

1 problem solving courts,⁶ procedural justice,⁷ restorative justice,⁸ therapeutic jurisprudence,⁹ and
2 transformative mediation.¹⁰

3 As early as 1997, several of these emerging disciplines had begun to merge, integrate,
4 coalesce, or link, based on similarities in their overall purposes and goals. One of the first
5 scholars to identify this was University of California – Santa Barbara sociology professor
6 Thomas Scheff, who observed in 1997 that: “[i]n recent years, an alternative approach to law, a
7 worldwide movement, has been building momentum. This movement has two vectors,

COMPREHENSIVE LAW MOVEMENT, unpublished book chapter manuscript (2003) to be included in book forthcoming from the International Centre for Healing and the Law (also summarizing the movement).

³ See, e.g., James M. Cooper, *Toward a New Architecture: Creative Problem Solving and the Evolution of Law*, 34(2) CAL. W. L. REV. 297 (1998) (advocating creative problem solving skills in the practice of law, legal education and other professional fields); Janeen Kerper, *Creative Problem Solving vs. The Case Method: A Marvelous Adventure in Which Winnie-the-Pooh Meets Mrs. Palsgraf*, 34(2) CAL. W. L. REV. 351 (1998) (introducing the emergence of creative problem solving as a legal discipline in response to the need for change in legal education); and Thomas D. Barton, *Conceiving the Lawyer as Creative Problem Solver*, 34(2) CAL. W. L. REV. 267 (1998) (discussing a symposium issue to educate creative problem solvers). One issue of the California Western Law Review (volume 34, issue 2) in 1998 was devoted to creative problem solving: California Western Law School houses the McGill Center for Creative Problem Solving, which sponsors a number of national and international programs implementing CPS, as well as several law school courses on CPS.

⁴ See, e.g., the International Alliance of Holistic Lawyers’ website: www.iah.org (visited April 11, 2005). Holistic justice is primarily a grass-roots movement among practicing attorneys in the United States and abroad. The IAHL sponsors an annual conference supporting and encouraging the holistic practice of law.

⁵ See, e.g., ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, *PREVENTIVE LAW: MATERIALS ON A NONADVERSARIAL LEGAL PROCESS* (1997) (the “textbook” for preventive law; now in its second edition). Preventive law is also known as “proactive law,” principally so in Finland, under the guidance and leadership of corporate attorney Helena Haapio.

⁶ E.g., drug treatment courts, mental health courts, domestic violence courts, and other specialized courts. These courts were formalized in 2000 by the adoption of a joint resolution of the Conferences of Chief Justices and Chief Court Administrators explicitly supporting the development of problem solving courts.

⁷ This is a social science concept based on social scientist Tom Tyler’s research on the factors creating satisfaction in litigants involved in legal processes. This work has informed, and altered in some cases, thoughts on how legal and judicial processes should proceed. See Tom R. Tyler, *The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil Commitment Hearings*, in DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, *LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 3* (1996) [hereinafter Wexler & Winick, KEY].

⁸ Restorative justice is one of the largest “vectors” and is associated with restorative criminal justice programs across the United States and in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. Numerous articles and books have been written on RJ; its principal resource in the U.S. can be found through the Center for Restorative Justice at the University of Minnesota, directed by RJ leader and Professor Mark Umbreit (website: <http://2ssw.che.umn.edu/rjp/People/Umbreit.htm>) (visited April 12, 2005).

⁹ Therapeutic jurisprudence is also one of the largest “vectors,” if not the largest. It is represented by numerous books and hundreds of law review articles that apply TJ to all areas of the law. Its founders, law professors David Wexler and Bruce Winick, maintain an extensive set of resources at its website, www.therapeuticjurisprudence.org (visited April 11, 2005).

¹⁰ Transformative mediation is associated with law professor R. Baruch Bush and is explicated in his book co-authored with communications professor Joseph Folger, *THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION* (Jossey-Bass, 1994). The vectors are listed in alphabetical order, not in order of importance, size, or seniority.

1 restorative justice and therapeutic jurisprudence ...”¹¹ The term “vectors” reflects the forward
2 movement of the disciplines into the future and their convergence toward common goals. In
3 1988, I began building on Professor Scheff’s insight by examining other potential “vectors” and
4 exploring what their unifying characteristics might be. There appeared to be at least seven more
5 and, by 2000, the similarities of the nine or so vectors were so clear that I began using the
6 “comprehensive law movement” as a working title for the movement.¹²

7 The similarities coalesce into two common features, thus unifying the vectors as a
8 “movement.” First, each explicitly recognizes and values law’s potential as an agent of positive
9 interpersonal and individual change and seeks to bring about a positive result (such as healing,
10 wholeness, harmony, or optimal human functioning) as part of the resolution of legal matters.
11 Second, each integrates and values extralegal concerns -- factors beyond strict legal rights and

¹¹ Thomas J. Scheff, *Community Conferences: Shame and Anger In Therapeutic Jurisprudence*, 67(1) REV. JUR. U.P.R. 97, 97 (1998).

¹²Admittedly, the title is a rudimentary and nondescript one. However, the term “comprehensive law movement” appears at least 20 times in recent literature, as follows: Carwina Weng, *Multicultural Lawyering: Teaching Psychology to Develop Cultural Self-Awareness*, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2005); Marjorie A. Silver, *Commitment and Responsibility: Modeling and Teaching Professionalism Pervasively*, 14 WIDENER L. J. 329 (2005); Ilhyung Lee, *In Re Culture: The Cross-Cultural Negotiations Course in the Law School Curriculum*, 20 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 375 (2005); David B. Wexler, *Therapeutic Jurisprudence*, 20 TOURO L. REV. 353 (2004); Pauline H. Tesler, *Collaborative Family Law*, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 317 (2004); Carolyn Copps Hartley & Carrie J. Petrucci, *Practicing Culturally Competent Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Collaboration Between Social Work and Law*, 14 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 133 (2004); Leonard L. Riskin, *Mindfulness: Foundational Training for Dispute Resolution*, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 79 (2004); Marjorie A. Silver, *Lawyering and Its Discontents: Reclaiming Meaning in the Practice of Law*, 19 TOURO L. REV. 773 (2004); James Coben & Penelope Harley, *Intentional Conversations About Restorative Justice, Mediation and the Practice of Law*, 25 HAMLIN J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 235 (2003-04); James L. Nolan, Jr., *Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving and the Meaning of Justice*, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541 (2003); Ann E. Freedman, *Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases: Secondary Traumatic Stress and the Need for Compassionate Witnesses*, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 567 (2003); Leonard L. Riskin, *The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Contributions of Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers, and Their Clients*, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2002); Douglas A. Codiga, *Reflections on the Potential Growth of Mindfulness Meditation in the Law*, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 109 (2002); David B. Wexler, *Lowering the Volume Through Legal Doctrine: A Promising Path for Therapeutic Jurisprudence Scholarship*, 3 FLA. COASTAL L. J. 123 (2002); David B. Wexler, *Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Legal Education: Where Do We Go From Here?* 71 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 177 (2002); Steven Keeva, *Once More, With Healing: Ex-Law Dean Heads Center Dedicated to Alternative Approaches to Practice*, 90 A.B.A.J. 74 (2004); Ellen Ostrow, *The Lawyer’s Life: Clear The Obstacles to a Balanced Life*, 39 TRIAL 27 (2003); J. Kim Wright & Dolly M. Garlo, *Law As a Healing Profession*, 63 OR. ST. B. BULL. 9 (2003); Jean Hellwege, *‘Comprehensive Law’ Makes the Case for a Kinder, Gentler Law Practice*, 39 TRIAL 12 (2003); Carole L. Mostow, *Holistic Lawyers Hope to Transform Conflict Resolution*, 12 NO. 4 PROF. LAW. 24 (2000).

1 duties-- into law and legal practice. These “rights plus”¹³ factors include: needs, resources,
2 goals, morals, values, beliefs, psychological matters, personal wellbeing, human development
3 and growth, interpersonal relations, and community wellbeing.

4 In recent years, a number of efforts have been made to link and disseminate the
5 important developments represented by the “vectors.”¹⁴ This article will synthesize those efforts,
6 explore the underpinnings of this movement, and then explore the ramifications of this exciting
7 movement for the future of legal education and the legal profession.

8 Law as a healing profession has great transformational potential. It could begin to
9 address the “tripartite crisis” in the legal profession of deprofessionalism, low public opinion of
10 lawyers, and lawyer distress.¹⁵ It could make the legal system a more inspiring, humane, and
11 hospitable place for clients, lawyers, judges, and indeed society as a whole.

12 II. AREAS OF CONVERGENCE -- COMMON GROUND

13 While intuitively the vectors of the comprehensive law movement may appear similar, it
14 is important to examine the precise ways in which they resemble each other, as well as the ways
15 in which they differ. Professor Bruce Winick, one of the two fathers of therapeutic
16 jurisprudence,¹⁶ described the vectors beautifully when he said they are like members of an
17 extended family. He explained that some have red hair, some have brown hair and brown eyes,
18 some have blue eyes, but when you put them all together for a group photo, a striking family
19 resemblance is evident in each member. Yet, each member has his or her own distinctive
20 features that are peculiar to that member only.¹⁷ The beauty of the movement is evident not only

¹³ Term attributed to Pauline H. Tesler, collaborative law co-founder and San Francisco attorney.

¹⁴ Daicoff, AFTERWORD, *supra* note 1; *see also* J. Kim Wright & Dolly M. Garlo, *Law As A Healing Profession: New Trends Are Expanding Choices In Law Practice*, 63 OR. ST. B. BULL. 9 (2003).

¹⁵ Susan Daicoff, *Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism*, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337 (1997) (describing and documenting this “tripartite crisis”).

¹⁶ DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, *ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE* (1991).

¹⁷ Personal communication with Bruce J. Winick, Redondo Beach, CA, March, 1997.

1 in the features that unify the vectors, but also in their distinct and individual differences; they
2 remain separate and vibrant movements of their own, while sharing common ground.

3 All of the disciplines comprising the comprehensive law movement share at least two
4 features in common: (1) a desire to maximize the emotional, psychological, and relational
5 wellbeing of the individuals and communities involved in each legal matter, and (2) a focus on
6 more than just strict legal rights, responsibilities, duties, obligations, and entitlements. These
7 two features unify the vectors and distinguish them from more traditional approaches to law and
8 lawyering.

9 The dominant, traditional approach found in the profession usually downplays, if not
10 ignores these concerns. It does not value the emotional consequences of the outcomes and
11 processes involved in resolving legal matters or factors other than legal rights. Law schools
12 traditionally teach students to sift through facts and issues to eliminate “irrelevant” concerns and
13 focus only on what is “relevant” to the rule of law.¹⁸ The emotional and interpersonal dynamics
14 of a matter are deemed irrelevant to the pure legal analysis learned in the first year of law school.
15 Sometime during the third year of law school or first few years of practice, lawyers are left to
16 their own to rediscover their ability to evaluate these dynamics and somehow incorporate that
17 assessment into their work as lawyers, but this process (if it occurs) happens haphazardly and
18 without direction. It may not happen at all. For example, empirical research on lawyers
19 indicates that, compared to nonlawyers, lawyers tend to evaluate settlement options by focusing
20 solely on monetary value (the “economic bottom-line”), while nonlawyers tend to be much more
21 influenced by nonmonetary, psychological factors in their decisions to accept a settlement offer

¹⁸ Kerper, *supra* note 2, at 369.

1 in a lawsuit.¹⁹ This suggests that instead of re-incorporating nonlegal factors into our
2 professional decisions, lawyers focus instead on pure legal analysis (who wins or loses) and the
3 economic bottom line (how much in damages will the winner receive).

4 Certainly, in law school, emotional and interpersonal concerns are strongly de-
5 emphasized, if not blatantly ignored. Empirical research indicates that law school actually
6 fosters two shifts in values that echo this de-emphasis. The first shift is away from what Carol
7 Gilligan calls an “ethic of care” and towards a “rights” or “justice” orientation.²⁰ The care ethic
8 values interpersonal harmony, maintaining relationships, people's feelings and needs, and
9 preventing harm.²¹ In contrast, the “rights” or “justice” orientation focuses on rights, rules,
10 standards, individuality, independence, justice, fairness, objectivity, accomplishments,
11 ambitions, principles, personal beliefs, and freedom from the interference of others.²² During
12 law school, law students tend to either intensify their rights orientations or move from a care
13 ethic to a rights orientation.²³

14 The second shift that occurs during law school is away from an emphasis on
15 “growth/self-acceptance, intimacy/emotional connection, and community/societal contribution,”
16 which have been called “‘intrinsic’ values,” and towards an emphasis on

¹⁹ Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, *Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer*, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77 (1997).

²⁰ CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). The ethic of care typically emphasizes interpersonal concerns and is believed to be characteristic of women. Unsatisfied with the appropriateness of Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development to women, Gilligan and others performed research that found that women more often make decisions out of an "ethic of care" while men more often decide on the basis of a "rights" orientation. *See also* Carol Gilligan, *Moral Orientation And Moral Development* in E. F. KITTAY & D. T. MEYERS (EDS.), WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY (New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987); Judith White & Chris Manolis, *Individual Differences in Ethical Reasoning Among Law Students*, 25 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 19, 33 (1997) (briefly describing the history of the debate between Kohlberg and Gilligan).

²¹ Sandra Janoff, *The Influences of Legal Education on Moral Reasoning*, 76 MINN. L. REV. 193, 219-22 (1991).

²² *Id.*

²³ *Id.*

1 “appearance/attractiveness,” “money/luxuries, popularity/fame, and beauty/attractiveness,” which have
2 been called “‘extrinsic’ value[s].”²⁴

3 Both shifts appear among law students as early as the first year of law school. In both
4 shifts, a movement away from valuing interpersonal harmony, connectedness, and emotional
5 wellbeing is evident. The comprehensive law movement values these concerns, in contrast. It
6 asks lawyers to focus on these concerns and issues that are traditionally ignored, if not actively
7 silenced, in law school and law practice. In this way, it differs from traditional approaches to
8 law and lawyering. While “good,” traditional lawyers may implicitly or unconsciously take
9 these concerns into account in their representation of clients, the comprehensive law movement
10 differs from traditional lawyering in that it *explicitly* values interpersonal, emotional,
11 psychological, and relational concerns. It elevates the importance of these concerns in the law
12 and seeks to consciously train lawyers to effectively deal with these concerns. The revolutionary
13 nature of the movement is thus evident. The next two sections explore the two unifying features
14 in more detail.

15 **A. Optimizing Human Wellbeing**

16 First, the vectors of the comprehensive law movement seek legal solutions that make
17 things better, or at least not worse, for the people involved in the legal matter. They explicitly or
18 implicitly attempt to optimize the psychological and emotional wellbeing of the individuals
19 involved. All of the vectors seek to resolve the legal dispute or matter in a way that prevents
20 harm to, preserves, or enhances individuals’ interpersonal relationships, psychological wellbeing,

²⁴ Lawrence S. Krieger, *Psychological Insights: Why Our Students and Graduates Suffer, and What We Might Do About It*, 1 J. ASS’N LEG. WRITING DIRS. 259 (2002), and Lawrence S. Krieger, *Institutional Denial About the Dark Side of Law School, and Fresh Empirical Guidance for Constructively Breaking the Silence*, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 112 (March/June 2002).

1 opportunities for personal growth, mental health, or satisfaction with the process and outcome of
2 the matter.²⁵

3 While the vectors may initially focus on the wellbeing of the individual client at hand,
4 they often seek to preserve or enhance the wellbeing of all of the individuals involved in the
5 matter. They intuitively understand the well-known social science finding that positive
6 relationships and good connections with one’s family, friends, colleagues, peers, and community
7 lead to enhanced psychological wellbeing and functioning²⁶ and, as a result, they often work to
8 preserve, maintain, restore, or create good interpersonal relationships.

9 Because of the emotional devastation that can result from traditional adversarial
10 litigation, many of the vectors explicitly seek nonlitigious solutions to legal problems.²⁷ Some
11 vectors are explicitly therapeutic to the individuals involved²⁸ and some are indirectly
12 therapeutic.²⁹ Many utilize collaborative methods in solving legal problems;³⁰ however, some
13 explicitly acknowledge that litigation, uncompromising positions, and legal force can themselves
14 be healing and they use these methods in achieving their goals.³¹

15 Social scientists might call this feature “optimizing human functioning.” They might
16 define the vectors’ goal as “satisfaction with the legal process” or “good mental health.”
17 Jurisprudents might call the goal therapeutic or curative. Others might describe the goal as a
18 search for healing or restoration. Native American tradition might call the goal “harmony” and
19 then define harmony as three-part wholeness, meaning harmony within oneself (intrapersonal

²⁵ This focus echoes the overall values embedded in the paradigm shifts and jurisprudential precursors to the movement discussed in Part IV., *infra*, such as connectedness, interpersonal harmony, and human wellbeing.

²⁶ See Richard Sheehy & John J. Horan, *Effects of Stress Inoculation Training for First-Year Law Students* (August 2000) (paper presented at annual meeting of the American Psychological Association), available at <http://horan.asu.edu/d-rs-apa-y2k.htm> (visited April 15, 2005).

²⁷ E.g., preventive law, creative problem solving, collaborative law, procedural justice, and holistic justice.

²⁸ Explicit: e.g., therapeutic jurisprudence, transformative mediation, and drug treatment courts.

²⁹ Implicit: restorative justice.

³⁰ See e.g., Tesler, *supra* note 1.

1 harmony), harmony between self and a Supreme Being, if one so believes (vertical harmony),
2 and harmony between self and others (horizontal or interpersonal harmony).³² Whatever
3 moniker is used, the concept is focused first on people and second on leaving people in the best
4 possible internal, psychological, emotional, moral, relational, and spiritual state at the conclusion
5 of their legal matter.

6 **B. “Rights Plus:” Considering Extra-Legal Factors**

7 The second unifying feature is that all of the vectors take into consideration, when
8 assessing or resolving a legal problem, more than just the strict legal rights, liabilities,
9 obligations, duties, and entitlements presented. While law school teaches us to focus only on the
10 law and what facts are relevant to the legal tests used in courts, the comprehensive law
11 approaches explicitly go above and beyond the law to incorporate a consideration of one or more
12 extra-legal factors. The factors considered include: the social, psychological, and emotional
13 consequences of various courses of action, the communities in which the individuals involved
14 exist, and the parties’ emotions, feelings, needs, resources, goals, psychological health,
15 relationships, values, morals, and financial concerns.³³ Pauline Tesler, one of the founders of the
16 collaborative law movement, calls this feature “rights plus.”³⁴

17 Every traditional lawyer probably takes his or her client’s financial concerns into account, so
18 that at least one extra-legal factor is usually considered beyond the client’s legal rights or duties.³⁵
19 In fact, focusing on the economic bottom line is rather characteristic of attorneys, as compared to

³¹ See e.g., Daicoff, AFTERWORD, *supra* note 1, reviewed in 87 A.B.A. J. 79 (May 2001).

³² Definition attributed to Dean Emeritus David Link formerly of Notre Dame Law School, now president of the International Centre for Healing and the Law, formed under the auspices of the Fetzer Institute.

³³ Daicoff, AFTERWORD, *supra* note 1, at 470-71.

³⁴ This term was coined by Pauline Tesler, one of the co-founders of the collaborative law movement and a collaborative divorce lawyer in the San Francisco area. Interview with Pauline H. Tesler, Esq., of Tesler, Sandmann and Fishman, Dublin, Ireland (July 8, 1999).

1 therapeutic jurisprudence perspective (Is this process therapeutic or not? How could it be made
2 so?), a procedural justice view (How will this process affect the participants psychologically?),
3 or a creative problem solving approach (Does this process allow for the broadest, most creative
4 approach to solving the problem?).

5 Until now, the legal system offered only one “lens,” the traditional approach to
6 lawyering. This lens typically focuses on legal rights, duties, and responsibilities and on
7 resolution of legal matters and disputes. The comprehensive law movement adds at least five
8 more “lenses.” Each of these new lenses focuses on concerns, beyond legal rights, through
9 which to view legal matters.

10 Despite perhaps being limited to one “lens,” the existing legal system offers a number of
11 “processes” which can be used to carry out the goals identified by the traditional “lens.” The
12 existing processes include: litigation, mediation (facilitative and evaluative forms thereof),
13 arbitration, private adjudications, private trials, and old-fashioned negotiation and settlement.
14 The comprehensive law movement adds at least five more “processes” to the lawyers’ toolkit,
15 each of which is consistent with a different paradigm for resolution of legal matters. These
16 lenses and processes will be individually examined, below.

17 **A. “Lenses”**

18 **1. Therapeutic Jurisprudence**

19 Therapeutic jurisprudence (“TJ”) emerged around 1990 and now is represented by more
20 than five hundred and eighty one articles and eighteen books. Its cofounders, law professors
21 David Wexler and Bruce Winick, often define it by quoting law professor Christopher Slobogin's
22 definition of TJ: "the use of social science to study the extent to which a legal rule or practice

1 promotes the psychological or physical well-being of the people it affects.”³⁸ Therapeutic
2 jurisprudence explicitly acknowledges, like it or not, that law, legal personnel, and legal
3 procedures have psychological effects upon the individuals and groups involved in each legal
4 matter. According to Professors Wexler and Winick, it asks, “whether the law’s antitherapeutic
5 consequences can be reduced, and its therapeutic consequences enhanced, without subordinating
6 due process and other justice values.”³⁹

7 Because it grew out of an interdisciplinary, law, and psychology viewpoint, they explain
8 that TJ was first applied to traditional mental health law topics such as “the civil commitment of
9 the mentally ill, the insanity defense, and incompetency in both civil and criminal contexts.”⁴⁰
10 TJ has rapidly grown and spread into many other areas that include the civil commitment of
11 sexual offenders and outpatient drug abusers. TJ has also reached sentencing and probation
12 agreements, workers’ compensation law, sexual orientation law and disability law, fault-based
13 tort compensation schemes, domestic violence, crime victims, mandatory child abuse reporting,
14 contract law,⁴¹ and family law.⁴² TJ has even explored the therapeutic consequences of
15 practicing law upon lawyers.⁴³

16 Importantly, therapeutic jurisprudence seeks to optimize the therapeutic effects of
17 substantive rules of law, legal personnel’s actions, and legal processes without elevating
18 therapeutic concerns over traditional legal concerns such as rights or due process. It simply says,

³⁸ Wexler & Winick, KEY, *supra* note 6, at xvii, in part quoting Christopher Slobogin, *Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas To Ponder*, 1 PSYCH., PUB. POL. & L. 193 (1995) (reprinted in Wexler & Winick, KEY, *supra* note 6, at 775).

³⁹ Wexler & Winick, KEY, *supra* note 6, at xvii.

⁴⁰ *Id.* at xix.

⁴¹ *Id.* at xvii, xix, and Table of Contents.

⁴² Barbara A. Babb, *An Interdisciplinary Approach to Family Law Jurisprudence: Application of an Ecological and Therapeutic Perspective*, 72 IND. L. J. 775 (1997) (proposing an interdisciplinary approach to resolving family law issues).

⁴³ Amiram Elwork, Ph.D. & G. Andrew H. Benjamin, Ph.D., J.D., *Lawyers in Distress*, 23 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 205 (1995).

1 given two different options for achieving a particular legal result, if one option is more
2 therapeutic than the other, the lawyer should attempt to pursue the more therapeutic course of
3 action.

4 For example, suppose that a mental health patient is involuntarily civilly committed to a
5 long-term treatment center for chemical dependency. Suppose also that this patient has the legal
6 right to receive a certain standard of care⁴⁴ and is not receiving that care. The lawyer
7 representing this patient as a client might well proceed to bring legal action against the treatment
8 center in order to force the center to provide more appropriate care for the client. However, the
9 lawyer could either: (1) do this with the collaboration of and input from the client's treatment
10 team, consisting probably of a unit director, psychiatrist, psychiatric nurse, and social worker or
11 mental health counselor, and maybe even with the involvement of and input from the client's
12 family; or (2) do this alone with the client, following the client's wishes. The legal result may be
13 the same in both situations; the client gets his or her legal standard of treatment care.

14 However, suppose that this particular client has been hospitalized many times before and
15 is quite belligerent and resistant to treatment. The client's treatment team views the client's
16 efforts to secure an attorney as simply more evidence of the client's resistance to treatment and,
17 from a psychological perspective, as simply a diversion to allow the client to avoid making any
18 real positive changes in his or her life. In the first scenario, the lawyer is more likely to
19 accomplish the client's legal goal in a way that allows the treatment team to assist the client in
20 gaining some psychological insights about why he or she is pursuing legal action. The lawyer
21 and the treatment team might actually be able to collaborate to achieve the legal goal while
22 making the process therapeutically meaningful for the client and thus enhancing his or her
23 treatment. The lawyer in the second scenario is more likely to work at cross purposes to the

1 treatment, actually becoming a distracting influence on the client, and hampering any real
2 psychological progress the client is making in treatment. Given that both options are likely to
3 achieve the same legal result, the TJ-oriented lawyer might encourage the client to allow him or
4 her to pursue the first approach.⁴⁵

5 TJ has been applied to employment law to argue that the Americans with Disabilities
6 Act’s provision requiring confidentiality of employee claims made pursuant to the Act is
7 countertherapeutic.⁴⁶ Confidentiality deprives the claiming employee’s coworkers of an
8 opportunity to assist and cooperate in designing and implementing reasonable accommodations
9 for the employee’s disability. Coworker assistance and participation can reduce resentment
10 towards the accommodated employee, increase social support for the accommodation and the
11 accommodated employee, and maintain or increase overall workplace morale.

12 TJ has also been applied to the United States military’s policy on homosexuality of
13 “don’t ask, don’t tell and don’t pursue”⁴⁷ to demonstrate the policy’s countertherapeutic aspects.
14 Under this policy, the armed services do not require applicants to disclose whether they are
15 homosexual or bisexual. The military will not discharge homosexual members unless
16 homosexual conduct is engaged in, but making a statement that one is homosexual or bisexual
17 constitutes “homosexual conduct.” Thus, a member of the armed forces who states that he or she
18 is gay or bisexual can be discharged from military service. However, no investigations or

⁴⁴ Based on Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).

⁴⁵ This hypothetical is a composite of situations encountered by the author in her capacity as a former mental health therapist in a substance abuse treatment center and the “Mr. A” case study in Robert D. Miller, Gary J. Maier, Frederick W. Blancke and Dennis Doren, *Litigiousness as a Resistance to Therapy*, in DAVID WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT 332-35 (Carolina Academic Press 1990).

⁴⁶ Rose Daly-Rooney, *Designing Reasonable Accommodations Through Co-Worker Participation: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Confidentiality Provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act*, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 89 (1994).

⁴⁷ Kay Kavanagh, *Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Deception Required, Disclosure Denied*, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 142 (1995) (reprinted in Wexler & Winick, KEY, *supra* note 6, at 343).

1 inquiries will be conducted solely to determine a member’s sexual orientation.⁴⁸ From a TJ
2 perspective, Kay Kavanagh argues that this policy is countertherapeutic for homosexual service
3 members because, while it allows them to be homosexual, it requires them to refrain from
4 discussing their sexual orientation. It requires deception and prevents them from talking about
5 activities that would raise a presumption that they are engaging in homosexual acts. For
6 example, they cannot discuss with whom they spent the weekend, from whom they are receiving
7 a phone call, etc. This sets them apart from their colleagues and forces them to be emotionally
8 distant and isolated from their co-workers.⁴⁹ It reduces the social support available to gay
9 service members, causes constant strain and tension in maintaining secrecy, causes distressing
10 isolation, and lowers self-esteem due to inauthenticity.⁵⁰

11 TJ asks lawyers to beware of “psycho-legal soft spots,” which are, according to Bruce
12 Winick, areas “in which certain legal issues, procedures, or interventions may produce or reduce
13 anxiety, distress, anger, depression, hard or hurt feelings, and other dimensions of [emotional] ...
14 well-being.”⁵¹ For example, elderly clients may present developmental, end-of-life, health, and
15 family relationship concerns. Clients with terminal cancer or HIV/AIDS may present needs
16 relating to the dying process, the emotional stages of grief, and family relationships. Personal
17 injury clients may display anger, depression, and a desire for revenge. Their anger can be
18 misdirected onto the lawyer. They may need the opportunity to “tell their story” and be “heard.”
19 They may need to hear an apology from the defendant or need help to avoid becoming
20 emotionally “stuck” in the grief process. Domestic violence victims may need extra
21 understanding and support, suffer from low self-esteem, and have ambivalent feelings towards

⁴⁸ Kay Kavanagh in Wexler & Winick, *KEY supra* note 6, at 346-50.

⁴⁹ *Id.* at 352-356.

⁵⁰ *Id.*

⁵¹ Bruce J. Winick, *The Expanding Scope of Preventive Law*, 3 Fla. Coastal Sch. L.J. 189, 195 n.15 (2002).

1 the offender. A lawyer or judge who insists that a domestic violence victim be completely
2 finished with the relationship, or, at the other extreme, one who buys into the victim’s denial and
3 justification, can be countertherapeutic. For example, Kate Paradine relates a case in which the
4 lawyer told the victim that the perpetrator was behaving poorly because he “still loves you,” at a
5 time when she said she most needed to hear, “You don’t have to put up with that behavior.”⁵²
6 Alcohol or drug dependent clients are likely to display denial, rationalization, and resistance and
7 they are prone to relapse. A TJ lawyer considers the effects of these potential issues, includes
8 them in lawyer-client discussions, and considers them in developing, with the client, a course of
9 action that is most likely to have the desired legal *and* therapeutic outcome.

10 TJ recognizes the often-devastating effects of protracted, costly, and adversarial litigation
11 as a “psycho-legal soft spot” and sometimes, therefore, seeks nonlitigation alternatives for
12 certain clients. For example, it is a known phenomenon that doctors are more likely to either
13 commit malpractice or have another malpractice action filed against them in the six months
14 following the filing of a malpractice suit against them.⁵³ For this reason, a TJ defense lawyer
15 might use this social science insight to recommend a nonlitigated, immediate settlement of his or
16 her client’s *first* malpractice case to minimize the effect of this phenomenon on the doctor’s
17 medical practice.

18 In cases where ongoing relationships are key, a nonlitigated settlement may preserve the
19 interpersonal relationships between the parties and lead to a better overall outcome. For
20 example, a tenured professor who sues his or her school for gender discrimination may desire to

⁵² Kate Paradine, *The Importance of Understanding Love and Other Feelings in Survivors’ Experience of Domestic Violence*, 37 CT. REV. 40 (Spring 2000).

⁵³ Edward A. Dauer et al., *Transformative Power: Medical Malpractice Mediations May Help Improve Patient Safety*, ABA DISPUTE RESOLUTION, Spring 1999 at 9 (reviewing successful pilot malpractice mediation programs in Massachusetts and Toronto). One wonders if perhaps the doctors’ confidence is shaken and they become more prone to either mistakes or lawsuits as a result of the initial filing.

1 continue working there, post-lawsuit. A mediated resolution might preserve a better future
2 working relationship for employee and employer, and thus a better outcome for all involved, in
3 the long run.

4 Litigation itself, however, can at times be therapeutic. In cases that present a significant
5 power imbalance between the parties, such as a sexual harassment suit where the employer is
6 intractable, arrogant, and self-righteous and where the employee has a long history of
7 victimization, litigation may be the most therapeutic process for both parties. It could allow the
8 plaintiff to assert himself or herself, perhaps for the first time. It would also give the employer a
9 terrific “wake up call” which might force it to reassess its treatment of its employees and make
10 some positive changes.

11 TJ is probably the most visible and prolific vector, at least in academic and judicial
12 circles. It has rapidly spread to all areas of the law and has been enthusiastically adopted by
13 American judges in the form of “problem-solving courts.” (see part II, B. 4, *infra*).

14 **2. Preventive Law**

15 Preventive law (“PL”) is perhaps the oldest vector of the movement. Preventive law
16 emerged in the 1950s, although its founder, attorney and law professor Louis Brown, conceived
17 of it in the 1930s. Its 1978 casebook, *Planning by Lawyers*, was revised and republished as a
18 preventive law textbook in 1997.⁵⁴ The *Preventive Law Reporter* has been published since
19 1982.⁵⁵

20 Preventive law attempts to avoid or prevent litigation before it arises. As a lens,
21 preventive law asks what measures can be put in place to prevent future litigation or future legal
22 problems. It takes a proactive approach and allows the attorney to intervene in clients’ lives

⁵⁴ Hardaway, *supra* note 4.

1 before problems arise. By anticipating disputes before they arise, planning ahead, and
2 intervening to prevent legal problems whenever possible, the lawyer serves the client’s interests
3 in a proactive, albeit nontraditional, way. The client may be spared the traumatizing effects of a
4 litigated confrontation with another person or legal entity. Preventive law also considers the fact
5 that interpersonal relationships, such as husband-wife or employer-employee, may endure long
6 after the current difficulty has passed, and a solution that irreparably ruptures the bond may lead
7 to future legal problems and thus be really no solution at all. The emphasis in preventive law is
8 on a good, ongoing lawyer-client relationship, open communication, and the prevention of legal
9 disputes.

10 For example, a preventive employment law attorney might assess a corporate client’s
11 employee policies and procedures manual and practices in order to assess whether the
12 corporation has any potential exposure to harassment or discrimination suits. Then, the PL
13 lawyer would put into place policies and procedures, perhaps including some in-service training,
14 if any “legal soft spots” emerged as a result of the lawyer’s “audit.” Periodic check ups would
15 be performed with the client to intervene proactively with any troubled employee/employer
16 situations.

17 Dean emeritus Edward Dauer gives this example:⁵⁶ Suppose a mature gentleman comes
18 to see a lawyer about issuing some new shares of stock in the family corporation to his son-in-
19 law. It turns out that the amount of stock involved would allow the son-in-law to exercise some
20 influence over the direction of the business. In discussing the client’s intentions, the lawyer
21 realizes there are numerous risks the client may not have considered. Any competent lawyer
22 would investigate the statutory, regulatory, and tax liability implications of the transaction, as

⁵⁵ The first volume of the PREVENTIVE LAW REPORTER was published in July 1982 (Butterworth Legal Publishers) by the National Center for Preventive Law (U.S.), University of Denver, College of Law.

1 well as issues of voting control, percentage ownership, and buy-sell agreements. Preventive law
2 would take the additional steps of anticipating and pre-empting opportunities for conflict, dashed
3 hopes, unfulfilled assumptions and damaged relationships. If, for example, the client and his
4 son-in law fail to get along after the stock is issued, their disagreements, frustrated expectations,
5 and conflicting interests may result in shareholder deadlock or even civil litigation, impacting the
6 family as well as the business.

7 Preventive law was recently integrated with therapeutic jurisprudence, melding its
8 processes and concepts with TJ’s therapeutic goals, in order to provide a richer approach to
9 practicing law.⁵⁷ The integration of TJ and PL, collectively referred to as therapeutically-
10 oriented preventive law (“TOPL” or “TJ/PL”), merges the well-developed lawyering skills of PL
11 with the psychological sophistication of TJ. From this integration developed the concept of
12 lawyers foreseeing not just legal soft spots, but also “psycho-legal soft spots,” and acting to
13 prevent situations from occurring that were troublesome both legally and psychologically.⁵⁸ To
14 effectively practice TJ/PL, a lawyer must employ excellent communications skills and
15 interpersonal sensitivity, as well as a familiarity with psychology.

16 **3. Procedural Justice**

17 In 1990, social scientist Tom Tyler published an empirical study finding that litigants’
18 satisfaction with judicial processes depended more on three psychological factors than on the
19 actual win-lose outcome of the process.⁵⁹ These three factors were: being given an opportunity
20 to speak and be heard; being treated with dignity and respect by the judge and the other legal
21 personnel; and how trustworthy those in authority appeared and behaved. Being allowed to

⁵⁶ Stolle, et al., *supra* note 34, at 34-35.

⁵⁷ Dennis P. Stolle et al., *Integrating Preventive Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence*, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 15 (1997).

⁵⁸ *Id.*

1 participate in the decision-making process and having the judge explain his or her reasons for
2 making his or her decision were also relevant to these factors and thus to litigants’ satisfaction.
3 In other words, whether these factors were present dictated how satisfied one was with a legal
4 process, regardless of whether one won or lost. Tyler concluded: “People’s evaluations of the
5 fairness of judicial hearings are affected by the opportunities which those procedures provide for
6 people to participate, by the degree to which people judge that they are treated with dignity and
7 respect, and by judgments about the trustworthiness of authorities. Each of these three factors
8 has more influence on judgments of procedural justice than do either evaluation of neutrality or
9 evaluations of the favorableness of the outcome of the hearing.”⁶⁰ Procedural justice (“PJ”)
10 suggests that litigation in itself is not necessarily what people want from the law; they want a
11 voice, an opportunity to tell their story, to be treated with respect by the authority figures, and to
12 have the decision (if made by a third party) explained to them.

13 I typically use the following scenario to illustrate procedural justice concepts: If a sexual
14 harassment plaintiff brings a lawsuit against her former employer and ultimately receives back
15 pay and a fair damage award but is poorly treated by the judge, the attorneys, and the employer’s
16 representatives throughout the proceeding, the glow of the “win” is likely to fade substantially.
17 If she feels as if she was not given an opportunity to tell her story because of the restrictions
18 placed on witness’ testimony or if her credibility and character are impugned during cross-
19 examination in a way that leaves her feeling decimated afterward, and if she gets the impression
20 that the judge does not want her to speak freely, then she may feel violated by the process rather

⁵⁹ Tyler in Wexler & Winick, KEY, *supra* note 6, at 6-7.

⁶⁰ *Id.* at 12.

1 than vindicated. Tyler’s work would suggest that she would feel less satisfied, or even be
2 unhappy, with the outcome under these circumstances.⁶¹

3 Another example can be seen in the treatment of a chronic substance-dependent man
4 who is facing sentencing for a minor, drug-related criminal offense. The sentence is likely to
5 consist of a multitude of measures, including mandatory inpatient and outpatient substance
6 abuse treatment, jail time, house arrest, community service, and community restitutionary
7 measures. It will likely take 18 months to complete. Wexler has applied Meichenbaum and
8 Turk’s empirical research on factors enhancing patients’ compliance with health care
9 professionals’ directions (i.e., “doctor’s orders”) to situations like this and concluded that this
10 man will be more likely to comply with the terms of his sentence if he is given a chance to
11 participate with the judge in the formulation of its terms, among other things.⁶² If he is given
12 a voice in the decisional process, is treated with dignity and respect by the judge and the
13 other legal personnel, and is given an explanation by the judge as to how he came to his
14 decision, he is more likely to “buy in” to the program and follow it. In the long run, this
15 approach will be more likely to facilitate this man’s successful recovery from substance
16 abuse.

17 Another example can be found in corporate hierarchical decision-making. Suppose
18 that a medium-sized corporation (without unionized employees) has just revised its
19 employment contracts with its employees, because it just concluded an expensive and painful
20 lawsuit with an ex-employee over the terms of her contract. In an effort to prevent future
21 lawsuits, the corporation unilaterally amends its annual employment contracts and policies
22 and procedures manual in order to minimize future disputes over its employment-related

⁶¹ DAICOFF, KNOW THYSELF, *supra* note 1, at 179-80.

⁶² David Wexler, *Inducing Therapeutic Compliance Through the Criminal Law*, 14 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 43 (1990).

1 decisions, acting on the advice of its lawyer (who may even be practicing preventive law).
2 The employees receive the new contracts in the mail, with no explanation as to the changes.
3 They are furious, feel betrayed by the corporation, and perceive the new contracts as
4 undercutting their legal rights, to their detriment and to the corporation’s unilateral benefit.
5 Now the corporation has to engage in “damage control” to preserve the morale of its
6 employees. Procedural justice would have dictated that the corporation should have included
7 its employees or a representative group thereof in the process of revising the standard
8 employment contracts. If they had been involved in the process, understood the reasons for
9 the changes, were given a voice and an opportunity to be heard and to participate in revising
10 the contracts, they would have been more likely to accept the new contracts without question.
11 Morale and favorable employer-employee relations would have been preserved. Future
12 employee lawsuits might have been prevented.

13 Procedural justice alone is not a way of practicing law or administering justice, but its
14 insights have weighty consequences for lawyers, clients, and judges. It applies to and can
15 inform all of the approaches, traditional or comprehensive, to legal practice and the
16 administration of laws.

17 **4. Creative Problem Solving**

18 Creative Problem Solving (“CPS”) refers to a broad approach to lawyering and legal
19 problems that takes into account a wide variety of non-legal issues and concerns and then seeks
20 creative, win-win solutions to otherwise win-lose scenarios. Its website explains that, “clients
21 and society are increasingly asking lawyers to approach problems [not always as fighters, but]
22 more creatively. The Center develops curriculum, research, and projects to educate students and
23 lawyers in methods for preventing problems where possible, and creatively solving those

1 problems that do exist. The Center focuses both on using the traditional analytical process more
2 creatively and on using nontraditional problem solving processes, drawn from business,
3 psychology, economics, neuroscience, and sociology among others.”⁶³

4 Law professor Linda Morton gives an example of how the principles of CPS can be
5 applied to and reinforced in other areas of the law school curriculum.⁶⁴ She starts with the
6 common example given in Property class of the client who has been sued by a neighbor who is
7 claiming adverse possession:

8 The students' initial reaction might be to examine legal doctrine learned
9 through the study of appellate cases (e.g., Was there sufficient use of the
10 premises? Was the use permissive?). In teaching substantive law, this process
11 must be undertaken in order to learn both content and legal analysis.
12 However, analysis of the issue should not end there. A creative problem
13 solving paradigm can teach other methods that lawyers might use to resolve
14 the issue. In doing so, students would inevitably incorporate more humanistic
15 and creative concepts in their thinking. In using the model offered, students
16 would first have to identify the problem, taking into account interests and
17 needs of those involved (e.g., Is this a case of neighborhood hostility? Land
18 acquisition? What does the client want to happen? What can she afford?
19 How do her values and interests compete with others involved?).
20 Understanding the problem is the next step (e.g., What further research would
21 have to be undertaken? What other disciplines should be consulted? How
22 could the problem have been prevented?). Once the problem is thoroughly
23 understood, solutions, in addition to that of litigation, are posed (e.g., Can this
24 be resolved through a negotiation, mediation, or neighborhood coffee? Or
25 should the client simply sell the property? What are the possible results of
26 each?). After a full range of solutions is offered, the next step is to choose
27 among them, keeping in mind the effects of implementing each one (e.g., Who
28 decides? And, according to whose values? Who might be harmed?).
29 Ultimately, an analysis is required as to whether the "best" solution has been
30 chosen (e.g., Will such choice prevent future problems?). By framing class
31 discussion in a creative problem solving context, the student is exposed to a
32 much richer variety of approaches to the issue that legal analysis alone can
33 offer.⁶⁵

⁶³ CPS is associated with the McGill Center for Creative Problem Solving at California Western School of Law (website: go to <http://cwsu.edu/main/home.asp>, select Creative Problem Solving) (visited April 11, 2005), which sponsors a number of law school courses on CPS, national and international projects, and periodic convergences.

⁶⁴ Example and questions from Linda Morton, *Teaching Creative Problem Solving: A Paradigmatic Approach*, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 375, 386-87 (1998).

⁶⁵ *Id.*

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Law professor Janeen Kerper in her 1997 article on CPS and the famous Palsgraf explosion-on-the-railroad-platform case gives the most vivid example of creative problem solving.⁶⁶ She asserts that in most first-year torts classes across the country, Cardozo’s opinion in this case is analyzed as a “brilliant piece of legal reasoning,”⁶⁷ deciding just how far liability extends. In contrast, Kerper points out that the ultimate result of this famous torts case for Helen Palsgraf was dismal if not devastating. From a CPS perspective, it is “an example of particularly bad lawyering.”⁶⁸ Not only did Mrs. Palsgraf lose the case on appeal, but she also had to pay her own and the railroad’s attorneys’ fees. A single mother, struggling to provide for her children by working two menial jobs, and suffering from a speech impediment as an after effect of the incident that impaired her ability to work and communicate with her children, Mrs. Palsgraf was ultimately held liable for costs roughly equivalent to a year’s earnings. Financially, she ended up poorer as a result of the lawsuit and she achieved none of her nonlegal goals. Anecdotal evidence suggests that she even became mute as a result of the lawsuit’s eventual outcome.⁶⁹

Kerper re-evaluates Mrs. Palsgraf’s case from a creative problem solving standpoint and contrasts what the CPS lawyer might do, with what her lawyer, Matthew Wood, did. For example, solutions that would have addressed Mrs. Palsgraf’s physical problems, medical expenses, limited employment opportunities, and childcare obligations might well have been fashioned with the railroad’s concurrence. By “brainstorming” to identify mutually acceptable alternatives to litigation, Mrs. Palsgraf’s attorney may have better served her needs. Indeed, Kerper suggests, had Mrs. Palsgraf been afforded the opportunity to thoroughly explore her

⁶⁶ Kerper, *supra* note 2.
⁶⁷ *Id.* at 365.
⁶⁸ *Id.*
⁶⁹ *Id.*

1 options and acknowledge her needs, she might have avoided the risks of a lengthy lawsuit that
2 ultimately left her worse, physically and financially, than when she started.⁷⁰

3 **5. Holistic Justice**

4 Holistic lawyering encompasses many forms of practice that would easily fit within some
5 of the other vectors, such as TJ or CPS. Holistic law or holistic justice (“HJ”) is hard to define
6 because it refers to a loose coalition of practicing lawyers in the United States and world who
7 embody a rather diverse set of approaches. Most see themselves as healers and peacemakers;
8 some focus more expressly on spiritual principles. HJ explicitly seeks to: “promote peaceful
9 advocacy and holistic legal principles; encourage compassion, reconciliation, forgiveness, and
10 healing; advocate the need for a humane legal process; contribute to peace building at all levels;
11 enjoy the practice of law; listen intentionally and deeply in order to gain complete understanding;
12 acknowledge the opportunity in conflict; and wholly honor and respect the dignity and integrity
13 of each individual.”⁷¹

14 Holistic lawyers often view the client’s situation as an opportunity for growth for both
15 the client and the lawyer, although they might be inclined to define growth along spiritual lines
16 rather than along psychological lines. Some explicitly hold that “everything happens for a
17 reason” and seek to find a greater purpose for or meaning in the legal problem or the interaction
18 of the lawyer and client. Some explicitly follow their own personal values in their professional
19 work and refuse to take actions that conflict with those personal values, always of course
20 discussing those actions and values with the client. Some try to elicit from their clients their
21 deepest desires, use the client’s heartfelt goal as the goal of the lawyer-client relation, and view
22 their role as helping the client achieve that deeper goal. Wall Street attorney Arnie Herz, who

⁷⁰ *Id.* at 368-70

⁷¹ Website: <http://iahl.org> (visited April 11, 2005).

1 was profiled in the American Bar Association Journal in 2001⁷², describes holistic practice well
2 when he gives this example of his lawyering work:

3 Attorney Arnie Herz, for example, represented an imposing ex-football player we
4 shall call John Smalls, in a dispute with the new owners of the company Smalls
5 had just sold, after ten years of successful solo ownership. Smalls was furious
6 with the new owners' treatment of him as employee post-sale and with their
7 mismanagement of the company. Unfortunately, he had signed a noncompete
8 agreement as part of the sale and felt bound by it, despite his frustration.
9 Determined to sue the new owners for mistreatment and mismanagement, he
10 approached Herz, who opined that a lawsuit might succeed but would cost well
11 over \$100, 000 in fees and costs to litigate. Smalls was ready to move, but Herz
12 decided to slow him down a bit and asked, "If you could have anything you
13 wanted in your life, what would you want your life to look like six months from
14 now?" Smalls said more than anything, he wanted to be free of the new owners
15 and wanted to make more money. He thought he could make a lot more money
16 without them but didn't want to "let them off the hook." Frustrated that Herz was
17 trying to talk him out of suing, Smalls commented, "You're too nice- I need a
18 tough litigator," packed up, and started to walk out the office. Talking a big risk,
19 Herz responded, "I know you think I'm not tough, but in all my years of
20 experience, I think you may be the weakest person I've worked with. You set out
21 a vision that was to be free of these people—you didn't mention that you wanted
22 to punish them, teach them a lesson, or spend \$100,000 of your own money and
23 five years of your life doing so. What I see is that you don't have the strength to
24 hold on to your own vision and deal effectively with your own anger. And I'll bet
25 you've been doing this all your life." At first Smalls flushed with anger. But
26 something in what Herz said rang true. He sat down and began listening and
27 discussing; together, they agreed on a plan of action that involved a more
28 collaborative, nonlitigious approach to resolving the matter. Smalls was freed
29 from his noncompete clause three months later. The new owners teetered on the
30 edge of bankruptcy for years—as Herz had predicted; even had Smalls sued, he
31 would not have been able to collect a dime. Freed of the new owners, Smalls was
32 in fact able to make a lot more money. Financially, the plan was a huge success.
33 Personally, Smalls later said, the process of resolving this legal matter had
34 allowed him to learn how his anger had been controlling his life, affecting his
35 relationship with his wife and his kids, and blocking him from his full potential.
36 Herz's approach to representing Smalls is one illustration of how a
37 comprehensive lawyer might conduct such a law practice. Herz went beyond the
38 law to ask about the client's deepest needs, goals, and desires and then used that
39 information to create, with the client, the best strategy. Admittedly, he took a
40 major risk early in the lawyer-client relationship, and not all comprehensive
41 lawyers would be comfortable doing so. Using excellent interpersonal skills,
42 though, Herz assessed that Smalls was a no-nonsense person who would respond

⁷² Steven Keeva, *What Clients Want: People Who Come to Arnie Herz Seeking Legal Help Leave With Some Unexpected Solutions*, 87 A.B.A.J. 48 (June 2001).

1 only to straight talk—which he did. Litigation in this case only would have
2 wasted time and money and fueled the client’s excessive anger. The final process
3 and outcome were not only financially successful but also personally and
4 emotionally beneficial for Smalls.⁷³

5
6 **B. Processes: The Process-Type Vectors**

7 Approximately four of the vectors consist of concrete processes for lawyering or dispute
8 resolution, rather than the broad, general, approaches to law and law practice embodied by the
9 lens-type vectors. These are collaborative law, transformative mediation, restorative justice, and
10 problem-solving courts. Each is examined in turn, below.

11 **1. Collaborative Law**

12 Collaborative law (“CL”) is a non-litigative method for resolving divorce and custody
13 actions that allows the clients and their attorneys control over the resolution, without a third-
14 party decision-maker.⁷⁴ It originated among practicing family lawyers who were seeking a
15 better, less emotionally damaging, more economical way for divorcing spouses to resolve their
16 differences. The theory is that the traditional methods of resolving family law disputes often
17 create more animosity between the divorcing spouses and harm family relationships. This is in
18 part because the traditional approach takes people whose behavior and emotional state are at
19 their worst and then engages them in an adversarial process. If the clients’ attitudes indicate that
20 they are appropriate for a collaborative process, collaborative law allows the ex- or divorcing

⁷³ Susan Daicoff, *Resolution Without Litigation: Are Courtrooms Battleground For Losers?*, GP SOLO, Oct./Nov. 2003 at 45-46.

⁷⁴ Tesler, *supra* note 1; see also Pauline H. Tesler & Peter B. Sandmann, Ten Questions For Clients Weighing Litigation v. Collaborative Law, 21 ALTERNATIVES HIGH COST LITIG. 11 (2003); Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: Achieving Effective Resolution in Divorce Without Litigation, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 403 (2002); Pauline H. Tesler, The Basic Elements of Collaborative Law, 21 ALTERNATIVES HIGH COST LITIG. 9 (2003); Pauline H. Tesler, *Collaborative Law: A New Paradigm for Divorce Lawyers*, 5 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & LAW 967 (1999); Pauline H. Tesler, *Collaborative Law: What It Is and Why Family Law Attorneys Need to Know About It*, 13 AM. J. FAM. L. 215 (1999); Pauline H. Tesler, *Collaborative Law: A New Approach to Family Law ADR*, 2 CONFLICT MGMT. 12 (1996); Pauline H. Tesler, *Collaborative Law Neutrals Produce Better Resolutions*, 21 ALTERNATIVES HIGH COST LITIG. 1 (2003); Pauline H. Tesler, *Client Relations: Tips From a Collaborative Practitioner*, 21 ALTERNATIVES HIGH COST LITIG. 13 (2003).

1 spouses and their attorneys to meet in a series of four-way conferences outside of court to resolve
2 the issues in divorce and custody cases. The attorneys and clients work together in a
3 collaborative atmosphere with a foundation of mutual, contractual agreement to the process and a
4 commitment to participate in good faith. CL offers the opportunity for divorcing spouses to
5 dissolve their marriages with less anger, hostility, cost, time, and negative emotion than result
6 from most litigation processes. Through the CL process, they can also begin to develop a
7 workable, cooperative post-divorce relationship that may be useful if they must continue to co-
8 parent children in the future.

9 The main features distinguishing CL from simple mediation or negotiation are the six-
10 way communication (among and between the two spouses and two lawyers), the parties’
11 commitment to the CL process, and the binding agreement of the attorneys to withdraw if the
12 parties go to court. No formal litigation is usually instituted until settlement is reached. There is
13 a strong psychological component to the lawyer-client relationship in that emotions, needs,
14 transference, etc. are openly acknowledged and dealt with in order to maximize the results of the
15 4-way conferences. According to one of the two co-founders, attorney Pauline Tesler, one of the
16 most important features of CL is the fact that the attorneys are contractually forbidden from
17 representing their clients in court should the collaborative process break down. This feature
18 aligns the attorneys’ financial interests with that of their clients’ and greatly incentivizes the
19 attorneys to work towards creative solutions to the outstanding issues. Without this, the
20 attorneys can easily lapse into, “Why worry if my client is misbehaving or the clients aren’t
21 agreeing? I get paid either way.” Attorney Tesler maintains that this feature produces
22 unprecedented creativity and revolutionary energy in both attorneys and clients.⁷⁵ This contrasts

⁷⁵ Pauline H. Tesler, *Collaborative Law: A New Paradigm for Divorce Lawyers*, 5 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & LAW 967 (1999).

1 with the usual process, where the lawyers simply litigate if negotiations break down, thus they
2 collect a fee and thereby “win,” whether or not the clients settle.

3 In a collaborative divorce process, the lawyer first assesses, with the client, the
4 appropriateness of the client for a collaborative process. The client must be able to deal
5 effectively with his or her negative emotions (what Tesler calls the client’s “shadow self”) and
6 must be able to negotiate with honesty and in good faith with his or her spouse. Second, the
7 lawyers create in the four-way conferences what psychologists might recognize as a container, or
8 safe space, within which conflicts and issues between the spouses can be aired and resolved.
9 Establishing ground rules, guidelines, boundaries, and consequences of inappropriate behavior
10 by a participant creates this “container.”⁷⁶

11 One example that founders and attorneys Pauline Tesler and Stewart Webb have used in
12 their trainings is the hypothetical “Henry/Ruth” divorce. In this case, Henry has a Type “A”
13 personality and is very organized and conscientious, but a bit controlling. Ruth has been a
14 homemaker for years but is now living on her own and making her way, financially. Henry and
15 Ruth have been married for 20 years and have one 17-year-old son, Justin, who is currently being
16 treated in-patient for drug and alcohol abuse. Ruth has moved out of the house into her own
17 apartment and begun working part-time. Henry is providing her with spousal support that is
18 inadequate, as it is below the statutory guidelines in amount. Because they have seen so many of
19 their friends go through agonizing, lengthy, costly divorces, they elect to use collaborative law
20 attorneys for theirs. Henry and Ruth, despite their differences, some distrust, and a bit of
21 hostility, both agree that for Justin’s sake, this process needs to be as amicable and cooperative
22 as possible. They agree that they need to resolve their differences and come to agreement on
23 property division, child and spousal support, and custody in an amicable fashion, in order to

1 maximize their son’s chances of success in his treatment program and in the future. However,
2 they are not in agreement on all of the financial issues. Despite their disputes over money, they
3 are ultimately able to resolve the issues, divide their property, develop a plan for Justin, and
4 agree on spousal and child support, in a series of four-way conferences involving Henry, Ruth,
5 and their respective attorneys. The process takes four months and costs about a fourth of what a
6 traditional uncontested divorce would cost in legal fees and costs. At the end of the process, the
7 parties attach their signed agreement to their petition for dissolution, file it, and are promptly
8 divorced. The attorneys and the spouses agree at the outset to honor the specific guidelines of
9 the CL process, which includes a contractual undertaking by the attorneys to withdraw from
10 representation if the process breaks down and the parties end up litigating the issues. Neutral
11 third-party evaluators are agreed to, engaged, and used to explore and help resolve the
12 psychological and financial issues involved in Henry and Ruth’s lives. Full and honest
13 disclosure of assets and financial matters is required. In the four-ways, communication flows in
14 six directions, between all members of the four-party conference. Between the four-ways, the
15 attorneys and their clients talk, the two clients may talk, and the two attorneys talk.

16 CL has spread rapidly to many metropolitan areas in the United States.⁷⁷ Groups of
17 specially trained lawyers in these areas offer CL processes to divorcing spouses, as long as the
18 opposing side’s attorney is also trained in the CL process. In 1997, Pauline Tesler conducted a
19 training session at the annual meeting of the American Bar Association and, in 2001, the
20 American Bar Association published her practice-oriented book, *Collaborative Law*.⁷⁸ CL may
21 eventually be expanded into other areas of law, such as employment law disputes.

⁷⁶ *Id.*

⁷⁷ See, e.g., <http://www.collaborativefamilylawfl.com/index.html> and <http://www.collaborativelawsf.com/> (regional CL websites for South Florida and San Francisco).

⁷⁸ Tesler, *supra* note 53.

1 **2. Transformative Mediation**

2 Transformative mediation (“TM”) is a form of mediation that emerged in the 1990s. Its
3 founder, law professor R. Baruch Bush, co-authored a 1994 book⁷⁹ with communications
4 professor Joseph Folger, in which they explain that transformative mediation differs substantially
5 from traditional mediation (both the facilitative and evaluative forms) in both its goals and
6 process. Unlike traditional mediation, which focuses on dispute resolution, transformative
7 mediation focuses less on the outcome of the mediation or the solution to which the parties
8 agree, and more on how the process of mediation might change the individuals involved.
9 Specifically, transformative mediation seeks to foster a sense of “empowerment” and the
10 experience of “recognition” in each of the parties. Empowerment, as defined by Bush and
11 Folger, means the parties grew in maturity by developing and owning their own solution. It does
12 not refer to the experience of having a third party enforce one’s rights; instead, it refers to an
13 internal condition in which the person feels more capable of solving his or her problems.⁸⁰

14 Recognition, as defined by Bush and Folger, means that it resembles a feeling of empathy
15 for another person, in which one person is able to “stand in the shoes” of the other and see the
16 matter from another’s perspective.⁸¹ It often results in feelings of compassion for the other and
17 in its finest form, culminates in forgiveness. Once a party can experience recognition, the next
18 goal is for that party to communicate those insights or feelings to the other party. This is called
19 “giving recognition.”⁸² Bush and Folger explain that the ability to see a matter from the other
20 person’s standpoint is a mark of personal growth, just as rigid egocentrism is a measure of

⁷⁹ ROBERT BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH FOLGER, *THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION* (1994).

⁸⁰ *Id.* at 89-94.

⁸¹ *Id.*

⁸² *Id.* at 96.

1 emotional immaturity.⁸³ Transformative mediation thus explicitly seeks to foster personal and
2 moral growth in the parties as its goal, rather than the resolution of the dispute, which is
3 secondary in importance to growth.⁸⁴

4 TM views conflict as a destabilizing “crisis in human interaction”⁸⁵ rather than a
5 violation of rights or conflict of individual interests. Its three-person mediations seek to restore
6 balance between self and other, transform conflict into a positive, constructive process, and
7 encourage parties to do two things: (1) regain their sense of strength and self-confidence (the
8 “empowerment” shift); and (2) expand their responsiveness to each other (the “recognition”
9 shift). By focusing on these goals, the parties are moved towards increased personal
10 development and enhanced personal and interpersonal skills.⁸⁶

11 Bush and Folger use the example of the “Sensitive Bully” to illustrate TM.⁸⁷ In this case,
12 Charles, a young man, is charged with assault and battery of an adolescent, Jerome. Jerome’s
13 father, Regis, an imposing, stern African-American man, who enters mediation visibly angry,
14 accompanies Jerome to the mediation. Charles, in contrast, appears undefensive, quiet, and even
15 cowed. Charles is contrite and ashamed of what he has done. However, Regis begins with a very
16 aggressive and unforgiving attitude towards what Charles has done to his son. The mediator asks
17 Regis and Charles to take turns describing what happened. Charles is a young, slight, African
18 American man who walks with a limp. Charles routinely cut through Jerome’s neighborhood on
19 his way from the bus stop to see his girlfriend, and Jerome and his friends routinely “razzed”
20 Charles as he passed. The two had had verbal altercations before the incident. On this occasion,

⁸³ *Id.* at 92.

⁸⁴ *Id.* at 81-84, 87.

⁸⁵ Robert A. Baruch Bush & Sally Ganong Pope, *Changing the Quality of Conflict Interaction: The Principles and Practice of Transformative Mediation*, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 67, 72 (2002).

⁸⁶ *Id.* at 82-83.

⁸⁷ Bush & Folger, *supra* note 52, at 5-11.

1 Jerome was with a group of his friends when the dispute arose. On this day, Jerome took it a bit
2 far with his verbal insults and Charles physically assaulted Jerome. Charles finally snapped and
3 retaliated, albeit inappropriately. Through this mediation, Regis realizes that his son, Jerome,
4 and his friends had been making fun of Charles' physical disability and that, finally, Charles
5 couldn't take it anymore. Once Regis realizes this, he scolds his son for making fun of Charles.
6 He gives "recognition" by telling Charles he understands "how cruel kids can be." Charles
7 explains that all he wants to do is see his girlfriend and he is happy to walk a different route
8 through the neighborhood. By subtly focusing on Charles' physical condition, the content of the
9 verbal interactions between Charles and Jerome pre-assault, and how each party's comments in
10 the mediation had affected the other, the mediator was able to elicit what TM calls "recognition,"
11 a sort of empathy or standing in the other's shoes, from both Charles and Regis. Each was able
12 to appreciate the other's feelings and motivations. Then, by having the parties jointly develop
13 the solution to the problem, the mediator facilitated what TM calls "empowerment." The parties
14 worked together to develop a way that Charles can walk through Jerome's neighborhood without
15 encountering Jerome and his friends. The mediator does not offer or impose a solution for the
16 future, but encourages the parties to work it out themselves.

17 TM has been a bit controversial in its explicit goals and methods. It is part of the CL
18 movement because it seeks to improve the relational, moral, and personal functioning of the
19 parties involved, in the resolution of legal disputes. It focuses explicitly on processes that can
20 foster growth in the parties' ability to communicate, understand each other, solve their own
21 problems, resolve conflicts, and interact with other people.

22 **3. Restorative Justice**

1 Restorative justice (“RJ”) is a widespread movement in the criminal justice area that has
2 been steadily growing since the mid-1980s. RJ seeks to restore the relationship between the
3 criminal offender and his or her community and seeks to restore harmony. It does this through
4 dialogue, negotiation, problem solving for the future, and an emphasis on the offender’s
5 acceptance of accountability to his or her victim and to the community. RJ is seen in almost
6 every jurisdiction in the United States, in many forms, such as: teen court, victim-offender
7 mediation, reparative probation programs, and community parole boards. RJ is particularly
8 popular for use in the U. S. with juvenile offenders, due to its reliance on the pressure brought
9 to bear on the offender by peers, family, and community members and its resultant potential for
10 rehabilitating juvenile offenders. However, it is even more widely used in Australia, Canada,
11 and the United Kingdom, extending even to use in sentencing adult offenders. Outside the
12 American criminal justice system, RJ forms include collaborative forms of adjudication and
13 sentencing, such as circle sentencing and family group conferences, that actually substitute for
14 prosecution, trial, and sentencing.

15 In RJ, the community, victim, and offender, in a collaborative process, participate in
16 some form in criminal adjudications or criminal sentencing. It may be as simple as post-
17 sentencing victim-offender mediation or as complicated as sentencing that is done in a
18 community, “circle” conference with all parties present. It usually relies on some sort of
19 conference, which can be as small as a three-person mediation between the victim and the
20 offender, or as large as a community-wide circle sentencing process that utilizes community or
21 peer pressure brought to bear on the offender. This interpersonal or public pressure is designed
22 to produce ‘therapeutic shame,’ which facilitates responsibility-taking, accountability, and
23 personal growth and development in the offender. It emphasizes restitution and relationships

1 between the offender, victim, and community instead of a top-down, hierarchical system
2 focused on imposing punishment. The website for The Center for Restorative Justice &
3 Peacemaking at the University of Minnesota School of Social Work explains that:

4 [t]hrough restorative justice, victims, communities, and offenders are placed in
5 active roles to work together to. . . Empower victims in their search of closure;
6 Impress upon offenders the real human impact of their behavior; Promote
7 restitution to victims and communities. Dialogue and negotiation are central to
8 restorative justice, and problem solving for the future is seen as more important
9 than simply establishing blame for past behavior. Balance is sought between
10 the legitimate needs of the victim, the community, and the offender that
11 enhances community protection, competency development in the offender, and
12 direct accountability of the offender to the victim and victimized community.”⁸⁸

13
14 In the United States in particular, RJ principles have been added to traditional criminal
15 justice processes as an enhancement, rather than as a substitute for existing criminal law
16 procedures. This allows for full preservation of the constitutional rights of the accused and
17 procedural due process, which are particularly important in U.S. criminal law. For example, in
18 the domestic violence area, restorative justice principles might dictate that domestic violence
19 victims should have more input into the proceedings, that the state should attempt to restore
20 victims to their former state through compensation and economic and social support, that victims
21 need varied support to become independent, that offenders should be held accountable, required
22 to make amends, required to participate in rehabilitation programs and reintegrated into the
23 community, and that the community should be more involved and responsible for assisting the
24 victim, the offender, and their family through the process of solving the problem.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ The website is <http://ssw.che.umn.edu/rjp/> (visited April 11, 2005).

⁸⁹ Randall B. Fritzler & Leonore M.J. Simon, *Creating a Domestic Violence Court: Combat in the Trenches*, 37 Ct. REV. 28, 35-36 (Spring 2000) (discussing the creation of specialized domestic violence courts employing a therapeutic or restorative approach).

1 Victim-offender mediation is a specific, direct RJ “process.” Writer Barbara Stahura
2 relates this story:⁹⁰

3 One evening in July, 1998, Terri Carlson and her husband
4 were walking home along the side of the road from the annual
5 community festival in Byron, Minnesota, when a four-wheel-drive
6 pickup truck going about 55 swerved, hitting and killing Terri’s
7 husband and injuring Terri. The 25-year-old driver, Eric, was a
8 deputy county sheriff, whose blood alcohol level was 50% over the
9 minimum for drunk driving. Yet Terri felt badly for him. She
10 herself had occasionally driven drunk. She said, “He was only 25.
11 ... just a baby. He had lost everything he’d committed to in his
12 profession.” When he received a 44-month sentence, despite her
13 request to give him 10 years’ probation and community outreach,
14 she felt “further violated.” She packed up her three children and
15 moved to Oregon, but upon finding out about restorative justice,
16 she and Eric began a process designed to reconcile and resolve
17 what had happened. It took a year of preparation and individual
18 meetings with the mediator before they were ready to meet
19 together with the mediator. In that meeting, “they had a warm and
20 honest talk, even laced with laughter, and reached an agreement.”
21 Terri promised to help Eric reintegrate himself back into the Byron
22 community. They agreed to speak jointly to schools, community
23 groups, and the city council about how to prevent what happened.
24 And they agreed that Eric should speak to Terri’s three children
25 about the death of their father.⁹¹

26
27 This is a vibrant and stirring example of restorative justice at work. In the United States,
28 as this story illustrates, restorative justice is most often a post-sentencing process designed to
29 bring about reconciliation between the victim, offender, and community, resolution for all, and
30 reintegration of the offender into the community. With teenage offenders, it is often used for
31 sentencing of minor crimes. However, it is equally useful to bring healing to victims of serious
32 crimes, their offenders, and the communities in which they live. In other legal systems, such as
33 in Native American and aboriginal settings, restorative justice is used even for sentencing of
34 adult crimes. These “circle sentencing conferences” are used to discuss the event, air feelings,

⁹⁰ Barbara Stahura, *Trail ‘Em, Nail ‘Em, and Jail ‘Em: Restorative Justice*, SPIRITUALITY & HEALTH, Spring, 2001 at 43.

1 and sentence the offender via a collaborative, community-wide process including the offender,
2 victim, their friends and families, and their surrounding communities. RJ allows the victim to
3 ask questions, express feelings, and reach resolution about the event. It also allows the offender
4 to experience “therapeutic shame,”⁹² accept appropriate personal responsibility for his or her
5 actions, and perhaps even apologize, thus possibly leading to changed behavior.

6 **4. Problem Solving Courts**

7 A parallel shift has occurred in the court system, mainly due to judges’ interest in
8 therapeutic jurisprudence. A number of specialized, “problem solving” courts (“PSCs”) have
9 been established, based on TJ principles.⁹³ Their approach to judging is long-term, relational,
10 interdisciplinary, and focused on healing. Examples of these courts are drug treatment courts,
11 mental health courts, domestic violence courts, and unified family courts, which focus on
12 treating and resolving the interpersonal and psychological issues underlying the legal problems
13 rather than on punishing defendants or assigning fault. The following chart compares traditional
14 adjudication with the general approach taken by these problem solving courts:

15 **A COMPARISON OF TRANSFORMED AND TRADITIONAL COURT PROCESSES⁹⁴**

16 Traditional Process	Transformed Process
17 Dispute resolution	Problem-solving dispute avoidance
18 Legal outcome	Therapeutic outcome
19 Adversarial process	Collaborative process

⁹¹ *Id.*

⁹² Scheff, *supra* note 10.

⁹³ Bruce J. Winick, *Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts*, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1055 (2003).

⁹⁴ Roger K. Warren, *Reengineering the Court Process*, Madison, WI, Presentation to Great Lakes Court Summit, September 24-25, 1998.

1	Claim- or case-oriented	People-oriented
2	Rights-based	Interest- or needs-based
3	Emphasis placed on adjudication	Emphasis placed on post-adjudication and alternative
4		dispute resolution
5	Interpretation and application of law	Interpretation and application of social science
6	Judge as arbiter	Judge as coach
7	Backward looking	Forward looking
8	Precedent-based	Planning-based
9	Few participants and stakeholders	Wide range of participants and stakeholders
10	Individualistic	Interdependent
11	Legalistic	Common-sensical
12	Formal	Informal
13	Efficient	Effective

14 Drug treatment courts have rapidly proliferated throughout the United States since the
15 first one was implemented in Miami, Florida, in 1989. Their success rates have drawn attention
16 and propelled their implementation in other jurisdictions across the country.⁹⁵ Statistics show

⁹⁵ Alex Segura, Jr., “Alumni’s return shows success of drug court,” South Florida Sun-Sentinel, Thursday, August 9, 2001 at 10B (noting that the Fort Lauderdale, Florida court was the third in the nation, established in 1991, after those in Miami and Las Vegas). In 2001, it was estimated that there were 660 drug courts “in 48 states, as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, a number of Native American Tribal Courts, and one federal district court, according to the Drug Courts Program Office of the U.S. Department of Justice,” according to Jan Pudlow, “Palm Beach County opens its drug court,” The Florida Bar News, April 15, 2001 at 14 (noting also that Miami (Dade County)’s drug court opened in 1989). Pudlow also reported a 70% success rate. *Id.*

1 that up to 80% of incarcerated individuals may be suffering from substance abuse.⁹⁶ Where
2 substance abuse is involved, courts may offer an offender a choice of traditional criminal
3 prosecution or participation in a drug treatment court (“DTC”). The goals of drug treatment
4 court are to reduce repeated criminal behavior, avoid the costs of incarceration, and rehabilitate
5 the offender, thereby ultimately benefiting the community. DTCs can be implemented either
6 pre-plea or post-plea. An offender must voluntarily enter into a formal contract that explains the
7 conditions of DTC participation, which typically include frequent court appearances,
8 participation in a drug rehabilitation program, close supervision, and drug screens. If the
9 offender is a juvenile, then the offender’s parents must sign the contract as well.

10 Treatment is monitored by regular appearances before a DTC judge. Mandatory court
11 appearances are weekly, then fortnightly, and finally monthly. The treatment “team” usually
12 consists of the judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, probation officer, drug treatment court
13 coordinator, treatment provider, and community-policing officer. Typical terms of a contract
14 include regular attendance at recovery fellowship meetings, interactions with a mentor already in
15 the recovery program, participation in the recovery program with the mentor, compliance with
16 routine check-ins with the DTC coordinator or case manager, random urine tests, and perfect
17 attendance at court appearances. If an offender fails to comply with the terms of the contract, the
18 offender faces a number of graduated, intermediate sanctions. Repeated failures can eventually
19 lead to expulsion from the DTC and a return to traditional court for prosecution, trial, or
20 sentencing (depending on whether the diversion to DTC occurred pre- or post-plea). Program
21 completion depends on individual progress, usually between 14 and 24 months, after which a

⁹⁶ Judge William G. Schma, *Alternatives for the Common Good*, 85 A.B.A. J. 103, 103 (June 1999) (according to statistics from the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, alcohol and drugs

1 joyous “graduation ceremony” is held and the originating charges are dismissed. Offenders
2 sometimes ask that the arresting officer be present at graduation, out of gratitude for the officer’s
3 intervention in their lives.⁹⁷

4 The DTC approach to adjudication modifies judicial rules, procedures, and communication
5 postures. DTC team members attempt to collaborate with their clients to develop a flexible and
6 realistic treatment strategy and a changed lifestyle for the client. The offender is recast into the
7 role of a client, a term of respect and equanimity. The judge is required to have the temperament
8 and technique to serve as a team player or coach, mediating differences, coordinating styles, and
9 encouraging the client to recover. The judge no longer needs to referee the attorneys who
10 collaborate for the client’s benefit and accountability. The judge’s role shifts from a neutral
11 arbiter to that of the central figure in the team, a “cheerleader,” and a “stern parent.”⁹⁸ The
12 attorneys cease gamesmanship and behave like partners for a common client, tailoring remarks
13 and input to support the client’s adherence to a treatment plan. Treatment professionals report on
14 the client’s recovery progress, not the need for perfection. Emphasis is placed on positive
15 behavior change by confirming client strengths. Sanctions for non-compliance are imposed to
16 obtain compliance for treatment and recovery, not for punishment reasons. When intermediate
17 sanctions are necessary, the entire team evaluates what needs immediate attention, discusses the
18 best way to accomplish the goals, and then comes to a collaborative resolution. In the case of

are implicated in 80 percent of incarcerations). On one criminal docket in Judge Schma’s court, 24 out of 27 felony defendants had a history of addiction to alcohol or drugs, or mental illness or both.

97 David S. Hobler, *Drug Treatment Court: The Making of Judicial Capital – Collaborative, Therapeutic, and Preventive Practices* (unpublished manuscript, 2001); *see also* National Drug Court Institute, *Ethical Considerations for Judges and Attorneys in Drug Court* (May, 2001), published with the cooperation of the Drug Courts Program Office of the United States Department of Justice (setting forth an interpretation of the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, for those attorneys and judges practicing in drug court).

1 juvenile offenders, parents, school representatives, and concerned significant adults attend court
2 and contribute to the solution as team members. The future of drug treatment courts appears
3 sound; their reported success rates are impressive⁹⁹ and their effect on judges' satisfaction has
4 been remarkable.¹⁰⁰

5 Other problem solving courts, such as mental health courts,¹⁰¹ domestic violence courts,
6 and unified family courts,¹⁰² have processes similar to the drug treatment court procedures.
7 Domestic violence courts (“DVC”) have had mixed success.¹⁰³ DVCs place the offender into a
8 treatment program much like a DTC, but also combine the criminal domestic violence action
9 with a civil protective order for the victim, and can address other legal needs of the family, such
10 as those involving family law, custody, visitation, and child support. It consolidates the court
11 interaction for the victim and family, providing one-stop shopping rather than several trips to
12 more than one court and related offices. Overall, there appear to be mixed results. Even though
13 the focus is on the victim, the process has been described as being time-consuming and
14 inefficient and often not well-received by judges, prosecutors, and the existing system.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁸Peggy Fulton Hora, William G. Schma, & John T. Rosenthal, *Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America*, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 477-83 (1999).

⁹⁹ Jan Pudlow, “Palm Beach County opens its drug court,” *The Florida Bar News*, April 15, 2001 at 14, reporting that, of the 100,000 drug dependent criminal offenders who have entered drug court, 70% were either still enrolled or had graduated, which was, according to Pudlow, “more than double the rate of traditional treatment programs retention rates,” citing statistics from the Drug Courts Program Office of the U.S. Department of Justice. *Id.*

¹⁰⁰ Deborah J. Chase & Peggy Fulton Hora, *The Implications of Therapeutic Jurisprudence for Judicial Satisfaction*, 37 CT. REV. 12 (2000) (reporting the results of an empirical study on the positive effects on judges of judging in problem solving courts).

¹⁰¹Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, *Solutions for the Mentally Ill in the Criminal Justice System: A Symposium Introduction (National Symposium on Mental Illness and the Criminal Justice System)*, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 901 (2004). This entire symposium issue is devoted to articles on mental health courts.

¹⁰² Michael A. Town, *The Unified Family Court: Preventive, Therapeutic, and Restorative Justice for America's Families*, NCJFCJ (Winter, 2002), at 14-17.

¹⁰³ Fritzler and Simon, *supra* note 61.

¹⁰⁴ Betsy Tsai, *The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements On An Effective Innovation*, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285 (2000).

1 Judge William Schma, of Michigan’s Ninth Judicial Circuit, provides two examples of the
2 effectiveness of drug treatment courts and mental health courts in criminal cases involving drug
3 addiction and mental illness, respectively:

4 Mark, a drug addict, was arrested for selling crack cocaine. He was placed on lifetime
5 probation but kept using. Besides facing 20 years in prison (at a cost of \$20,000 to
6 \$25,000 per year), he was dying from kidney failure but could not stay clean long enough
7 to undergo a transplant procedure. Despite these obstacles, Mark was enrolled in a drug
8 court program. A team I supervised directed his recovery through regular court visits,
9 treatment and case management. Now, for the first time in a life of substance abuse,
10 Mark is clean and crime-free. And he is ready for his transplant.

11

12 When Melvin came to court he was out of control. A paranoid schizophrenic on lifetime
13 probation for delivery of cocaine, he had stopped taking his medication and had been
14 arrested. As deputies led him out of the courtroom, he shouted to me, “You’re a white-
15 scum son of a bitch. You haven’t heard the last of this.” The exasperated probation
16 agent was prepared to recommend prison. But when Melvin’s attorney, family and
17 probation agent agreed to cooperate, I delayed disposition of the violation. Melvin was
18 released to the custody and supervision of family and the probation department. He
19 resumed treatment, counseling and his medication, and he was placed on electronic
20 monitoring. Today Melvin is stabilized and has a standing, informal visit with me every
21 other Tuesday. The last time he brought along his toddler son and spoke enthusiastically
22 of his hopes for the boy’s future. When Melvin leaves, we shake hands.¹⁰⁵

23 Among practicing attorneys, problem solving courts, restorative justice, and
24 collaborative law have perhaps been the most visible vectors to date. The next section explores
25 why comprehensive approaches are rapidly growing at this particular time. It examines
26 developments within the legal profession, society in general, and the world that may be
27 precursors of the comprehensive law movement.

¹⁰⁵ Schma, *supra* note 67.

1 **IV. JURISPRUDENTIAL UNDERPINNINGS,**
2 **PHILOSOPHICAL PRECURSORS AND PROPELLERS,**
3 **AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

4 Several philosophical shifts have occurred in recent decades, perhaps paving the way for
5 the emergence of comprehensive law approaches within the legal profession. Some of these are
6 global and societal in nature and not limited to law. Others exist entirely within the legal
7 profession. This Section will explore what led up to the comprehensive law movement and why
8 it developed now.

9 **A. Philosophical Shifts in Society**

10 First, the globalization of the world, hastened by technological advances and worldwide
11 environmental concerns, has made the world smaller. Other cultures and countries have become
12 more accessible and “real.” Environmental problems have made us more dependent upon other
13 countries and have forced us to collaborate with them in order to solve imminent global
14 environmental concerns that threaten our way of life. For example, once we realized that toxic
15 dumping in the United States creates a hole in the ozone layer over another country that in turn
16 affects our supply of a particular good produced elsewhere, we began to realize that we were not
17 and could not remain isolated from the rest of the world. In turn, we have gained an awareness
18 that “we are all in this together” and that cooperation is necessary in order for us to thrive and
19 prosper in the future. Also, in the last decade of the 1990s, partly as a result of the end of the
20 Cold War, there may have been a decline in the prominence of a polarized, adversarial, “us and
21 them” mentality in which we viewed other people, other countries, and other cultures as enemies
22 to be feared and avoided.¹⁰⁶ We found ourselves collaborating with countries and people we
23 formerly viewed as hostile and intractable. These developments, then, may have contributed to a

1 growing societal awareness of our “connectedness” to, and an openmindedness towards, all
2 people, all countries, and all cultures in the world.

3 Second, some assert that our society has witnessed the decline of a philosophy focused on
4 individual rights, logic, and reason and the concomitant rise of a counterbalancing ethos, focused
5 on compassion, care, relationships, and connectedness.¹⁰⁷ Perhaps our societal values have
6 begun to shift and change as a result of growing diversity in our power structure, governments,
7 corporations, schools, and other institutions. The ethics and values of previously disempowered
8 individuals may have begun to seep into our collective consciousness.¹⁰⁸ The increasing
9 influence of a “feminine ethic” or “ethic of care” may have led to a greater emphasis on
10 interpersonal relationships, emotional wellbeing, and interpersonal harmony.¹⁰⁹

11 For example, in 1988, Anne Wilson Schaeff and Diane Fassel argued that our entire
12 society is undergoing a paradigm shift, from the predominance of what they call the “White Male
13 System/Reactive Female System,” which values logic, rationality, objectivity, superiority,
14 individuality, detachment, and correctness, to the rise of an alternative system, the “Emerging
15 Female System.”¹¹⁰ They described this paradigm shift as a move from a closed, static, objective
16 worldview to one valuing wholeness, reconciliation, vulnerability, holism, health, cooperation,
17 ecology, spirituality, and transformation. They describe it as a shift from positivism, empiricism,

¹⁰⁶ This particular shift, however, appears to have reversed as a result of the events of September 11, 2001.

¹⁰⁷ ANNE WILSON SCHAEFF, WHEN SOCIETY BECOMES AN ADDICT 5-18 (1987) (controversially describing the rights-based philosophy as the “White Male System,” noting that it is the same as the Addictive System, using the addictions model of human behavior); ANNE WILSON SCHAEFF & DIANE FASSEL, THE ADDICTIVE ORGANIZATION 33-46 (1988) (tracking this paradigm shift through the work of (among many others) Thomas Kuhn in 1970, Marilyn Ferguson in 1980, Morris Berman in 1984, and Carol Gilligan in 1979).

¹⁰⁸ See AMY HILSMAN KASTLEY ET AL., CONTRACTING LAW (Carolina Academic Press 2000).

¹⁰⁹ Carrie Menkel-Meadow, *Review Essay, What’s Gender Got to Do With It?: The Politics and Morality of an Ethic of Care*, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 265 (1996).

¹¹⁰ Schaeff and Fassel, *supra* note 91.

1 and the certainty of right answers to the uncertainty of the unknown.¹¹¹ They track this paradigm
2 shift from science to business, education, religion, and medicine and note the contribution of
3 feminist thought and alternative perspectives to the shift.¹¹²

4 **B. Post-Enlightenment Values**

5 Law professor Thomas Barton brilliantly puts this philosophical shift in historical
6 perspective when he identifies that our society is moving into a “Post-Enlightenment” phase,
7 complete with a new set of values. He explains that the current American legal system has
8 idealized Enlightenment values such as personal freedom, independence, autonomy, will, and
9 individual liberty for years, but these values are now giving way to a Post-Enlightenment period,
10 in which “the concepts of separation -- both intellectual and social – are eroding in favor of the
11 long-subordinated notions of [human] connection.”¹¹³ Professor Barton points to an “emerging
12 culture of connectedness” as evidence of the rise of Post-Enlightenment values such as
13 belongingness, loyalty, community, cultural identity, and people’s relationships to each other and
14 to their communities. For example, Professor Barton notes a growing concern in the law for
15 issues of inequality of power in human relationships (e.g., domestic violence law) and stronger
16 recognition and protection of one’s cultural identity or membership in a particular ethnic group
17 (e.g., Native American law, recognition of specific cultural beliefs as exonerating or mitigating

¹¹¹ ANNE WILSON SCHAEF, *WHEN SOCIETY BECOMES AN ADDICT* 8-9 (1987) (quoting Morris Berman’s insight that this shift is towards “participatory consciousness”).

¹¹² *Id.*

¹¹³ Thomas D. Barton, *Troublesome Connections: The Law and Post-Enlightenment Culture*, 47 *EMORY L. J.* 163, 163-64 (1998). Barton explains that Enlightenment values are associated with the Enlightenment period, which has predominated for the past 300 or so years, and with 18th century writers such as Voltaire, Kant, Montesquieu, and Bentham. Interestingly, the period before the Enlightenment is typically thought of as the Renaissance, which is associated with humanism and humanistic values (the pendulum swings, yet again!). And, interestingly, a group of lawyers associated with one of the vectors of the comprehensive law movement, holistic justice, has formed a lawyer group, website, and support mechanism named Renaissance Lawyer (<http://www.renaissancelawyer.com>) (visited April 14, 2005).

1 factors, and legal respect for cultural differences). These developments evidence the growth of
2 Post-Enlightenment values.

3 Professor Barton goes on to argue that law based on Enlightenment values functions well
4 when a decision as to right or wrong, black or white, must be made. However, it is ineffective in
5 other situations, because it does not easily accommodate or honor the fact that the parties may
6 have an ongoing relationship with each other or with their communities. Professor Barton says:

7 ...in a given case the law may oscillate between either separationist functions or
8 connectedness values. This is because the desired outcomes often involve both
9 protection and the building of a stronger relationship. In many instances of domestic
10 violence, for example, the victim certainly wants and needs protection. The victim,
11 however, may not want or may not be able to afford for the underlying relationship to be
12 terminated. Instead, the victim desires the underlying relationship to be made more
13 healthy and respectful. Yet this is precisely the sort of solution for which the
14 Enlightenment legal process is poorly equipped.... Cases involving communities which
15 are hostile to racial, ethnic, or sexual orientation minorities, cases involving unruly
16 children, and even cases involving noisy neighbors may present the same challenges--to
17 build stronger relationships among the parties while simultaneously stopping whatever
18 immediately threatening behaviors escalated the problem to the legal domain. The
19 fundamental need is for an integrative solution that works with, rather than ignores, the
20 given social context.¹¹⁴
21

22 Perhaps in response to the shortcomings of Enlightenment law, various alternative ways
23 of handling legal problems have developed, such as creative problem solving, transformative
24 mediation, victim-offender mediation in criminal law, community-based sentencing of criminals,
25 teen court, and collaborative approaches to divorce and child custody matters. All of these
26 approaches, which are part of the comprehensive law movement, explicitly honor people's
27 relationships with each other instead of focusing solely on individual rights. Because they seek
28 to maintain and preserve those connected relationships instead of sacrificing or destroying them
29 in the name of individuality and separateness, they are consistent with Professor Barton's Post-
30 Enlightenment values.

1 **C. Jurisprudential Propellers**

2 For years, legal realism was the predominant jurisprudential school of thought in the
3 United States. The pessimism of legal realism and its critical legal studies offspring may have
4 created a longing for solutions and hope. The certainty of realism’s predecessors, natural law
5 and legal positivism, probably fostered a reassuring sense of order, predictability, and rationality
6 in the law, but this predictability disintegrated in the last 40 or 50 years. Cynicism and
7 discouragement may have grown, when legal realism emerged in the 1930s to debunk the neat
8 universe of legal positivism and point out that law, as made by legislators and judges, was much
9 more capricious and biased than positivism made it appear. Realism may have helped us lose
10 faith in the justice meted out by the legal system.¹¹⁵

11 After realism, jurisprudential thought Balkanized¹¹⁶ into various movements that
12 understand law from the lens of a particular viewpoint, including critical legal studies, feminist
13 theory, and the “law and” movements.¹¹⁷ Most of these newer schools of thought expand upon
14 the basic concept of legal realism by viewing law as a product of deep and pervasive societal
15 biases.

16 All of these schools of thought, however, leave us with a terrific explication of a problem
17 but without a solution. If law is indeed arbitrary and capricious, what then? What approach does

¹¹⁴ *Id.* at 214-15.

¹¹⁵ David M. Hunsaker, *Law, Humanism and Communication: Suggestions for Limited Curricular Reform*, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 417, 419 (1979-80) (describing the relationship between legal realism, legal positivism, and Langdell’s case method approach to legal education). Originally, natural law predominated, with its idea that laws were simply reflections of preexisting, divine laws that existed independent of man. Then, legal positivism emerged, with its idea that laws were simply black and white rules that conformed to rules of logic and analysis; if one could find the proper rule or exception, and precedent, one could generate the proper rule of law to fit any particular legal problem. Cases were viewed as “the embodiment of legal principles.” *Id.* In contrast, realism suggested that judges and juries decided legal cases based on their moods, their biases, their predilections, and a million other unspoken criteria. Cases were viewed as “in fact the rationalizations for values choices made by judges.”

¹¹⁶ I am indebted to Professor Ellen Waldman of Thomas Jefferson School of Law for this outline of the development of the newer jurisprudential schools of thought and for the term, “Balkanized.”

¹¹⁷ See e.g., law and economics, law and literature, law and psychology, law and sociology, law and socioeconomics.

1 one then take to practicing law, judging cases, or making law? Further, once we accept that law
2 and our legal system are not necessarily rational or logical, the question becomes “why use it at
3 all?” In fact, some sectors of American society have abandoned formal legal courts, either
4 resorting to self-help methods, private judges, mediation, or private courts to settle their legal
5 problems. Therapeutic jurisprudence in particular and the comprehensive law movement in
6 general may have developed in response to the lack of hope and direction we are left with, once
7 we accept the major premise of legal realism and these newer schools of thought. The idea of
8 recognizing law’s potential to have a positive impact on people’s lives and of creating alternative
9 means of resolving legal problems may provide hope during a time when the reliability, utility,
10 or rationality of law and legal procedures are in question.

11 Viewing law as a healing profession is a natural outgrowth of feminist jurisprudence.
12 Focusing on the healing, restorative, curative functions of law is entirely consistent with
13 feminine and feminist values,¹¹⁸ which have mainstreamed into current legal thought through
14 feminist jurisprudence. The comprehensive law movement is also a natural product of the law
15 and psychology movement, which looks at law, lawyering, and legal processes from a
16 psychological perspective. Once one begins to examine the psychological aspects of law, or
17 even the psychological aspects of legal problems or clients, the therapeutic potential of law and
18 legal processes becomes apparent. It is natural, then, to propose ways to maximize this potential
19 and minimize any detrimental psychological effects. This is precisely what one of the most
20 vibrant vectors of the movement, therapeutic jurisprudence, seeks to do.

¹¹⁸ For example, a more “feminine” approach to establishing criminal culpability for someone who is mentally disordered is taken by Lady Wooton, as quoted in RALPH REISNER ET AL., *LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM* 589-91 (3d ed. 1999). There, she argues for bifurcating guilt and sentencing and then explains that the distinction between hospitalization and incarceration becomes unnecessary. Her idea is that the offender simply serves a custodial sentence, with the line between prisons and mental health treatment being blurred. Barbara Wooton, *Book Review of A. Goldstein, The Insanity Defense*, 77 *YALE L.J.* 1019, 1028-32 (1968), *quoted by* Reisner et al., *supra*, at 589-91.

1 Since at least 1980, commentators within the legal profession have bemoaned the state of
2 the profession. Commentary on our lack of professionalism, rampant immorality, malfeasance,
3 malpractice, client neglect, overly aggressive natures, greed, and unethical behavior, as well as
4 the lack of attorney discipline and oversight, has been prolific.¹¹⁹ Individuals inside and outside
5 the legal profession alike have been dissatisfied with the law, the American legal system, and
6 lawyers. The situation has been described as a professionalism crisis. Society’s opinion of
7 lawyers is depressingly low. The public sees lawyers as makers of conflict and dissension rather
8 than as positive forces in people’s lives or work. Alcoholism, depression, and other
9 psychological problems exist in the legal profession at least twice as frequently as they appear in
10 the general population. These problems comprise a “tripartite crisis” in the legal profession,
11 consisting of deprofessionalism, low public opinion of lawyers, and lawyer distress and
12 dissatisfaction.¹²⁰

13 In response to this tripartite crisis, many well-seasoned practicing lawyers have sought
14 alternative forms of law practice, often saying something like, “If I can’t find another way to
15 practice law, one that I find satisfying and fulfilling, then I am quitting law entirely.” The search
16 for alternatives has led many practicing lawyers to develop the forms of practice that comprise
17 the comprehensive law movement. Many of the vectors emerged because of lawyers’, clients’,
18 and society’s deep dissatisfaction with existing models for handling legal matters.

19 Academic commentators have responded to this tripartite crisis by proposing solutions
20 such as more pro bono and public service, returning to the roots of our profession as counselors
21 and advisors, viewing law as a “calling” rather than as a business, and taking different

¹¹⁹ Susan Daicoff, *Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney attributes Beaming on Professionalism*, 46 AM. U.L.REV. 1337 (1997) [hereinafter Daicoff, *Review*].

1 approaches to lawyering, such as lawyering with an “ethic of care”¹²¹ and “moral lawyering.”¹²²
2 Despite the lack of an explicit link between these proposals and the emergence of the vectors of
3 the comprehensive law movement, it is clear that the approaches embodied in the comprehensive
4 law movement are consistent with the call of these commentators for value-laden approaches.¹²³

5 **D. Parallel Developments in Psychology**

6 In addition, the comprehensive law movement may reflect a parallel progression within
7 social science and science in general, from a more analytical, scientific approach to a more
8 humanistic, relativistic, and individualized approach. In social science, for example, psychology
9 has undergone several phases, beginning with the analytic approach of Sigmund Freud and Carl
10 Jung and psychodynamic theory. It then progressed from this past-oriented and sometimes
11 elusive approach to a more scientific, logical, tangible, almost mechanical approach, in B. F.
12 Skinner’s behaviorism. Then, in response perhaps to the black-and-whiteness of behaviorism,
13 Carl Rogers’ humanistic psychology emerged, with its focus on optimizing human potential, on
14 client-centered, individualized treatment, and on the interpersonal relationships involved in
15 therapy.

16 Similarly, law was first seen as a somewhat undisciplined liberal “art,” until Christopher
17 Langdell of Harvard proposed a more “scientific” approach to law through the study of cases.

18 Since then, law has been viewed as something that can be studied via a rational, logical

¹²⁰ Susan Daicoff, *Asking Leopards To Change Their Spots: Can Lawyers Change? A Critique of Solutions to Professionalism by Reference to Empirically-Derived Attributes*, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 547 (1998); DAICOFF, KNOW THYSELF, *supra* note 1.

¹²¹ Menkel-Meadow, *supra* note 93.

¹²² Robert M. Bastress, *Client Centered Counseling and Moral Accountability for Lawyers*, 10 J. LEGAL PROF. 97, 97-99 (1985).

¹²³ See Marc W. Patry, David B. Wexler, Dennis P. Stolle, & Alan J. Tomkins, *Better Legal Counseling Through Empirical Research: Identifying Psycholegal Soft Spots and Strategies*, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 439, 441 (1998) (suggesting a strong possibility for therapeutic jurisprudence to incorporate an ethic of care in preventive law).

1 approach. Now, like psychology, law may be moving into a more humanistic mode, focused
2 more on human wellbeing and interpersonal relationships.

3 **E. Humanism and Law in the 1970’s; Neo-Humanism in the 2000’s**

4 Finally, the comprehensive law movement may reflect a resurgence of a humanistic
5 movement in law that occurred in the 1960’s and 1970’s. This earlier humanism-in-law effort
6 may have gone “underground” during the materialistic and prosperous 1980’s, but be resurfacing
7 today in a sort of “neo-humanism” evidenced by the popularity of the vectors of the
8 comprehensive law movement.

9 In 1980, Chief Justice Warren Burger called for lawyers to return to their roles as healers,
10 foreshadowing the comprehensive law movement by a decade or more. He said:

11 [Lawyers] must be legal architects, engineers, builders, and from time to time, inventors
12 as well. We have served, and must continue to see our role, as problem-solvers,
13 harmonizers, and peacemakers, the healers – not the promoters – of conflict.¹²⁴

14
15 As early as 1955, Dean Griswold argued for “the inclusion of human relations and
16 communications training in the law school curriculum.”¹²⁵ He pointed out that:

17 [L]awyers deal with people. They deal with people far more than they do with appellate
18 courts. They deal with clients; they deal with witnesses; they deal with persons against
19 whom demands are made; they carry on negotiations; they are constantly endeavoring to
20 come to agreements of one sort or another with people, to persuade people, sometimes
21 when they are reluctant to be persuaded. Lawyers are constantly dealing with people
22 who are under stress or strain of one sort or another.¹²⁶

23
24 Robert Redmount in 1968 charged that legal education emphasized “a cohering
25 framework and system of rules and reason ... in which the data of experience are

¹²⁴ Warren E. Burger, *The Decline of Professionalism*, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1993) citing Warren E. Burger, *The Role of the Law School in the Teaching of Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility*, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 377, 378 (1980).

¹²⁵ Hunsaker, *supra* note 98, at 421 citing Dean Griswold, 37 CHICAGO B. RECORD 199, 203 (1956), cited in Howard Sacks, *Human Relations Training for Law Students and Lawyers*, 11 J. LEGAL EDUC. 316, 317 (1959).

¹²⁶ Hunsaker, *supra* note 98, at 421 citing Dean Griswold, 37 CHICAGO B. RECORD 199, 203 (1956), cited in Howard Sacks, *Human Relations Training for Law Students and Lawyers*, 11 J. LEGAL EDUC. 316, 317 (1959).

1 subordinate.”¹²⁷ He argued for explicitly using psychology in law school to teach law students
2 greater psychological sophistication and asserted that “continuing social change and the lack of
3 good attunement to personal and social experience jeopardize law’s standing and competence to
4 deal effectively with social and personal problems.”¹²⁸

5 Shaffer and Redmount in 1975 condemned legal education for lacking “mental, moral,
6 emotional, and social development and therefore ... not serv[ing]... the best interests of society,
7 or for that matter, the best interests of the legal profession. It lacks humanistic concern...”¹²⁹

8 Hunsaker in 1979 agreed and said: “[w]hile the law school may develop skills in analysis, issue
9 spotting, fact-principle discrimination, and logical deduction, it has neglected and ignored the
10 teaching of *humanistic* values and the development of human relations skills [*emphasis in*
11 *original*].”¹³⁰ These authors went on to advocate additional communication skills training,
12 human relations training, and infusion of social science knowledge in legal education.¹³¹

13 These pleas were echoed in a 1978 book by clinical psychiatrist Andrew Watson. In this
14 book, Watson integrated law and psychology and advocated a psychological approach to legal
15 counseling.¹³² A number of articles and commentary followed from 1965 to 1980, proposing a
16 greater emphasis in the law on psychological knowledge, human experience, interpersonal skills,
17 and humanistic values.¹³³ These efforts culminated in a 1981 book by lawyers and law

¹²⁷ Robert S. Redmount, *Humanistic Law Through Legal Education*, 1 CONN. L. REV. 201, 210 (1968) (emphasizing the value of human experience in law, which is pragmatic to the individual) [Redmount I].

¹²⁸ *Id.* at 211.

¹²⁹ Hunsaker, *supra* note 98, at 419-20, quoting THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT S. REDMOUNT, *LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE*, chapter 2 at 24 (1977).

¹³⁰ Hunsaker, *supra* note 98, at 419.

¹³¹ See generally Charles A. Reich, *Toward the Humanistic Study of Law*, 74 YALE L. J. 1402 (1965) (advocating for greater emphasis on social science, interdisciplinary approaches, and moral and psychological knowledge in legal education); Hunsaker, *supra* note 98, and Redmount I, *supra* note 110 (all arguing for curricular reform in law school).

¹³² ANDREW S. WATSON, *THE LAWYER IN THE INTERVIEWING & COUNSELING PROCESS* (Bobbs-Merrill 1975).

¹³³ See) Peter D’Errico, Stephen Arons, & Janet Rifkin, *Humanistic Legal Studies at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst*, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 18 (1976-77)(predicting a sustained national interest in humanist analysis in the law in spite of pressure for formal legal techniques); Robert S. Redmount, *Humanistic Law Through*

1 professors Dvorkin, Himmelstein, and Lesnick titled “Becoming a Lawyer: A Humanistic
2 Perspective on Legal Education and Professionalism.”¹³⁴

3 Most of this early humanism-in-law commentary noted that law and legal education
4 focused almost exclusively on logical, rational analysis of cases and legal problems. Perhaps
5 this was originally appropriate, as Charles Reich in 1965 noted that, before the 1960s, lawyers
6 usually concerned themselves chiefly what law dealt with: commerce and business. However, he
7 argued that the role of law in society in the 1960s began to change, as law became a “primary
8 instrument . . . for fundamental social change.”¹³⁵ Law began to permeate every activity. Social
9 problems, such as poverty, civil unrest, unemployment, and mental illness, increasingly became
10 legal problems. As law became more and more intertwined with social and human problems,
11 Reich says, law had to look to social science for assistance and become “the queen of the
12 humanities.”¹³⁶ Lawyers and legal education needed to focus on developing interpersonal skills,
13 psychological sophistication, and a more humanistic orientation.¹³⁷

14 However, the ideas espoused in this earlier psychology in law movement did not entirely
15 become mainstream in legal education, nor did they appear in law practice. What did occur was
16 a greater emphasis on clinical training and clinical programs, including lawyering skills training,
17 in law school. Interviewing, counseling and negotiating courses and clinical opportunities are
18 now available and encouraged in practically every American law school. Thus, this earlier

Legal Counseling, 2 CONN. L. REV. 98 (1969-70) [Redmount II]; Redmount I, *supra* note 110; Reich, *supra* note 114; and Hunsaker, *supra* note 98 (proposing greater emphasis on interpersonal skills, communications skills, and people skills training in legal education). Other individuals associated with this earlier humanism and law movement include Paul Brest (now dean of Stanford Law School), Columbia University law professor Peter Straus, Charlie Halpert (former dean at CUNY-Queens), Professor Howard Lesnick, and Jack Himmelstein.

¹³⁴ ELIZABETH DVORKIN, JACK HIMMELSTEIN, & HOWARD LESNICK, BECOMING A LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALISM (1981). This book was in fact specifically influenced by Carl Rogers’ work on humanistic psychology, thus strengthening the link between various movements in psychology and law. For a critique of this book, see Walter Gellhorn, “Humanistic Perspective:” *A Critique*, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 99 (1982).

¹³⁵ Reich, *supra* note 114, at 1407.

1 humanistic movement did have an effect. However, the hoped-for wholesale infusion of
2 psychology into legal training and law practice did not occur.

3 However, the integration of law and psychology, or humanism and law, may have
4 emerged in the 1990s in the vectors of the comprehensive law movement. The approaches to
5 law and lawyering embodied by the various vectors of the comprehensive law movement are
6 consistent with the humanistic approach advocated in the 1981 book, “Becoming A Lawyer,”¹³⁸
7 yet they did not develop as a direct result of this early humanistic movement. Instead, they
8 developed mostly from the practicing bar and from a different law and psychology movement
9 known as therapeutic jurisprudence. If these earlier law professors’ efforts to bring humanistic
10 psychology into law have had an effect, the effect appears to have been indirect: skipping over
11 legal education, skipping over a few decades, and emerging now from the “trenches.”

12 Dean emeritus Edward Dauer, who is one of the leaders of preventive law, suggests that
13 perhaps the idealism of this earlier humanism-in-the-law movement crumbled under the strain of
14 the Vietnam War and Watergate, two events that fostered massive cynicism towards law and
15 lawyers.¹³⁹ The cynicism and disappointment felt by society after these two events may have
16 quashed burgeoning idealism in the 1960s and 1970s and then paved the way for the materialism
17 and self-centeredness found in the profession (and society) in the 1980s. If so, the
18 comprehensive law movement may reflect a concrete response to growing societal
19 disillusionment with the materialism and cynicism of the 1980s.

¹³⁶ *Id.* at 1408.

¹³⁷ Hunsaker, *supra* note 98, at 420.

¹³⁸ ELIZABETH DVORKIN, JACK HIMMELSTEIN, & HOWARD LESNICK, BECOMING A LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALISM (1981).

¹³⁹ Personal communication (e-mail) with Edward Dauer, Dean Emeritus at Denver University College of Law, August 5, 2002.

1 In short, a number of philosophical shifts in the last century and particularly in the last
2 decade have paved the way for the comprehensive law movement in the 21st century. Perhaps
3 we have become sated with our own thirst for individual freedom, with our promotion of
4 personal good at the expense of others, and with our worship of individual rights. Maximizing
5 our legal rights and our clients’ has not brought us emotional wellbeing, harmony, peace, joy, or
6 even happiness. Many litigation-experienced clients and lawyers are searching, saying, “there
7 must be a better way” to resolve legal disputes, to handle legal matters, and to practice law.
8 Focusing on the human element in law and on how law can serve as a positive force in the lives
9 of individuals, families, groups, and communities could be a natural product of this discomfort
10 with and within the law -- and of shifts in attitude occurring within and without the legal
11 profession.

12 **V. TEACHING COMPREHENSIVE LAW APPROACHES**

13 As the comprehensive law movement develops, other questions and concerns have
14 emerged. First, there are a number of contemporary movements in legal education, such as
15 efforts to humanize legal education, mindfulness meditation, and the infusion of spirituality into
16 law school, that may be related to the movement. Second, there may be additional skills that
17 attorneys and law students will require in order to successfully practice comprehensive law.
18 Finally, the relationship of the comprehensive law movement to the psychology of lawyers
19 should be explored. This section will explore each of these concerns, in turn.

20 **A. Parallel Developments in Legal Education**

21 While many of the vectors of the comprehensive law movement have been developed by
22 practicing lawyers and judges, some parallel developments have emerged in legal education,
23 primarily through the work of various like-minded law professors. These academic

1 developments are related to the comprehensive law movement because of their emphasis on
2 humanism, values, and enhanced interpersonal and intrapersonal sensitivity. They also assist law
3 students to develop or preserve core skills and attributes necessary to effectively practice law
4 comprehensively.

5 **1. The Humanizing Legal Education Movement**

6 Energized by the leadership and enthusiasm of law professor Lawrence Krieger,¹⁴⁰ a group of
7 law professors have banded together to make law school and legal education a more humane
8 environment. Aware of common complaints about the competitive and intimidating nature of the
9 law school environment¹⁴¹ and painfully aware of the empirical data demonstrating that law
10 students are “normal” before they enter law school but rapidly develop depression and other
11 psychiatric distress thereafter, which does not abate after graduation,¹⁴² these professors began
12 sharing information, teaching techniques, and research on how to humanize legal education.¹⁴³
13 While the thrust of this movement has focused on humanizing the experience of law school for
14 law students, its values are consistent with comprehensive law’s intention of humanizing legal
15 process for participants. The humanizing movement also encourages law students to identify,
16 evaluate, and maintain their own personal morals, values, beliefs, and standards during law
17 school. This exploration of values may prepare or propel some students to practice law

¹⁴⁰ Clinical law professor at Florida State University Law School.

¹⁴¹ Lawrence S. Krieger, Psychological Insights: *Why Our Students and Graduates Suffer, And What We Might Do About It*, 1 J. ASS’N LEG. WRITING DIRECTORS 259, 262 (2002).

¹⁴² Connie J. A. Beck & Bruce D. Sales, *Lawyer Distress: Alcohol-Related Problems and Other Psychological Concerns Among a Sample of Practicing Lawyers*, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 2 (1996).

¹⁴³ Their first formal program was presented at the 2001 annual Association of American Law Schools conference. Currently this group’s listserv has 250 subscribers. *Humanizing Legal Education*, at the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools jointly sponsored by the Sections on Clinical Legal Education, Law, & Mental Disability, and Law & Religion, in San Francisco, CA, January 2001; at www.law.fsu.edu/academic_programs/humanizing_lawschool.php (quoting website, “Humanizing legal education is an initiative shared by legal educators seeking to maximize the overall health, well being, and career satisfaction of

1 comprehensively rather than traditionally.

2 **2. Mindfulness Meditation**

3 Law professor Leonard Riskin, author and legal commentator Steven Keeva, and others have
4 written about the importance of the lawyer’s mental state to the efficacy of his or her work.¹⁴⁴
5 One strategy that many attorneys and law students are experimenting with, to improve their
6 professional efficacy, is “mindfulness meditation.” Some have incorporated the principles and
7 insights of mindfulness meditation into their preparation for professional practice. These
8 concepts have been introduced to law students through such avenues as the Yale Law School
9 project for Meditation and the Law and programs sponsored by the Fetzer Institute.¹⁴⁵ Being
10 more aware of and able to manage and monitor one’s mental state, emotions, and reactions can
11 assist lawyers in their daily work, particularly if they are practicing comprehensive law, due to
12 its emphasis on the ability to identify and cope with the emotions and mental states of others.

13 **3. Law and Spirituality**

14 Law and religion is a familiar topic, but some recent commentary has focused on the concept
15 that one’s spiritual beliefs, values, and practices are relevant to law, legal education, and law
16 practice.¹⁴⁶ Specifically, they are important for preparing one’s mental state for legal work,

law students and lawyers.”); listserve at www.law.fsu.edu/academic_programs/humanizing_lawschool/listserve.php
(sites visited on April 11, 2005).

¹⁴⁴ Leonard L. Riskin, *The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Contributions of Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers, and Their Clients*, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2002); Douglas A. Codiga, *Reflection on the Potential Growth of Mindfulness Meditation in the Law*, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 109 (2002); see also STEVEN KEEVA, *TRANSFORMING PRACTICES, FINDING JOY AND SATISFACTION IN THE LEGAL LIFE* (Contemporary Books 1999).

¹⁴⁵ See Steven W. Keeva, *Practicing From the Inside Out*, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97 (2002); Codiga, *supra* note 122.

¹⁴⁶ See Calvin G. C. Pang, *Eyeing the Circle: Finding a Place for Spirituality in Law School Clinic*, 35 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 241 (1999); Charles Senger, *Spirituality in Law School*, 81 MICH. B.J. 44 (Dec. 2002). Professor Calvin Pang, who infuses spirituality into his law school clinical courses, has written at length about how to incorporate spirituality into a clinical course and the benefits of doing so. Calvin G. C. Pang, *Eyeing the Circle:*

1 maintaining the lawyer’s mental health, the professional choices one makes as a lawyer, and the
2 way in which one interacts with clients. Lawyers who have personal spiritual practices or who
3 are explicitly faith-based themselves may be drawn to comprehensive law practice, due to the
4 easy interface of the goals of comprehensive law with their personal values.

5 **B. Teaching Comprehensive Law Practice Skills**

6 Mindfulness meditation and personal spiritual practices may be skills helpful to the
7 comprehensive practice of law. In addition to these, there are a number of other skills that
8 lawyers may need in order to practice law comprehensively. This section outlines and describes
9 these skills.

10 Law professor Leonard Riskin provides a terrific football analogy to understand the
11 relevance of these skills to the comprehensive law movement. He reminds us that a football
12 coach teaches his players the overall philosophy of football as well as how to throw, block, and
13 tackle. The players learn the game and then practice the moves on the field. However, if the
14 players do not actually go to the gym and become stronger through weight lifting, they do not
15 become strong, effective football players. Just as strength training prepares football players to
16 play football, the comprehensive law skills, outlined below, prepare comprehensive lawyers to

Finding a Place for Spirituality in Law School Clinic, 35 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 241 (1999); and 20 R. HAW.L.REV. 1; 1995-JUN HAW. B.J. 28; 1993-SEP HAW. B.J. 24. Professor Charles Senger teaches a law school course devoted entirely to law and spirituality; he presented a talk on his course at the second international conference on therapeutic jurisprudence, May 2001, in Cincinnati, Ohio. In that panel on law and spirituality, Professor Pang of the University of Hawaii Law School spoke, as well as Professor Daisy Floyd of Texas Tech. Professor Tim Floyd of Texas Tech noted the importance of concepts such as forgiveness, prayer, and priority-setting to lawyers seeking to incorporate their spiritual values into their law practices.¹⁴⁶ According to Professor Floyd, small groups of practicing lawyers discussing law and spirituality have sprung up around the country. Talk given by Professor Tim Floyd of Texas Tech University School of Law, April 7, 2003, at Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, Huntington, New York, at the symposium titled: “Lawyering and Its Discontents: Reclaiming Meaning in the Practice of Law” [hereinafter “Discontents”]. Practicing lawyer Arnie Herz has, on occasion, introduced a client to nonreligious, nondenominational spiritual practices because he thought it would improve the client’s mental state and assist the client in visualizing a positive future for himself or herself after the legal dispute’s resolution. Talk given by Arnie Herz at Florida Coastal School of Law, Jacksonville, Florida, on October 22, 2003.

1 perform their work.¹⁴⁷ These skills include: excellent interpersonal, human relations skills; self-
2 knowledge (or intrapersonal skills); and rudimentary psychological sophistication, or emotional
3 intelligence.¹⁴⁸

4 **1. Interpersonal Skills**

5 First, there are communications and relational skills that attorneys need in order to form
6 and maintain working relationships with their clients, opponents, judges, and other legal
7 personnel. These skills include empathy, advanced empathy, reflective listening, and
8 questioning skills. Empathy is often defined as the ability to stand in another’s shoes and
9 express an understanding of the other’s thoughts and feelings. Advanced empathy refers to the
10 ability to express the implicit thoughts and feelings under the surface of the other’s actions and
11 words. For example, a person facing major surgery might express anger, frustration, and
12 irritation with the doctors but underneath might feel afraid, worried, and mistrustful of the
13 surgeons. Basic empathy would reflect the person’s anger; advanced empathy would recognize
14 and acknowledge the underlying fear. Advanced empathy always runs the risk of being
15 inaccurate, as the hearer must guess at the implicit or submerged feelings of the other. Reflective
16 listening, or active listening, refers to the ability to hear and paraphrase the facts of the other’s
17 words as well as the thoughts and feelings expressed by the other. It usually employs
18 paraphrasing of the events as well as basic empathy (in the form of restatements of the explicit
19 feelings expressed); it tends to result in the other feeling “heard” and understood. Questioning
20 skills refer to the ability to distinguish between closed-ended questions (those requiring only a

¹⁴⁷ Personal communication with University of Missouri-Columbia law professor Leonard L. Riskin, April 6, 2003, at “Discontents,” *supra* note 131.

¹⁴⁸ Marjorie A Silver, *Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interference in the Lawyer/Client Relationship*, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 259 (1999) (providing an excellent and exhaustive review of the skills needed to practice law comprehensively); *see also* Kerper, *supra* note 2, at 371-72 (noting the importance of the theories of multiple intelligences to learning to creatively problem solve as a lawyer).

1 yes or no answer) and open-ended questions (those requiring an answer other than yes or no) and
2 the ability to know when to use each type. Closed ended questions tend to focus and direct the
3 speaker, often closing down the flow of information; open-ended questions, particularly when
4 combined with basic empathy, tend to encourage the flow of information and elicit more from
5 the speaker. These basic communications skills are useful in creating trusting relationships with
6 clients, witnesses, and other lawyers or when negotiating with other parties or lawyers.

7 Second, to practice law comprehensively, attorneys need a minimal amount of
8 psychological sophistication and an ability to contain and help clients maintain their emotions.
9 They also need to know when they are in over their heads. When it is appropriate to refer a
10 client to professional therapy or counseling, the lawyer should be prepared to make the referral
11 and perhaps offer to personally make the call to a suitable professional (and let the client know
12 that the professional is expecting his or her call). Therapeutically-oriented lawyers might view
13 these situations as a psycholegal soft spot that needs to be properly addressed by the referral to
14 professional psychological help. A second, conflicting psycholegal soft spot may then arise if
15 the referral to therapy in some way prejudices the client’s legal case, for example, by raising
16 doubt as to the client’s mental state.

17 One skill that lawyers particularly need is the ability to recognize and deal with
18 individuals going through the grief process.¹⁴⁹ Every litigant engaging an attorney has suffered a
19 loss of some sort. Thus, each litigant is likely to be experiencing one or more of Elizabeth
20 Kubler-Ross’ famous five stages of grief: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and

¹⁴⁹ Clinical psychologist Sanford Portnoy claims that over 40% of attorney-client communications involve the clients’ emotions and yet attorneys routinely dismiss the need to address clients’ emotions. For example, he says there are more complaints against attorneys brought by divorce clients and personal injury clients, probably because those clients’ emotions generally run high and they may displace anger onto the attorneys. Talk given by Dr. Portnoy at Touro College Law Center, April 7, 2003, “Discontents,” *supra* note 131. Dr. Portnoy published these ideas in his book, SANFORD M. PORTNOY, THE FAMILY LAWYER’S GUIDE TO BUILDING SUCCESSFUL RELATIONSHIPS (2000).

1 acceptance.¹⁵⁰ Litigation can facilitate or suspend the grief process – the process of dealing with
2 and resolving the loss that resulted in the legal problem. For example, in wrongful death actions,
3 litigation can interrupt the process of grieving if it focuses too long on the cause of or
4 responsibility for the death. On the other hand, litigation facilitates the grief process when it
5 helps the survivors sort out the events leading to the death or fulfills their sense of duty to the
6 deceased person, and is begun and concluded quickly after the death.¹⁵¹

7 Lawyers working with traumatized clients can help reverse the effects of trauma, using
8 excellent interpersonal skills. For example, if the client was raped and experienced degradation
9 and humiliation, the lawyer can provide the client with an additional measure of respect,
10 autonomy, and control. The attorney can ask the client when and for how long she wants to talk
11 about the event, listen well, and treat her with respect.¹⁵² Therapeutically-oriented lawyers might
12 well view this as a psycholegal soft spot that the lawyer can address with these restorative,
13 relational measures.¹⁵³

14 **2. Intrapersonal Skills**

15 In addition to the above human relations skills, lawyers also need intrapersonal skills,
16 meaning the ability to know themselves well enough to determine when they are over- or under-
17 reacting to a particular client, cause, or party. This is sometimes referred to as
18 “countertransference,” meaning when the lawyer’s own internal feelings, experiences, biases,
19 fears, frustrations, likes, or dislikes unduly influence or interfere with his or her work and the
20 lawyer loses his or her ability to react neutrally and objectively to the client, cause, or party.

¹⁵⁰ ELIZABETH KUBLER-ROSS, ON DEATH AND DYING 34-99 (1969) (discussing the five stages of coping in terminally ill patients).

¹⁵¹ Wexler & Winick, KEY, *supra* note 6, at 452-453.

¹⁵² *Id.*

¹⁵³ Ideas paraphrased from comments by University of Miami law professor Bruce Winick, April 7, 2003, “Discontents,” *supra* note 131.

1 This can only be detected if the lawyer is adept at knowing himself or herself and his or her
2 strengths and weaknesses, and can effectively evaluate and monitor his or her emotions,
3 thoughts, and actions.

4 In addition, lawyers need the ability to deal effectively with such countertransference,¹⁵⁴
5 including the ability to maintain personal boundaries. Lawyers, particularly those who feel
6 compassion and empathy for their clients, can become enmeshed with clients and their emotions.
7 Inappropriate attachment or involvement can cause the lawyer stress, derail the lawyer-client
8 relationship, distort the legal representation, distract the client from seeking professional
9 psychological help, and give rise to ethical dilemmas.¹⁵⁵

10 For example, lawyers working with clients who were sexually assaulted or abused, or clients
11 fighting human rights violations, can be vicariously traumatized by this exposure.¹⁵⁶
12 Comprehensive lawyers may be particularly vulnerable to this secondary trauma, because they
13 are likely to respond to these clients with understanding and empathy. Coping strategies
14 therefore need to go beyond simple stress management; lawyers need the ability to identify,
15 manage, and contain their own distressing emotions.¹⁵⁷

16 **C. Implications of the Movement for Law Student and Lawyer Distress**

17 Lawyers experience alcoholism, depression, and other forms of psychological distress and
18 dissatisfaction at a rate of about 20%, or one in five, which is about twice the levels found in the

¹⁵⁴ Marjorie A. Silver, *Love, Hate & Other Emotional Interference in the Lawyer/Client Relationship*, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 259, 261-66 (1999).

¹⁵⁵ Ideas paraphrased from talk given by Yale University law professor Jean Koh Peters, April 7, 2003, “Discontents,” *supra* note 131; *see also* Marjorie A. Silver et al., *Stress, Burnout, Vicarious Trauma, and Other Emotional Realities in the Lawyer/Client Relationship*, 19 TOURO L. REV. 847 (2004) (detailing a panel discussion that broadly looked at the emotional competence and intelligence of lawyers and the possibilities for positive intervention in legal education).

¹⁵⁶ *Id.*

¹⁵⁷ *See* Riskin and Codiga, both *supra* note 126, and Keeva, *supra* note 127.

1 general population.¹⁵⁸ Reasons for this unduly high level of psychological distress within the
2 legal profession are unclear. Most commentators have pointed to the long hours, the pressures of
3 private practice, competition in the profession, and deprofessionalism. However, until 2001, the
4 empirical research linked lawyer distress not to these factors, but instead only to feelings of
5 hostility, marital distress, job dissatisfaction, and a lack of social support.¹⁵⁹

6 In 2001, in a groundbreaking empirical study, Lawrence Krieger and Kannon Sheldon
7 discovered that law student (and, presumably, lawyer) distress is associated with certain shifts in
8 one’s value system during law school. Specifically, law students were more likely to be
9 distressed as they became progressively less oriented toward personal “growth/self acceptance,
10 intimacy/emotional connection and community/societal contribution.” Distress was also
11 increased as students became less likely to act for interest or inherent satisfaction and “more
12 oriented toward appearance/attractiveness” and “money/luxuries, popularity/fame” as well as
13 more motivated to please others.¹⁶⁰ Thus, as law students focused less on intrinsic satisfactions
14 and more on extrinsic rewards, they were more likely to experience a decline in their emotional
15 wellbeing.¹⁶¹ This suggests that lawyers who focus on external rewards such as money, prestige,
16 Martindale-Hubbell ratings, and even win-loss records, may be at risk for developing distress.

17 The vectors of the comprehensive law movement explicitly allow lawyers to infuse a set of
18 values into their law practice that may provide intrinsic rewards. For example, the
19 therapeutically-oriented lawyer may feel inherent satisfaction from legal work if he or she values
20 “doing good” for others and defines “good” as enhancing others’ psychological wellbeing. The

¹⁵⁸ DAICOFF, KNOW THYSELF, *supra* note 1.

¹⁵⁹ Beck & Sales, *supra* note 124.

¹⁶⁰ Lawrence S. Krieger & Kannon M. Sheldon, *Does Law School Change Law Students? Values, Motives, and Well-being in a First Year Class* (unpublished manuscript, 2001) (studying the emotional wellbeing of Florida State University law students and comparing it to that of advanced undergraduate students at the University of Missouri).

¹⁶¹ *Id.* This values shift and decline in wellbeing occurred as early as the first year of law school.

1 collaborative lawyer may obtain inherent satisfaction from doing work that preserves and fosters
2 harmonious relationships between divorcing spouses, knowing that those relationships will lead
3 to a better life and better mental health for the children of the divorce. Restorative justice
4 practitioners may experience satisfaction in seeing victims of crime achieve “closure,”
5 reconciliation, and come to terms with the crime and its effects, in seeing victims and offenders
6 receive apology and forgiveness, respectively, and in seeing offenders experience “therapeutic
7 shame” that effectively motivates them not to recidivate. Preventive lawyers may experience
8 satisfaction in knowing their legal efforts helped avoid the economic and temporal waste of a
9 lawsuit. Lawyers and judges employing the wisdom of procedural justice may appreciate the
10 enhanced satisfaction their clients and litigants gain from a legal process that allows for voice
11 and participation. Lawyers, judges, and other legal personnel involved in drug treatment courts
12 have reported personal satisfaction from the success of the court’s graduates in staying free from
13 drugs and crime.¹⁶²

14 Empirical research indicates that individuals who prefer the “Feeling” mode of decision-
15 making as measured by the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator¹⁶³ are in the minority in the legal
16 profession,¹⁶⁴ tend to drop out of law school,¹⁶⁵ and may be more prone to experience job

¹⁶² See Chase & Hora, *supra* note 99.

¹⁶³ The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator is a counseling instrument used to categorize individuals into one of 16 “types,” based on their preferences on four continua: Extraversion/Introversion; Sensing/Intuiting; Thinking/Feeling; and Judging/Perceiving. It was developed by Katharine Briggs and Isabel Myers and is widely used in corporate and academic settings to help people better understand the preferred approaches to life of themselves and others. There are approximately four published studies of the Myers-Briggs “types” preferred by lawyers and law students. See also Vernellia R. Randall, *Increasing Retention and Improving Performance: Practical Advice on Using Cooperative Learning in Law Schools*, 16 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 201 (1999); Eric Y. Drogin, *Jurisprudent Therapy and Competency*, 28 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 41 (2004); Lawrence R. Richard, *Psychological Type and Job Satisfaction Among Practicing Lawyers in the United States*, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 979 (2002); MARY H. MCCAULLEY & FRANK L. NATTER, PSYCHOLOGICAL (MYERS-BRIGGS) TYPE DIFFERENCES IN EDUCATION (1974).

¹⁶⁴ Daicoff, *Review*, *supra* note 110, at 1391-92.

¹⁶⁵ Paul Van R. Miller, *Personality Differences and Student Survival in Law School*, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 460-67 (1967) (defining “Feeling” type in 1967 study and finding that almost twice as many “Feeling” types dropped out of law school as compared to “Thinking” types).

1 dissatisfaction as lawyers.¹⁶⁶ Feelers prefer "harmonizing, building relationships, pleasing
2 people, making decisions on the basis of [their own] ... personal likes and dislikes, and being
3 attentive to the personal needs of others" and like to avoid conflict and criticism.¹⁶⁷ The opposite
4 of Feeling is Thinking; Thinkers prefer "logical analysis, principles, cool and impersonal
5 reasoning and cost/benefit analyses" and are "more tolerant of conflict and criticism."

6 Psychologist and lawyer Dr. Lawrence Richard, one of the leading researchers on the Myers-
7 Briggs type of lawyers, says that the dimensions of Thinking and Feeling both represent:

8 rational, valid decision-making methods. Both involve thought, and neither process is
9 related to emotions. ...

10 Those who prefer to make decisions on the basis of Thinking prefer to come to
11 closure in a logical, orderly manner. They can readily discern inaccuracies and are often
12 critical. They can easily hurt others' feelings without knowing it. They are excellent
13 problem-solvers. They review the cause and effect of potential actions before deciding.
14 Thinkers are often accused of being cold and somewhat calculating because their
15 decisions do not reflect their own personal values. They focus on discovering truth, and
16 they seek justice.

17 Those who prefer to make decisions on the basis of Feeling apply their own
18 personal values to make choices. They seek harmony and, therefore, are sensitive to the
19 effect of their decisions on others. They need, and are adept at giving, praise. They are
20 interested in the person behind the idea or the job. They seek to do what is right for
21 themselves and other people and are interested in mercy.¹⁶⁸

22
23 Feeling-type individuals are very likely to be attracted to comprehensive law approaches,
24 because they encourage the lawyer to focus on interpersonal harmony, do what is right for
25 others, avoid conflict and harm to others, and therapeutic, humanistic, or sanative values into his
26 or her work. These approaches allow a Feeling-oriented lawyer to infuse his or her own personal
27 morals and values into his or her work, assuming that the lawyer values enhanced mental
28 wellbeing and improved interpersonal relationships. For example, restorative justice and

¹⁶⁶ Richard, *supra* note 149, (Thinkers more plentiful in law; Thinking lawyers more satisfied with their jobs than Feeling lawyers).

¹⁶⁷ *Id.* at 1394.

¹⁶⁸ SUSAN J. BELL & LAWRENCE R. RICHARD, ANATOMY OF A LAWYER: PERSONALITY AND LONG-TERM CAREER SATISFACTION, IN FULL DISCLOSURE: DO YOU REALLY WANT TO BE A LAWYER? 149, 152 (Susan J. Bell ed., 2d ed.

1 collaborative law explicitly focus on interpersonal and relational harmony; transformative
2 mediation may indirectly foster it as well. All three tend to avoid interpersonal conflict. Holistic
3 justice explicitly encourages lawyers to follow their own values in determining whether to take a
4 case and what courses of action to take in representing the client. Creative problem solving and
5 therapeutic jurisprudence allow the lawyer to feel as if he or she is “doing good,” to the extent
6 that good is defined as optimizing one’s total life situation or maximizing others’ psychological
7 wellbeing, respectively.

8 To the extent that Feeling-oriented lawyers and law students are likely to drop out of law, or
9 are simply dissatisfied with their work, the comprehensive law approaches offer great promise
10 and hope. They offer an appealing alternative to traditional law practice that does not require the
11 lawyer to leave the profession. Instead, they actually utilize the lawyers’ Feeling preference as
12 an asset to his or her professional life, rather than marginalizing it as a detrimental or neutral
13 feature.

14 CONCLUSION

15 The curative potential of the comprehensive law movement for lawyers, the legal
16 profession, clients, and society is undeniable. Despite this potential, however, there are a
17 number of unanswered questions. For example, the typical adversarial, competitive lawyer
18 personality may impede lawyers’ efforts to practice law more comprehensively. They may resist
19 retooling and change, feel as if they are being asked to practice psychology without the
20 appropriate training and credentials, and worry about committing malpractice. Alternatively,
21 they may worry that comprehensive law practice will increase the standard of care so that if they
22 fail to practice comprehensively they will commit malpractice. Their general preference for the

1992). Richard also notes that the Thinking/Feeling scale is the most significant personality trait for predicting

1 Myers-Briggs dimension of Thinking may hamper their efforts to be more empathetic,
2 compassionate, relational, and harm-avoidant. However, research suggests that many lawyers
3 may have had Feeling and care-oriented preferences that were silenced in law school.
4 Comprehensive law approaches may actually encourage some lawyers to rediscover the values
5 and preferences with which they entered law school, rather than asking them to become
6 something they are not. Legal education must, however, retool a bit in order to effectively teach
7 the skills, underlying theories, and approaches contained in the comprehensive law movement.
8 A handful of law schools teach courses on comprehensive law approaches or therapeutic
9 jurisprudence; many law schools are teaching the skills necessary for practicing comprehensive
10 law in their clinical courses.¹⁶⁹

11 Another concern is that comprehensive law practice may conflict with the rules of
12 professional responsibility. A close reading of ABA Model Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 2.1 reveals
13 that comprehensive law practice need not violate the ethics code, as long as an open and trusting
14 lawyer-client relationship is formed, clients are given full informed consent, the scope of
15 representation is fully disclosed and agreed upon, and the lawyer's role as a comprehensive
16 advisor is agreed upon. Model Rule 2.1 explicitly encourages lawyers to include extra-legal
17 factors in their advice to clients, blessing the "rights plus" approach of the comprehensive law
18 vectors. Lawyer must, however, be careful not to oversell comprehensive law approaches to
19 clients simply because the lawyers themselves prefer to practice law this way. They must be
20 sure to present fairly the traditional approaches, alongside the comprehensive law approaches,
21 without bias, and allow the client to decide. Clients must still determine the ultimate goals of

lawyer satisfaction, stating, "those with a preference for Feeling are swimming against the tide." *Id.* at 153.

1 representation. Lawyers and judges must also be careful not to use comprehensive law
2 approaches paternalistically in cases where they feel that the client “really needs” psychological
3 treatment or help but the client simply refuses it, even after full informed consent and candid
4 advice from the lawyer. Lawyers and judges must also, as therapeutic jurisprudence directs, not
5 allow comprehensive concerns to “trump” traditional values of due process and civil rights.

6 Finally, it will be interesting to see how the comprehensive law vectors will be
7 incorporated into the existing law firm and legal profession culture. One option might be for
8 lawyers to incorporate parts of the movement into traditional practice. They may view the
9 comprehensive law movement as a smorgasbord of lenses and processes from which they will
10 pick and choose, incorporating comprehensive concepts in part or in whole as additions to their
11 existing repertoire of legal moves. This is the “toolkit” idea: that comprehensive law approaches
12 simply add to the lawyer’s existing toolkit to make the lawyer a more competitive and well-
13 rounded professional. Another option might be for firms to create entire departments devoted to
14 comprehensive law approaches, so that lawyers who excel at comprehensive law practice (and
15 clients appropriate for that kind of legal work) might be funneled to those separate departments.
16 This would allow traditional firms to retain clients that might otherwise depart for
17 comprehensive “boutique” practices and would allow lawyers within existing firms to create
18 forms of law practice that might be more creative and satisfying for them, without leaving the
19 firm. Or, the comprehensive law movement’s popularity might wane and it might turn out to be
20 an experiment in the law that we as a society ultimately abandon.

¹⁶⁹ For example, the author teaches Comprehensive Law Practice course at Florida Coastal School of Law, Bruce Winick teaches a similar course at the University of Miami Law School, David Wexler teaches a course on therapeutic jurisprudence at the University of Arizona School of Law.

1 More likely, the comprehensive law movement will remain, to color and add to our
2 understanding of what clients and society need and require from lawyers. It will become
3 incorporated into mainstream legal practice as part of the usual work that lawyers provide for
4 their clients. It will help lawyers reach their full potential as solvers of legal problems and
5 dispute resolution professionals, help legal services consumers reach their full potential as
6 individuals and maximize the functionality of their relationships, and thereby help our society
7 transform into the next phase of our evolution.