THE SUPREME COURT, STARE DECISIS, AND THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE IN PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION APPEALS

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ABSTRACT

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviews de novo the rulings of district judges about patent claim construction. This state of affairs—surprising to many lawyers who are unfamiliar with patent law—is controversial because claim construction is one of the most important and vexing aspects of patent litigation, necessary to the vast majority of patent cases, and because it is probably responsible, at least in part, for the high reversal rate in patent cases. Commentary by both scholars and judges about the standard of review in patent cases has centered on whether the Federal Circuit should change it and review claim construction rulings with deference.

This commentary relies on a flawed assumption. The Federal Circuit lacks the authority to review claim construction rulings deferentially, because de novo review is required by the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments. In particular, the Supreme Court stated that claim construction rulings are entitled to stare decisis.

This article will argue that deference should be granted to the factual findings and acquired technical expertise underlying district courts’ claim construction rulings in at least some limited cases—but it will also explain why change must and should come from the Supreme Court.

I. INTRODUCTION: PHILLIPS AND ITS DISSENTS

On July 12, 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued an en banc opinion in Phillips v. AWH, a patent infringement lawsuit concerning modular wall panels intended for use in constructing prisons. At issue—besides a prison panel patent—was nothing less than the basic question of how district courts should construe patent claims, and in particular the relationship between a patent’s specification and its claims. In the words of the court, this

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1 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 1209 (Fed. Cir.) (panel opinion), vacated, 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (granting rehearing en banc).
“has been an issue in patent law decisions in this country for nearly two centuries.” The *Phillips* en banc opinion will no doubt be a starting point for the practice of claim construction—and thus a centerpiece of patent litigation—for the foreseeable future.

But the *Phillips* opinion is perhaps more notable for what it did not resolve than what it did. The court had asked the parties and the patent bar to brief a series of seven questions.

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2 415 F.3d at 1312.
3 The seven questions read as follows:

This court has determined to hear this case en banc in order to resolve issues concerning the construction of patent claims raised by the now-vacated panel majority and dissenting opinions. The parties are invited to submit additional briefs directed to these issues, with respect particularly to the following questions:

1. Is the public notice function of patent claims better served by referencing primarily to technical and general purpose dictionaries and similar sources to interpret a claim term or by looking primarily to the patentee's use of the term in the specification? If both sources are to be consulted, in what order?

2. If dictionaries should serve as the primary source for claim interpretation, should the specification limit the full scope of claim language (as defined by the dictionaries) only when the patentee has acted as his own lexicographer or when the specification reflects a clear disclaimer of claim scope? If so, what language in the specification will satisfy those conditions? What use should be made of general as opposed to technical dictionaries? How does the concept of ordinary meaning apply if there are multiple dictionary definitions of the same term? If the dictionary provides multiple potentially applicable definitions for a term, is it appropriate to look to the specification to determine what definition or definitions should apply?

3. If the primary source for claim construction should be the specification, what use should be made of dictionaries? Should the range of the ordinary meaning of claim language be limited to the scope of the invention disclosed in the specification, for example, when only a single embodiment is disclosed and no other indications of breadth are disclosed?

4. Instead of viewing the claim construction methodologies in the majority and dissent of the now-vacated panel decision as alternative, conflicting approaches, should the two approaches be treated as complementary methodologies such that there is a dual restriction on claim scope, and a patentee must satisfy both limiting methodologies in order to establish the claim coverage it seeks?

5. When, if ever, should claim language be narrowly construed for the sole purpose of avoiding invalidity under, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 and 112?

6. What role should prosecution history and expert testimony by one of ordinary skill in the art play in determining the meaning of the disputed claim terms?

7. Consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in *Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.*, 517 U.S. 370, 134 L. Ed. 2d 577, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996), and our en banc decision in *Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.*, 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998), is it appropriate for this court to accord any deference to any aspect of trial court claim construction rulings? If so, on what aspects, in what circumstances, and to what extent?
Question 7—using the numbering of the Phillips en banc order—asked what deference the Federal Circuit can and should give to claim construction rulings by trial courts. The Phillips court simply “decided not to address that issue at this time,” but this decision—and thus Phillips’ underlying premise that there even can exist a purely legal framework for construing patent claims—drew a scathing dissent by Judge Mayer, joined by Judge Newman.

Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments and the Federal Circuit’s decisions in that case and in Cybor v. FAS Technologies, claim construction has been considered to be a matter of pure law and has accordingly been reviewed de novo on appeal by the Federal Circuit, “including any allegedly fact-based questions relating to claim construction.” This state of affairs has been controversial. Judge Mayer, for example, described “any attempt to fashion a coherent standard under this regime” as “pointless,” accused the court of “focus[ing] inappropriate power” in itself, and further attacked the court for “decid[ing] cases according to whatever mode or method results in the outcome we desire.” In dissent from the Phillips en banc order, he had previously written that “[n]early a decade of confusion has resulted from the fiction that claim construction is a matter of law, when it is obvious that it depends on underlying factual determinations . . . reviewable on appeal for clear

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (granting rehearing en banc). Like the Federal Circuit, this paper uses “claim construction” and “claim interpretation” interchangeably. See Markman v. Westview Insts., 52 F.3d 967, 976 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (“The dissenting opinion draws a distinction between claim interpretation and claim construction based on the distinction made in contract law. We do not make the same distinction for, in our view, the terms mean one and the same thing in patent law.”).

See 376 F.3d at 1383.

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1328.

Id. at 1330–35 (Mayer, J., dissenting).


Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Id. at 1456.

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1330 (Mayer, J., dissenting).

Id.

Id.
error.”14 In Judge Mayer’s view, the Federal Circuit should reconsider its holdings in *Markman* and *Cybor*, a possibility that the wording of Question 7 appeared deliberately to avoid.15 Several of the amicus briefs in *Phillips* urged a similar position, arguing that underlying factual determinations should be reviewed for clear error.16

As both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have explained, however, there are compelling reasons to treat claim construction—at least in the ordinary case—as a matter of pure law. Patent claims delineate the scope of an invention from which the patentee has a government grant of the right to exclude others; as such, the public should be able to rely upon a consistent construction of patent claims based only upon the documents available in the public record.17 Other legal instruments are construed by courts as matters of law rather than fact, and it is reasonable that patents be treated similarly.18 Finally, at least in principle, treatment as a matter of law may promote uniformity in how claims are construed.19 Unlike questions of fact, questions of law are generally entitled to stare decisis effect in addition to collateral estoppel.20 And unlike collateral estoppel, which can bind only the parties to the action in which an issue is decided, stare decisis may preclude reconsideration of an issue that is asserted by a party who

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14 *Phillips*, 376 F.3d at 1384 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting from order granting rehearing en banc).
15 Question 7 asks if, “[c]onsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in” *Markman* and with *Cybor*, “it is appropriate . . . to accord any deference to any aspect of trial court claim construction rulings.” *Id.* at 1383. This would seem to preclude any attempt to overrule *Cybor*, and of course the Federal Circuit is not empowered to overrule the Supreme Court’s decision in *Markman*, although it could overrule its own *Markman* decision to the extent doing so is consistent with binding Supreme Court precedent.
18 See *Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.*, 517 U.S. 370, 387 (1996) (“The construction of written instruments is one of those things that judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors unburdened by training in exegesis.”).
19 See *id.* at 390.
20 See generally Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Note that collateral estoppel may apply to questions of law, but will not apply to questions of law litigated anew in “substantially unrelated actions.” *Id.* at 1373.
has never before litigated the question. Thus, if a particular claim construction is entitled to
stare decisis effect, it will (at least in theory) apply in all future lawsuits in which it is at issue.

At the same time, even the Markman and Cybor courts acknowledged that judges, though
definitionally skilled in the law, are not necessarily skilled in the art to which a patent pertains,
and that extrinsic evidence—any evidence outside the public record of the patent document and
its file wrapper, including expert testimony—may help the court put itself in the position of a
person of ordinary skill in the art. Phillips was decided without addressing the question at all—correctly, as the claim
construction at issue did not involve any findings based on extrinsic evidence or expert
testimony. But the question remains as important and challenging as ever.

In Part II, this paper argues that the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in Markman and Cybor is
compelling, and that claim construction rulings should ordinarily be considered decisions of law
and reviewed de novo. It also argues, however, that the Federal Circuit—despite its undoubted
technical expertise—is not and cannot be skilled in every technical field. Thus, when trial
judges have heard testimony intended to put them in the position of one skilled in the art, the

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21 See id.
22 See id. Whether a decision that is entitled to stare decisis effect will be binding on future courts to consider the
same issue, or whether it will merely be persuasive, depends on the courts involved. See id. ("[S]tare decisis is a
doctrine that binds courts to follow their own earlier decisions or the decisions of a superior tribunal."); see also
infra note 123 and accompanying text. Either way, a claim construction that is entitled to some form of stare decisis
effect is more likely to be applied uniformly across multiple patent infringement suits than a claim construction that
is litigated anew by each new defendant. In particular, if a claim construction is adopted by the Federal Circuit, that
construction would be binding in district court infringement actions nationwide. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 390
(noting the uniformity conferred by the exclusive national appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit).
("Extrinsic evidence consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and
inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.").
is permissible, and often necessary, to receive expert evidence to ascertain the meaning of a technical or scientific
term or term of art so that the court may be aided in understanding . . . what [the instruments] actually say."); see also
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
26 See, e.g., Robert D. Wallick & Neil R. Ellis, The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: At the
nature of the many patent cases heard by the CAFC demonstrates . . . that the court is a technology-conscious legal
body highly qualified to hear, assess, and decide technical patent appeals from both judicial and administrative
Federal Circuit should grant deference to the decisions the trial judge makes about how particular technical claim terms are understood by practitioners of the art. In essence, it argues that Judge Mayer’s dissenting comments in the Phillips en banc order are correct, and that deference should be given to underlying trial-court factfinding—but only in the exceptional case where recourse to extrinsic testimony is necessary and appropriate.

This conclusion, however, must be squared with the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman. Part III of the paper questions whether this sort of deference is within the Federal Circuit’s power to grant, and concludes on the basis of Markman that it is not. In particular, for reasons that Part III explores, the Supreme Court’s holding that claim constructions should be granted stare decisis effect implies that they cannot be based on factfinding about which the Federal Circuit has granted deference to a trial court. The paper concludes that the Supreme Court should clarify or overrule Markman and hold that trial judges may make use of extrinsic evidence to help put them in the position of practitioners of ordinary skill in the art; that when they do so, their factual rulings are entitled to appellate deference; and that stare decisis is appropriate only as to legal matters that do not require particularized technical expertise.

Notably, as Part IV will argue in conclusion, the Phillips court was right not to tackle these questions: Phillips was not an appropriate case in which to decide them. But another may soon arise that is a fitting candidate for consideration by an en banc Federal Circuit and—one hopes—a grant of certiorari.

II. THE DEFERENCE THAT IS NEEDED

A. THE PECULIAR POSITION OF PATENTS

summarize the fundamental difficulty with claim construction, and by extension the fundamental
difficulty with deciding how claim construction should be conducted and reviewed on appeal.
Patents are carefully drafted legal documents based on over two hundred years of interpretive
case law and doctrines that are not always obvious even to non-patent attorneys. For instance,
even though the Federal Circuit has repeatedly counseled that claim language is entitled to a
“heavy presumption in favor of [its] ordinary meaning,” this is only true through the lens of
counterintuitive patent law doctrines such as the doctrine of equivalents (which expands the set
of infringing embodiments beyond the literal scope of the claims) and means-plus-function
claims (which, contrary to their literal meaning, cover only structures identical or equivalent to
those that perform a function in the embodiments described by a patent’s specification, not any
“means for” performing the stated function). At the same time, patents are technical
documents that often require consideration of concepts, conventions, and terms of art from
abstruse scientific and engineering disciplines. Understanding their meaning requires
consideration of what their terms mean to those of ordinary skill in the art, so expertise in patent
law is not enough to correctly construe them.

This dichotomy is a source of tension in how patent claims are interpreted and in how
those constructions are reviewed on appeal. On the one hand, treating patents as legal
documents suggests that they are best construed by judges skilled in patent law, using only the
public record associated with each patent: the text of the patent documents themselves and their

31 See, e.g., Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1307 (discussing how the term “light spot” refers by convention in the digital
printing art to the area in which “the intensity exceeds a fixed threshold”); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1168 n.9
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (discussing a patent on a DNA sequence encoding fibroblast beta-interferon and quoting a party as
describing one of the relevant technologies as “routine to those skilled in the art”).
32 See Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“It is the person of
ordinary skill in the field of the invention through whose eyes the claims are construed.’”).
prosecution histories. This approach counsels in favor of de novo review, as questions of law are traditionally reviewed without deference.\textsuperscript{34} Moreover, because Federal Circuit judges have particular expertise in patent law, they are generally better equipped than district court judges to correctly apply patent law doctrines.\textsuperscript{35} The legal approach, broadly speaking, is what the Federal Circuit has generally taken. Claim construction is conducted by reference to the intrinsic evidence alone—the words of the claims themselves, the rest of the specification, and the prosecution history—unless, in light of that evidence, a claim term is still ambiguous.\textsuperscript{36} And, of course, patent claim construction is reviewed entirely de novo.\textsuperscript{37}

On the other hand, the legal approach ignores, or at least underplays, the reality that many patents pertain to technical subjects. The meaning of a patent is defined by “what one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have understood the term to mean.”\textsuperscript{38} The Federal Circuit is a court of extremely competent judges, with clerks skilled in a variety of technical disciplines,\textsuperscript{39} but they are not and cannot be “of ordinary skill” in every art. No one can be skilled in every technical discipline he or she encounters, nor even in more than a select few—scientific knowledge is too fine-grained and broad-ranging. From an institutional

\textsuperscript{33} The prosecution history of a patent forms “part of the public record and shed[s] light on the meaning of the claims.” Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Huntsman Polymers Corp., 157 F.3d 866, 872–74 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Nonetheless, there is some debate about the extent to which the prosecution history should inform the construction of claims in a patent. See infra note 33. Indeed, this is one of the questions that the Federal Circuit considered in Phillips. See supra note 3. Consideration of this debate is beyond the scope of this paper; the “legal document” approach to claim construction rests only upon an assumption that patents can be construed by reading the intrinsic evidence. What that intrinsic evidence comprises is not important, so long as it is publicly available.


\textsuperscript{35} See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Judges Equipped To Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 17–18, 28–29 (2001). As Prof. Moore points out, however, Justice Jackson’s famous phrase, “We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final,” Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring), applies in some respects to the Federal Circuit on matters of patent law. The Federal Circuit is not formally final—the Supreme Court can review its decisions—but in practice the Federal Circuit is frequently left to craft patent law doctrines on its own. See Nicolas Oettinger, In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 323, 334–37 (2001) (arguing that even after taking into account the fact that the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction largely eliminates circuit splits about issues of patent law, the Supreme Court has shown a willingness to let the Federal Circuit make sweeping changes in patent law).

\textsuperscript{36} Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

\textsuperscript{37} Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).

\textsuperscript{38} Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
standpoint, an emphasis on the technical aspects of patents suggests that claim construction would ideally be conducted by one skilled in the art—a technical expert of some sort. Since that is not ordinarily practical, at least without altering the practice of handling patent infringement through suits in courts, judges must take steps, sometimes including taking testimony from expert witnesses who are skilled in the art, to put themselves in the position of one skilled in the art. District courts give extended consideration to a particular set of technical issues while they take testimony—consideration which likely includes factual determinations, if only implicit ones, about technical terms and how they are used. They also make credibility judgments about the expert witnesses. Compared to a district court, the Federal Circuit is not well-equipped to review more than whatever textual record is presented to it. An approach to claim construction that put more emphasis on the technical aspect would therefore likely counsel greater appellate deference, as it would recognize the importance of credibility judgments as well as the district courts’ expertise with factfinding. An appellate court that emphasized the technical nature of patent documents would likely review claim interpretation only for clear error.

B. DE NOVO AS A DEFAULT

The previous section noted that there are some good reasons to treat patents as legal documents whose construction is a matter of law. It also observed that patents are technical documents, and appellate judges who are experts in patent law but not “skilled in the art” are suboptimal decisionmakers about technical issues. How can the legal/technical dichotomy be

39 See Moore, supra note 35, at 18.
40 To some extent, district courts can put technical decisions in the hands of technical experts by appointing special masters. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 53. If anything, this reinforces the point: it is another way in which district courts are better situated than the Federal Circuit to grapple with technical issues.
41 As the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he trial judge's major role is the determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that role comes expertise.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). This is why factual findings by district courts are reviewed for clear error even when they do not involve credibility determinations. Id. at 575.
42 The precise standard of review is less important than the idea that some deference is due. I refer throughout this article to “clear error” because it is the traditional standard of review for factual determinations made by a trial judge. See id.; see also infra note 82 (listing contexts in which a standard of review other than clear error is applied.
resolved?

In some sense, the dichotomy is unresolvable. At least so long as patent infringement suits take their current form, decisions will always be made by judges who are not “of ordinary skill in the art.” Some balance must be struck, however. The policy considerations underlying the existing de novo framework are strong; indeed, in most cases, they are determinative. As this section argues, however, in the exceptional case—where disputed claim terms are used in ways idiosyncratic to a particular discipline—the Cybor model of pure de novo review, even of underlying questions of fact, becomes inadequate. Because a trial court has expertise in making factual determinations, and because it can make credibility judgments about experts that it hears directly, it is better situated to put itself in the position of one skilled in the art, and the determinations it makes about what terms mean to those skilled in the art and about which of multiple meanings controls ought to be given deference.

A number of factors militate in favor of granting deference only in the unusual case. As described above, the public has an interest in patents being objective documents with a fixed meaning discernible (at least to members of the public who are of ordinary skill in the art) by reading the document alone. Although a knowledge of patent law is inevitably required, and the intended audience for a patent is persons of ordinary skill in the art, this interest is still best served any time the claim construction inquiry is limited to intrinsic evidence. A trial judge

43 Some commentators have suggested changing the existing system, through legislative changes that grant the PTO more ability to find facts; through an administrative opposition proceeding; and through such proposals as creating specialized patent courts at the trial level. See generally Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003). The merits of such proposals are beyond the scope of this Article; my focus is limited to possible judicial changes to the Cybor and Markman de novo review regime.

44 See supra Section A.

45 See supra note 32; see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).

46 Arguably, considering prosecution history to be “intrinsic evidence” undermines this goal because it is much less accessible than the patent document itself, even if it is obtainable and a matter of public record. For an interesting set of arguments that reference to the prosecution history is misplaced in claim construction, see John R. Thomas, On Preparatory Texts and Proprietary Technologies: The Place of Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim
has no particular advantage over an appellate judge in reviewing this intrinsic evidence, if that is 
as far as a claim construction inquiry goes; all the evidence is in documentary form and is 
directly available. Moreover, the public interest in knowing the scope of patent claims is also 
furthersed by uniformity in how a given patent is construed, which in turn is enhanced by treating 
claim construction as a matter of binding legal precedent rather than a factual issue that must be 
reexamined anew when new parties litigate a patent for the first time. For these reasons, the 
Federal Circuit has consistently held that when the meaning of a patent claim is clear from the 
intrinsic evidence, claims should be construed with respect to that intrinsic evidence, and resort 
to extrinsic evidence such as expert testimony is not just unnecessary, but improper. An 
extension of this logic supports the conclusion—implicitly recognized by the Phillips court—that 
even if the specification is to be privileged over dictionaries, dictionaries should be privileged 
over other extrinsic evidence, because dictionaries “ha[ve] the value of being an unbiased source 
‘accessible to the public in advance of litigation.’”

Interpretation, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 183 (1999).

Even so, the availability of the prosecution history as public record is the traditional justification for using it 
to construe patent claims. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Huntsman Polymers Corp., 157 F.3d 866, 872–74 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). A sufficiently diligent member of the public could, in principle, consult it before embarking on a potentially-
infringing activity, and it is available for Federal Circuit judges to review as easily as for district judges. 
claim construction); cf. Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 331–33, 349–50 (1971) 
(holding that collateral estoppel may be asserted against a party to the original suit in which an issue is decided, but 
not against others). The benefit of uniformity also derives from the Federal Circuit’s national jurisdiction. See id.

Section 2 will discuss in greater detail the linkage between stare decisis and de novo review. In brief, stare 
decisis is premised on the ideas that lower courts cannot bind higher courts, and that decisions about legal issues are 
entitled to precedential effect. See Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 
1365, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2001). If the decision of a lower court receives deference and is adopted by the Federal 
Circuit without a de novo review, the decision effectively has a precedential effect that outweighs its author’s place 
in the hierarchy of courts. See infra. 

49 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1585). 
Compare this statement to Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318–19, which enumerates the many disadvantages of expert 
testimony.

Of course, dictionaries and expert testimony are hardly the only extrinsic evidence possible. Although the 
Phillips court did not recognize this fact, documentary evidence that is extrinsic to a patent but contemporaneous 
with it would seem likely to avoid many of the disadvantages of expert testimony. The weight that such evidence 
deserves will no doubt be explored in cases brought by prudent post-Phillips litigants. But to the extent that the 
application of such evidence requires an essentially factual inquiry into what an ordinary artisan would have 
understood a patent to mean at the time it was written or issued, the use of such other extrinsic evidence should also 
be entitled to deferential review on appeal.
Even where the intrinsic evidence does not reveal the meaning of patent claim terms, expert technical knowledge is often unnecessary when resolving ambiguities and defining claim terms. The reason for this is simple: the disputed claim terms, even for technical patents, are often not terms of art, but rather are ordinary English words given their everyday meanings.\(^{50}\) When technical meanings are not implicated, there is no reason to treat construction of patent documents any differently from the construction of any other objective legal document, such as a statute. In other words, there is no separate technical conception of many disputed claim terms; in these cases, the legal conception of the patent document controls.

This is likely part of what motivated the Federal Circuit’s pre-\textit{Phillips} holdings that “[d]ictionaries are always available to the court to aid in the task of determining meanings that would have been attributed by those of skill in the relevant art to any disputed terms used by the inventor in the claims.”\(^{51}\) In \textit{Texas Digital Systems v. Telegenix, Inc.}, the Federal Circuit emphasized the availability of dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises and specifically held that they are available at any time to both trial and appellate courts equally, whether or not offered into evidence by a party.\(^{52}\) As such, it questioned the appropriateness of labelling such sources as “evidence” at all, much less “extrinsic evidence”\(^{53}\) —rather, the court treated dictionaries almost as it would treat a source of law, like a case, of which a court would always be permitted to take judicial notice.

\(^{50}\) See, e.g., \textit{International Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp.}, 361 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (construing, in a case about the manufacture of MOSFETs (a type of high-power transistor), the term “adjoining” as used in its ordinary sense of “next to”); \textit{see also} Joseph Scott Miller & James A. Hilsenteger, \textit{The Proven Key: Roles & Rules for Dictionaries at the Patent Office and the Courts} (unpublished manuscript, Oct. 5, 2004), \textit{at} http://ssrn.com/abstract=577262 (criticizing \textit{International Rectifier’s} use of dictionaries to construe common English claim terms).

\(^{51}\) \textit{Tex. Digital Sys. v. Telegenix, Inc.}, 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing \textit{Vitronics}, 90 F.3d at 1584 n.6).

\(^{52}\) \textit{Id.} at 1203.

\(^{53}\) \textit{Id.} (“As resources and references to inform and aid courts and judges in the understanding of technology and terminology, it is entirely proper for both trial and appellate judges to consult these materials at any stage of a litigation, regardless of whether they have been offered by a party in evidence or not. Thus, categorizing them as ‘extrinsic evidence’ or even a ‘special form of extrinsic evidence’ is misplaced and does not inform the analysis.

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In *Phillips*, the Federal Circuit retreated somewhat from its holding in *Texas Digital*.\(^{54}\) Although it did not outright overrule that case, it stated that “the methodology it adopted placed too much reliance on extrinsic sources such as dictionaries, treatises, and encyclopedias and too little on intrinsic sources, in particular the specification and prosecution history.”\(^{55}\) When construing patents, it held, one should place the greatest weight on “how the patentee used the claim term in claims, specification, and prosecution history, rather than starting with a broad [dictionary] definition and whittling it down.”\(^{56}\) Notably, however, the *Phillips* court explicitly declined to preclude the use of dictionaries or to disavow its holding in *Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.*, that “judges are free to consult dictionaries and technical treatises ‘at any time in order to better understand the underlying technology and may also rely on dictionary definitions when construing claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition does not contradict any definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.’”\(^{57}\)

Although both *Vitronics* and the *Texas Digital* line of cases have acknowledged the utility of both general and technical dictionaries—the dictionaries cited in *Texas Digital* itself were two dictionaries of electronics\(^{58}\)—the terms that the court has most often looked to dictionaries to define have tended not to be technical ones. For instance, *Texas Digital* used them to define “display” and “activate,” neither of which had a meaning that diverged from the everyday one.\(^{59}\) Appellate judges are just as qualified to read, interpret, and apply ordinary English dictionary definitions as trial judges are. Interpreting English text in light of dictionary definitions does not make use of a trial judge’s expertise in factfinding, nor does it require the

\(^{54}\) *See* Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1320–24 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (discussing *Texas Digital*).

\(^{55}\) *Id.* at 1320.

\(^{56}\) *Id.* at 1321.

\(^{57}\) *Id.* at 1322–23 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).

\(^{58}\) *Texas Digital*, 308 F.3d at 1206 (citing MODERN DICTIONARY OF ELECTRONICS 20 (6th ed. 1984)), 1209 (citing ILLUSTRATED DICTIONARY OF ELECTRONICS 147 (3d ed. 1985)).

\(^{59}\) *Id.*
consideration of evidence to which the trial judge has had more thorough and direct exposure.\textsuperscript{60}

As Judge Linn pointed out in \textit{Texas Digital}, dictionaries have historically been considered to be acceptable sources for judges to consult when construing other documents as a matter of law, including both statutes and contracts.\textsuperscript{61}

It is thus an exceptional case in which resort to truly extrinsic evidence—expert testimony—is necessary. This is consonant with the observation of the the \textit{Vitronics} court that intrinsic evidence alone is usually sufficient.\textsuperscript{62} In these cases, claim construction reduces to a matter of law, and de novo review is logical and appropriate.

As the Federal Circuit has observed, however, expert testimony is sometimes still necessary. Claim terms may be ambiguous; it may be unclear which of several definitions apply; or claim terms may be used by those skilled in the art—particularly in rapidly evolving fields—in ways that are poorly reflected by published dictionaries and by the intrinsic evidence.\textsuperscript{63} Indeed, the renewed emphasis in \textit{Phillips} on considering the “ordinary meaning” of a claim term to be “its meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent” rather than “the meaning of the term in the abstract, out of context” renders it, perhaps, more likely that a court will have to resort to such evidence than under a pro-dictionary \textit{Texas Digital} conception of the art of claim construction: the court, after all, is not an “ordinary artisan.”\textsuperscript{64}

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\textsuperscript{60} There may be occasions in which use of a dictionary requires the resolution of some predicate factual question, such as whether a general dictionary or a technical treatise should control, or which of a number of definitions is more likely to be what a person skilled in the art might have meant. In these cases, there may be a reason to defer to trial court factfindings even when the trial court has used a dictionary rather than heard testimony from an expert witness. However, it would not be the interpretation of a dictionary definition that would receive deference; rather, it would be the resolution of the predicate question.

\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Id.} at 1203; \textit{see, e.g.}, Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 355, 125 S. Ct. 1752, 1759 n.1 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing three general-purpose dictionaries to define “court” for purposes of statutory interpretation).

\textsuperscript{62} \textit{See Vitronics}, 90 F.3d at 1583 (“In most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim term. In such circumstances, it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence.”).

\textsuperscript{63} \textit{See} Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (observing the necessity of extrinsic evidence when claim terms are ambiguous or terms of art).

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{See} Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
dictionary definition of that term, a court following Texas Digital might simply adopt the
dictionary definition, but a court following Phillips—and mindful of Phillips’ cautionary notes
about the importance of context—might need additional extrinsic evidence to determine whether
a dictionary’s definition is really what an “ordinary artisan” would have meant.

One example of the difficulty of adopting the viewpoint of an “ordinary artisan” is the
case of Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co. In Pitney Bowes, the Federal Circuit held that
the district court had properly taken and considered expert testimony on the way that persons of
ordinary skill in the art (here, the digital printing art) conventionally measured the size of a spot
of light. Although “size” would seem to be a straightforward and nontechnical term, light spots
are fuzzy; the size of a spot can be measured in different ways. Of particular interest was
whether the size of a spot varied with its intensity. If a spot was defined by the area in which
light intensity exceeded a certain percentage of the maximum, then varying the intensity would
not alter the spot size, whereas if a spot was defined by the area in which light intensity exceeded
a fixed threshold, varying the intensity would alter the size of the spot. The district court took
expert testimony on this question, and one expert testified that although the percentage-based
definition of size better accorded with usage in optics and with common English, as a term of art
in the digital printing field, spot size was usually measured with respect to a fixed light intensity:
only where the light is strong enough is printer toner deposited.

Ultimately, the Federal Circuit in Pitney Bowes held that the question of how light spot
sizes were measured in the art was irrelevant. On the basis of the written description, it held that
the disputed use of “spot” did not refer to a light spot at all, but rather to the “discharged area on
the photoreceptor.” However, Pitney Bowes’s spots remain a good example of how expert

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65 Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1306–09. The relevant claim language was “spots of different sizes.” Id. at 1302.
66 Id. at 1306–07.
67 Id. at 1307.
68 Id. at 1314.
testimony might be appropriately used during claim construction, not merely to inform the judge about the general state of the art,\(^{69}\) but to give an understanding of how specific terms are used and understood by those skilled in the art. The sizes of spots of light, not just spots of discharged photoreceptor material, were referred to in the *Pitney Bowes* patent—just not in the disputed claims—and the interpretation of the term remained relevant to collateral arguments about whether the claim construction excluded the preferred embodiment.\(^{70}\) To define the size of a light spot, the district court had little choice but to rely on expert testimony and choose among conflicting experts with differing views on common usage in the digital printing art. Thus, contrary to the Supreme Court’s conclusory statement in *Markman*, defining “spot size” as to a light spot required a credibility determination that was not “subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole document, required by the standard construction rule that a term can be defined only in a way that comports with the instrument as a whole.”\(^{71}\)

Inquiring of experts how terms are used in the art is a quintessentially factual inquiry, and may involve a credibility judgment that an appellate court is ill-equipped to review from a

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\(^{69}\) In an unusual statement of “additional views” on *Pitney Bowes*, Judge Rader, with Judge Plager concurring, discussed the circumstances in which expert testimony is permissible: “The process of claim construction at the trial court level will often benefit from expert testimony which may (1) supply a proper technological context to understand the claims (words often have meaning only in context), (2) explain the meaning of claim terms as understood by one of skill in the art (the ultimate standard for claim meaning . . . ), and (3) help the trial court understand the patent process itself (complex prosecution histories—not to mention specifications—are not familiar to most trial courts).” *Id.* at 1314 (Rader, J., “additional views”). Only the second of these directly constitutes construing the claims, and presumably corresponds to the “rare” situation in *Vitronics* in which expert testimony is permissible to construe claims that are ambiguous based on the intrinsic evidence.

\(^{70}\) *Id.* at 1309.

\(^{71}\) *Markman v. Westview Instruments*, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389 (1996). Indeed, in another recent Federal Circuit opinion, the court remanded a case to the district court specifically so that it could take expert testimony to determine how one of ordinary skill in the art would construe a claim term: “Unfortunately, on the record before us, we are unable to say with certainty whether or not one of skill in the art would understand that a power supply is designed to provide a constant voltage to a circuit. Given the complex technology involved in this case, we think that this matter can only be resolved by further evidentiary hearings, including expert testimony, before the district court.” *NeoMagic Corp. v. Trident Microsystems*, Inc., 287 F.3d 1062, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2002). As in *Pitney Bowes*, the question that required expert testimony was ultimately avoided rather than definitively resolved as a subsidiary fact issue. *See* *NeoMagic Corp. v. Trident Microsystems*, Inc., Civil Action No. 98-699-KAJ, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8054, at *45--*46 (D. Del. May 9, 2003) (holding that the expert testimony was ultimately unhelpful, and that the use of “power supply” in the specification rendered the construction adequately clear), *aff’d*, 110 Fed. Appx. 103 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 5, 2004) (unpublished). Again, however, the potential utility of expert testimony in claim construction, and the concomitant need for credibility determinations, is apparent.
written record. Such judgments are ordinarily reviewed with deference, even when made by a judge rather than a jury.\footnote{Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985).} The appellate court, of course, may reverse such findings when indeed they appear to be clearly erroneous based on the transcripts available to the appellate court or when the trial judge has misapplied the law—such as in cases where, under \textit{Vitronics}, resorting to expert testimony to construe claims is erroneous to begin with.

Granting clear error deference to subsidiary questions of fact has an additional advantage: it solidifies trial rulings upon which the parties have spent considerable judicial resources. The Federal Circuit has been widely criticized for the frequency with which it reverses district court claim constructions after an expensive trial.\footnote{See Moore, supra note 35, at 2–3; Rai, supra note 43, at 1058; see also Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001) (stating that the Federal Circuit’s claim construction reversal rate is forty-four percent); Andrew T. Zidel, Comment, Patent Claim Construction in the Trial Courts: A Study Showing the Need for Clear Guidance from the Federal Circuit, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 711, 746 (finding a reversal rate of 41.5% in patent cases decided after 2001).} Because subsidiary questions of fact would only be dispositive in a minority of cases, reviewing them for clear error would probably not significantly improve the overall reversal rate. But it would probably improve the reversal rate in cases involving highly technical patents, which are among the most complicated and expensive of cases.\footnote{See Rai, supra note 43, at 1066 (noting that patent infringement suits are a particularly expensive mechanism for mediating disputes about complex technology). Of course, not all high-technology cases require resolution of subsidiary questions of fact, see supra note 50, but this is not necessary for the reversal rate to improve.} It would also grant deference to those \textit{Markman} proceedings that are most expensive, if one of the various proposals for more interlocutory appeals of claim construction were followed and claim constructions were made appealable more often before a full trial.\footnote{See Craig Allen Nard, Process Considerations in the Age of Markman and Mantras, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 355, 378.} Thus, even if it only applies to a small subset of cases, appellate deference to subsidiary questions of fact during claim construction might well provide a nontrivial overall increase in judicial efficiency.

The sort of “mixed inquiry” in which clear error deference is granted to factual findings
that form only a small portion of a broader question of law sounds convoluted, but is actually quite commonplace. As Judge Mayer observed in his opinion in Markman, even where documents (such as contracts) are generally construed as matters of law and their constructions are reviewed de novo, their constructions have long been considered to turn on subsidiary questions of fact where terms are “obscure and indeterminate”\(^\text{76}\) or “contain technical words, or terms of art.”\(^\text{77}\) Indeed, contract interpretation hinges on subsidiary factual determinations whenever a contract is held to be ambiguous; then and only then is extrinsic evidence as to the intent of the parties admissible, and then and only then are findings about the interpretation of the contract reviewed for clear error by appellate courts.\(^\text{78}\) There are good reasons not to treat patents the same way—unlike contracts, patents are construed based on “what a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand claim terms to mean,”\(^\text{79}\) not on the drafters’ intentions, because patents bind the general public rather than just private parties. The point here, rather, is that there are other examples “mixed inquiries” on appellate review. Indeed, even among patent law doctrines, several issues are considered matters of law and reviewed de novo, but nonetheless depend on underlying factual questions that are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard: the public use\(^\text{80}\) and on sale\(^\text{81}\) bars, and obviousness.\(^\text{82}\)


\(^{77}\) Id. (quoting Goddard v. Foster, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 123, 142 (1872)).

\(^{78}\) See, e.g., Thatcher v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 397 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“‘The plain meaning of language of a contract or consent decree is a pure question of law, subject to de novo review by the appellate court.’ However, ‘if the intent of the parties is not unambiguously expressed by the language of the decree, the district court may review extrinsic evidence and enter subsidiary factual findings as to the parties’ intent, which are reviewed only for clear error.’”) (quoting South v. Rowe, 759 F.2d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 1985)) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Sy-Lene of Wash., Inc. v. Starwood Urban Retail II, LLC, 829 A.2d 540, 546 (Md. 2003) (a state-court example, describing this as the “objective” theory of contract interpretation).

\(^{79}\) Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).


\(^{82}\) Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 886 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Note that in some cases—where the factual determinations are made by a jury or by the International Trade Commission—the standard of review is not clear error. See, e.g., MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (standard of review for jury findings is whether “a reasonable jury could infer” them from the evidence); Comm. for Fairly Traded Venez. Cement v. United States, 372 F.3d 1284, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (standard of review for ITC
Thus, reviewing subsidiary factual issues in claim construction deferentially would be neither unusual nor impractical. The most sensible approach to claim construction is to treat de novo review as a sort of default rule, applied in the majority of cases in which its benefits—including the ability of the skilled public to construe patent claims simply by reading the patent and uniform interpretation of those claims by courts—are attainable without great cost. The Federal Circuit would then defer to factual findings only in the exceptional cases in which they were necessary for a district court to understand how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the claims of a patent. In these latter cases, the costs of de novo review—including inaccurate determination of technical issues and wasted trial-level judicial and litigant resources—outweigh the benefits.

III. THE DEFERENCE PRECEDENT REQUIRES AND HOW TO FIX IT

Assuming that some deference should, for policy reasons, be given to “underlying factual determinations” in at least the exceptional claim construction appeal, there remains the question of whether the Federal Circuit is free to grant such deference by ruling en banc in an appropriate case, or whether such deference is incompatible with the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman. Phillips Question 7 directed parties to brief the issue of whether a grant of such determinations is whether the determinations are supported by substantial evidence). The distinctions among deferential standards of review are not important to the argument here.

Also, the fact that the proposed approach to deferential review has been used in other contexts does not necessarily mean that it works well or is without controversy in those other contexts. See generally William H. Burgess, Comment, Simplicity at the Cost of Clarity: Appellate Review of Claim Construction and the Failed Promise of Cybor, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 763, 769–770 (2004) (discussing evolution and merits of the “mixed standard of review” for obviousness).

83 The skilled public would have to be able to determine whether a patent can be construed on its face, or whether underlying factual findings are necessary. The benefit of drawing the line where Vitronics did is that if a claim term is unambiguous from the intrinsic evidence, potential infringers can rely on the unambiguous construction. If claim terms are ambiguous, then even with the present system of de novo review and stare decisis, patentees must wait for a patent to be construed in court at least once, or incur high litigation costs themselves.

84 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Mayer, C.J., dissenting from order granting rehearing en banc).

deference is compatible with *Markman* and with *Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.* Some parties briefed the question as though there was no obstacle; one suggested that such deference was compatible not only with *Markman* but also, possibly, with *Cybor*; and another argued that *Cybor* is recent enough that stare decisis should counsel against overruling it, but that *Cybor* precluded deferential appellate review. In all these cases, however, the wording of the Federal Circuit’s question—and the consequent briefing of the parties—assumed that *Cybor* would remain good law. A broader question—and perhaps a better question—is whether even overruling *Cybor* is sufficient, or whether overruling or at least clarifying *Markman* is necessary at the level of the Supreme Court.

This Part considers these issues in turn. First, in Section A, it argues briefly that contrary to the statements of a few Federal Circuit judges, *Cybor* is incompatible with any grant of deference to trial court rulings. It then argues in Section B that two different, interrelated aspects of the Supreme Court’s decision in *Markman* compel de novo review of patent claim constructions on appeal: first, *Markman*’s admittedly ambiguous categorization of claim construction as a matter of law, and second, *Markman*’s statement that stare decisis ought to apply to claim interpretation. Section C argues that *Markman*’s stare decisis holding makes little sense and that the two aspects of *Markman* should be clarified or overruled by the Supreme Court.

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86 “7. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in *Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.*, 517 U.S. 370 . . . (1996), and our en banc decision in *Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.*, 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998), is it appropriate for this court to accord any deference to any aspect of trial court claim construction rulings? If so, on what aspects, in what circumstances, and to what extent?” *Phillips*, 376 F.3d at 1383 (order granting en banc review); see *Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc.*, 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).


88 See Brief for Amicus Curiae Sughrue Mion, PLLC at 16–19, *Phillips v. AWH Corp.*, Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286 (Fed. Cir. Sep. 20, 2004), available at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/files/sughrue_mion_pll.pdf. The Sughrue Mion brief is a bit ambiguous as to its position; it characterizes various concurrences and dissents as having “expressed doubt as to the reasoning of *Cybor,*” but most of the statements it cites appear to be attempts to reconcile *Cybor* with some deference.

Court. It further argues that although the arguments for treating claim construction as a matter of law in the ordinary case are compelling, efforts by a judge to determine what terminology means within a particular art on the basis of extrinsic evidence should be granted deference, as explained above in Part II.

A. WHAT CYBOR COMPELS

Cybor held explicitly that “claim construction is purely a matter of law” and that the Federal Circuit “reviews the district court’s claim construction de novo on appeal.” It held further that “[n]othing in the Supreme Court’s [Markman] opinion supports the view that the Court endorsed [the position] that claim construction may involve subsidiary or underlying questions of fact. . . . [W]e therefore reaffirm that, as a purely legal question, we review claim construction de novo on appeal including any allegedly fact-based questions relating to claim construction.”

Nonetheless, some Federal Circuit concurrences have suggested that Cybor does permit some implicit deference, even if not overtly recognized as such. Judge Bryson emphasized in his Cybor concurrence that “the rule that claim construction is an issue of law does not mean that [the Federal Circuit] intend[s] to disregard the work done by district courts in claim construction or that [it] will give no weight to a district court’s conclusion as to claim construction.” Judge Bryson went on to cite several examples of situations in which appellate courts, while ruling de novo on lower-court decisions of law, nonetheless granted some implicit deference: the Supreme Court deferring to regional circuits on issues of state law in states within the circuit; the Federal Circuit deferring to the Board of Contract Appeals on issues of contract interpretation, their area

90 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)).
91 Id. at 1455–56.
93 138 F.3d at 1463 (Bryson, J., concurring).
of particular expertise; and the Supreme Court leaving patent questions to the Federal Circuit.\textsuperscript{94} Judge Plager articulated a similar belief, arguing that even under a de novo standard of review, the trial judge’s rulings will “carry weight.”\textsuperscript{95} And in \textit{Phillips}, Judge Lourie noted that “even though claim construction is a matter of law, reviewable . . . without formal deference, I do believe that we ought to lean towards affirmance of a claim construction in the absence of a strong conviction of error.”\textsuperscript{96}

Despite these generalized statements, however, the Federal Circuit has not generally granted any deference to subsidiary findings, implicitly or explicitly. Notably, all of these observations about the possibility that some deference can be applied even under \textit{Cybor} have come in concurrence or dissent; the Federal Circuit has never recognized the possibility of deference under \textit{Cybor} in a panel opinion. The high reversal rate in patent cases also strongly suggests that the Federal Circuit does not, in practice, “lean towards affirmance.”\textsuperscript{97}

Regardless, even if it were to be adopted by the court, such a vague approach is an incomplete solution. As discussed above in Part II, what is needed is not an increased hesitation to reverse district courts—or at least, not just that—but rather a framework that permits the benefits of fully independent de novo review in the common case, but the benefits of deferential review when the technical aspects of a patent trump its legal aspects. Yet \textit{Cybor} permits nothing of the sort; it explicitly dismissed a suggestion that “allegedly fact-based questions” be treated any differently from the rest of the claim construction analysis.\textsuperscript{98} Thus, for the Federal Circuit to

\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Id.}; cf. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 232 (1991) (holding that although review of district-court state law determinations by courts of appeals is de novo, that de novo review “necessarily entails a careful consideration of the district court's legal analysis, and an efficient and sensitive appellate court at least will naturally consider this analysis in undertaking its review. . . . Any expertise possessed by the district court will inform the structure and content of its conclusions of law and thereby become evident to the reviewing court”).

\textsuperscript{95} 138 F.3d at 1462 (Plager, J., concurring).

\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Phillips} v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

\textsuperscript{97} \textit{See supra} note 73.

\textsuperscript{98} 138 F.3d at 1455–56.
grant district courts the greater deference that Part II advocated, *Cybor* must be overruled. 99 It resolved the question of deference in terms too explicit to ignore.

Two concluding notes on *Cybor* bear mention. First, as the New York City Bar Association brief in *Phillips* suggested, 100 there are prudential reasons why overruling *Cybor* at the Federal Circuit is less than desirable. *Cybor* may have been incorrect, at least in its extreme rejection of any possibility of formalized deference, but circumstances have not changed in the few years since it was decided that would ordinarily warrant a departure from the principle of stare decisis. 101 On the other hand, and second, *Cybor*’s holding that claim construction is to be reviewed de novo is arguably dictum. A deferential standard of review was not necessary to its outcome: Judges Mayer and Newman voted in favor of *Cybor*’s ultimate judgment of affirmance despite disagreeing with the majority that de novo review should apply. 102 As such, the case may have been a poor vehicle for deciding the core question of the appropriate standard of review the Federal Circuit, but this makes overruling it correspondingly easier, if overruling is formally necessary at all. Either way, however, as Section B will argue, *Markman* likely needs overruling or clarification by the Supreme Court, and because *Cybor*’s holding has never been decided at that level, the prudential concerns do not apply to a Supreme Court decision that compels *Cybor* to be modified.

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99 Like all decisions of the Federal Circuit, *Cybor* may be overruled by the Federal Circuit sitting en banc. See George E. Warren Corp. v. United States, 341 F.3d 1348, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Panel Discussion on Intra-Circuit Conflicts, 11 Fed. Cir. Bar J. 623, 648 (quoting Judge Michel as saying “the later en banc always trumps the earlier en banc”).


101 See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (stating that judicial departure from stare decisis requires “special justification,” but finding that justification where “the ‘conceptual underpinnings’ of . . . precedent . . . have significantly diminished in force,” as the court held that they had with respect to the law of adverse inferences from failure to produce exculpatory opinion letters).

102 See 138 F.3d at 1463–64 (Mayer, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
B. WHAT MARKMAN COMPELS

*Markman* is the only case in which the Supreme Court has recently confronted the categorization of claim construction as a matter of law or fact, and thus the only relevant source of binding authority in the en banc Federal Circuit on the question of deference. Importantly, however, *Markman* avoided all discussion of deference, and, indeed, at times appeared to eschew a clear *Cybor*-like holding that claim construction is a matter of pure law. At issue in *Markman* was whether the Seventh Amendment guarantee of a right to a jury trial in civil cases mandates that juries determine patent claim interpretations, or whether claim interpretation can and should be left for the judge. But in determining that it could and should be a matter for the judge, the Court outlined a series of policy arguments regarding institutional competence and the stare decisis effect of claims that leave no room for appellate deference to trial court claim construction rulings.

1. **Claim Construction as a Matter of Law**

In attempting to justify deference, both Federal Circuit judges and commentators have cited Justice Souter’s statements in *Markman* that claim interpretation is a “mongrel practice” that “falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact.” However, as the Federal Circuit majority in *Cybor* pointed out, even though the Supreme Court in *Markman* acknowledged that claim interpretation may have factual elements in reality, it

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103 See, e.g., *Markman* v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 379 (1996) (“We have also spoken of the line as one between issues of fact and law. . . . But the sounder course . . . is to classify a mongrel practice (like construing a term of art following receipt of evidence) by using the historical method.”). Justice Souter, the author of *Markman*, appears to have gone to some lengths to restrict the Court’s statement to the question of whether claim construction is an issue for the judge or for the jury and to avoid making clear statements categorizing claim construction as a matter of law. See, e.g., *id.* at 372 (“The question here is whether the interpretation of a so-called patent claim . . . is a matter of law reserved entirely for the court. . . . We hold that the construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court.”).

104 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”).

105 *Markman*, 517 U.S. at 372.

106 See *Cybor* Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1473 (Rader, J., dissenting).

consciously dismissed them when determining how claim interpretation should be treated under the law.\textsuperscript{109} Justice Souter’s analysis was “functional” in character and assigned claim construction as a legal question for judges for policy reasons,\textsuperscript{110} but it did assign them to the category of “law” rather than “fact”:

“[T]he fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question.” So it turns out here, for judges, not juries, are the better suited to find the acquired meaning of patent terms.

The construction of written instruments is one of those things that judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors . . . .\textsuperscript{111}

The Supreme Court went on to state that “any credibility determinations”—the archetypal factual determination\textsuperscript{112}—“will be subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole document.”\textsuperscript{113} Justice Souter might have intended to allocate claim construction to judges while retaining it as a question of fact entitled to clear error review; after all, judges can engage in factfinding without juries.\textsuperscript{114} However, the language of the opinion does not support this view. Rather, claim construction was given to judges as an interpretive issue uniquely within their competence as legal experts “train[ed] in exegesis,”\textsuperscript{115} and the Court proceeded to give reasons why it “treat[ed] interpretive issues as purely legal.”\textsuperscript{116} Under Supreme Court precedent, legal issues, when defined as such, are reviewed by appellate courts de novo.\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{108} Markman, 517 U.S. at 378, 388.
\textsuperscript{109} Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1455 (“[T]he Supreme Court was addressing which category, fact or law, claim construction should fall and not whether it should be classified as having two components, fact and law.”).
\textsuperscript{110} Markman, 517 U.S. at 388.
\textsuperscript{111} Id. (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
\textsuperscript{112} See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574–75 (1985) (holding that all factual determinations, not just credibility determinations, are reviewed for clear error, but noting the long history of restricting clear error review to credibility determinations and maintaining especial deference where credibility is concerned).
\textsuperscript{113} Markman, 517 U.S. at 389.
\textsuperscript{114} See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (“In applying the clearly erroneous standard to the findings of a district court sitting without a jury, appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide factual issues de novo.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
\textsuperscript{115} Markman, 517 U.S. at 388.
\textsuperscript{116} Id. at 391.
2. **Estoppel Versus Stare Decisis**

Another aspect of *Markman* bolsters this conclusion that *Markman* necessarily implies de novo review: its holding that claim interpretations have stare decisis effect. The *Markman* Court highlighted the importance of uniformity in claim construction, observing that for the patentee, for other possible inventors, and for potential infringers alike, “the limits of a patent must be known.” To this end, it argued that treating claim construction as purely legal would enable an adjudicated claim construction to be considered as legal precedent. The Court specifically distinguished issue preclusion, in which the determination of issues—including claim constructions—adjudicated in a previous lawsuit would be considered binding upon parties to that suit; in contrast, stare decisis could be asserted by any party.

Although the exact contours of *Markman* stare decisis are unclear, it would appear that the Court intended patent claim constructions by the Federal Circuit to be binding on district courts, even in other lawsuits. It would be peculiar indeed for a determination made by a district court, then affirmed by the Federal Circuit under a deferential standard of review, to be

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118 *Markman*, 517 U.S. at 391. Strictly speaking, Justice Souter’s opinion discussed “application of stare decisis on those questions not yet subject to interjurisdictional uniformity under the authority of the single appeals court,” id.; this might imply that by the term “stare decisis,” he meant the persuasive effect of one district court’s claim construction on another rather than the binding effect of Federal Circuit claim constructions on other courts. Whatever Justice Souter meant by “stare decisis,” however, it is clear that he intended claim constructions ratified by the Federal Circuit to have a binding effect nationwide. See Key Pharms. v. Hercon Lab. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“We recognize the national stare decisis effect that this court's decisions on claim construction have.”) (citing *Markman*).

119 *Markman*, 517 U.S. at 390.

120 See *id.* at 391; see also Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm. Prods., No. 01 C 1867, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22218, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2004) (“The Supreme Court has stressed the need for this 'intrajurisdictional certainty' by making claim construction a legal issue that in turn imposes the application of stare decisis on patent interpretation, making the Federal Circuit's claim construction of the '176 patent legal precedent in this case.'”).


122 See *Markman*, 517 U.S. at 391.

123 See Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[S]tare decisis is a doctrine that binds courts to follow their own earlier decisions or the decisions of a superior tribunal.”). At least some district courts appear to conclude from this principle that Federal Circuit claim constructions are binding. See Wang Lab. v. Oki Elec. Indus. Co., 15 F. Supp. 2d 166, 175 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding, in light of *Markman* and the general principle that Federal Circuit law is binding on district courts as to patent law, that the Federal Circuit’s construction of two patents was binding on the trial court in a later suit concerning those patents); see also Tex. Instrs. v. Linear Techs. Corp., 182 F. Supp. 2d 580, 589 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (holding that the court was not bound by the claim interpretation of a sister district court, but implying that this
given the effect of binding circuit precedent. Indeed, a deferential standard of review would undermine any claim that a claim construction was binding on future cases.

To see why this is so, consider what it means for a ruling to be held “not clearly erroneous.” Formally, when a judgment is affirmed as “not clearly erroneous,” that does not imply that the affirming court agrees with every aspect of the judgment or would have come to the same conclusion as the district court.124 Rather, it implies only that the judgment of the district court is not so far wrong—literally, not so clearly erroneous—that it cannot be allowed to stand.125 Another trial court might confront exactly the same patent claims, but come to a different conclusion about their construction, either because it has heard different evidence about a dispositive underlying factual issue or because it has made different credibility determinations about the expert testimony on that issue. Two rulings can simultaneously be “not clearly erroneous” even if they conflict with each other, and the fact that a particular claim construction has been upheld does not mean that another judge is bound to arrive at the same one if the standard of review for the first ruling was deferential.

Furthermore, in order for stare decisis to comport with due process, it must be restricted to questions of law that do not depend on the particular evidence presented. Due process requires that parties to a lawsuit have an opportunity to have their claims heard,126 when stare decisis applies a binding judicial decision to parties who did not originally litigate that decision, these due process protections would seem to be violated,127 as they would be if claim or issue

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124 See In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1402 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (observing this logical conclusion and stating that holdings that are based on clear-error deference to a district court are “not really holdings by an appellate panel . . . . Instead, they are holdings that the district judges’ [decision] is not clear error”).
125 See id.
127 See Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011 (2003); see also N.W. Forest Resource Council v. Dombeck, 107 F.3d 897 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that use of stare decisis to treat a district court decision in another district as binding violates due process).
preclusion were applied against a nonparty to the original action.\textsuperscript{128} The way out of this dilemma is twofold. First, stare decisis is typically seen as binding courts rather than parties; parties remain free to challenge binding precedent in a higher court.\textsuperscript{129} But this rationale is only effective as to matters that the higher court is free to examine independently. If the ruling with stare decisis effect were based on clearly erroneous review of an evidentiary finding, a party challenging that ruling through a later appellate proceeding would lack the opportunity to be heard that the original parties had, and the reviewing court, like the appellate court that issued the first affirmance, would be constrained in its capacity for review. Second, and relatedly, stare decisis is seen as acceptable because judicial rulings on questions of law are within the discretion of the court to pronounce, they are a form of positive lawmaking, and they are—in principle, at least—based on legal principles that will not change in light of new evidence.\textsuperscript{130} This rationale, too, depends on the binding decision being a matter of pure law.

Thus, if the Supreme Court in \textit{Markman} is serious in its holding that claim constructions are entitled to stare decisis effect—and it appears to be so—then that holding implies that claim construction is indeed a matter of pure law, reviewable de novo by appellate courts. It follows also that if, as Part II of this paper argued above, subsidiary findings of fact are an important part of some claim construction rulings and should be reviewed deferentially, \textit{Markman} must be clarified or overruled. The next section will argue that the Supreme Court can build upon \textit{Markman} without overruling it entirely, so as to maintain its goal of uniformity while permitting deference in appropriate cases.

\textbf{C. HOW TO FIX \textit{MARKMAN}}

\textit{Markman}'s holding that stare decisis applies to claim construction and its statement that claim construction is a matter of law appear to stand in the way of a sensible approach to claim

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{128} See \textit{Blonder-Tongue}, 402 U.S. at 331–33, 349–50.
\item \textsuperscript{129} Nat'l Org. of Veterans' Advocates, Inc. v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
\end{itemize}
construction as a “mixed” inquiry that rightly treats patents as both the legal and the technical
documents that they are. There are several reasons why there is nevertheless no need for a
dramatic change in or outright overruling of Markman, however; rather, the Supreme Court can
(and should, in an appropriate case) clarify its position on claim construction by embracing clear
error review of subsidiary facts while leaving most of Markman—with its well-placed policy
concerns for uniformity and stability in patent claim interpretation—intact.131

First, Markman was primarily about the question of whether judges or juries should
construe patent claims.132 Nothing in this article’s proposal for clear error review of underlying
facts affects the Court’s holdings about the respective roles of judges and juries or the Seventh
Amendment. Although the application of the Seventh Amendment is related to a distinction
between “fact” and “law,” Justice Souter explicitly noted in Markman that claim construction is
a “mongrel” between the two and thus that the “sounder course” is to classify it for Seventh
Amendment purposes by reference to historical practices.133 The holding that historical practices
preclude any Seventh Amendment right to the jury determination of claim constructions is not
inconsistent with a holding that claim constructions deserve some level of appellate deference.
The fact/law distinction that Justice Souter held unhelpful in deciding the Seventh Amendment
question may retain its vitality in determining a standard of review. Factual and legal
determinations in patent claim construction may be too finely distinguished, as a practical matter,

130 See Barrett, supra note 127, at 1047–60.
131 Indeed, as Judge Rader observed in dissent in Cybor, purely de novo review of patent claim construction rulings
has the potential to decrease, rather than increase, the stability of the patent system—the reversal rate is so high that
litigants can no longer rely on the early determination of patent claims promised by the first Markman opinion and
must instead wait for the Federal Circuit to rule. Worse—argued Rader, using the example of CVI/Beta Ventures,
Inc. v. Tura LP, see infra note 139—even the Federal Circuit’s rulings have lacked stability from appeal to appeal.
See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476–77 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J., dissenting from the
pronouncements on claim interpretation in the en banc opinion, concurring in the judgment, and joining part IV of
the en banc opinion).
132 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996); see also Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138
F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“The Court's primary concern in [Markman] was the Seventh
Amendment issue of whether a right to a jury trial on claim construction inured to a party due to any potential
factual issues involved.”).
133 517 U.S. at 378.
to separate out the former for jury determination, but they are not necessarily too finely
distinguished for an appellate court to be resistant to overturning the factual findings that a trial
judge has made on the way to understanding what a skilled artisan, as opposed to a lay person,
learns from a patent.\footnote{134} Moreover, the Seventh Amendment question and the deference question
are logically distinct; trial judges often serve as factfinders and are still granted deference, and a
trial judge serving in this capacity is still able to make credibility determinations.\footnote{135} Thus, it is
only the stare decisis holding (and the Court’s closely-related and absolute-sounding, but not
strictly necessary, statements about claim construction being treated as a matter of law) that are
in tension with heightened deference.

Second, however, even this stare decisis holding need not change in most cases. As
discussed above,\footnote{136} cases in which extrinsic evidence—and thus appellate deference to trial court
factfinding—are necessary are rare. In most cases, claim construction will be a purely legal
issue and can still be granted stare decisis effect. In the remainder of cases, much of the claim
construction process is legal in character and can still bind future courts, even if any factual
determinations require reexamination in light of a party’s proffers of evidence. At first, it might
seem peculiar to grant stare decisis effect only to some claim constructions or to some portions
of a claim construction opinion, but courts often make fine-grained determinations about the
extent to which other courts’ rulings are controlling, in the contexts of both estoppels and of the
distinction between holdings and dicta. There is no reason to believe that such a system is
unworkable, and it would preserve a large portion of the uniformity and stability that \textit{Markman}
extols.

\footnote{134} On the other hand, courts often give subsidiary questions of fact to juries but reserve the overarching questions of
law for judges. For instance, when construing contracts, underlying factual determinations are often given to juries,
even if the interpretation of the document is ultimately a question of law for the court. \textit{See Markman v. Westview
\footnote{135} \textit{Cf. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmas., Inc.}, 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (allocating to the trial judge the gatekeeping
function of determining whether expert testimony is reliable).
Finally, it is questionable whether stare decisis has had the pro-uniformity effects that the Supreme Court hoped for. Of federal court decisions that cite *Markman*, only about a dozen discuss the stare decisis effect of claim constructions, and only a few of these appear to grant stare decisis effect to patent claim constructions; the doctrine is apparently seldom used in practice. Indeed, even the Federal Circuit has declined to apply it. For example, in *CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Custom Optical Frames, Inc.*, the court construed the claim term “elasticity” one way, solely on the basis of intrinsic evidence. Yet in a subsequent case involving the same patentee, the court declined to use the same construction of the same claim term, and indeed reversed a district court opinion that had done so. If the Federal Circuit is not going to give stare decisis effect to its own claim interpretations, this guts the doctrine entirely: district courts have held that the stare decisis effect does not apply to the decisions of one district court as to another, so the only rulings that ordinarily have binding stare decisis effect are those of an appellate court.

One reason why stare decisis is so seldom used may be that it is unnecessary. Nonmutual

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136 See *supra* Section B.
138 92 F.3d 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
139 *CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP*, 112 F.3d 1146 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see Moore, *supra* note 35, at 18–21. As Moore notes, the Federal Circuit later attempted to resolve the inconsistency between the two *CVI/Beta* cases on the grounds that the former was in the context of a preliminary injunction proceeding. See *CVI/Beta Ventures*, 112 F.3d at 1160 n.7; Moore, *supra* note 35, at 19–20. It is true that the claim construction in the preliminary injunction proceeding was, due to the early stage of the litigation, non-final. *CVI/Beta*, 112 F.3d at 1160 n.7. However, Moore argues, correctly in my view, that this explanation is not compelling if claim construction is a matter of pure law and where, as in the *CVI/Beta* cases, decisions are made solely on the same intrinsic evidence. See Moore, *supra* note 35, at 20.
141 Intriguingly, the Federal Circuit has occasionally applied stare decisis—or at least cited to previous claim construction rulings—when construing individual claim terms, even when those terms are used in the cited and citing opinions in two entirely different patents and contexts. See *Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co.*, No. 05-1103, slip op. at 9 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 23, 2006) (citing *Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp.*, 361 F.3d 1363, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2004), an opinion construing the term “annular” in a transistor patent, while construing the term “annular” in a baseball bat patent). *Wilson Sporting Goods* is even a post-*Phillips* opinion, in which one might expect the court to construe claim terms only in context—though admittedly the court’s citation was as to the “ordinary and customary” meaning of the term. See *id.*
collateral estoppel may always be employed against a patentee on issues of claim construction, and judicial estoppel may bind a patentee to the patentee’s previous proposed constructions even where that patentee did not originally prevail. Estoppel doctrines are clearer, fairer, and stronger, and they apply equally to fact and to law; as such, it is likely that courts use them in preference to stare decisis in the majority of patent cases where they are available, and that in practice they do much of the work that the Supreme Court assigned to stare decisis.

IV. CONCLUSION

Given these considerations, the Supreme Court should consider moderating its holding in *Markman* and overruling the overly strict holding by the Federal Circuit in *Cybor* that every aspect of claim construction is a matter of law for the court. *Markman*’s stare decisis effect needs modification, or at least clarification, if such a moderation is to occur, but it would be no great loss even if the stare decisis holding were to disappear entirely—and it need not. All that is necessary is for the Supreme Court to take an appropriate case involving expert testimony. It is entirely appropriate that *Phillips* was not that case; despite the appearance of Question 7 in the Federal Circuit’s en banc order, the trial court in *Phillips* heard no expert testimony, and neither the majority nor the dissent in the *Phillips* panel opinion resorted to extrinsic evidence to conduct their claim constructions. When an appropriate case arises, though, the Supreme Court can and should close the rift that *Markman* and *Cybor* created within the patent community, and in so doing should strike a sensible balance between the conceptions of a patent as a legal document and as a technical one.

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144 See *Phillips v. AWH Corp.*, 376 F.3d 1382, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (granting rehearing en banc).