the
order to catapult the defendant into a higher sentencing range, sometimes making the difference of decades on a sentence. Other cases involve an agent suggesting that the defendant come to the transaction heavily armed, as the presence of firearms often generates a sentencing enhancement96 (more so for certain types of weapons, like automatic rifles, which agents sometimes request specifically).97 Similarly, agents posing as decoys for pedophiles in Internet chat rooms ascribe an age to themselves that is just young enough to implicate the most serious
government’s act of fronting money to purchase a larger quantity of drugs than the defendant was predisposed to sell); United States v. Barth, 788 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding that “[t]he Court finds it not at all fortuitous that the agent arrested the defendant only after he had arranged enough successive buys to reach the magic number (in reference to the 50 grams of cocaine, which doubles the minimum mandatory sentence from 5 years to 10 years”), vacated, 990 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1993); People v. Cousins, No. 239767, 2003 WL 22222056 at *7 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2003) (holding that the defendant was not a victim of sentencing entrapment when he was asked to supply a larger quantity of cocaine for the third transaction); State v. Burnett, No. C9-98-1201, 1999 WL 289221 at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. May 11, 1999) (holding that it was not enough to establish sentencing entrapment when the undercover agent had contacted her supervisor before making the last sale to determine if the addition of that amount would establish a first degree offense).

95 Often times a claim of sentencing entrapment arises under circumstance where an undercover agent requests the defendant to transform powder cocaine into cocaine base or to provide the agent with cocaine base rather than powder cocaine. Cocaine base carries a higher penalty under the Sentencing Guidelines, 120-135 months, whereas powder cocaine carries a sixty month minimum mandatory sentence Cocaine base is crack cocaine, powder cocaine can be “cooked” in a microwave to become crack. See United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that “a request by a government agent for crack cocaine upon a seller’s delivery of powder cocaine, without more, does not establish a claim of ‘sentencing entrapment.’ “); United States v. Sautler, 60 F.3d 270, 280 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the defendant’s contention that downward departure from the Guidelines is warranted due to the undercover agent’s encouragement of having the defendant transform the powder cocaine into crack); United States v. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. 105, 112 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding that the undercover agent’s insistence that the purchase of cocaine was conditioned on the defendant transforming the cocaine powder into crack was impermissible because this demand did not further the investigation); United States v. Kimley, No. 01-4324, 2003 WL 1090706, at * 1 (3rd Cir. March, 12, 2003) (reiterating the defendant’s claim that the informant both induced him to sell crack rather than powdered cocaine and manipulated his sentence by making repeat purchases from him).

96 See 18 U.S.C. §924 (c) (establishing a minimum five year enhancement for the use of a firearm in drug trafficking, ten years if the firearm is a short-barreled shotgun, thirty years if the firearm is a machine gun or a gun equipped with a silencer).

97 See United States v. Jones, 102 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that sentencing entrapment was not warranted to the defendant’s allegation that the agents knew that they would arrest him already but only insisted upon him exchanging a machine gun for drugs in an attempt to lengthen his sentence); United States v. Ramirez-Rangel, 103 F.3d 1501 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the trial court should have held a private hearing in chambers to decide whether the confidential informant’s testimony would be relevant to the defendants’ claim that the agents chose to exchange machine guns for their methamphetamines instead of handguns, in an attempt to enlarge their sentences by a mandatory thirty years); United States v. Cannon, 886 F. Supp. 705, 708 (D.N.D. 1995) (holding that an undercover agent’s encouragement of buying handguns and a machine gun warranted a downward departure because the sole purpose of this action was to increase the defendants’ sentences by 25 years), rev’d on other grounds, 88 F.3d 1495 (8th Cir. 1996).
category of attempted sexual predation, while not so young as to limit the appeal to the most
radical perpetrators.98

The idea of agents planning and scheming around the specific provisions of the
sentencing guidelines strikes many as an abuse.99 Some courts, therefore, entertain arguments
that the defendant’s sentence should be mitigated to offset the increase that state agents
manipulated.100 The conviction itself stands, but the sentence can be for less time101 if the case
meets the applicable test.102

98 This tactic does not have to rely on subjectivity or passions of judges exclusively, of course; sometimes
the grading of punishments or sentencing guideline enhancements are explicit and are drawn at somewhat arbitrary
lines. For example, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines contain a two-level enhancement for attempts to engage in
prohibited sexual conduct with a minor or an undercover agent posing as a minor or an adult with custody of the
(10th Cir. 2003) (involving Internet and child pornography); United States v. Robertson, 350 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir.
2003) (stating that the Sentencing Guidelines do not draw a distinction between someone posing as a child over the
Internet or someone posing as a panderer, so no distinction should be drawn between the two); United States v.
Dotson, 324 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that Internet advertising for child pornography is not an abuse of
power). The Sentencing Guidelines explicitly state that for pedophiliac computer crimes, it does not matter whether
there was a real “victim” or merely an undercover agent posing as a victim. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2A3.1,
cmt., application n.1.

99 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was created to remedy the level of judicial discretion in determining
sentence duration. Therefore, the Sentencing Guidelines established minimum mandatory sentences for drug
transactions, focusing on the quantity and type of drugs involved in the exchange. Many scholars have noted that the
new system has now shifted the discretion and abuse to the prosecutors and undercover agents that determine the
amount of drugs sold, types of drugs sold, and who to target. See e.g. Eric P. Berlin, Comment, The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines' Failure To Eliminate Sentencing Disparity: Governmental Manipulations Before Arrest,
1993 Wis. L. Rev. 187 (1993) (arguing that the Sentencing Guidelines create an increase in the severity of punishment
and double prison populations nationwide); Andrew G. Deiss, Comment: Making The Crime Fit The Punishment:
Pre-Arrest Sentence Manipulation By Investigators Under The Sentencing Guidelines, 1994 U. Chi. Leg. F. 419
(1994) (stating that the minority view is that the Guidelines give the undercover agents too much discretion, the
majority opinion is that the Guidelines give the prosecutors too much discretion);Joan Malmud, Comment:
Defending A Sentence: The Judicial Establishment Of Sentencing Entrapment And Sentencing Manipulation
Defenses, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1359 (1997) (discussing the history of abuse in sentencing and the possible remedies);
147 (1996) (discussing the history of abuse in sentencing and arguing that sentencing entrapment should not be used
for “straight” stings”).

100 See 18 U.S.C. §3553(b) (“The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range referred to
in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstances of a kind, or to
a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that
should result in a sentence different from that described.”); United States v. Stauffer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir.
1994) (stating that before the advent of the Sentencing Guidelines courts could prevent sentencing entrapment by
Not surprisingly, there are two rival tests, generally tracking the “subjective” and “objective” tests for regular entrapment. Most of the courts categorize the issue as “sentencing entrapment” and use a predisposition test: was the defendant predisposed to commit the crime to the degree charged (i.e., to buy/sell the full quantity of drugs involved), or something less, but for the agent’s inducement? The burden is on the defendant to prove his reticence. Other voicing their discretion in sentencing, however under the Guidelines “courts can ensure that the sentences imposed reflect the defendants’ degree of culpability only if they are able to reduce the sentences of defendants who are not predisposed to engage in deals as large as those induced by the government.”).

103 United States v. Palo, No. 97-50167, 1999 WL 51507, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 1999) (stating that the Ninth Circuit has identified two available remedies for valid sentencing entrapment claims: 1) “a sentencing court may decline to apply the statutory penalty provision for the greater offense that the defendant was induced to commit, and instead apply the penalty provision for the lesser offense that the defendant was predisposed to commit;” or 2) “a sentencing court may exercise its discretion to depart downward from the sentencing range for the greater offense that the defendant was induced to commit.”).

102 Circuits that recognize sentencing entrapment use similar tests that revolve around predisposition. See United States v. Woods, 210 F.3d 70, 75 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen a defendant, although predisposed to commit a minor or lesser offense, is entrapped in committing a greater offense subject to greater punishment.”); United States v. Gutierrez-Herrera, 293 F.3d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen the government causes a defendant initially predisposed to commit a lesser crime to commit a more serious offense.”); United States v. Citro, 842 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing five factors used to determine sentencing entrapment; “1) the character, reputation and previous conduct of the defendant; 2) whether the government initiated the crime in question; 3) whether the defendant was engaged in the crime in question for profit; 4) whether the defendant exhibited reluctance at committing the crime in question; and 5) the nature of the government’s inducement.”); Padilla, 2003 WL 22016868 at *6 (stating that the Eighth Circuit defines “sentencing entrapment as ‘outrageous official conduct’ that overcomes the volition of an individual who was predisposed to commit a less serious crime and unduly influences them to commit a more serious crime for the purpose of increasing the resulting sentence of the entrapped defendant.”) (citing United States v. Rogers, 982 F.2d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1993)).

103 See United States v. Stavig, 80 F.3d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that sentencing entrapment “may occur where outrageous government conduct overcomes the will of a defendant predisposed to deal only in small quantities of drugs, for the purpose of increasing the amount of drugs and resulting sentencing); United States v. Aikens, 64 F.3d 372, 376 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that sentencing entrapment “may occur where outrageous government conduct overcomes the will of a defendant predisposed to deal only in small quantities of drugs, for the purpose of increasing the amount of drugs and the resulting sentencing imposed against the defendant.”); United States v. Stuart, 923 F.2d 607, 624 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that “sentencing entrapment occurs when a defendant, although predisposed to commit a minor or lesser offense, is entrapped in committing a greater offense subject to a greater punishment.”); United States v. Si, 343 F.3d 116, 1128 (9th Cir 2003) (stating that “[s]entencing entrapment occurs when a defendant is predisposed to commit a lesser crime, but is entrapped into committing a more significant crime that is subject to more severe punishment because of government conduct.”).

104 See United States v. Nieto-Cruz, No. 03-50420, 2004 WL 886346 at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 2004) (stating that the defendant failed to meet his burden of proving that “he had neither the intent nor the ability to produce the amount of drugs involved.”); United States v. Medina, No. 99-10332, 2002 WL 1808705, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug 6, 2002) (stating that “[t]he defendant bears the burden of proving sentencing entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence.”); United States v. Naranjo, 52 F.3d 245, 250 & n. 13 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating “[i]n making a sentencing entrapment claim, the burden in on the defendant to demonstrate both the lack of intent to produce and the lack of capability to produce the quantity of drugs at issue.”);
courts focus instead on what they call “sentencing manipulation” and look solely at whether the undercover agents themselves deployed any outrageous tactics to induce the defendant into committing a greater crime; this is much like the “objective” test for regular entrapment. A few courts apparently consider both, but the failure rate of these defense maneuvers makes this point almost moot. “Sentencing entrapment” is the far more common approach and term. In the academic literature, “sentencing entrapment” is a general phrase used to describe the

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106 “Outrageous government conduct” is used sometimes instead of “sentencing manipulation,” and may result in an acquittal rather than a lower sentence, even though it addresses the same basic phenomenon of undercover agents ratcheting up the sentence as the sting operation proceeds. Acquitting a defendant outright can serve no other purpose than possibly punishing the police, which I have argued elsewhere is misguided public policy that acquittals do not deter police because police are focused on arrests rather than convictions; that there is little economic or psychological basis for assuming that the police suffer disutility when a third party (like a defendant) receives a benefit or increased utility; that the type of police most likely to engage in reprehensible conduct are the least likely to be deterred by such an abstract form of punishment; and that the potential for greater payoffs in some cases outweighs the inconvenience of acquittals in other cases. See generally Stevenson, supra note __. See also United States v. Padilla, 2003 WL 22016886 at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2003) (stating that “[s]entencing manipulation by definition is not a defense . . . . [and] has no bearing on the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Succeeding under this theory will result in the court granting a downward offense level adjustment under the guidelines.”); State v. Soto, 562 N.W.2d 299, 305 (Minn. 1997) (stating that “[s]entencing manipulation is outrageous government conduct aimed only at increasing a person’s sentence. Whereas sentencing entrapment focuses on the predisposition of the defendant, the related concept of sentencing manipulation is concerned with the conduct and motives of the government officials.”).

107 See Padilla, 2003 WL 22016886 at *7 (stating that “the First Circuit[ ] commingle[s] the sentencing manipulation and sentencing entrapment doctrines.”); Dehaney v. United States, No. 97 CR. 545(BSJ), 2001 WL 1242289, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2001) (noting that the Second Circuit recognizes sentence manipulation but also requires that one must necessarily prove that “he was not predisposed to commit the offense.”).

108 See United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that “garden variety manipulation claims are largely a waste of time,” because sentencing manipulation “is a claim only for the extreme or unusual case.”).

109 The First Circuit uses the terms sentencing entrapment and sentencing factor manipulation, which are used to describe the same conduct. Padilla, 2003 WL 22016886 at *5 (quoting Woods, 210 F.3d at 75). The Eighth Circuit, Seventh Circuit, and Ninth Circuit use the term sentencing entrapment and have recognized the defense. Id. at *5, *6. The D.C. circuit recognized sentencing entrapment in Shepherd. 857 F. Supp. 105. The First Circuit and Second Circuit recognize sentence manipulation. Id. at *7 (citing Woods, 210 F.3d at 75; Dehaney, 2001 WL 1242289, at *5). The Fifth Circuit recognize sentence manipulation but has not departed downward. Id. (citing Cunningham, 2002 WL 1896932, at *10). In United States v. Jones, the Fourth Circuit recognizes the existences of sentence entrapment and sentence manipulation, however the viability of either defense was not addressed. 18 F.3d 1145 (4th Cir. 1994). For more discussion, see Joan Malmud, Comment: Defending A Sentence: The Judicial Establishment Of Sentencing Entrapment And Sentencing Manipulation Defenses, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1359 (1997) (distinguishing between the doctrines of sentence entrapment and sentence manipulation, also noting that the Sixth Circuit and Eighth Circuit have recognized the existence of some form of the sentence manipulation doctrine); Todd E. Witten, Comment: Sentence Entrapment And Manipulation: Government Manipulation Of The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AKRON L. Rev. 697 (1996) (discussing the evolution and history behind the different circuits’ treatment of sentencing entrapment and sentence manipulation).
whole area – the agents’ tactic itself, the defense, and the body of cases or concept – rather than to describe one test as opposed to another.

This phrase seems to have been coined by the Eighth Circuit (or rather, by defense counsel appearing before the Eighth Circuit) in the 1991 case U.S. v. Lenfesty.\textsuperscript{110} This was a novel argument from a defendant at the time and did not go over well: “We are not prepared to say there is no such animal as ‘sentencing entrapment.’”\textsuperscript{111} The same week, the Eighth Circuit addressed it in another ruling, U.S. v. Stuart,\textsuperscript{112} this time less dismissively: “Perhaps there is such a thing as ‘sentencing entrapment,’ but we are not persuaded that [the defendant] has succeeded in establishing it.”\textsuperscript{113} A slow onslaught of cases ensued in various circuits over the next year; the first court to recognize “such an animal” as sentencing entrapment (the Eighth Circuit’s phrase was frequently repeated) was a district court in Minnesota, in United States v. Barth,\textsuperscript{114} where the court found that the Sentencing Commission had “failed to adequately consider the terrifying capacity for escalation of a defendant's sentence based on the investigating officer's determination of when to make the arrest.”\textsuperscript{115}

The federal courts have split on whether to recognize sentencing entrapment at all,\textsuperscript{116} meaning the Supreme Court may have to settle the question. A few circuits have not yet considered it;\textsuperscript{117} those that do recognize it in theory generally reject it in individual cases.\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{111} Id. at 1300.
\textsuperscript{112} 923 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1991).
\textsuperscript{113} Id. at 614.
\textsuperscript{115} Id. at 1057.
\textsuperscript{117} Padilla, 2003 WL 22016886 at *6, *8 (noting that to date, the Third Circuit has not recognized sentencing entrapment or manipulation).
Individual defendants often appear unsympathetic, given that they set out to commit some crime, and the government agent simply orchestrated an incremental escalation.\textsuperscript{119} I have some suggestions to offer for the approach the Supreme Court should adopt if it does have the opportunity to address the issue in the near future. The opportunity may not arise, however, if the current decline in cases continues.

B. \textit{Decline in Sentencing Entrapment}

Sentencing entrapment cases reached their peak in 1996-97, at least in the federal courts (the state cases are too rare to speak of a pattern), and the cases have dropped off steadily since then. In addition, the claims do not fare well at all. In the mid 1990’s this seemed like the new, fresh

\textsuperscript{118}See e.g. \textit{United States v. Case}, 217 F. Supp. 2d 158, 161-162 (D. Me. 2002) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that his sentence should be reduced for the final sale, which occurred after the agents could had arrested him for making a ten pound sale); \textit{United States v. Lora}, 129 F. Supp. 2d 77, 94 (D. Mass. 2001) (holding that the defendants were predisposed to buy cocaine and were not offered “artificially favorable credit terms” that induced them to purchase more cocaine than they had resources for); \textit{Gutierrez-Herrera}, 293 F.3d at 377 (holding that the defendant was predisposed to distribute cocaine by his admittance of supplying two kilograms to individuals intended for them to resell it); \textit{United States v. Estrada}, 256 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was offered bargain basement prices for cocaine, given generous credit terms to accept the larger amount even though he originally requested a much smaller amount, and that he only had enough money on him to purchase 3.75 kilograms of the 5 kilogram purchase); \textit{United States v. Ross}, No. 02-50226, 2004 WL 1375522, at *12 (9th Cir. June 21, 2004) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that the defendant was predisposed to commit an offense involving 100 kilograms of cocaine); \textit{United States v. Vega}, Nos. 02-50253, 02-50499, 2004 WL 785311, at *3 (9th Cir. April 7, 2004) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to reduction of his sentence because he was “predisposed to sell in amounts up to whatever he could handle, including the 233 gram sale (referring to heroin offense that he is charged with)[ ”]); \textit{United States v. Rice}, No. 02-1383, 2004 WL 1240824, at *3 (10th Cir. June 7, 2004) (rejecting the defendant’s sentencing factor manipulation claim that he was improperly induced into manufacturing and selling twenty machine guns because of the government’s fronting him with the money to purchase supplies); \textit{United States v. Hightower}, No. 03-1015, 2004 WL 729255, at *4 (10th Cir. April 6, 2004) (holding that the defendant was not a victim of sentencing entrapment when the agent specifically asked for crack when he had knowledge that the defendant could also supply other drugs which carried less penalty).

\textsuperscript{119}As discussed by the district court in \textit{United States v. Kaczmarski}, the difference between sentence entrapment and manipulation may be significant due to the possibility that even if a sentencing entrapment defense is not available to a defendant that is predisposed to commit a greater crime, a sentence manipulation claim might still be available. 939 F. Supp. 1176 (E.D. Pa. 1996); but see Garcia, 79 F.3d at 76 (stating that Seventh Circuit rejects sentence manipulation because “the government must be permitted to exercise its own judgment in determining at what point in an investigation enough evidence has been obtained.”).
area of entrapment law (although it is not entrapment proper, but very similar); it now has the same earmarks of decline, disuse, and discredit as the regular entrapment defense.  

C. Risk, Uncertainty, and Sentences

The 1996-97 peak in sentencing entrapment cases, followed by a drop-off in numbers, provides a vivid illustration of the effects of legal uncertainty on criminal litigation. As mentioned above, the idea of sentencing entrapment first appeared in the *Lenfesty* case in 1991, and more defense attorneys attempted to raise the argument nationwide over the next few years. Most of the early holdings created a state of almost “perfect” legal uncertainty: the court recognized that the defense of sentencing entrapment might exist, although no fact pattern had yet arisen that would suffice – including the case at bar. This atmosphere of uncertainty

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120 Combining the state and federal cases, the numbers are as follows:
- 2001-2004=86 cases
  - 2003-2004=30
  - 2002-2003=27
  - 2001-2002=29
- 1998-2001=107 cases
  - 2000-2001=31
  - 1999-2000=32
  - 1998-1999=44
- 1995-1998=147 cases
  - 1997-1998=47
  - 1996-1997=60
  - 1995-1996=40
- 1994-1995=30 cases

From the numbers, it seems like 1996-1997 was the year for sentencing entrapment cases. Before and after 1996-1997 the numbers remain fairly steady but are decreasing. Note that this includes some cases that procedurally occurred as an appeal for ineffective assistance or counsel due to counsel not arguing the defense at district court level.

121 *Lenfesty*, 923 F.2d at 1300.

122 See, e.g., United States v. Knecht, 55 F.3d 54, 57 (2nd Cir. 1995) (expressing that the validity of the defense has not been determined, even if it was, the defendant was predisposed to launder proceeds from illegal activity with the knowledge that it was probably drug money); United States v. Washington, 44 F.3d 1271, 1279-1280 (5th Cir. 1995) (choosing not to address the viability of the theory due to the facts of the case);United States v. Wright, No. 93-4228, 1995 WL 101300, at *3 (6th Cir. March 9, 1995) (declining to address the issue of accepting the sentencing entrapment doctrine, because even in a court that accepts the doctrine, the facts of the case would not support a claim), United States v. Cotts, 14 F.3d 300, 306 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that even is sentencing entrapment is a viable theory, defendant failed to present evidence that outrageous conduct occurred); United States
functioned as a type of “green light” for defendants to try this claim, with no way of knowing whether the facts of their case would foreclose the option (but also having little to lose, if they are already at the sentencing phase of their case). As more of these cases made their way through the appeal process (which can take two or three years), the rules became clarified, comments to the sentencing guidelines were added and judicially noticed, and more defendants could see the outcome of the claims ahead of time. This led to a decrease in the number of cases.

Sentencing entrapment and regular entrapment are conceptually distinct. The former is a mitigating factor for punishments, while the latter allows the defendant to go free if the claim is successful. Yet there must be some interplay between the two, as evidenced by the fact that the tests for sentencing entrapment are simply adaptations of the two tests for regular

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123 Between 1994 and 1996, numerous sentence entrapment cases were addressed on appeal. For examples of cases, see Figueroa v. United States, 19 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Satterwhite, 23 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Jones, 102 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding defendant’s entrapment defense not reviewable); United States v. Broomfield, 103 F.3d 131 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Wright, 48 F.3d 1220 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Murphy, 16 F.3d 1222 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Williams, 97 F.3d 1455 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Castellanos, 70 F.3d 117 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Garcia, 53 F.3d 334 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Okoro, 42 F.3d 1392 (7th Cir. 1994); Roldan v. United States, 33 F.3d 56 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Cotts, 14 F.3d 300 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming sentencing judgment of the lower court); United States v. Shipley, 62 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Doyle, 60 F.3d 396 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that government did not engage in outrageous government conduct by offering the defendant leniency in exchange for cooperation to lead to a more culpable drug dealer); United States v. Clark, 36 F.3d 1101 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Merical, 32 D.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hulett, 22 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the record failed to support that the defendant was entrapped as a matter of law, and that the issue of entrapment was properly submitted to the jury); United States v. McLinn, 19 F.3d 24 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Warren, 16 F.3d 247 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the government’s repeated undercover purchases of drugs from the defendant does not constitute outrageous conduct); United States v. Appel, 105 F.3d 667 (9th Cir. 1996); Nobles v. United States, 105 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lutz, 103 F.3d 142 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Mitchell, 103 F.3d 142 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lee, 99 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. McCord, 99 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bui, 97 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Robinson, 94 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1996) (concerning a government sting operation for manufacturing and selling counterfeit credit cards); United States v. Castaneda, 94 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming the trial court's decision that the defendant was a victim of sentencing entrapment but reversed defendants sentence because the trial court failed to adjust his sentencing); United States v. Brown, 73 F.3d 370 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ashley, 72 F.3d 135 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Graves, 67 F.3d 309 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Gamboa, 66 F.3d 336 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Chavez-Vasquez, 64 F.3d 667 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Valencia, 61 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Davis, 56 F.3d 74 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Simpson, 64 F.3d 667 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Arivizo, 53 D.3d 340 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Banh, 33 D.3d 60 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Gibbs, 15 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 1994).

124 See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 79 F.3d 74, 75 (7th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing between sentencing manipulation” and the objective test or outrageous government conduct.)
entrapment. Obviously, courts have been influenced by traditional entrapment law in crafting rules for these newer types of cases. What may be less obvious is the fact that sentencing entrapment cases are can influence future decisions on regular entrapment. Court in sentencing entrapment cases are still defining the boundaries and subtleties of “predisposition,” “inducement vs. opportunity,” and “outrageous government conduct”– the elements of the traditional defense under alternative rules. The precedents established are not irrelevant or completely distinguishable. “Predisposition” is being used in almost the same way, semantically, whether it is the predisposition to go from selling zero drugs to one gram, or to go from selling nine grams to ten; in either case, it means something like readiness, willingness, or a lack of resistance to lawbreaking. The problem is that sentencing entrapment cases are bad test cases for these

125 For examples of the objective approach to sentence entrapment (referred to as sentence manipulation), see United States v. Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1994) (“When an accusation of sentencing factor manipulation surfaces, the judicial gaze should, in the usual case, focus primarily—though not exclusively—on the government’s conduct and motives.”); United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 194 (1st Cir. 1992) (hinting that sentence manipulation may occur even if the facts of the case are “insufficiently oppressive to support an entrapment defense . . . or [a] due process claim . . . .”); United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1153 (4th Cir. 1994) (linking sentence manipulation to outrageous government conduct and holding that a successful manipulation claim only arises when “outrageous government conduct that offends due process could justify a reduced sentence.”); United States v. Okey, 47 F.3d 238, 240 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that “[a]sentencing manipulation occurs when the government engages in improper conduct that has the effect of increasing a defendant’s sentence.”).

For examples of the subjective approach to sentence entrapment, see Woods, 210 F.3d at 75 (“[W]hen a defendant, although predisposed to commit a minor or lesser offense, is entrapped in committing a greater offense subject to greater punishment.”); Gutierrez-Herrera, 293 F.3d at 377 (“[W]hen the government causes a defendant initially predisposed to commit a lesser crime to commit a more serious offense.”); Citro, 842 F.2d at 1152 (stating the five factors used in determining sentencing entrapment: “1) the character, reputation and previous conduct of the defendant; 2) whether the government initiated the crime in question; 3) whether the defendant was engaged in the crime in question for profit; 4) whether the defendant exhibited reluctance at committing the crime in question; and 5) the nature of the government’s inducement.”).


... [T]he record reveals that Biggs was predisposed to deal in distribution-sized quantities of methamphetamine. Biggs was charged following the execution of a reverse-sting operation in which the government sold four pounds of methamphetamine to Biggs and his co-defendant. Biggs sought to purchase the drugs so that he could resell them in Memphis, Tennessee. Biggs met an informant at a nightclub and gave the informant $2,000 for the purchase. Later, during a telephone conversation that was recorded, the informant stated that he felt a pressing need to be rid of the four pounds of methamphetamine he was about to possess and that Biggs could have all four pounds for $5,000. Biggs accepted the bargain, delivered $2,500 to make the purchase, and was arrested after he and his co-defendant took possession of all four pounds of methamphetamine. At sentencing, Biggs stated that it was never his “intention to buy four pounds of crystal meth.” He stated that, "If they had not been practically give [sic] to me, I wouldn't be in the trouble I am now."
concepts. The defendants are so unsympathetic that some courts refuse to recognize the
defense,\(^{127}\) and those who do usually refuse to apply it in a given case.\(^{128}\) The precedents
generated will be almost uniformly unfavorable, but a definition of “predisposition” generated in
a sentencing entrapment case would be appropriate to cite as authority in the traditional type of
case, as the word is being used in the same way. This influence of bad test cases on the core
concepts of the defense will cause a shift over time that is unfavorable to defendants.

The other problem is that despite the nearly complete semantic overlap between the two
occurrences of “predisposition”\(^{129}\) (both types of cases use the term to refer to a lack of
resistance on the defendants part to an offer, request, or suggestion from an undercover agent),
there is an important difference that most people would recognize but find difficult to articulate.
A predisposition to commit a crime in the first place seems greater in degree than a
predisposition to move from selling nine grams to ten.\(^{130}\) The latter is merely an incremental
change. The former, in contrast, seems to be a step from one category into another, from non-
criminal to criminal, from not guilty to guilty. This is a large semantic step. Sentencing
entrapment cases involve a move from “criminal” or “guilty” to slightly “more criminal” or
“more guilty.”

\(^{127}\) See United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 668, 673 (11th Cir. 1992) (“as a matter of law, we reject Duke’s sentence entrapment theory... because this circuit rejects this theory as a defense, we need not address it further.”).


\(^{129}\) The same analysis could be applied to the other core terms as well.

\(^{130}\) See, e.g., U.S. v. Arvizo, 53 F.3d 340 (Table), 1995 WL 261137 (9th Cir.1995) (change from one kilo to four).
The sentencing guidelines and codified gradations of felonies, however, transform this incremental step into a qualitative change. The increased certainty of the legal rules alters the semantic play of the terms. The consequences are significant – if the court decides the term is applicable, it can mean a difference of several years in prison.\textsuperscript{131} Now both uses of “predisposition” refer to a line between significant categories – the legal significance is no longer picayune and incremental even though the action seems incrementally different to the actor at the time. The legal rules frame the situation differently that the actor in the commission of the offense. The undercover agents will be more aware of this phenomenon than the offender will.

The problem is that there is no linguistic wall or boundary to keep a court’s application of “predisposition” to one set of factors from affecting its application to another type of case. This is different from the specialized uses of other legal terms like “agreement,” which may have distinct meanings depending on whether it is a criminal case or a contracts case. With entrapment, the combination of semantic blurring between the elements/core terms across different types of entrapment cases, and the semantic effect caused by codified, mechanical punishment factors, creates a linguistic effect that pushes all entrapment cases away from favoring defendants.

The federal sentencing guidelines themselves present an interesting study in the effects of legal uncertainty. The guidelines were created with the purpose of limiting judicial discretion.\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{131} See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1 (1995), and the explanation offered by Professor Neal Katyal:

. . . [O]ne kilo of crack yields a 188-235 month sentence and one kilo of heroin yields 121-151 months. The four level enhancement increases a crack sentence to 292-365 months—an average increase of about ten years. The enhancement increases a heroin sentence, however, to 188-235 months, a much smaller increase of about six years.


The drafters and proponents of the guidelines feared that too much judicial discretion allowed for abuses, or at least disparities in punishments from judge to judge, and such disparities seemed unfair (fairness being equated with sameness). Indeed, legal vagueness does confer discretion on the relevant state actors. For example, in administrative law, enabling statutes containing vague, open-ended terms serve to delegate authority from the legislature to agency officials.

With the sentencing guidelines, the original thought was to “undelegate” (i.e., expropriate or reappropriate) punishment discretion from judges to the legislature.

Many judges and commentators believe this process backfired, resulting in more unfairness and draconian punishments than before – the literature is almost too vast to cite. In addition, many commentators on sentencing entrapment blame the sentencing guidelines for the

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134 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Judith N. Levi, Regulatory Variables and Statutory Interpretation, 73 WASH. UNIV. L. Q. 1103 (1995). Eskridge and Levi argue that governmental discretion or decision-making is often delegated through what they call “regulatory variables,” linguistic devices in the statute that leave the delegated interpreter a range of meanings and applications. See id. at 1107-08 (they eventually shift to the term “regulatory variability” out of fear that readers will imagine a list of magic words that delegate discretion). It is well-established that the legislature intends to delegate some of its authority to agencies; the focus here is on the mechanism for delegation, which is essentially a linguistic one. Some portions of enabling statutes may be specific and directive, other provisions contain ambiguity, requiring the authorized official or administrator to exercise discretion to fill in the gaps or flesh out the practical meaning. This linguistic feature of vagueness or ambiguity inherently delegates authority. As Eskridge and Levi observe, “The level of linguistic generality permits an inference about the speaker's willingness to delegate gap-filling discretion to another person (i.e., police officers and judges). The more general the statutory term, the more discretion the directive is implicitly vesting in the implementing official.” Id. at 1111 (noting that this discretion may be "vested deliberately or inadvertently"). Stronger examples of regulatory variables are “reasonable,” “substantial,” “good-faith,” and the phrase “all deliberate speed.” Id. at 1113.

135 Although the nondelegation doctrine has received a fair amount of treatment in the academic literature, there seems to be a mirror-image phenomenon that we might call an “undelegation” doctrine, by which Congress uses greater specificity and detail in its enactment to appropriate more power for itself and away from other branches of government or the citizenry at large. A thorough discussion of this issue, however, is outside our scope here.

phenomenon of agents “ratcheting up” punishments during stings; these commentators claim that
the sentencing guidelines simply shifted discretion from judges to prosecutors and law
enforcement. 137

This conclusion is misguided. Legal uncertainty was blamed for being the vehicle by
which too much delegation of discretion and authority took place (conferred on the judges); this
is a plausible enough argument. It seems paradoxical, then, to argue that a lack of uncertainty or
vagueness confers or delegates discretion on a different branch of government. Normally power
is delegated to enforcement agencies through vague, open-ended statutes, just as it was with the
judiciary before the guidelines were in place. The confusion here is that the issues are being
framed in terms of discretion, which is really a problem of legal vagueness and agency costs.
Instead, the issue should be framed as one of legal certainty, which is a problem of informational
asymmetries and the abolition of windfall benefits in isolated cases. Prosecutors and undercover
agents did not receive more discretion – i.e., more freedom – after the enactment of the
guidelines. They were just as free to suggest that a target bring a firearm to a set-up drug deal
before as they are now. If anything, prosecutors and agents have less freedom and discretion
now, because there are mechanical rules controlling the outcomes, around which they must plan.
The guidelines merely afforded some possible incentives that influence strategy. The world of
both judges and prosecutors alike is less free and discretionary; everything is more pre-
determined. 138 Greater certainty, however, completely changes investment decisions of state
actors, as well as their strategy games when moving toward trial.

137 See supra note 132 and sources cited therein.
138 But see WILLIAM D. RICH, L. PAUL SUTTON, TODD M. CLEAR, AND MICHAEL J. SAKS, SENTENCING BY
MATHEMATICS: AN EVALUATION OF THE EARLY ATTEMPTS TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT SENTENCING GUIDELINES
159-60 (1982) (a study of localized experiments that predates the enactment of the federal guidelines):
[T]hese diverse measures almost unanimously converge on a single conclusion: sentencing
guidelines have had no detectable, objectively manifested impact on the exercise of judicial
sentencing discretion. Judges frequently departed from the sentencing recommended by the
When sentences were uncertain, the world of punishments was comparable to a Knightian market where future demands are uncertain; under Frank Knight’s model, uncertainty is the only environment where true entrepreneurial profits can occur (as opposed to net revenue, which is really just a compensation for the owner’s time, talents, and risk of lost investment dollars). These “true profits” are analogous to occasional windfall benefits for defendants in the form of acquittals (and if one wants to study the problem from the prosecution’s standpoint, there were occasional windfall results in the form of particularly severe sentences on certain bad actors). It is true that the lack of guidelines conferred discretion on judges, allowing them to express their own preferences, but the result for defendant was an occasionally very lucky break, a shower of mercy – or an occasional unfortunate turn. Frank Knight’s model of differentiating between risk and uncertainty for purposes of results and investments implies that greater certainty in the outcomes flattens out any profits across the board. As outcomes become more predictable, uncertainty shifts toward straightforward, quantifiable risk.

Fixing the payouts of punishment eliminates extreme turns in fortune and levels off the possible “lucky breaks” to defendants. Thus, the sentencing guidelines appear to impose more draconian results. At the same time, Knight’s model concludes that uncertainty in outcomes probably generates a net loss across the whole system; the losses of all the failed entrepreneurs guidelines. Denver judges rarely provided written reasons for their departures. There was no clear increase in the proportion of sentences that fell within the guidelines’ prescriptions. Racial and sexual disparities, where extant before guidelines, showed no signs of reduction. Neither was there a significant diminution of statistically unexplained variation in sentences. Sentencing guidelines did not enhance the predictability of sentences. The authors concede, however, that in each of the experimental settings, compliance with the suggested guidelines was voluntary and there was no sanction for a judge ignoring the recommendations. The authors posited that the results would be different if compliance could be enforced. Id.

139 See generally KNIGHT, supra note ___.
taken together must outweigh the windfall profits of occasional winners. 140 Highly predictable outcomes (Knight’s favorite example is statistical-based insurance markets) 141 flatten profits but probably result in an incremental net increase in societal wealth, because the increase in transactions with better information allows for increasingly efficient allocations of wealth and resources.

This means that the advent of mechanical sentencing guidelines would result in most cases settling as plea bargains (ninety-five percent now do on the federal docket), 142 and defendants overall being slightly better off, but getting no breaks. The sentencing guidelines in this sense probably benefit defendants overall, very incrementally, but the individual defendant has far less chance of mercy or a lucky break.

That is only part of the picture, however, because in criminal law, the individual is always pitted against the state. This match is in place even before the decision to commit crime occurs. Greater specificity in legal rules tends to benefit parties who are more established and have greater access to ex ante legal information, enabling them to plan around rules or exploit loopholes in the rules. 143 Administrative regulations, for example, are usually more burdensome for would-be market entrants in the regulated industry than those already established (thus, more specific rules flattens true profits but increases the potential for oligopoly rents). 144 In contexts where the individual is pitted against the state, greater legal certainty will almost always benefit the state and disadvantage the individual. This scenario may be better for society overall, and therefore beneficial to most individuals in society, as its overall wealth increases incrementally.

140 See generally KNIGHT, supra note ___ at ___.
141 Id. at ___.
142 For more discussion if the strategy influences on the high plea bargain rate, see RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 365-67 (2001).
143 See Ferguson & Peters, supra note 35, at ___.
144 Id.
But the individual in an adversarial position to the state can only get lucky if there is legal uncertainty. This is a matter of informational asymmetries and the disparate position to exploit loopholes created by specificity in the rules. Prosecutors and undercover agents learn the rules ahead of time (or by being repeat players in the game), and plan their decisions around those.\text{145} Most criminals are in less of a position to do this, and end up losing.\text{146} Perhaps they should lose – if they are, after all, criminals. The point here is not to defend or attack the guidelines, but to explain that this is not a matter of increased “discretion” for law enforcement, but the result of advantages that legal certainty brings to the (informationally) dominant party.

If a court is considering a rule to adopt for cases of sentencing entrapment or manipulation, my proposal is that “predisposition” is a problematic test, due to its semantic fluctuations and overlap with other categories of cases. Similarly, looking at the conduct of agents (the objective/outrageous government conduct approaches) will usually result in a win for the prosecution, because the agents are in a position to plan carefully around the rules. Any “wrongdoing” on their part will almost always appear to be nothing more than “playing it smart” or being more clever than the defendant. Perhaps a better test is to weigh the disparities in information access. An experienced criminal or one who “should have known better” should have less leniency in sentencing entrapment than a true novice to crime. The guidelines, of course, already have provisions recognizing the defendant’s background, separating first-time offenders from repeat offenders, but these are usually downward departures after the sentence

\text{145} For a discussion of some of the strategic advantages held by prosecutors, and the incentives motivating their decisions, see Posner, supra note __, at 365-67. For example, due to the government’s enormous resources, prosecutors can spread these resources out strategically but unevenly, “extracting guilty pleas by the threat to concentrate its resources against any defendant who refuses to plead and using the resources thus conserved to wallop the occasional defendant who does invoke his right to a trial.” Id. at 367.

\text{146} Admittedly, certain types of criminals, like those perpetrating computer crimes, are very well-networked and informed of law enforcement policies. The vast majority of entrapment cases, however, involve drug crimes, and these defendants are not necessarily characterized by expertise in the law.
has been ratcheted up for aggravating factors. My proposal is that enhancements should be subject to a quick-look approach to screen out setups of true novices.

D. *Entrapment By Estoppel*

Entrapment by estoppel involves no subterfuge and no undercover agents, unlike traditional entrapment. The defense applies instead to situations where 1) there was some official assurance of the legality of a certain action, 2) by an appropriately authorized state actor, 3) followed by a reasonable reliance on the assurance by the defendant, and 4) criminal charges against the defendant for carrying out the action.

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147 See MARCUS, supra note 1, at 447-48. Marcus notes that “much of the rationale for the claim implicates due process concerns under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.” *Id.*


149 See, e.g., *U.S. v. Bunnell*, 280 F.3d 46, 49-50 (1st Cir. 2002) (firearm violation); *U.S. v. Spires*, 79 F.3d 464, 466 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on entrapment because of there was not evidentiary support in the record); *U.S. v. Ormsby*, 252 F.3d 844, 851 (6th Cir. 2001) (state government official’s assurances cannot be basis of reasonable reliance for federal law firearm regulations); *United States v. Mendoza*, No. 03-10070, 2004 WL 385678, at *2, (9th Cir. March 2, 2004); *People v. Chacon*, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 211 (2004) (holding that the defense of entrapment by estoppel not available because the defendant did no rely on a government agent’s advice); *State v. Woods*, 616 N.W.2d 211, 217-18 (Mich.App. 2000) (presenting elements of the entrapment by estoppel defense); see also MARCUS, supra note 1, at 49.

150 The question of whether the defendant’s reliance was reasonable tends to be the most common point of dispute in the cases. For a good discussion of the doctrine generally and of this point in particular, see *U.S. v. Gil*, 297 F.3d 93, 107-08 (2nd Cir. 2002) (vacating and remanding to allow crucial evidence to be presented). See also MARCUS, supra note 1, at 48; *U.S. v. Parker*, 267 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir. 2001) (child pornography case, where defendant claimed he was supplying the government with leads on other violators); *State v. Kremlacek*, 1999 WL 759970 (Neb. App. 1999); *U.S. v. Rector*, 111 F.3d 503, 506 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the defendant is not entitled to the entrapment by estoppel defense because he did not met the element that he was relying on a government agent’s advice).

151 A succinct explanation of this defense, distinguishing it from similar strategies a defendant could use, is found in *United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez*, 17 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1994):

We find considerable assistance in negotiating our way through this area from the roadmap recently provided by the Eleventh Circuit in Several defenses may apply when a defendant claims he performed the acts for which he was charged in response to a request from an agency of the government . . . First, the defendant may allege that he lacked criminal intent because he honestly believed he was performing the otherwise-criminal acts in cooperation with the government. "Innocent intent" is not a defense per se, but a defense strategy aimed at negating the mens rea for the crime, an essential element of the prosecution’s case . . . A second possible defense is "public authority." With this affirmative defense, the defendant seeks exoneration based on the fact that he reasonably relied on the authority of a government official to engage him in a covert activity. The validity of this defense depends upon whether the government agent in fact
law version of promissory estoppel in contracts. The appellation “entrapment” is somewhat misleading, because there is little association with the rest of entrapment law. The challenged actions of the state agents are nearly always inadvertent, and the agent’s association with the government open and obvious.

The defense sounds straightforward enough: many people would be surprised to learn, in fact, that the defense rarely works, as it usually arises in cases where the defendant cannot

had the authority to empower the defendant to perform the acts in question. If the agent had no such power, then the defendant may not rest on the “public authority” defense... A third possible defense... is “entrapment by estoppel.” This defense applies when a government official tells a defendant that certain conduct is legal and the defendant commits what would otherwise be a crime in reasonable reliance on the official’s representation.

See also U.S. v. Burrows, 36 F.3d 875, 881 (9th Cir. 1994) (adopting the above passage as its own rule). A strange illustration of the foregoing distinctions can be seen operating in the background of United States v. George, 266 F.3d 52 (2nd Cir. 2001), where the prosecution requested that the defendant be acquitted, if at all, under the theory of entrapment by estoppel, rather than a lack of the requisite mental state, to avoid creating unfavorable precedent.

152 See, e.g., EDWARD J. MURPHY ET. AL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 129 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., Foundation Press 6th ed. 2003) : “The doctrine of equitable estoppel is founded on concepts of equity and fair dealing. It provides that a person may not deny the existence of a state of facts if he intentionally led another to believe a particular circumstance to be true and to rely upon such a belief to his detriment. The elements of the doctrine are that (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.”.


"Entrapment by estoppel differs markedly from the traditional entrapment defense because a defendant need not show that a government official "induced" his conduct but only that the official offered an honest, albeit mistaken, opinion that the conduct was lawful. Similarly, the defense differs from the "outrageous government misconduct" defense that some courts have recognized as a matter of substantive due process in cases where, even though the defendant was criminally predisposed, the government induced the crime or participated in it through means that "shock the conscience."

154 In the last few years, the defense was only successful in one reported federal case, United States v. Batterjee, 361 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2004). Batterjee was convicted for violating a federal statute prohibiting non-immigrant aliens from possessing firearms or ammunition; Batterjee was residing in the States on a student visa. He ordered a pistol and filled out federal Form 4473 to obtain a permit for the weapon, indicating truthfully that he was not a citizen on the forms. He provided additional materials requested by the gun store owner, a firearms license, and assurances from the store owner that he was completing the license application properly. The statute prohibiting certain aliens from possessing firearms, however, was amended before the defendant’s gun purchase, making it illegal for him to consummate the purchase, although the instructions on the application forms were not updated to reflect this change. When prosecuted, Batterjee claimed that the form and the store owner (a federal licensee) had misled him. The district court rejected this defense, but his conviction was reversed on appeal; he reasonably relied on the licensee’s representations as to his eligibility to possess a firearm.

In state courts, entrapment by estoppel seems to have succeeded only twice in the last few years, and in one of these cases the acquittal was reversed on an appeal by the state. People v. Chacon, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 211 (2004) (successful defense at trial reversed on appeal); State v. Hagan-Sherwin, No. CR 03-249, 2004 WL 743808 (Ark. 2004)
meet the test – where there was either no assurance or not reasonable reliance.\textsuperscript{155} Although the cases cover a wide range of crimes,\textsuperscript{156} by its nature the defense is best-suited for regulatory offenses, especially firearms violations.\textsuperscript{157} It is exceedingly rare, of course, that an official would encourage a citizen to commit some common-law crime of violence or theft; and the entrapment by estoppel defense would probably not apply such a case anyway, because on such a suggestion would probably seem “unreasonable” to a court.

Firearm violations dominate this field.\textsuperscript{158} Convicted felons purchase guns, a rather predictable violation of federal law, under a blithe or simplistic hope that the prohibitions do not

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\textsuperscript{155} See MARCUS, supra note 1, at 49 (“Defendants have had a difficult time demonstrating that these elements are present.”).


\textsuperscript{157} A few of the cases involve former government informants who had temporary authority to go along with illegal activities as part of a sting operation (or so it was claimed), but this authorization expired while the defendant continued. See, e.g., United States v. Hilton, 257 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2001) (arguing that the defendant’s previous collaboration with the government mislead him to believe that collecting child pornography was legal as long as he turned over the material to a government agent).

\textsuperscript{158} See, e.g., United States v. Bunnell, 280 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that there was no basis for a defense of entrapment by estoppel); United States v. Emerson, 2004 WL 180360, 86 Fed.Appx. 696, No. 03-10104 (5th Cir. Jan. 28, 2004) (ruling that there was no basis for entrapment by estoppel defense or for ineffective assistance of counsel claim); United States v. Ormsby, 252 F.3d 844 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that the defendant could not present an entrapment by estoppel defense); United States v. Haire, 89 Fed.Appx. 551, No. 02-2162, 2004
apply in their case. The purported assurances usually come in the form of written instructions on the permit application form (which are admittedly confusing), verbal instructions about the application from gun shop owners (in rare cases held to be agents of the state, due to their special role in administering the federal applications). Some claims assert assurances or tacit approval from courts, police, or probation officers who fail to admonish the defendant properly.

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Eligibility requirements – like the no-felon rule for gun licenses – are particularly suited for creating the scenarios where this defense arises. Misstating one’s eligibility or hiding disqualifying factors on federal forms are commonplace transgressions (whether intentional or careless), but can still trigger criminal sanctions.162 This offense, in turn, can constitute a probation violation, so that the consequences for some defendants are quite severe.163 If one thinks of “entrapment by estoppel” primarily in terms of fudging on gun license applications and the like, the limited usefulness of the defense becomes apparent. There is only one academic article devoted to the subject from the last ten years,164 and only two bar journal articles,165 indicating the small amount of interest this doctrine generates. Eligibility requirements come up in many of the non-firearms cases as well, especially with certain immigration/illegal re-entry cases.166

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162 See supra note ___ and cases cited therein.


164 See Connelly, supra note ___ (arguing that the defense should only apply to crimes not requiring proof of culpable intent, and that the applicability of the defense in a given case should be decided by the court, not the jury). Two older articles provided some of the conceptual framework for courts addressing this issue before it took on its present name. See Note, State Estopped To Prosecute Criminal Conduct Suggested By Police, 81 HARV. L. REV. 895 (1968), discussing People v. Donovan, 279 N.Y.S. 2d 404 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1967); Note, Applying Estoppel Principles in Criminal Cases, 78 YALE L.J. 1046 (1969).

165 Michael S. Pasano, Walter J. Taché, & Thierry Olivier Desmet, Using the Defense of Entrapment by Estoppel, 26 CHAMPION 20 (May 2002); Mark S. Cohen, Entrapment By Estoppel, 31 COLO. LAW. 45 (Feb. 2002). Both articles are descriptive law summaries designed to aid practitioners, without advocating for a significant change in policy.

166 See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 89 Fed.Appx. 632, No. 03-10070, 2004 WL 38567 (9th Cir. March 2, 2004) (“Defendant did not demonstrate that his asserted defense of entrapment by estoppel had a "reasonable probability" of success, so he did not demonstrate prejudice based on his attorney's failure to recognize it.”); United States v. Alba, 38 Fed.Appx. 707, No. 01-2510, 01-2907, 2002 WL 522819 (3rd Cir. April 8, 2002); United States v. Miranda-Ramirez, 309 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. George, 266 F.3d 52 (2nd Cir. 2001) (holding that jury instructions were erroneous); U.S. v. Santana Cruz, 216 F.3d 1074 (Table), 2000 WL 900207 (2nd Cir. 2000); U.S. v. Ramirez-Valencia, 202 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the entrapment by estoppel defense failed because defendant had no reasonable basis to rely on the advice given); U.S. v. Gutierrez-Gonzalez, 184 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to entrapment by estoppel defense because the legal conseling organization he consulted was not a government agency); U.S. v. Ortegon-Uvalde, 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir.
Like other entrapment defenses, the number of cases in this area has been decreasing for the last few years. The Supreme Court addressed the doctrine in three cases, the third being in 1973 when Court actually used the term “entrapment by estoppel” for the first time (previous cases simply called it a due process violation). The federal cases peaked around 1995 (similar to sentencing entrapment) and have declined since then. This is a rapid rise and fall

1999) (holding that the defendant could not avail himself of the entrapment by estoppel defense because he did not rely on the Immigration and Naturalization Service's erroneous warning); U.S. v. Aquino-Chacon, 109 F.3d 936 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Active misleading did not occur unless the government affirmatively told a citizen that an activity was lawful. The court held that defendant was not actually misled because the notice did not affirmatively state that it was legal to re-enter the United States after five years without the consent of the Attorney General.”); U.S. v. Thomas, 70 F.3d 575 (11th Cir. 1995) (affirming the defendant’s sentence because he failed to show that reliance upon the erroneous form when he reentered the United States).

From 1994-1997 in federal court the defense was raised in forty-two reported cases, from 1998-2001 it was raised forty-nine, and from 2002-2004 only twenty-nine times.

United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655 (1973) (remanding case to allow the corporation to present evidence of its reliance to satisfy the defense of entrapment by estoppel); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (holding that the defendant’s conviction could not be sustained based on his reliance of the sheriff’s dispersal order); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959) (finding that the convictions of three defendants was precluded because they were instructed by a government agent that they had a right to refuse to answer questions).


See, e.g., United States v. Achter, 52 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that the defense of entrapment by estoppel is excluded because the elements were not satisfied); Roberts v. State, 48 F.3d 1287 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that defendant would be given a sentencing hearing with no mandated minimum sentence because his arresting officer failed to tell him all of the consequences that could result from his refusal to take the blood/alcohol test); United States v. French, 46 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 1995) (“The court affirmed the lower court's determination of the length of defendant's sentence and his past criminal history.”); United States v. Abcasis, 45 F.3d 39 (2nd Cir. 1995) (defining all elements of entrapment by estoppel); United States v. Sims, 68 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Kyle, 67 F.3d 309 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Light, 64 F.3d 660 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Campbell, 65 F.3d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to entrapment by estoppel because he did not demonstrate any basis for the defense); United States v. Caron, 64 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that the petition for rehearing en banc granted but limited to certain issues); United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d 1379 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the defendant’s prior felony convictions were properly used as predicate offenses for his conviction and sentencing); United States v. Heavilin, 60 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Valentine, 59 F.3d 171 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Neufeld, 908 F.Supp. 491 (S.D.Ohio 1995) (holding that entrapment by estoppel barred prosecution); United States v. Indelicato, 887 F.Supp. 23 (D.Mass. 1995).

A growing number of these cases, interestingly, have the procedural posture of being ineffective assistance of counsel claims, indicating that the defense functions sometimes as an afterthought or last resort. See, e.g., United States v. Strube, 65 Fed.Appx. 865, No. 01-3526, 2003 WL 21246540 (3rd Cir. Mar. 30, 2003) (holding that the defense of entrapment by estoppel and outrageous conduct by the government not available to the defendant); United States v. Emerson, 86 Fed.Appx. 696, No. 03-10104, 2004 WL 180360 (5th Cir. Jan. 28, 2004) (finding that the defendant had not shown that he had a valid defense of entrapment by estoppel, so he could not have shown that his attorney's failure to request an instruction or to object to the lack of an instruction was professionally unreasonable or that he was prejudiced); Hood v. United States, 342 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Lewis, 62 Fed.Appx. 757, No. 01-10270, 2003 WL 722128 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2003) (finding that a partially redacted article that gave some evidence that defendant’s were guilty, was not unfairly prejudicial, and thus did not adversely affect the jury's attitude toward defendants apart from their judgment of guilt as to the crimes charged); United States v. Mendoza, 89 Fed.Appx. 632, No. 03-10070, 2004 WL 385678 (9th Cir. March 2, 2004); United
for a criminal defense; it is very difficult to find any estoppel cases at all before 1981 in the federal district or circuit courts, and then there were less than five reported cases per year nationwide until the early 1990’s.

The state patterns are different. They are still increasing, although they got off to a much slower start: there are almost no reported state cases before 1988, and then only one or two cases per year until recently. In 1999, there were at least twelve cases; in 2000, there were at least sixteen cases; in 2001, there were at least twenty cases, at least four of which focused on the lack of a “knowledge defense” of the defendant in possession of the firearm.

Some notable cases include:

- States v. Scott, 41 Fed.Appx. 372, No. 01-7124, 2002 WL 1150819 (10th Cir. May 30, 2002);

The defense was raised three times from 1994-1997, ten times from 1998-2001, and twelve times from 2002-2004, at least in the cases (published and unpublished) available on Westlaw.

See Burkett v. State, 518 So.2d 1363 (Fla.App. 1988). There are three or four cases from the early 1970’s that discuss the scenarios now typical for this defense under the rubric of “entrapment OR estoppel,” using traditional elements for the former and equitable estoppel analysis for the latter, very skeptically. See, e.g., Cohen v. City of New York, 329 N.Y.S.2d 596, 69 Misc.2d 189 (New York 1972); People v. Larson, 308 N.E.2d 148, 17 Ill.App.3d 683 (Ill. 1974) (finding that elements of the entrapment defense were not met); State v. LeDent, 176
two per year (nationwide) from 1992 to 1998. Since then the defense has become more commonplace in the state courts, and the numbers are catching up to the federal cases. This is surprising, in a sense, given the continuing predominance of federal regulatory crimes.

The cases prior to 1981 (i.e., in the 1970’s) involved fact patterns that actually blurred the lines between entrapment by estoppel and the traditional entrapment defense, such as bribery cases. An agent posing as a government official pretending to accept a bribe (typically immigration officers) is in some sense being open and explicit about their government status, but there is nonetheless a ruse at work, as with the traditional defense. This recurring fact scenario prevented entrapment by estoppel from “coming into its own” as a distinct legal doctrine until the 1980’s. It is somewhat unfortunate that the terminology choice did not settle on simple “estoppel” or “government estoppel” rather than including “entrapment”; it would have been less confusing, and more descriptive.

Entrapment by estoppel provides another illustration of legal uncertainty and differing levels of access to legal information. The interplay with these concepts differs somewhat from

N.W.2d 21, 185 Neb. 380 (Neb. 1970) (. . .[E]stoppel is no defense to a criminal action.); People v. Lawrence, 18 Cal.Rptr. 196, 198 Cal.App.2d 54 (Calif. 1962) (finding that the convictions were not erroneous due to the defendant’s claim of entrapment).

See State v. Johnson, 1998 WL 1701 (Ohio App. 1998); Miller v. Com., 492 S.E.2d 482 (Va.App. 1997); People v. Dingman, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 211 (Cal.App. 1996) (affirming the trial court’s judgment because the statute was not unconstitutionally vague); Com. v. Twitchell, 416 Mass. 114, 617 N.E.2d 609 (Mass. 1993); State v. Fogarty, 607 A.2d 624 (N.J. 1992) (finding that the common law and constitutional entrapment defense was unavailable to defendant because the police had not coerced defendant into driving his vehicle, but instead had ordered defendant to leave in his vehicle, without knowledge of his intoxication, while they were attempting to break up a fight in a parking lot). There are no reported cases using the phrase “entrapment by estoppel” in state courts anywhere for the years 1989-91, or 1994-95.

See, e.g., U.S. v. Anderton, 629 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1980) (reversing and remanding because the jury instructions misled the jury); State v. DeKay, 387 So.2d 570 (La., Jun 23, 1980) (finding no evidence of entrapment); U.S. v. Sarno, 596 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. (Nev.), May 07, 1979); Harary v. Blumenthal, 555 F.2d 1113 (2nd Cir. 1977) (affirming the lower court's conviction of public accountant that bribed a special agent of the Internal Revenue Service); People v. Strohl, 57 Cal.App.3d 347, 129 Cal.Rptr. 224 (Cal.App. 2 Dist., Apr 19, 1976) (“[T]he evidence sufficiently supported the jury's finding that the criminal intent to commit the bribery originated in the mind of defendant, not the agent's or coroner's, and thus, there was no unlawful entrapment.”); Johnston v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 356 F.Supp. 904 (E.D.N.Y., Mar 21, 1973) (finding that a claim of entrapment did not violate the accused's civil rights and was dismissed); U.S. v. Caracci, 446 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. (La.) (affirming the bribery conviction), Jun 02, 1971); U.S. v. Chisum, 312 F.Supp. 1307 (C.D.Cal., Apr 24, 1970).
the previously discussed categories of defenses. Sentencing entrapment results from high levels of certainty in punishment rules; entrapment by estoppel results from high levels of certainty in conduct rules, or more better, in eligibility or authorization rules.

First, the offenses that give rise to entrapment by estoppel are almost all technical violations of statutes, albeit serious ones. Many of the defendants could not have been charged with a common law crime having basic act-intent requirements; instead, the case turns on breaching a line drawn somewhat arbitrarily (but still legitimately) by the legislature.

Licensing and eligibility regulations, such as those pertaining to firearms, sometimes serve an important public policy function, but the parameters themselves are not a matter of public morality as the need to have some sort of structure or framework in place. This means that the offenders are unlikely to have moral intuitions or inculcated social norms about the precise requirements of the law. If the rules were unclear, vague, or general, defendants would be better able to rebut the charges on the merits, arguing that there was either a lack of criminal intent or that their behavior did not rise to the level of the criminality contemplated by the statute. The

178 That is, violating firearm licensing requirements, etc. The main exception to this statement is the line of cases involving former government informants who claim to have had temporary authorization to engage in criminal activity (such as collecting child pornography or storing narcotics as part of a pervious sting operation), who continued to do so after their period of authorization ended. See, e.g., United States v. Fulcher, 188 F.Supp.2d 627 (W.D. Va. 2002) (DEA agent acknowledged that he might have mislead the defendant into believing he had authority to investigate drug dealing between guards and inmates, therefore the defense was valid); United States v. Hilton, 257 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2001) (arguing that the defendant’s previous collaboration with the government mislead him to believe that collecting child pornography was legal as long as he turned over the material to a government agent). See also United States v. Clegg, 846 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1988) (government knew and encouraged the defendant to sell firearms); United States v. Rosenthal, 266 F.Supp.2d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (arguing that his deputization by the city reflected the federal government’s approval of cultivating marijuana, but the defense failed because immunity under the controlled substance act was only granted when enforcing a law under the act); United States v. Guevara, No. 02-1426, 2004 WL 1147091 (2nd Cir. May 21, 2004) (claiming that she was recruited by a government informant to distribute heroine, but in order to prevail on the defense the government, not the informant, had to give her actual authority to act as an informant); United States v. Strube, 65 Fed.Appx. 865, No. 01-3526, 2003 WL 21246540 (3rd Cir. May 30, 2003) (claiming that an informant recruited him to help in a government drug trafficking investigation, however the defense failed because he was not directly authorized by the government); United States v. Parker, 267 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2001) (claiming he was compiling images of child pornography for government agents, however he did not have authorization by a government agent); United States v. Pickard, 278 F.Supp.2d 1217 (D. Kan. 2003) (Defendant had a relationship with the DEA and other governmental agencies as an informant, but the defense failed because he could not prove that his conduct in manufacturing LSD was authorized).
certainty and precision of the rules at issue in these cases create a type of strict liability (or something close to it). Rules on the strict liability end of the continuum are the ones most likely to give rise to an entrapment by estoppel defense.

Greater certainty in legal rules is more likely to give rise to strict liability (that is, the elimination or weakening of the intent requirement), although there are a few exceptions where statutes have higher gradations of regulatory felonies for “knowing” or “intentional” violations, as in the case of some tax fraud regulations. It is not only a type of crime (regulatory or eligibility requirements) that lends itself to this defense, but a level of verbal certainty and precision in the rule itself.

Technical violations also place the citizenry at the mercy of the government for adequate information or notice about the rules; it is harder to guess, for example, what might be the exceptions (if there are any) to the felon-firearm rule, much less the “exceptions to the exceptions.” Ignorance of the law, however, is generally no excuse, even with regulatory or

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180 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., THE COMMON LAW 47 (1991) (noting that this "substantive principle is sometimes put in the form of a rule of evidence, that every one is presumed to know the law"). It is exactly this form of the rule that this section brings into question. See also Joshua Dressler, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 147-158 (2nd ed. 2001); Model Penal Code § 2.02(9) (1966) ("Neither knowledge nor recklessness nor knowledge as to whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to the existence, meaning or application of the law determining the elements of an offense is a defense.").

Holmes' explanation includes a strong dose of "tough luck" in typical Holmesian prose:
The true explanation of the rule is the same as that which accounts for the law's indifference to a man's particular temperament, faculties, and so forth. Public policy sacrifices the individual to the general good. It is desirable that the burden of all should be equal, but it is still more desirable to put an end to robbery and murder. It is no doubt true that there are many cases in which the criminal could not have known that he was breaking the law, but to admit the excuse at all would
technical offenses; active misinformation or miscommunication might be, and that is the essence of the entrapment by estoppel defense. Heightened legal certainty in eligibility or authorization rules creates a special, paradoxical situation: adequate (effective) communication of the rule is necessary for compliance, but not necessary for liability. Certain individuals – generally, those disqualified from the eligibility in question – could not know the exact parameters of the rule without being told. Yet actual notice (basically, effective communication from the government) is not required for conviction, only “constructive notice” (that is, some sort of token communication to the public). This conundrum is true with many criminal laws, of course – most people do not know exactly what the laws in their jurisdiction say, which is no defense to crime, while the government has some technical duty of generalized notice. The tension is more evident, however, with eligibility requirements.

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181 See, e.g., Doctor’s Hospital of Hyde Park v. Appeal of Daiwa Special Asset Corp., 337 F.3d 951 (7th Cir. 2003) (“There are an enormous number of state laws, and it might be unreasonable to expect a person . . . to determine in advance the possible bearing of all of them.”); Torres v. INS, 144 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 1998) (immigration laws changed without public announcement or publication).

182 See, e.g., North Carolina v. White, 2004 LEXIS ___ (Jan. 20, 2004) (“Although ignorance of the law is no excuse, due process requires that the defendant have knowledge, actual or constructive, of the statutory requirements before he can be charged with its violation.”); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., *Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes*, 71 VA. L. REV. 201, 206-12 (1985). See also WAYNE R. LA FAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 217-18 (2003). Regarding strict liability, La Fave says that “…some attention should be given here to the question of whether liability may be imposed for an omission when the defendant was…unaware of the existence or scope of the legal duty.” Some courts refuse to hold defendants liable for crimes of omission without having knowledge of the statute creating the duty omitted, according to La Fave, but courts generally assume that defendants have (constructive) knowledge of statutes when they violate them with affirmative actions.

183 In a recent study of educated citizens in four different states, the results confirmed the hypothesis that “people do not have a clue about what the laws of their states hold on . . . important legal issues.” John M. Darley, Kevin M. Carlsmith, and Paul H. Robinson, *The Ex Ante Function of the Criminal Law*, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 165, 167 (2001).

184 See, e.g., Cambell v. Bennett, 212 F.Supp. 2d. 1339, 1343 (M.Dist. Ala. 2002) (“. . .[T]he due-process concept of fair notice. . . . is central to the legitimacy of our legal system: Elementary considerations of fairness
This tension is worse, perhaps, due to the nature of eligibility requirements. People are more likely to engage in wishful thinking or excessive optimism that they are part of an “included group” than they are to think that an act of violence, theft, possession of contraband, etc. is somehow legal; this seems especially true when the “included group” is the majority of the population, as with non-felons who want gun licenses.

Finally, the numbers of cases seem to reflect the changing levels of uncertainty pertaining to the defense itself. The scarcity of cases until recently is rather striking; it is hard to believe that government agents throughout history have managed to communicate better than they have in the last ten years. Rather, it seems that the idea of raising the defense simply occurs to more defendants now that the elements of the defense have been crystallized, as evidenced by the failure rate/weakness of the defense itself in the reported cases. The federal cases, however, did not increase in response to the crystallization of the rule in the early 1970’s; the jump in the number of cases is probably more related to changes in federal gun-licensing laws in the late 1980’s or early 90’s, or a shift in focus of federal law enforcement, such as the War on Drugs.

dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted.”); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 264 (1994).

Probably the most well-known case about the notice requirement in criminal law, at least from the United States Supreme Court, is Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), involving a residency registration law for felons visiting Los Angeles. The defendant had just moved to the city and did not know about the requirement; the Supreme Court held that her conviction under the ordinance violated due process rights. It is not clear, however, that the Court was concerned entirely with the notice issue, although the opinion certainly relies on that in part; Lambert’s crime also involved a simple omission or passive act (not registering), which would not have been a crime at all under common law. Moreover, the Court may have simply disliked the residency registration requirement because of the general chilling effect that such requirements have on interstate travel. The ambiguity of its holding, and the other complicating factors in the case, have caused it to have little value for precedent compared to other Supreme Court decisions in the criminal law area. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 9, at 171-73 (discussing Lambert and possible interpretations of its holding); LA FAVE, supra note 11, at 203:

It is important to note, however, that the Lambert decision does not require legislative tampering with the doctrine that ignorance of the criminal law is no excuse. Ignorance of the law, after all, is an excuse when it negatives a required mental element of the crime, so it would be fairly simple to redraft legislation of the kind condemned in Lambert so that guilt depends upon a knowing violation of a legal duty.

Another reading of the case is that it stands for the notion that unlimited uncertainty – uncertainty in the rules (i.e., vagueness) severe enough to undermine the deterrent effect – is invalid.
The ongoing increase of estoppel cases in state court is probably attributable to the fact that it is a much newer defense at that level, and many states have yet to consider their first test case or apply the defense to a significant range of facts.\(^{185}\)

**V. ENTRAPMENT AND NEW TECHNOLOGY**

As crime has gone online in recent years, so has law enforcement. Certain crimes, like identity theft, electronic money laundering, and attacks on websites, depend inherently on the use of computers, and it is not at all surprising that solving or preventing such crimes involves computer surveillance and enforcement.

What is somewhat more surprising, although the novelty has long worn off and the causes self-evident, is the use of computers and the Internet for one of the most base, impulse-driven, and unsophisticated sorts of crimes: sexual predation on children.\(^{186}\) This section is devoted primarily to this crime, rather than on what are sometimes called “core” computer crimes, such as hacking and denial of service attacks on websites; although these crimes present interesting issues for possible entrapment claims, the tech-entrapment cases themselves are almost entirely focused on pederasty.

\(^{185}\) See, e.g., *State v. Hagan-Sherwin*, No. CR 03-249, 2004 WL 743808 (Ark. April 8, 2004) (state claimed the defense was not available because it was not a recognized defense in the state, but it was allowed by the court.) .

\(^{186}\) An interesting historical observation was made by a federal court in New York:

> The interest of federal law enforcement officers in the flow of child pornography over the Internet was evidently piqued by the much-publicized case involving the abduction of a ten-year old Maryland boy . . . Bureau agents investigating the matter discovered that computer on-line services were being used to entice children into sexual encounters with adults, and that child pornography was being distributed regularly by computer. The Baltimore office of the FBI subsequently spearheaded an investigation wherein law enforcement agents would sign on to computer services and attempt to identify traffickers of image files containing child pornography. Evidence against defendant in the case at bar originated from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. *U.S. v. Lamb*, 945 F.Supp. 441, 445 (N.D.N.Y., Nov 05, 1996)
Pedophiles find the Internet particularly suited for pursuing their ends; it allows (now somewhat limited) anonymity, freedom from normal social inhibitions, and a wide range in which to search for “consenting” youth to victimize, which is obviously more convenient than victims who run or fight. Apart from recruitment efforts, pedophiles who like to associate with others sharing the same preferences and desires are able to find one another much more easily, to communicate freely across long distances, and to share child-porn images or stories instantly. In rational-choice terms, the transaction and search costs for pedophilia, which once were quite high outside an extended family, have been drastically reduced. While some may contend that online sex-related activities simply reflect the real-world of sexual enterprise, pedophilia is a special case that has almost always carried severe social stigma, limited opportunities, and complications with finding cooperative victims. The online environment is particularly conducive to the commission of this type of crime.

The Internet is also particularly conducive to certain types of sting operations; to the extent that the Web has altered the landscape for pedophilia (more so than for most crimes, it seems), it has also altered law enforcement – again, particularly in this area. It is easy (both in the sense of being simple and cheap) for officers or agents to troll online chatrooms posing as adolescents seeking sexual experimentation to lure pedophiles into extended correspondence (accumulating incriminating evidence from conversations and emailed images). Eventually they

187 See Gregg, supra note 16, at 161-66 (discussing ways in which computers and the Internet facilitate child related sex crimes); Yamagami, supra note 15, at 550.

188 Id.

189 See Hanson, supra note __, at 536 (“The ease with which law enforcement officials can assume false identities in cyberspace and the suitability of cyberspace for consensual or victimless crimes indicate a probable increase in undercover sting operations.”).
arrange a real-life sexual rendezvous, which usually becomes the occasion and location for the arrest. 190

The rules regulating sting operations, of which the entrapment defense is a major part, 191 have not adapted fully to this new environment. 192 These cases proceed under traditional rules for entrapment in the given jurisdiction, generally resulting in an unsuccessful defense. Those more concerned about overly aggressive law enforcement could see this is a bad trend; 193 those more concerned about the seriousness of this particular crime tend to see the trend of a broken-down entrapment defense as a miniscule move in the right direction. 194

Traditional rules for entrapment are becoming inapplicable. There are five major problems with applying the traditional rules, which have made the entrapment defense unworkable in these cases to the point of becoming nearly obsolete:

190 See, e.g., U.S. v. Poehlman, 217 F.3d 692, 697 (9th Cir. 2000) (meeting at hotel in another state, surprised by agents); State v. Ryerson, 2004 WL 1433672, 2004-Ohio 3353, (Ohio App. Jun 28, 2004) (“Appellant arrived at the restaurant at the designated time, stayed there a short while, and then traveled to a nearby gas station . . . [The police] had been watching appellant from his squad car, followed him into the gas station. There, he arrested appellant and transported him to the police department.”); State v. Cunningham, __ N.E.2d __, 2004 WL 829881 (Ohio App. 2004) (“arrested by . . . police while attempting to meet ‘Molly,’ the other supposed fourteen-year-old virgin; Molly was actually a policeman . . .”); State v. Turner, 805 N.E.2d 124 (Ohio. App. 2004) (involving a minister that arranged through the Internet to commit unlawful sexual acts with a minor); State v. Canaday, 641 N.W.2d 13 (Neb. 2003) (finding that the defendant was induced to commit the offense because the undercover agent repeatedly tried to encourage defendant to have sexual relations with her young daughter); U.S. v. Mitchell, 353 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Mitchell left his home in Elkhart, Indiana on December 15, 2001, and drove to the pre-arranged meeting spot in the parking lot of a Holiday Inn in Hillside. Once there, he called Dena to let her know that he had arrived. . .Shortly thereafter, a Sheriff’s Deputy posing as Dena approached Mitchell and he was arrested.”); Com. v. Zingarelli, 839 A.2d 1064 (Pa.Super.,2003) (defendant arrested while waiting at ice cream stand for supposed victim, with a box of condoms, a key to a hotel room prepared with bottle of wine, etc.); Laughner v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1147 (Ind. App., 2002) (arrested at gas station rendezvous).

191 Apart from internal procedural guidelines for undercover operations, of course.

192 See generally Hanson, supra note __, at 536 (“[T]he current entrapment doctrines as applied to cyberspace do not effectively address the concerns behind the entrapment defense . . . requiring law enforcement to meet a reasonable-suspicion standard before engaging in undercover operations would better address those concerns.”).

193 See generally id.; Graham, supra note __, at 480-83.

194 See, e.g., Gregg, supra note __, at 188-93.
1. “Predisposition,” usually the critical element under the subjective test, is a foregone conclusion in almost all of the cases, because the defendants actively log onto certain chat rooms, engage in repeated, typed communications with their intended victims.195

2. In states using the objective test, on the other hand, the conduct and conversations of the agents can be very difficult to trace or verify. There is less accountability for government where the enforcement method is cheap and relatively invisible when orchestrated.196 Traditional stings typically require a host of armed “backup” agents nearby in case the primary undercover operative encounters trouble (i.e., gets discovered) and elaborate surveillance equipment; catching pedophiles can be done mostly from a cubicle in an office.197 In addition, the Internet enables a single officer to entrap multiple individuals at once, simultaneously, as through online bulletin board postings (i.e., “pre-teens wanted”). This multiple-simultaneous feature of online entrapment may not be undesirable from a policy perspective, but it is a significant change from the traditional arrangement that the entrapment defense contemplated.

3. The inexpensive, relatively invisible nature of such operations also permits private entrapment to become rampant, which is not the case offline settings or with other crimes.

Online vigilantism against pedophiles, in fact, has taken on expected proportions. Traditional

195 See Hanson, supra note __, at 541-43 (arguing that the subjective test is inadequate for protecting the innocent in cyberspace).
196 See id. at 544-47, arguing that the objective test is also inadequate to protect innocent individuals from police setups online. Hanson’s argument on this point is different than the one offered here; he argues that the rules for the objective test are too unclear and unsettled to apply to this new context. I would contend, on the contrary, that the objective test makes it easy for courts to generate bright-line rules, but that the inexpensive online setting makes it easy for police to work around these clear rules.
197 There is an underlying assumption in my reasoning that costs contribute to the sense of “reasonableness” for a court evaluating law enforcement methods; questionable methods that involve exorbitant costs are more likely to evoke the ire of the judiciary, I assume, than questionable methods whose cost-benefit justification is readily apparent. Even for those who disassociate rights from efficiency concerns, costs in the real world can function as a proxy for “reasonableness” on the part of the government, because grossly disproportionate devotion of resources to an individual target is likely to evince something unfair and undemocratic.
Entrapment rules do not allow consideration of “private entrapment.” Individuals tempted, induced or set up by anyone besides a state agent cannot raise an entrapment defense to criminal charges. Historically this was not a problem, because most individuals, even if they had the motivation to entrap others, do not have the resources to orchestrate a sting while protecting themselves from retaliation if caught; private entrapment was therefore a rare occurrence. The Internet has changed this, for better or worse, at least for the crimes perpetrated partly online.

4. Traditional entrapment rules have tended to relax certain evidentiary rules, particularly about “past crimes.” Online stings present special, new evidentiary problems because the online conversations, although “recorded” on a computer’s storage system, are out of context when later submitted as evidence in court; this is essentially a hearsay problem. These records are easily altered, redacted, and otherwise manipulated after the arrest, without detection or evidence of the

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198 This is true except in cases of “derivative entrapment,” where the private party who entrapped the defendant was in turn entrapped by an agent. “Derivative entrapment” and “vicarious entrapment,” as seen in U.S. v. Valencia, 669 F.2d 37 (2nd Cir. 1981), and Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994); see also LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 452-54 (§ 5.2(a)); John E. Nilsson, Of Outlaws and Offloads: A Case for Derivative Entrapment, 37 B.C. L. REV. 743 (1996). “Vicarious entrapment” refers to the situation where the original targets of the sting operation act on their own to recruit additional members of the conspiracy; the Valencia court held that if the original party had a valid entrapment defense, the spouse who was subsequently recruited could also use the defense. “Derivative entrapment” refers to situations where the undercover agent uses an unsuspecting middleman as a means of passing on an inducement to a distant target. In rare circumstances, an entrapment defense has succeeded for the distant target, as in United States v. Washington, 106 F.3d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1997). So far, the cases are still quite rare and usually unsuccessful; see, e.g., U.S. v. Hsu, 364 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e have expressly refused to recognize as a basis for an entrapment defense.”); U.S. v. Turner, 2003 WL 22056405 (D. Mass., Sep 04, 2003) (derivative entrapment defense held unavailable where intermediary was not found to have been entrapped); United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 573-74 (4th Cir.2000) (“[I]n the Fourth Circuit, a defendant cannot claim an entrapment defense based upon the purported inducement of a third party who is not a government agent if the third party is not aware that he is dealing with a government agent.”).

199 See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 458 (Roberts, J. dissenting); LAFAVE, supra note 12 at § 5.2(d). For example, North Carolina has codified this evidentiary exception in its Rules of Evidence. North Carolina Rules of Evidence, Rule 404(b) (2001) makes evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" inadmissible "to prove the character of a person in order the show that he acted in conformity therewith," but admissible for other purposes "such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident." See, e.g., Di Frega v. Pugliese, 596 S.E.2d 456, 460 (N.C. App., 2004); State v. Bush, 595 S.E.2d 715, 719 (N.C. App., 2004).
alteration (unlike most physical evidence). In addition, agents can structure their online conversations linguistically to elicit particularly incriminating statements that the defendant may not otherwise have made.

5. Many of these cases frame the charges as “attempt” crimes (“attempted molestation of a minor,” etc), with exclusion of a few cases where the charges include the completed crime of sending sexually explicit images to a minor. Attempt charges have a strange interplay with certain defenses. Most jurisdictions use a test requiring only that the defendant take some

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200 See, e.g., State v. Bolden, 2004 WL 1043317 (Ohio App. 2004) (State's alleged failure to preserve missing logs of Internet conversations did not constitute Brady violation); U.S. v. Poehlman, 217 F.3d 692, 695 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The government was unable to produce the text of the original e-mail at trial, but Poehlman offered undisputed testimony as to its substance.”).

201 See, e.g., Poehlman, 217 F.3d at 696, n. 2: “Much of the evidence in this case is in the form of e-mail messages sent back and forth between Sharon and Poehlman. In the breezy, informal style of e-mail, there are numerous grammatical, spelling and syntax errors in the messages. Because indicating each mistake with a [sic] would be too distracting, and correcting all of the errors poses the risk of altering the meaning of the messages, we reproduce the messages in their original form, warts and all.”

202 See, e.g., Com. v. Zingarelli, 839 A.2d 1064 (Pa.Super.,2003) (refusing to hold that public policy required the elimination of undercover sting operations); Laughner v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1147 (Ind. App., 2002) (finding that impossibility to commit the crime because the child was actually an undercover agent was not a valid defense); United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 2002) (attempt to entice minor to engage in sexual activity); U.S. v. Poehlman, 217 F.3d 692, 697 (9th Cir. 2000) (referring to his initial state-court charges of attempt);U.S. v. Crow, 164 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 1999) (involving Internet child exploitation); Hatch v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. Rptr 2d 453 (Cal. App. 2000).

Conspiracy charges can be used in jurisdictions allowing a “unilateral” approach to conspiracy (where the only “conspirators” besides the defendant are government agents). An illustration (where the entrapment defense happened to be successful) is State v. Canaday, 641 N.W.2d 13 (Neb. 2002). Solicitation, closely related to attempt and conspiracy, also appears in these cases, although more often with a “real” child victim. See, e.g., U.S. v. Dhingra, __ F.3d __, 2004 WL 1243995, (9th Cir. 2004).

203 See, e.g., People v. Martin, 2001 WL 1699653 (Mich. App. 2001). At least one court considers attempted sex crimes with children to be a completed crime of sexual abuse of a minor, even though the “minor” was a middle-aged undercover agent in an Internet chat room; see People v. Chow, 2002 WL 857763 (Mich.App., May 03, 2002).

“substantial step” toward the commission of an offense (along with the specific intent to commit the crime) in order to convict of attempt; this step itself does not necessarily have to be an illegal action. Not having to wait for a completed crime or transaction allows law enforcement to use simplified stings, and prosecutors to muster less evidence than with some substantial offenses that require proof of harm or injury. The abbreviated fact pattern of an attempt charge gives the defense less with which to work in concocting an entrapment defense.

Under the subjective test, it may be easier to prove that a defendant was “predisposed” to attempt a crime than to complete it; it often takes more resolve and planning to guarantee one’s criminal goal than to simply start off on the road in that direction (take a substantial step). Under an objective test, it may take somewhat less government inducement to prompt an attempt, as opposed to a completed crime, for the same reasons; thus there is less likelihood of objectionable activity by the agents. In addition, traditionally the best defense to attempt charges was “factual impossibility”; situations where the crime went uncompleted are often ones where completion became impossible for some reason (admittedly, many jurisdictions have abolished the impossibility defense for attempt for a number of reasons). Yet an “impossibility” theory for the defendant may be mutually exclusive with an entrapment defense, particularly where the latter requires an ex ante admission of committing the crime charged. It can greatly complicated or weaken a defense to argue alternatively both impossibility and entrapment.

There may be good reason to leave the entrapment defense behind in online pedophile cases. As discussed above, the Internet drastically reduces the search and transaction costs for sexual predation on minors, creating an artificially conducive environment for the crime. Online

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205 This would be a general problem with mixing entrapment under a subjective test with attempt charges for any crime, not just online sexual predation.
sting operations offset this effect, not only by catching perpetrators, but by creating a chilling
effect in the chat rooms generally. The uncertainty introduced by the presence of an unknown
number of undercover agents online can function as a deterrent that is not only healthy, but
perhaps necessarily in order to re-establish a balance. If the entrapment defense is both
infeasible and undesirable in one particular area like this, concerns of judicial economy may
justify abandoning it in this narrow class of cases.

If there is a need to preserve the entrapment defense for innocent citizens who somehow
become beguiled by sexual conversations with an apparent child online, I offer two modest
proposals. First, an exclusionary rule for online entrapment-related evidence would bolster the
accuracy of the results in these cases, even if exclusionary rules have doubtful effect on the
police themselves. I am not suggesting an adoption of this rule across the board; only for
online sting operations, where the recorded text of conversations is particularly susceptible to
tampering. The technology is widely available to record automatically online conversations
from a given computer; a simple rule requiring certification that such recording was running all
the time, not selectively, would suffice.
The second proposal is to build entrapment safeguards into the elements of attempt, rather than having entrapment function (or fail to function) as an affirmative defense. Audrey Rogers, for example, has suggested incorporating a clearer definition of the requisite intent for criminal liability online, to account for varying levels of user error or confusion. Another approach would involve nothing more than specifying what qualifies as a “substantial step” for attempt, that is, something offline and objective. Almost all the cases involve stings that culminated in an arranged meeting at a motel or restaurant. Requiring some sort of incriminating statement at the supposed rendezvous confirming the defendant’s continuing intention would not be particularly burdensome on the police, but would make the results of the cases more predictable and certain. Of course, such a move would make the entrapment defense unnecessary in these cases; again, given the state of the defense, it is justifiable to develop a policy that wastes fewer judicial resources on doomed, declining defenses.


I disagree. Entrapment is a common-law defense; the Supreme Court has not recognized it as a constitutional issue, like the exclusionary rules. Catching online pedophiles seems to be the worst possible scenario for implementing such a requirement (although government pandering of child pornography, as in *Jacobson*, is a different matter), where waiting for reasonable suspicion will often mean waiting for a child victim to be discovered. Rogers, *supra* note 200, at 510-23. For a contrary view (arguing that the intent rules are already too lax), see *Yamagami*, *supra* note 15, at 570-78.

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Attempt liability draws an imaginary line, so to speak, between “mere preparation” and a “substantial step” toward consummation of the offense; the latter triggers criminal liability, which is not present up to that point. The exact placement of this line, however, is somewhat uncertain in most jurisdictions, with courts defining “substantial step” mostly on a case-by-case basis. If we conceive the defendant as moving along a continuum from “mere preparation” to completion of the crime, whether the continuum consists of a series of steps or the passage of time, then sting operations present the troubling scenario of helping the criminal skip some of the steps or time that the crime would usually require, arriving at the line of a “substantial step” more quickly or easily. If the usual progression, however, is also a progression of accumulated culpability, then the defendant whose crime was facilitated in some way by undercover agents has arrived at the threshold of criminal liability without passing through the usual process of accumulating culpability or blameworthiness. One way to account for this accelerated blameworthiness may be to have a clearer, more objective line for “substantial steps.” With computer-related crime, one obvious way to do this would be to have the step from online activity to real-world actions constitute a bright-line rule for liability. This would be less useful where the charges involve completed crimes of sending obscene material to minors, but more useful in situations where the defendant goes to a pre-arranged location to meet his supposed victim, and later denies having an intention to consummate the crime with a minor.
VI. CONCLUSION

Studying the entrapment defense in terms of the numbers and varieties of reported cases provides a fascinating glimpse into the trends in our criminal law system. The classic defenses studied in law school courses are not simply sets of rules and exceptions; some go through long periods of disuse, then become popular issues of litigation, and then fade again toward disuse. It is also interesting to see that “entrapment” is not simply a defense, but a number of conceptually distinct defenses or claims that we often cluster together.

The numbers of cases in which these defenses fail is also very telling. Studying a defense as a set of elements or rules often involves looking at some exemplary cases or hypothetical situations where the requirements are met; this, in turn, can create the impression that the defense simply “works” when A, B, and C happen together. Recognizing that the defenses fail the vast majority of the time enriches our understanding by adding a functionalist dimension. The defenses are often a last resort for defendants in a rather desperate situation. The procedural posture of a number of cases supports this conclusion. Studying entrapment by the numbers reveals a defense on the decline.

Mathematical, precise rules for matters such as sentencing or gradation of felonies influence this area in a very concrete way – particularly sentencing entrapment, but also the other entrapment defenses. Issues of legal certainty and uncertainty affect all these cases in two ways. First, as legal rules become more detailed and enumerated, there arises a significant disparity in the legal information readily available to state agents as opposed to potential defendants, and this informational disparity operates in the background of each of the scenarios that give rise to the
Entrapment defenses (sting operations, firearm licensing procedures, etc.). Some legal rules become so precise and mechanical, numerical benchmarks take on increased importance, whether in specified amounts of contraband for certain sentencing factors, numbers of previous convictions, etc. As seen in the foregoing discussion, there is a sense in which many defendants are entrapped by the numbers.

Second, as courts rule on a larger number of cases asserting an entrapment defense, an individual defendant is better able to assess the chances of succeeding on the defense in quantifiable terms, making pleas more likely. The greater certainty in these numbers helps explain the decline of the defense, both in frequency and procedural strength.

New technology has changed the playing field for certain crimes, like sexual predation on children, and at the same time has transformed the nature of law enforcement efforts against these very crimes. The traditional rules of entrapment do not adapt well to this new environment, and a change is needed. While it may be possible to revamp the existing defenses to address these developments, it may be more efficient to build entrapment principles into the elements of the crimes themselves, achieving the same goals with better judicial economy.

The approach taken in this essay, although novel, could be used for fruitful research in other areas of criminal law as well. It would enrich our understanding of all the classic criminal defenses (insanity, impossibility, duress, etc.) to analyze their functional role in our justice system and their numerical relevance for defendants today. In additional, the effects of legal uncertainty on each defense could be an important consideration for future policy discussion.