CITIZENS OF AN ENEMY LAND: ENEMY COMBATANTS, ALIENS, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PSEUDO-CITIZEN

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Does citizenship as we know it still exist in the post-September 11 world? Do the exigencies of war require a more cautious approach in deciding who among the citizenry is legitimately a citizen? The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in two cases that resolve these questions in opposite ways. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld1 and Padilla v. Rumsfeld2 each raise constitutional challenges to the military’s detention of a U.S. citizen accused of taking actions against the U.S. government in a time of war.3 In Hamdi, the Fourth Circuit resolved these challenges against the U.S. citizen.4 Emphasizing Hamdi’s ties with foreigners and foreign lands and his tenuous connection with the United States, the opinion applied precedent relating to non-citizens to evaluate the citizen’s constitutional claims.5 In Padilla, the Second Circuit held the military detention unconstitutional.6 Characterizing Padilla as a prototypical member of the citizenry, as an “American citizen seized on American soil,” it declined to apply doctrines created to govern the non-citizen.7

This article exposes the radical redefining of citizenship augured in the recent case law addressing citizens suspected of disloyalty. Cases in which the military has detained U.S. citizens on the suspicion that they are “enemy combatants” have blurred the distinctions between citizens and non-citizens. Rules that grew out of jurisprudence about non-citizens have crept into decisions in which the government has questioned the legitimacy and loyalty of citizens. The appearance of these rules and their implications for citizenship have gone virtually unnoticed by advocates and critics of the enemy combatant cases. Yet the presence of these rules accompanies the

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1 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003).
2 Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 699 (2d Cir. 2003).
3 Id. at 699; Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 470-71
4 Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 470-71.
5 Id. at 460, 470-71, 474.
6 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 699.
7 Id. at 711-24.
courts’ *sub rosa* evaluation of whether the citizen is legitimately a member of the citizenry. Together, they effectively create a hybrid category of citizenship – what I call “pseudo-citizenship,” to which lesser constitutional protections against federal power apply.

This article reframes the current heated debate about these cases. That debate has polarized as a conflict between the power of the federal government in wartime and the scope of constitutional protections for citizens. Recast as a debate about the very substance of citizenship, radically different questions arise. Is there room in our constitutional framework for a new category of citizenship that draws from constitutional norms governing non-citizens? Should the courts make room for a jurisprudence of pseudo-citizenship in a world in which traditional notions of war and conflict no longer seem to apply?

**Introduction**

On May 8, 2002, upon landing at Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport, José Padilla was arrested in connection with a grand jury investigation into the September 11 attacks. Padilla is a U.S. citizen, born in Brooklyn, New York. He grew up in Brooklyn and Chicago and moved to Florida as a young adult. Family friends and others remember him as a handsome, quiet boy who played basketball in the street and was close to his mother. As a teen and later an adult, he apparently joined a gang and acquired a criminal record that included a juvenile conviction for murder and later a weapons charge. He converted from Roman Catholicism to Islam at some point along the way. According to the Department of Defense, in 1998, Padilla moved to Egypt, changed his name to Abdullah al Muhajir, and traveled to

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9 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 699, 700.


14 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 700.


16 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 700.

countries in the Middle East and Southwest Asia in 1999 and 2000. Allegedly, he met with senior al Qaeda officials and discussed plans to detonate a radioactive bomb in the United States. After his arrest, Padilla was held as a civilian material witness in the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York. In June 2002, when Padilla’s counsel moved to vacate the material witness warrant, President Bush declared that Padilla was an “enemy combatant” and ordered the Secretary of Defense to take custody of him. The Department of Defense transferred him to a naval brig in South Carolina and has detained him there since, incommunicado and, until recently, without access to counsel.

In the fall of 2001, the Northern Alliance captured Yaser Esam Hamdi in Afghanistan and turned him over to the United States military along with other prisoners. When the U.S. military discovered that Hamdi was a U.S. citizen, they transferred him from a detention camp in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to the Norfolk Naval Station Brig in Virginia.

Unlike Padilla, Hamdi did not grow up in the United States. He was born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana but his family left the United States for Saudi Arabia when he was a young child. In contrast to the searching media inquiry into Padilla’s U.S. childhood, neither the media nor the courts have shed much light on Hamdi’s background. According to the petition his father filed on his behalf, Hamdi was residing in Afghanistan when Northern Alliance forces detained him. The Department of Defense alleges that he served with the Taliban and had an assault rifle when he was captured.

special advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (hereinafter “Mobbs Declaration”)). Mobbs claimed to have no direct knowledge of Padilla’s actions or of the interrogations that produced the information in the declaration. Padilla, 352 F.3d at 700.

18 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 700-01 (citing the Mobbs Declaration).
19 Id. at 701; see also Risen & Shenon, supra note ___.
20 The government may detain as a material witness an individual who has unique information about a crime and when necessary to ensure the person’s appearance and testimony at relevant court proceedings. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000); see Stacey M. Studnicki & John P. Apol, Witness Detention and Intimidation: The History and Future of Material Witness Law, 76 St. John’s L. Rev. 483, 485 (Summer 2002).
21 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 700.
22 Id.
23 Neil A. Lewis, Supreme Court Will Hear 3rd Detainee Case, N.Y. Times, February 21, 2004, at A9 (reporting that government officials had granted Padilla and Hamdi access to counsel while maintaining that they were under no legal obligation to do so).
24 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 700.
26 Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 460. Hamdi has generated three appellate panel opinions, the last two of which are relevant to this article. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Hamdi I”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Hamdi II”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (“Hamdi III”), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004).
27 Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 460.
28 Id.
29 See e.g., supra, notes 10-13, 15.
30 Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 460.
31 Id. at 461.
Padilla, President Bush has classified Hamdi as an “enemy combatant.” Like Padilla, the Department of Defense has detained Hamdi in a military brig and, until recently, without access to legal counsel. The United States has brought no charges against either detainee.

On January 8, 2003, the Fourth Circuit upheld the military’s detention of Hamdi, ruling that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments did not require the government to provide him a criminal trial. Portraying him as a foreigner who “may not have renounced his American citizenship,” the opinion described Hamdi’s U.S. citizenship as accidentally obtained and characterized his connection with the U.S. community as minimal at best. Consistent with that portrayal, the opinion relied upon rules that govern the scope of constitutional protections for non-citizens. It applied the plenary power doctrine, which calls for extraordinary judicial deference to the executive and legislative branches and diminished constitutional protections when those branches act in the spheres of immigration, national security, or foreign policy. The plenary power doctrine was created in part to govern those deemed outside the social contract embodied in the Constitution, such as non-citizens. Hamdi was the first time that a court had applied the plenary power doctrine to a U.S. citizen in the United States alleged to be an unlawful combatant.

On December 18, 2003, the Second Circuit ruled that, because Padilla was an “American citizen” seized on “American soil,” the military could not constitutionally detain him and he was entitled to the constitutional protections of a criminal trial. It declined to apply to Padilla standards developed to govern non-citizens in indefinite detention, instead emphasizing his citizenship and the constitutional protections that limited the President’s power to detain citizens. It rejected the application of the plenary power

32 Id.
33 Id. at 460-61.
34 Id. at 460; Padilla, 352 F.3d at 700.
35 Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 470-71.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 460 (stating “Hamdi apparently was born in Louisiana but left for Saudi Arabia when he was a small child”).
38 Id. at 474 (citing, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001)); see infra, notes 247-56 and accompanying text.
39 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (articulating the elements of the plenary power doctrine). Curtiss-Wright excluded citizens from the scope of its holding: “Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens…..”). Id.; see also David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 1015-26 (Summer 2002) [hereinafter “In Aid of Removal”] (describing the Supreme Court’s deference to the plenary power of the federal government when it creates “substantive criteria” to govern the admission and expulsion of aliens, and noting that plenary power is limited only by due process considerations).
41 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 699.
42 Id. at 711-24; see also id. at 733 (Wesley, J., dissenting) (citing as precedent for the legality of Padilla’s
doctrine to Padilla, holding that the President had overstepped his powers in indefinitely detaining this citizen.\textsuperscript{43}

What distinguishes these two detainees? Both are citizens. Both have been declared to be unlawful combatants. Both are detained in military custody in the United States. Yet the two cases reach opposite conclusions. Although the opinions seek to distinguish one another based on whether the seizure took place inside or outside the United States, away from a zone of combat,\textsuperscript{44} both citizens have been detained within the United States and within reach of a functioning civil court. Can we attribute the outcomes entirely to a liberty-oriented Second Circuit versus a security-minded Fourth Circuit?

Assuming the government's allegations are true, the harm to the United States that Padilla would cause by detonating a radioactive bomb in the United States is arguably greater than the harm to the United States that Hamdi caused fighting the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Shouldn't the executive branch have greater latitude to protect the country against disloyal citizens when the threat is within our borders? Does the characterization of Hamdi as effectively a foreigner and Padilla as the archetypal U.S. citizen suggest a more compelling explanation for the different outcomes in these two opinions? What is the significance of the reliance in \textit{Hamdi} and not \textit{Padilla} on rules traditionally applied to non-citizens and of the use of the plenary power doctrine? Scholarship concerning the enemy combatant cases has generally overlooked the appearance of the plenary power doctrine and, associated with it, the reliance on rules governing non-citizens to measure the scope of constitutional protections for citizens. Although many observers have commented on the differences in the treatment of citizens and non-citizens alleged to be belligerents, little attention has been paid whether these cases actually maintain a firm line between citizenship and alienage.\textsuperscript{45}

The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in both \textit{Hamdi} and \textit{Padilla} and will hear the cases in the upcoming term.\textsuperscript{46} As the Court grapples with the tension between national security and individual rights that both \textit{Hamdi} and \textit{Padilla} raise, its decision cannot fail to affect traditional conceptions of equal citizenship. In doing so, the Supreme Court is likely to consider two central precedents about the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens detained as enemy combatants, \textit{Ex Parte Milligan}\textsuperscript{47} and \textit{Ex Parte Quirin}.\textsuperscript{48} All four cases

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\item\textsuperscript{43} Id. at 711-24.
\item\textsuperscript{44} Id. at 711; \textit{Hamdi III}, 316 F.3d at 465.
\item\textsuperscript{45} Hiroshi Motomura, \textit{Immigration and We The People After September 11}, 66 ALB. L. REV. 413, 422 (2003) ("What is really troubling about the government's response to September 11 has not been that the government is treating citizens and non-citizens differently. Rather, it is that current policies treat many citizens as if they were non-citizens—at least if we look beyond a narrow, legalistic definition of what it means to be a U.S. citizen"); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, \textit{Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals}, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1296 (2002) (arguing that protecting the rights of non-citizens requires linking them with the rights of citizens).
\item\textsuperscript{47} 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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consider the habeas petitions of U.S. citizens that invoke constitutional protections against military detention or trial. Like Padilla, Milligan rejected the government’s assertion of plenary power to assert military jurisdiction over citizens, holding that the citizen possesses individual constitutional rights that constrain the exercise of federal power. Like Hamdi, Quirin rejected the petitioner’s citizenship-based claim to constitutional protections under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and relied on rules and principles from cases involving non-citizens. Elements of the plenary power doctrine appear in Quirin, including judicial deference to the government’s claim that it has inherent power to try a citizen in a military forum where individual constitutional rights do not apply.

In this article, I propose that the unlawful combatant cases have erased the divide between citizens and non-citizens and created a hybrid category of citizenship. I seek to explain why rules that govern the scope of federal power over non-citizens, such as the plenary power doctrine, have begun to appear in decisions about federal power over citizens. I suggest that underlying the courts’ decisions throughout the unlawful combatant cases are determinations about the legitimacy of the individual petitioner’s citizenship. The emergence of the plenary power doctrine in these cases reflects the application of a sub rosa membership test for true citizenship that evaluates whether a citizen is entitled to the full benefits of individual constitutional rights. This membership test not only measures the strength of the individual’s connection to the United States, but also evaluates the community with which the court associates the individual and the legitimacy of that community’s claim to participation in the constitutional social contract.

Whether a citizen suspected of being an “enemy combatant” is truly a member of the national community predetermines the ultimate decision about whether the citizen is entitled to the constitutional protections of a criminal trial rather than a military forum. Those viewed as having insufficient tie to the United States community become in effect, pseudo-citizens who receive a lower level of constitutional protection than full citizens. Pseudo-citizens are subject to the plenary power doctrine, which permits law governing non-citizens to apply. This focus on the quality or nature of the individual’s citizenship is consistent with the use of the plenary power doctrine, which grew out of contexts in which citizenship was either suspect or absent.

Part I of this article describes the development of the pseudo-citizen in the Supreme Court case law starting with Milligan in 1866 and leading up to

48 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
49 Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121-22.
50 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38, 44.
51 Id. at 29-46.
the current enemy combatant cases. In the century after Milligan, the plenary power doctrine emerged through the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning groups considered outside of the national membership: Asian immigrants and Native Americans. Finally, this section explores how, in Quirin, the petitioner’s failure to meet the citizenship test coincided with the Court’s early application of elements of the plenary power doctrine to citizens accused of being enemy combatants. I propose that, in these cases, the doctrine contributed to the creation of a category of pseudo-citizens.

Part II argues that this membership test plays out in opposite ways in Hamdi and Padilla. It explores the application of the plenary power doctrine in Hamdi to citizens accused of being enemy combatants, and the tension in Padilla concerning the doctrine. Part III addresses the implications of a membership test that creates a new category of citizenship. It discusses the possible outcome of the upcoming Supreme Court decisions in Hamdi and Padilla and confronts the larger effects on both citizens and non-citizens of the malleability of citizenship categories. I observe that a hierarchy of citizenship in which some citizens receive greater constitutional protections than others upsets common understandings about equality across citizens. A membership test for citizenship is likely to disproportionately impact those citizens who are perceived as being on the margins of citizenship. It also unmoors expectations about the stability and permanency of citizenship by allowing the government, rather than the citizen, to control citizenship status. Finally, I conclude that the use of rules governing non-citizens instructs us to be cautious when fashioning rules for non-citizens because those rules may eventually be applied to citizens.

I. CITIZENSHIP, MEMBERSHIP AND THE RISE OF THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE

In the decades between the Court’s Ex Parte Milligan and Ex Parte Quirin decisions, the Court laid the groundwork for a membership test to determine whether a citizen accused of aiding the enemy was subject to a military trial rather than the constitutional protection of a criminal trial. Throughout this period, the Court applied membership and social contract principles, which focus on “the consent of a particular population to be governed” and identify who is entitled by that consent to the protections of the Constitution.

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53 See Cleveland, supra note __, at 7; Saito, Asserting Plenary Power, supra note __, at 429.
54 Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 281; Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 474.
55 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 713-14; see also id. at 726 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
56 Cleveland, supra note __, at 20.
57 Scholars of immigration jurisprudence have explored the tension between social contract/membership theory and a more inclusive view of constitutional protection based on personhood. They seek to explain the tension in the
Who is entitled to constitutional guarantees is not obvious from the text of the Constitution. Although the Constitution begins with the phrase “We the People,” it does not define who those “people” are. Few provisions of the Constitution specify that they apply to citizens only. Most provisions, particularly the Bill of Rights, either address “the people” or “persons” or couch their application in more general terms. The acquisition of citizenship appears once in the body of the Constitution, empowering Congress to enact “an uniform Rule of Naturalization.”

Social contract theory, also called membership theory, has attempted to answer the question of who “the People” are. The social contract/membership approach begins with the premise that “members of the citizenry have agreed to be governed in a particular manner.” McCulloch v. Maryland took this approach in its description of the constitutional bargain struck between the people and their government: “The government proceeds directly from the people . . . . Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.” From that contractual premise, the membership approach concludes that “[o]nly members and
beneficiaries of the social contract are able to make claims against the government.67 Conversely, “the government may act outside of the contract’s constraints against” non-members. 68

This section explores how Ex Parte Milligan’s69 use of membership/social contract theory laid the groundwork for the evolution of a category of pseudo-citizens without full membership in the citizenry. The Court’s later application of membership theory to Chinese immigrants and Native Americans spurred the development of the plenary power doctrine and led to the early construction of the pseudo-citizen. Quirin applied the membership test from Milligan and aspects of the plenary power doctrine to categorize the petitioner as a pseudo-citizen and exclude him from entitlement to the constitutional rights of the criminal process.

A. Ex Parte Milligan: The U.S. Citizen Insider

In Milligan, the Court granted the habeas petition of a citizen of Indiana who the military had detained and tried during the Civil War.70 Lamdin P. Milligan was born in Ohio71 and had lived in Indiana for twenty years before he was arrested at his home by the officer commanding the military district of Indiana.72 Military authorities had raided the offices of Milligan’s associate and confiscated “guns, ammunition, and incriminating documents.”73

A military commission tried Milligan and several others on charges of conspiring against the U.S. government, affording aid and comfort to the rebels, inciting insurrection, disloyal practices, and committing violations of the laws of war.74 These charges were based on allegations that in 1863 and 1864 Milligan had aided a secret society known as the Order of American Knights or the Sons of Liberty in an attempt to overthrow the U.S.

67 Cleveland, supra note __, at 20. See also J.M. Spector, To Ban or Not to Ban an American Taliban? Revocation of Citizenship & Statelessness in a Statecentric System, 39 CAL. W. L. REV. 263, 271-72 (Spring 2003) (describing citizenship theories based on consent); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1471, 1490 (1986) (describing citizenship as “membership in a state generated by mutual consent of a person and the state”); Michael Walzer, WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE AN AMERICAN? ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 82-95 (1996) (describing the citizen as a member of a political community who is entitled to certain benefits from the state and who must fulfill “common expectations” pertaining to that membership).
68 Cleveland, supra note __, at 20. See also Peter H. Schuck & Rogers M. Smith, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT, ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 23-24 (1985).
69 Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
70 Id. at 121-22.
71 William Rehnquist, Civil Liberty and the Civil War: The Indianapolis Treason Trials, 72 IND. L.J. 927, 932 (1997). According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, Milligan was a lawyer who had become active in Democratic politics. Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Milligan, 71 U.S. at 6, 122. Several others active in the Democratic Party were also arrested and charged, including Harrison H. Dodd, a leader of the Order of American Knights, Horace Heffren, a Democrat in the Indiana legislature, and William Bowles, in his eighties, who was a slave owner and sympathized with the South. Rehnquist, supra note __, at 932. Dodd escaped to Canada before his military trial could conclude. Id. at 933.
government, communicated with the enemy, and conspired to seize munitions stored in arsenals, liberate prisoners of war, and resist the draft. The military commission found him guilty, sentenced him to be hanged, and the President approved the War Department’s order for his execution.

A few months later, Milligan sought habeas corpus in civil court. The United States Circuit Court for Indiana empanelled a grand jury pursuant to a federal statute that made habeas corpus available to citizens of states “in which the administration of the laws in the Federal tribunals was unimpaired” once a grand jury had convened and adjourned without indictment or presentment. The grand jury considered Milligan’s case and then dispersed, having found no violation of United States laws. Milligan’s habeas corpus petition thus confronted the Supreme Court with incompatible rulings from the civil and military courts.

The Supreme Court decided, as a threshold matter, that it had jurisdiction to determine whether a military commission rather than a criminal court was the proper tribunal for Milligan. The Supreme Court then held that a military commission had no jurisdiction to try a citizen who was not a member of the military and who resided in a state loyal to the Constitution when the civil courts, created by Congress and empowered to hear criminal cases, were open and functioning. The Court rejected the government’s argument that the Bill of Rights did not apply in wartime. It held that the military trial had violated the Sixth Amendment’s requirement of a trial before an impartial jury and the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that a grand jury indictment precede all prosecutions of citizen civilians.

From one perspective, questions about membership in the national community seem to be absent in Milligan. After the Civil War, the dominant vision of federal power was of a federal government limited to the enumerated powers in the Constitution. Milligan’s holding relied upon two precepts of the enumerated powers doctrine: that the national government’s power stems solely from the enumerated powers of the Constitution, and that the powers granted to the people in the Constitution limit that federal power. First, Milligan confined the source of the government’s authority to the text of the
Constitution, rejecting arguments that law external to the Constitution such as an “unwritten criminal code” or the “laws and usages of war,” could trump constitutional provisions. Second, the constitutional powers of the states and the people prohibited the federal government from suspending civil rights and subjecting citizens to military command. The founders had “secured in a written constitution every right which the people had wrested from power during a contest of ages” and neither the President, nor Congress, nor the judiciary could disturb those rights.

In the end, Milligan reveals a deep conflict about who “the People” are who wield the constitutional power that constrains the government. While Milligan seems to extend constitutional protections to “all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances,” a closer reading of the opinion suggests a more limited membership in the constitutional community. Throughout the opinion, the Supreme Court invokes citizenship as a central source of constitutional rights and characterizes it as a status imbued with constitutional guarantees against government action.

Milligan’s citizenship is the first piece of information that the Court imparts, emphasizing that “Milligan is a citizen of the United States” and “has lived for twenty years in Indiana.” The opinion frames the “controlling question” of the case in terms of citizenship. Inquiring whether the military had jurisdiction to try and sentence Milligan, the opinion begins its response by observing that “Milligan, not a resident of one of the rebellious states, but a citizen of Indiana for twenty years past, and never in the military or naval service, is, while at his home” arrested by the military, imprisoned, convicted, and sentenced to be hanged.

Citizenship defines the rights at play in this case for the Court, evoking the constitutional protections of a criminal trial. In discussing the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the Court noted that the writ had “never before

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87 Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121-22. The military commission could not be “justif[ied] on the mandate of the President; because he is controlled by law, and has his appropriate sphere of duty, which is to execute, not to make, the laws . . . .” Id. at 121. Nor could Congress grant such power to a military commission. Id.
88 Id. at 121.
89 Id. at 124.
90 Id. at 119, 125.
91 Id. at 120. The Court emphasized that the principles of the Constitution do not yield even in “troubled times . . . when rulers and people would become restive under restraint, and seek by sharp and decisive measures to accomplish ends deemed just and proper . . . .” Id. at 120. This proclamation of the breadth of the Constitution’s protections and the universal population to which they extend flows from a vision of the Constitution as the central source of law for all people, not just citizens.
92 E.g., id. at 115 (“[t]he privilege of this great writ had never before been withheld from the citizen”), 119 (“it is the birthright of every American citizen when charged with a crime, to be tried and punished according to law”), 121 (“the ‘laws and usages of war’. . . . can never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority of the government, and where the courts are open and their process unobstructed”); see also id. at 121-22, 123, 125, 126.
93 Id. at 107.
94 Id. at 118.
been withheld from the citizen.”\textsuperscript{95} The Court stated that “it is the birthright of every American citizen when charged with a crime, to be tried and punished according to law.”\textsuperscript{96} That “birthright” entitles the American citizen to the protections of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.\textsuperscript{97} Other than those serving in the military, “citizens of states where the courts are open, if charged with crime, are guaranteed the inestimable privilege of trial by jury.”\textsuperscript{98} Military trials of civilian citizens were impermissible because “a trial by an established court, assisted by an impartial jury, was the only sure way of protecting the citizen against oppression and wrong.”\textsuperscript{99}

In this way, \textit{Milligan} addresses the question of what identifies “the People” whose powers limit the government’s actions. The Court’s answer is that citizens — at least those who reside in loyal states — belong to the class of “people” who may invoke the Constitution’s protections.\textsuperscript{100} The Court positions Milligan the Citizen as an insider, as a member of the constitutional community deserving of constitutional protections, despite allegations and evidence that he aided the enemy.

Is this emphasis on citizenship merely rhetorical? The Court’s focus on the significance of citizenship to constitutional protections appears to motivate the result in this case. Certain facts — that he is a citizen, has been a longstanding resident of Indiana, and has never lived in the rebellious states — surface again and again in the opinion.\textsuperscript{101} This refrain emphasizes Milligan’s identity with the community of citizens of Indiana and the United States.\textsuperscript{102} It assumes a significance in the opinion that transcends mere rhetorical support for the Court’s holding. His citizenship is defined less by the one-dimensional nature of his formal citizenship status than by the depth and quality of his connection to the United States.\textsuperscript{103} Milligan’s citizenship,

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\item[95] Id. at 115.
\item[96] Id. at 119.
\item[97] Id.
\item[98] Id. at 123.
\item[99] Id. at 126.
\item[100] See Leti Volpp, \textit{The Citizen and the Terrorist}, 49 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1575, 1592 (June 2002) (positing citizenship as a form of inclusion, in which citizens “imagine fellow members who are to be included in a network of kinship or membership”).
\item[101] Id. at 107 (“The case made by the petition is this: Milligan is a citizen of the United States; has lived for twenty years in Indiana; and, at the time of the grievances complained of, was not, and never had been in the military or naval service of the United States”), 108 (“Milligan insists that said military commission had no jurisdiction to try him . . . because he was a citizen of the United States and the State of Indiana, and had not been, since the commencement of the late Rebellion, a resident of any of the States whose citizens were arrayed against the government”), 118 (“Milligan, not a resident of one of the rebellious states, or a prisoner of war, but a citizen of Indiana” for twenty years past, and never in the military or naval service, is, while at his home, arrested by the military power of the United States”), 131 (“It is not easy to see how he can be treated as a prisoner of war, when he lived in Indiana for the past twenty years, was arrested there, and had not been, during the late troubles, a resident of any of the states in rebellion”).
\item[102] See Volpp \textit{supra}, note \textsuperscript{100} at 1593 (focusing on the role of ideology in “either including one as a citizen or excluding one from membership”).
\item[103] See Peter H. Schuck, \textit{Citizenship in Federal Systems}, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 207-08 (Spring 2000) (comparing the “legal” dimension of citizenship, which “emphasizes the positive law that creates the distinctive status of citizen,” with the “psychological” dimension which measures an individual’s identification with a particular
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the length of his residence in Indiana, and his connection to that state form a sort of “minimum contacts” test\(^\text{104}\) that measures the strength of the connection between the citizen and the citizenry.

Yet, applying a social contract-membership approach could lead to the opposite conclusion from the one the Court reached. Milligan arguably breached the social contract through his alleged conduct.\(^\text{105}\) In the midst of a war over the very survival of the social contract, why not permit a military commission to decide whether Milligan remained a party to that contract?

The answer may lie in \textit{Milligan}’s dual vision of the social contract that underlies the Constitution. The social contract between the government and its people includes, on one level, individual citizens. On a second level, in \textit{Milligan}, “the people” are composed of the people of the state or the nation as a whole. The Court examines the effect of military jurisdiction on both levels. In addition to addressing whether the Constitution endowed Milligan with enforceable rights as an individual member of the social contract, the Court also focused on the people of Indiana and the United States. This second view of membership hearkens back to the social contract theory in \textit{McCulloch v. Maryland}.\(^\text{106}\) \textit{McCulloch} described the bargain as struck primarily between the people of their states and the national government, and secondarily requiring the “assent of the states” themselves.\(^\text{107}\) This agreement was entered into by delegates “chosen in each state by the people” of that state.\(^\text{108}\) In this view, the people of the states as a whole compose the membership of the community that entered into the social contract.

This collective bargain manifests itself in two ways in \textit{Milligan}. First, the opinion characterizes the government’s use of a military commission instead of a criminal court as flouting the instruction of the people’s national representatives. Congress had created a statutory process to determine the loyalty of citizens like Milligan who had been detained by the military.\(^\text{109}\) It “declared penalties against the offences charged, provided for their punishment, and directed [the Circuit Court of Indiana] to hear and determine them.”\(^\text{110}\) In effect, the legislature had defined a protected category of citizens who were within the circle of membership. The military trial evaded these instructions.

Second, the opinion turned to the people of Indiana. The loyalty of the

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\(^{105}\) Milligan was charged with insurrection, conspiring against the government, communicating with and aiding the enemy, conspiring to seize weapons and liberate prisoners of war. \textit{Milligan}, 71 U.S. at 6-7, 122.


\(^{107}\) Id. at 403.

\(^{108}\) Id.

\(^{109}\) \textit{Milligan}, 71 U.S. at 115-16, 122.

\(^{110}\) Id. at 122.
state of Indiana and its people marked them as members of the constitutional community and affirmed their accord with the constitutional contract. The proceeding in the Indiana Circuit Court “was held in a state, eminently distinguished for its patriotism, by judges commissioned during the Rebellion.”\(^{111}\) Its people composed the jury, “upright, intelligent, and selected by a marshal appointed by the President,” that participated in providing Milligan the constitutional right to trial by jury.\(^{112}\) The community of citizens of Indiana who composed the grand jury found no criminal violation,\(^{113}\) indicating that they, as a jury of Milligan’s peers, had seen no reason to exclude him from their group. Thus, the use of the military commission upstaged and demeaned the authority provided under the Constitution to the states and the people. It violated the bargain embodied in the Constitution between “the people” of the state of Indiana and the government they and others had created.

The outcome of the case directly relates to the connection between Milligan’s citizenship and the community of citizens of Indiana. The issue of whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments applied related to his status as a member of the citizenry of Indiana. The Court rejected the application of the “laws and usages of war” to citizens “in states which have upheld the authority of the government.”\(^{114}\) Milligan’s connection to Indiana permits that state’s loyalty to act as a proxy for Milligan’s, nullifying his alleged disloyalty. As a citizen of a loyal state, regardless of his own beliefs or actions, the benefits of membership apply to guarantee him a criminal trial. By affirmatively considering the loyalty of the state of Indiana and the value of the participation of its people in the criminal process, the Court elevated to constitutional magnitude the harm that trial by military commission might do to this second level of the social contract.

On the strength of this social contract analysis, the government’s accusations of treason and insurrection did not cause the Court to exclude Milligan as an outsider. He is never characterized as a member of the enemy forces. The anti-governmental actions of which he is accused scarcely make an appearance in the opinion, and then only after its central holdings.\(^{115}\) Even when the Court suggests that those who conspire against the government in wartime are “dangerous enemies,”\(^{116}\) their alleged actions are “crimes” and the

\(^{111}\) Id.

\(^{112}\) Id.

\(^{113}\) Id. at 107-08, 122.

\(^{114}\) Id. at 121.

\(^{115}\) Id. at 107, 122 (referring to the accusations merely as “certain charges and specifications”). Even then, they are almost an afterthought, an opportunity for the Court to condemn the alleged conduct without attaching to it any significance that would impact the outcome of the case. The Court stated: “[A]lthough Milligan’s trial and conviction by a military commission was illegal, yet, if guilty of the crimes imputed to him, and his guilt had been ascertained by an established court and impartial jury, he deserved severe punishment.” Id. at 130 (emphasis in original).

\(^{116}\) Id. at 130 (stating “Open resistance to the measures deemed necessary to subdue a great rebellion . . . becomes an enormous crime when it assumes the form of a secret political organization, armed to oppose the laws,
“enemies” are subject to criminal law, not a military trial.\footnote{Id. ("[T]hose concerned in [such conspiracies] are dangerous enemies to their country, and should receive the heaviest penalties of law, as an example to deter others from similar criminal conduct.").} \textit{Milligan} is usually interpreted as a case about the scope of constitutional protections for citizens during wartime.\footnote{See e.g., \textit{Duncan v. Kahanamoku}, 327 U.S. 304, 314 (1946); \textit{Rehnquist, supra note }\textit{__, at }130, 137.} Its holding could have been limited to the unique context of the Civil War, and the emphasis on citizenship explained by the need to promote unity among a divided people just after the war ended. Yet the case takes up more interpretive space than that. It employed the enumerated powers doctrine to constrain the federal government and constitutionally empower Milligan and the citizens of Indiana. It enlivened notions of social contract and membership to centralize citizenship within the constitutional inquiry. And it defined the guideposts for identifying those citizens that belonged within the membership: indicia of association with a state or community considered a party to the social contract, and the potential for harm to that community’s stake in the social contract. These guideposts find application beyond the Civil War in later cases addressing citizens and foreign wars.

\textbf{B. Plenary Power and the Pseudo-Citizen}

Nearly a century passed between \textit{Milligan} and \textit{Ex Parte Quirin}, the next time the Court confronted the extent of federal power over citizens accused as enemy combatants. During this century, the plenary power doctrine emerged through case law that excluded particular groups – primarily Native Americans and Asian immigrants – from membership in the constitutional community.\footnote{See id. at 25-158; Saito, \textit{Asserting Plenary Power, supra note }\textit{__, at }434-43; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, \textit{SIMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP} 11-36 (2002) [hereinafter "SIMBLANCES"] . These scholars have also explored a third context: the territories. \textit{See Cleveland, supra note }\textit{__, at }163-250; Saito, \textit{Asserting Plenary Power, supra note }\textit{__, at }443-47, 455-58. I do not focus on the territories in this article.} Citizenship, or the lack of it, was a central feature of the Court’s move towards expansive federal power and away from a national government limited by the constitutional division of power between the federal government, the states, and the people. The Court’s use of membership theory in formulating the plenary power doctrine led to the construction of a pseudo-citizenship subject to greater federal power and fewer constitutional protections.\footnote{Criticism of the plenary power doctrine has been legion. \textit{See, e.g., Wishnie, supra note }\textit{__, at }503 & n.51 (noting “The plenary power doctrine has suffered withering criticism as a shameful and racist relic”) (collecting citations).}

This section will first sketch the outlines of the modern plenary power doctrine as it appeared in \textit{United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp.}.\footnote{\textit{United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp.}, 299 U.S. 304 (1936).}
Second, it will examine how membership theory influenced the plenary power doctrine’s application to the constitutional rights of non-citizens: immigrants seeking to enter or remain in the United States and Native Americans before their naturalization by statute. Third, it will explore the Court’s decisions about whether the plenary power doctrine continued to apply when Native Americans and immigrants subsequently became citizens.

1. **Curtiss-Wright** and the Plenary Power Doctrine

The plenary power doctrine emerged in its modern form in the Supreme Court’s 1936 decision in *Curtiss-Wright*, over 60 years after *Milligan*. The case arose from allegations that the Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation sold arms to Bolivia in violation of a presidential proclamation that prohibited such sales. The Supreme Court upheld the proclamation against the challenge that it was an invalid delegation of legislative power to the executive.

*Curtiss-Wright* articulated three characteristics of the plenary power doctrine: reliance on a source of federal power that originated outside of the text of the Constitution, the absence of substantive constitutional limits on that power, and judicial deference to executive or legislative decisions that extend from that power. It also took two steps that would later influence the treatment of U.S. citizens detained as enemy combatants.

First, *Curtiss-Wright* took a great step away from *Milligan*’s reliance on the enumerated powers of the Constitution as the source of federal power and a constraint upon that power. Instead, it confined the enumerated powers doctrine to “internal affairs,” excluding it from contexts that involve sovereignty or nationality.

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123 *Curtiss-Wright*, 299 U.S. at 318-22.
124 Id. at 311. The proclamation was made pursuant to a joint resolution of Congress. *Id.*
125 Id. at 333.
126 Id. at 318-22; see Cleveland, supra note __, at 5 (delineating the three characteristics).
127 *Curtiss-Wright*, 299 U.S. at 318-19 (declaring that “the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution” and, consistent with international law, the President was the “sole organ of the nation in its external relations”). Federal authority over foreign affairs was inherent in the United States’ status as an independent sovereign. *Id.*
128 *Id.* (rejecting claims of constitutional restraint on federal power in the acquisition of territory, expulsion of aliens, and the making of international agreements, and declaring that “[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory”).
129 Id. at 322 (cautioning that the Court “should not be in haste” to craft judicial rules about federal power in foreign relations and warning courts to “hesitate long before limiting or embarrassing” the “sovereignty” and “powers of nationality” of the federal government) (quoting Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915)).
130 Id. at 315-16 (rejecting the “broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution”).
131 See *id* at 322. The federal powers to “acquire territory by discovery and occupation,” to “expel undesirable aliens” and to make “such international agreements as do not constitute treaties in the constitutional sense” were “inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality” despite not being “expressly affirmed by the
Second, Curtiss-Wright carefully divorced its holding from U.S. citizens. It declared that “[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens.” Thus, citizens appeared to remain firmly within constitutional boundaries and outside of the reach of the plenary power doctrine.

Although Curtiss-Wright is acclaimed as the first full articulation of the plenary power doctrine, its beginnings have been traced to the 19th century, shortly after the decision in Milligan.133 Despite Curtiss Wright’s exempting citizens from its holding, the history of the doctrine reveals that citizens who were perceived as less than full members of the citizenry could, in fact, be subject to the plenary power doctrine. It is this history that opened the way to the doctrine’s application in the current enemy combatant cases.

2. The Early Development of the Plenary Power Doctrine: Non-Citizens

In the early 1800s, prior to Milligan, both Native Americans and Chinese immigrants were considered citizens of foreign states, and Congress barred them from becoming naturalized U.S. citizens.134 The enumerated powers doctrine also limited the federal government’s power over Native Americans to the constitutional provisions that expressly addressed them.135 Beginning two decades after Milligan, the Court reversed its reliance on the enumerated powers doctrine and invoked membership principles to justify expanding federal power over both Native Americans and immigrants. In separate decisions, the Court described both communities as aberrant states, existing within but apart from the nation.

In United States v. Kagama, the Court held that Congress had authority to legislate a criminal code for Native Americans.136 The Court based its decision in part on a view of Native Americans that excluded them as a community from equal membership in the polity. As dependents of the federal government, the tribes were fully within the “exclusive sovereignty” of the government: “The power of the General Government over these remnants

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132 Id. (emphasis added).
133 See Cleveland, supra note __, at 25-158; Saito, Asserting Plenary Power, supra note __, at 434-43; Aleinikoff,SEMBLANCES, supra note __, at 11-36.
134 See Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 28 (1882), repealed by Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, § 1, 57 Stat. 600 (1943); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 19-20 (1831) (holding that under Article III, the Court had no jurisdiction over Native American tribes as “foreign states”); see Naturalization Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 103 (1790) (limiting naturalization to “free white persons”), repealed by 70A Stat. 644 (1956). See also Saito, Asserting Plenary Power, supra note __, at 436 (describing legislative and judicial racial restrictions on citizenship prior to the Fourteenth Amendment).
135 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832) (holding that the War, Treaty and Indian Commerce clauses of the Constitution governed the relationship between Native Americans and the national government). Worcester also rejected the argument that international law provided a source of authority in lieu of the Constitution. Id. at 543-46.
136 118 U.S. 375, 380 (1886).
of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. 137 Later, the Court would describe the Native Americans as “wards of the nation,” “in a state of pupilage,” and as such subject to federal plenary authority. 138 This child-like relationship with the federal government left no room for conceiving of the tribes as equal parties to the constitutional contract.

Three years after Kagama, in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 139 the Court held that Congress had sovereign power to exclude Chinese resident aliens from re-entry into the country, despite a treaty with China that had guaranteed their reentry. 140 Like Kagama, Chae Chan Ping relied heavily on membership and social contract theory to deny constitutional protections to Chinese residents. In rebutting the argument that resident aliens were “persons” entitled to the panoply of constitutional rights, the Court described the Chinese as a race inherently separate from the members of the national community, “a Chinese settlement within the state, without any interest in our country or its institutions.” 141 Instead, “they remained strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, and adhering to the customs and usages of their own country. It seemed impossible for them to assimilate with our people, or to make any change in their habits or modes of living.” 142

This refusal to assimilate constituted a breach of the social contract. Because the Chinese “retained the habits and customs of their own country,” 143 they set themselves apart from “our people,” the primary parties to the social contract. As a result, Chinese immigrants had no claim to the constitutional protections that were the benefit of the constitutional bargain. 144

137 Id. at 384.
138 Stephens, 174 U.S. at 484. Plenary power drawn from sovereignty undergirded federal authority to lease tribal lands without tribal consent, see Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 307-08 (1902), determine the citizenship of tribes, abolish tribal laws and courts, legislate the division of tribal lands, and subject the tribes to the jurisdiction of the United States, see Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 478, 486-92 (1899) (rejecting Fifth Amendment takings challenge). This power brooked no interference from judicial consideration of individual constitutional rights: “Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government.” Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (rejecting Fifth Amendment due process and takings claims).
139 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
140 Id. at 589. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the Constitution did not empower Congress to expel permanent residents and that the due process clause protected them from arbitrary expulsion. Id. at 589-90, 609; Cleveland, supra note __, at 124-26 & n.874 (citing Briefs for Appellant by Attorneys Houndly and Carter at 30, 62). Instead, it turned to sources of sovereign power outside any specific constitutional provision, locating adequate federal authority in international principles governing national territory, and sovereign concerns for self-preservation and security. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 603-04, 606; see also Saito, Asserting Plenary Power, supra note __, at 435. The decision did not address Chae Chan Ping’s constitutional due process arguments. See Saito, Asserting Plenary Power, supra note __, at 435; Cleveland, supra note __, at 131.
141 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 595-96
142 Id. at 595.
143 Id.
144 Later decisions relied on membership/social contract theory to expand the notion that powers inherent in sovereignty rather than constitutional grants of authority were the source of federal control over Native Americans and immigrants. Upholding immigration statutes excluding individuals deemed likely to become a public charge, the Court declared that under international law, “every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and
The Court’s decisions hearken back to the second level of the social contract from *Milligan* that looked to whether the group to which the individual belonged was part of the “people” of the constitutional community. These aberrational communities contrast markedly with *Milligan*’s staunchly loyal and civic-minded state of Indiana. Unworthy of the constitutional contract to which the citizenry of Indiana was a party in *Milligan*, the Native American tribes and Chinese communities were incapable of employing that contract to imbue their Native American and immigrant members with constitutional protection.

3. The Acquisition of Citizenship and the Plenary Power Doctrine

The beginning of the twentieth century brought two major expansions in U.S. citizenship: the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment granting citizenship to those born in the United States\(^{145}\) and Congress’s naturalization of the Native American tribes.\(^{146}\) The question arose whether this new enfranchisement affected the government’s plenary power over the Native Americans and children of Chinese residents.

In *United States v. Wong Kim Ark*, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s grant of birthright citizenship included the offspring of Chinese immigrants.\(^{147}\) The specter that birthright citizenship would confer full constitutional rights on this aberrant group and that the government would lose its plenary power to exclude them engendered stormy debate among the justices.\(^{148}\) In a strident dissent, Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Harlan argued that Congress had the power to bar “all persons of a particular race, or their children,” from citizenship.\(^{149}\) Nevertheless, the majority held that the plenary power of the government to expel Chinese aliens from the country did not trump the Fourteenth Amendment’s grant of citizenship to all those born

\(^{139}\) *Nishimura Ekiu v. United States*, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) ; see also id. at 660 (rejecting arguments that constitutional due process protected all “persons” within U.S. jurisdiction, reasoning that the decisions of the President and Congress constituted sufficient due process of law for entering aliens without a claim to membership). The following year, the Court declared that the “right to exclude or to expel all aliens,” including permanent residents, was “an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation.” *Fong Yue Ting v. United States*, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893). This expansion of inherent federal power over immigrants was concentrated in decisions about immigrants who sought to enter or remain in national territory. *e.g.*, *Chae Chan Ping*, 130 U.S. 581; *Ekiu*, 142 U.S. at 659. Inherent federal power encountered greater judicial resistance when applied to aliens within the United States who were not seeking entry or fighting deportation. *e.g.*, *Yick Wo v. Hopkins*, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (striking down San Francisco ordinance that discriminated on the basis of alienage as a violation of the Equal Protection clause).

\(^{145}\) U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.


\(^{148}\) Id. at 705-06, 726 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the majority’s ruling would exempt the native-born children from the plenary power that permitted the government to deport their parents).

\(^{149}\) Id. at 732 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.\footnote{150}

This unity between citizenship and constitutional immunity from federal plenary power disintegrated when Native American tribes obtained U.S. citizenship.\footnote{151} In a series of decisions, the Court held that federal plenary power over Native Americans was consistent with their acquisition of citizenship.\footnote{152} In \textit{Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock}, despite legislation granting citizenship to the Cherokee tribe, the Court denied the Cherokees’ Fifth Amendment due process and takings claims.\footnote{153} Although Congress had invested the tribes with citizenship, the Court held that Congress retained plenary control over the administration of tribal property and that the judiciary must defer to that power.\footnote{154} The takings question, therefore, was “not one for the courts.”\footnote{155}

Here too, the second level of the social contract influenced the Court’s decision about whether the Native American citizen could invoke constitutional rights. Unlike the people of the loyal states in \textit{Milligan}, the tribes were “a state, or separate community,”\footnote{156} apart from the national community and unable to imbue their members with the benefits of the social contract. The inability of the tribes as a community to enter into this second level of the social contract stemmed from their race. Conferring citizenship did not change the race of the Native Americans, who remained dependent on the federal government\footnote{157} and were not entitled to the “privileges and immunities” associated with U.S. citizenship.\footnote{158} Despite the tribes’ claim to citizenship, they were “nevertheless Indians in race, customs, and domestic government,” and like other Native American communities, required “special consideration and protection”\footnote{159} by the United States “as a superior and
civilized nation.”\textsuperscript{160}

In contrast to the state of Indiana acting as a proxy for Milligan in the social contract, the tribes’ exclusion from the social contract acted as a proxy for the exclusion of Native American citizens as individuals. In \textit{United States v. Sandoval},\textsuperscript{161} the Court held that the citizenship of tribal members was not “an obstacle to the exercise by Congress of its power to enact laws for the benefit and protection of tribal Native Americans as a dependent people.”\textsuperscript{162} Although a few individual Native Americans may have shown themselves ready for citizenship,\textsuperscript{163} the “degraded,” “simple, uninformed, and inferior” nature of the tribe as a whole justified Congressional plenary power.\textsuperscript{164}

4. \textbf{Plenary Power and the Pseudo-Citizen}

The result of the immigrant and Native American tribe exclusions was the creation of a type of citizenship distinct from that described in \textit{Milligan}. The citizen in \textit{Milligan} possessed the constitutional clout to limit the federal government to its enumerated powers. In contrast, in the Native American and immigrant exclusion cases, lack of citizenship expanded the scope of federal plenary power and limited constitutional protections. Once Native Americans were granted citizenship, that status provided no greater footing for constitutional rights. These cases suggest that for communities excluded from membership, citizenship was not sufficient to stave off application of the plenary power doctrine.

It is tempting to discard these instances as bygone relics of race-based thinking, or pigeonhole them as relevant only to the specialized areas of immigration and Native American jurisprudence. These cases, however, reflect a thoroughly modern conflict between two theories of citizenship. The first, a “formal or nominal membership in an organized political community”\textsuperscript{165} is exemplified by the Fourteenth Amendment’s grant of birthright citizenship to native-born Chinese or the statutory citizenship of the Native Americans. The second is citizenship as identity or solidarity with a...

\textsuperscript{160}Id. at 46; see also Cleveland, supra note __, at 75.
\textsuperscript{161}231 U.S. 28 (1913).
\textsuperscript{162}Id. at 48.
\textsuperscript{163}Id. at 41 (quoting a report from the federal superintendent in Albuquerque: “While a few of these Pueblo Indians are ready for citizenship. . . a large per cent of them are unable, and not yet enough advanced along the lines of civilization, to take upon themselves the burden of citizenship.”).
\textsuperscript{164}Id. at 39, 45; see also id. at 46 (stating “in respect of distinctly Indian communities the questions whether, to what extent, and for what time they shall be recognized and dealt with as dependent tribes requiring the guardianship and protection of the United States are to be determined by Congress, and not by the courts.” (quoting \textit{Tiger v. Western Invest. Co.}, 221 U.S. 286, 315 (1911)).
nation and its members. Formal citizenship status highlights equality among citizens and distinctions between citizens and non-citizens. Solidarity with a nation implies patriotism, evoking loyalty to country and compatriots.

Under these two models of citizenship, Milligan can be seen as a case in which both formal citizenship status (of Milligan) and identity and solidarity (of the state of Indiana) led to full citizenship for Milligan. The Native American cases, in contrast, are the result of a divergence between the formal legal citizenship status of the individual Native American and the tribes’ lack of identity and solidarity with the nation and its members. As a result, Milligan’s full citizenship entitled him to constitutional rights against excessive federal power, while Native Americans became pseudo-citizens, entitled to a lesser set of rights and subject to greater plenary power.

The Court’s decisions about immigrants and Native Americans laid the groundwork for the full articulation of the plenary power doctrine in Curtiss-Wright, as Sarah Cleveland has described. Curtiss-Wright explicitly relied on the immigrant exclusion cases to bolster inherent federal power. While Curtiss-Wright suggested that U.S. citizenship was a dividing line between the use of the plenary power doctrine and the full application of the Constitution, this suggestion was to be short-lived. By 1942, Ex Parte Quirin would employ aspects of the plenary power doctrine during the Second World War to sanction the military trial of a captured soldier who

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166 Bosniak, Citizenship, supra note __, at 480. It evokes “the quality of belonging – the felt aspects of community membership.” Id. at 479 (citing Derek Heater, CITIZENSHIP: THE CIVIC IDEAL IN WORLD HISTORY, POLITICS AND EDUCATION (1990)). See also William E. Connolly, IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC NEGOTIATIONS OF POLITICAL PARADOX 198 (1991)).

167 See Scaperlanda, supra note __, at 718. One either has equal status as a citizen among other citizens, or lesser status as an alien. “When citizenship is understood as formal legal membership in the polity, aliens remain outsiders to citizenship; they reside in the host country only at the country's discretion; there are often restrictions imposed on their travel; they are denied the right to participate politically at the national level; and they are often precluded from naturalizing.” Bosniak, Citizenship, supra note __, at 461-62.

168 Bosniak, Citizenship, supra note __, at 480. Patriotism “takes as given that members of the nation experience themselves as part of a collective whole, part of a shared national culture or project.” Id. at 481. This approach to citizenship has attracted critique as myopically focused on the nation-state as the location of citizenship, when individuals often experience stronger feelings of identity and solidarity with social or cultural groups or with transnational and transborder groups other than members of the same nation, or with a more global community. See id. at 480-85 (arguing that that “at least some politically and socially-based non-state communities— including some that have taken form across national boundaries—can serve as sites of citizenship identity and solidarity”); id. at 480 n. 136 (citing Ernest Gellner, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (1983)).

169 Id. at 463-64 (describing the enjoyment of rights as “the defining feature of societal membership”).

170 Cleveland, supra note __, at 273-77(citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318-19, 322). She notes “The decisions in the Indian, alien, and territory cases do much to explain, though not to justify, the inherent powers analysis of Curtiss-Wright.” Id. at 273 (proposing that these cases engendered the turn toward extra-constitutional sources of inherent federal power, the absence of limitations on that power from individual constitutional protections, and the extreme judicial deference that later appeared in Curtiss-Wright as the three hallmarks of the plenary power doctrine).

171 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318 (citing Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893)).

172 Id. at 318 (stating that “[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens”).

claimed U.S. citizenship.

C. Ex Parte Quirin: Breaking Down the Citizen/Alien Divide

Ex Parte Quirin appears to radically depart from Milligan in subjecting a U.S. citizen accused of colluding with the enemy to a military tribunal rather than the criminal process.174 Scholars have labeled Quirin an unprecedented expansion of federal power in its deference to the executive’s military trial of a U.S. citizen when the civilian courts were open and available.175 Yet Quirin follows the lead of Milligan and the early plenary power cases in focusing on the indicia of full citizenship and the quality of the community with which the Court associates the citizen seeking habeas corpus. Quirin and the more recent enemy combatant cases reveal an emphatic distancing of the petitioners from the community of U.S. citizens, and a relocation of the accused citizens to the realm of foreigners.

1. Ex Parte Quirin: the Citizen Outsider

As in Milligan, the issue in Quirin was whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments required a jury trial rather than a military trial.176 In Quirin, the Court denied writs of habeas corpus to eight soldiers of the German army.177 The soldiers had been delivered by submarine to beaches on Long Island and in Florida with instructions to destroy war industries and facilities in the United States.178 They were arrested in Chicago and New York City, and tried before a military tribunal.179 The eight challenged the jurisdiction of the military tribunals to try them when the civil courts were open and functioning.180 One, Herbert Haupt, claimed to be a naturalized citizen and asserted that, consistent with Milligan, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments precluded a military trial.181 The Court declined to inquire into Haupt’s claim.

174 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 40-45.
176 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 40-45.
177 Id. at 48.
178 Id. at 21. Upon landing in the United States, they removed their uniforms and buried them. Id. at 21. It is likely that they landed in uniform in order to ensure that, if captured, they would be classified as lawful combatants under international conventions. See Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 328, 335 (2002); Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31 (defining an unlawful combatant as one “who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property”).
179 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21.
180 Id. at 18-19, 24.
181 Id. at 20, 24. Although Quirin addresses only Haupt’s claim of citizenship, in fact there was another naturalized citizen among the eight whose citizenship the Court never mentions. See Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military Governance in a Madisonian Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 649, 735 (August 2002) (citing Robert E. Cushman, Ex Parte Quirin et al.--The Nazi Saboteur Case, 28
to citizenship,"^{182} reasoning that there was no distinction between alien and citizen belligerents. Since the federal government exercised discretion over both, the Court upheld the use of the military commission to try Haupt.\textsuperscript{183}

In contrast to the elevation of citizenship status in \textit{Milligan}, \textit{Quirin} entirely subordinated the role of citizenship in the inquiry about the constitutional rights of citizens suspected of being enemy combatants. The opinion accomplished this in three moves, each of which implicates membership principles. First, it aligned the petitioner with outsiders – Haupt’s German companions.\textsuperscript{184} In the process it excluded him from membership in the U.S. citizenry and from the benefits of the constitutional contract. Second, it aggregated citizens and non-citizens within a single category, the “enemy belligerent,”\textsuperscript{185} permitting the same legal standards to apply to all within it. Third, it applied law governing foreigners and foreign nations. In short, \textit{Quirin}’s aggregation of citizens and non-citizens within the single category of enemy belligerents admits, with one stroke, the application to a U.S. citizen of norms created to apply to non-citizens and pseudo-citizens.

The opinion’s introduction of Haupt aligns him with the non-citizen petitioners so strongly that he is indistinguishable from them:

\begin{quote}
All the petitioners were born in Germany; all have lived in the United States. All returned to Germany between 1933 and 1941. All except petitioner Haupt are admittedly citizens of the German Reich, with which the United States is at war.”\textsuperscript{186}
\end{quote}

Like \textit{Milligan} and the plenary power cases, the Court’s description of Haupt burrows beneath the surface of formal citizenship status. Haupt’s U.S. citizenship is submerged within his identification with the seven German citizens.

The Court in \textit{Quirin} distinguishes Haupt from the archetypal member of the citizenry in a way that contrasts with \textit{Milligan}’s refrain about the petitioner’s long-term association with the state of Indiana. The Court highlights the involuntary and inadvertent nature of Haupt’s acquisition of citizenship: “Haupt came to this country with his parents when he was five

\begin{footnotes}

\item Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38.

\item Id. at 44. \textit{Quirin} has been criticized as lacking in precedent, hastily decided, and politically and circumstantially motivated. \textit{E.g.}, Bryant & Tobias, \textit{Quirin, supra note ___}, at 361-63; Belknap, \textit{supra note ___}, at 471-77. \textit{See also} Katyal & Tribe, \textit{supra note ___}, at 1291 (suggesting that “Quirin plainly fits the criteria typically offered for judicial confinement or reconsideration” because it was “rendered under extreme time pressure, with respect to which there are virtually no reliance interests at stake, and where the statute itself has constitutional dimensions suggesting that its construction should be guided by relevant developments in constitutional law.”).

\item Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20.

\item Id. at 24.

\item Id. at 20.
\end{footnotes}
years old; it is contended that he became a citizen of the United States by virtue of the naturalization of his parents during his minority and that he has not since lost his citizenship. Haupt thus arrived in the United States when he was too young to make weighty decisions about nationality, and his claimed naturalization was second-hand, trickling down through his parents. The Court portrays Haupt as an accidental citizen; one who acquired citizenship through no fault of his own, and, for unexplained reasons, never lost it.

At this point, the Court was at a crossroads. It could have taken up the question whether Haupt was a citizen as a formal matter by deciding whether, as the government contended, Haupt had “renounced or abandoned his United States citizenship” and “elected to maintain German allegiance and citizenship.” If the Court had found that Haupt was not a citizen, it might have avoided altogether considering the role of citizenship in determining an accused citizen’s constitutional rights.

In a brief paragraph, the Court discarded the relevance of Haupt’s citizenship to whether he could be tried by a military commission in an area of the United States where the civil courts were operating. It reasoned that U.S. citizenship does not relieve citizens “who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts” from the consequences of a violation of the law of war. It distinguished Milligan from Haupt on that basis because, unlike Haupt, “Milligan, not being a part of or associated with the armed forces of the enemy, was a non-belligerent, not subject to the law of war.…"

This passage can be read as merely distinguishing Haupt from Milligan by labeling Haupt an enemy belligerent and Milligan as a non-belligerent. But the distinction does not hold up under scrutiny. Although the Court asserted that the difference between Haupt and Milligan lay in Haupt’s
association with the armed forces of the enemy, the offenses alleged in both cases are difficult to distinguish. Milligan and his secret society, like the saboteurs in *Quirin*, were accused of aiding the enemy, inciting insurrection, disrupting the war effort, and conspiring to send arms and currency to the enemy. While Milligan was not accused of wearing the uniform of the enemy army, the charges against him were, in essence, the same as those in *Quirin* — that he “associated” with the enemy and was “bent on hostile acts.”

*Quirin* is consistent with *Milligan* and the immigrant and Native American cases because it applied a kind of “minimum contacts” test, analyzing certain factors that signal connection with the United States, e.g., the citizen’s place of birth, length of residence in the United States, and residence (or lack thereof) in enemy territory. *Quirin* contrasted Haupt’s accidental acquisition of citizenship by echoing *Milligan*’s recurring emphasis on the indicia of full citizenship, describing Milligan as “a citizen twenty years resident in Indiana, who had never been a resident of any of the states in rebellion.” Unlike *Milligan*, *Quirin* focused on Haupt’s lack of connection to the United States and his alignment with a belligerent foreign nation to conclude that no constitutional protections applied. Justice Stone’s analysis of the quality of Haupt’s citizenship resulted in excluding him from the national membership in a way that is reminiscent of the resident aliens in the immigrant exclusion cases and the pseudo-citizens of the Native American cases.

*Quirin* also evaluated the second level of the social contract in which the state or national community holds a constitutional interest in the rights that an accused citizen asserts. Like *Milligan*’s focus on the loyalty of the state of Indiana and its near-silence about the acts Milligan was accused of, *Quirin* highlighted Haupt’s association with a community: the citizenry of Germany and the members of its army. Using this lens, the Court’s characterization of Haupt as indistinguishable from the other Germans allowed the group of German soldiers to act as a proxy for his membership in the same way that the citizens of Indiana did for Milligan or the tribes did for individual Native Americans. Haupt’s association with the members of the enemy nation excluded him from the benefits of the social contract.

Aligning Haupt so completely with the rest of the German soldiers foreclosed any judicial consideration of the interest of another potential party to the social contract: the citizenry of the United States. The opinion does not confront the possibility that the military trial of Haupt deprived the people of

193 Id.
194 *Milligan*, 71 U.S. at 6, 122.
195 Id.
196 See *Int’l Shoe Co.*, 326 U.S. at 316.
197 *Quirin*, 317 U.S. at 45.
the United States of a constitutionally significant interest in participating in the process of determining Haupt’s guilt.

2. The Alien Citizen

*Quirin* erased the distinction between citizen and non-citizen enemy belligerents. Drawing a parallel between aliens and “citizen enemies,” the Court reasoned that since the Fifth and Sixth Amendments permitted military trial of “offenders [who] are aliens not members of our Armed Forces, it is plain that [the Amendments] present no greater obstacle to the trial in like manner of citizen enemies . . . .”

The Court contrasted this undifferentiated enemy belligerent category with members of the loyal community. It asserted that the drafters of the Constitution would not have excepted “members of our own armed forces charged with infractions of the Articles of War” from the guarantee of trial by jury while extending it to “alien or citizen offenders against the law of war.” These “members of our own armed forces” are parties to the social contract and embody archetypal members of the national community. It would be inconsistent to deny constitutional protections to these full members while granting them to aliens and pseudo-citizens outside of the constitutional contract.

The Court’s description of Haupt’s citizenship as an inadvertent naturalization and the consequent devolution in his status to that of an alien without constitutional protections is reminiscent of the way that membership principles limited the constitutional rights of immigrants and Native Americans under the plenary power doctrine. Just as the Court drew on principles from the immigrant exclusion cases to expand plenary authority over Native Americans, *Quirin* drew on a parallel to aliens to minimize the role of citizenship in determining whether constitutional protections applied to Haupt. Similarly, the conclusion that Native Americans, though nominally citizens, were incapable of membership in the national community mirrors *Quirin’s* portrayal of Haupt’s accidental citizenship and his resulting exclusion from full citizenship. In both contexts, the Court concluded that citizenship alone did not bestow constitutional protection against the

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198 *Id.* at 44.
199 *Id.*
200 The armed forces also constitute a category that does not distinguish on the basis of citizenship status. They are composed of both citizens and non-citizens, as the Court points out in its reference to “aliens not members of our Armed Forces.” *Quirin*, 317 U.S. at 44. In this light, the Court appears to act as an equalizing force, erasing distinctions based on citizenship so that citizen and alien alike, loyal member and disloyal belligerent alike, receive equal protection under the Constitution when accused of the same offenses.
201 See *Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock*, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (relying on *Chae Chan Ping*, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) to hold that Congress could abrogate treaties with Indians in the same way that it could abrogate treaties with foreign nations).
sovereign power of the government.

3. Membership and Plenary Power

Breaching the divide between citizenship and alienage in Quirin coincides with the appearance of central elements of the plenary power doctrine. Quirin embodies a struggle between the enumerated powers doctrine that held sway in Milligan and the plenary power doctrine developed in the Native American and immigration cases. The opinion does not rely expressly on the plenary power doctrine, and in fact Justice Stone asserts in his opinion that the enumerated powers doctrine governs his analysis. Yet all three hallmarks of the plenary power doctrine ground the decision: reliance on inherent federal power derived from sources of law that originate outside of the Constitution; diminished constitutional limitations on federal government power; and judicial deference to the executive and legislative branches.

The opinion relies in the main upon the first hallmark of the plenary power doctrine: sources of law, particularly international law and pre-constitutional norms, that were considered outside of the enumerated powers of the government in Milligan’s time. The Court elevated international law to primary status over constitutional or domestic law as precedent to determine Haupt’s rights. The Court held that “[c]itizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war.” The use of international law at this juncture is significant because, in line with the plenary power doctrine, it originates outside of the constitutional framework and therefore apart from the social contract.

202 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25 (stating “Congress and the President, like the courts, possess no power not derived from the Constitution”). Justice Stone also framed the relevant issue in terms of constitutional limits on federal power: “We are concerned only with the question whether it is within the constitutional power of the national government to place petitioners upon trial before a military commission for the offenses with which they are charged.” Id. at 29.

203 See discussion of the elements of the plenary power doctrine, supra, notes ___ -- ___ and accompanying text. See also Cleveland, supra note __, at 5 (describing the characteristics of the plenary power doctrine).

204 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318; see Cleveland, supra note __, at 5.

205 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38.

206 Id. at 29. The Court concluded that the “laws and usages of war” were within the constitutional boundaries of the congressional power: “By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases. Congress, in addition to making rules for the government of our Armed Forces, has thus exercised its authority to define and punish offenses against the law of nations by sanctioning, within constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of military commissions.” Id. at 28 (emphasis added). This is exactly the argument that Milligan rejected as outside of the enumerated powers of the Constitution. Milligan held that neither the “laws or usages of war” nor the laws of nations empowered the legislature or the executive to use a military commission to try a citizen who was not a member of the armed forces. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121-22 (declaring that the laws and usages of war could “never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority of the government, and where the courts are open and their process unobstructed . . . Congress could grant no such power”).
Quirin turned also to conventions of war formulated for non-citizens prior to the Constitution.\textsuperscript{208} The Court first determined that enemy belligerents fell neither within the guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments nor within the stated exception for members of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{209} It looked outside the text of the Constitution and outside the realm of citizenship to preconstitutional rules of war that permitted the military trial of “alien spies” without a jury.\textsuperscript{210} Based on those rules, Quirin broadly exempted from the Fifth Amendment the military trial, without a jury, of enemies for offenses against the law of war.\textsuperscript{211}

The second hallmark of the plenary power doctrine, a diminishing of the power of individual constitutional rights,\textsuperscript{212} is consistent with the Court’s conclusion that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not apply. The third hallmark of the plenary power doctrine, judicial deference to inherent federal power, also emerged in Quirin.\textsuperscript{213} Although the Court initially claimed broad jurisdiction to review executive branch actions affecting individual constitutional safeguards,\textsuperscript{214} it later retreated from this role when it reached the question of the scope of the executive’s power. In an echo of Curtiss-Wright’s warning that the courts should “hesitate long before limiting or embarrassing the executive when wielding the ‘powers of nationality’ or relations with other countries,”\textsuperscript{215} the Court yielded to the discretion of the executive. It declared

\textsuperscript{208} Quirin, 317 U.S. at 33, 41-44.
\textsuperscript{209} Id. at 40-43.
\textsuperscript{210} Id. In construing the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the Court relied on a statute passed contemporaneously with the Amendments that had permitted the military trial of alien spies “according to the law and usage of nations.” Id. at 41 (citing § 2 of the Act of Congress of April 10, 1806, 2 Stat. 371). It was later amended to include citizen spies, 34 U.S.C. § 1200; see Quirin, 317 U.S. at 42 n.14 (noting that “in 1862 Congress amended the spy statute to include ‘all persons’ instead of only aliens”). Quirin relied on this later inclusion of citizens as support for erasing the citizen/alien distinction, stating, “[u]nder the original statute authorizing trial of alien spies by military tribunals, the offenders were outside the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury, not because they were aliens but only because they had violated the law of war.” 317 U.S. at 44.
\textsuperscript{211} Id. at 41-44. The opinion asserts that its conclusion was consistent with “a contemporary construction of both Article III, s 2, and the Amendments.” Id. at 41. This construction of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments was contested in the parties’ briefs in Milligan, and rejected as outside the enumerated powers of the Constitution, Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121-33; see id. at 30 (On the Side of the Petitioner) (“These acts do not confer upon military commissions jurisdiction over any persons other than those in the military service and spies”); id. at 99-100 (Reply of the United States) (describing the use of military commissions to try and execute spies and traitors during the Revolutionary War). Without expressly addressing the government’s analogy to spies and traitors, Milligan concluded that there were no implicit exceptions to the right to trial by jury. That right “is preserved to every one accused of crime who is not attached to the army, or navy, or militia in actual service.” Id. at 123.
\textsuperscript{212} See Cleveland, supra note __, at 5.
\textsuperscript{213} Cf. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 379 (Spring 2002) (asserting that the Court in Quirin exercised “federal judicial authority and resolved challenges to the constitutionality of presidential orders on the merits”). Bryant and Tobias’ analysis is partly in tension with my reading of the case. It is true that the Court agreed to accept jurisdiction; however, its explicit deference to executive power raised the bar for the application of individual constitutional rights in a way that is characteristic of judicial deference under the plenary power doctrine.
\textsuperscript{214} Quirin, 317 U.S. at 19. In setting the stage for the Court’s inquiry, Justice Stone spoke “of the duty which rests on the courts, in time of war as well as in time of peace, to preserve unimpaired the constitutional safeguards of civil liberty.” Id. at 19. Neither the President’s attempt to limit judicial review nor the petitioners’ status as “enemy aliens” could “foreclose[] consideration by the courts of petitioners’ contentions that the Constitution and laws of the United States constitutionally enacted forbid their trial by military commission.” Id. at 25.
\textsuperscript{215} Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 322.
that the courts should not interfere with a military detention and trial “ordered by the President in the declared exercise of his powers as Commander in Chief of the Army in time of war and of grave public danger” without a “clear conviction that they are in conflict with the Constitution or laws of Congress constitutionally enacted.”216 This “clear conviction” allowed for a greater level of judicial review than the abject deference that the plenary power doctrine would eventually require.217 Still, it was a far remove from the proactive judicial inquiry that Milligan employed under the enumerated powers doctrine.218

II. THE RECENT ENEMY COMBATANT CASES

Hamdi and Padilla present a question unexplored by Milligan or Quirin: the constitutional legitimacy of indefinite military detention in the United States, without trial, of a U.S. citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant.219 The two cases confront head-on – for the first time – whether the plenary power applies to U.S. citizens in the United States who are suspected enemy combatants. The Fourth Circuit relied on the plenary power doctrine to uphold Hamdi’s indefinite detention, deferring to the President’s declaration that Hamdi was an enemy combatant.220 In Padilla, the Second Circuit held that Padilla’s detention was unconstitutional.221 It rejected the government’s argument that under the plenary power doctrine, the President’s declaration that Padilla was an enemy combatant justified the detention and mandated judicial deference to executive power.222

216 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25.
217 Wishnie, supra note __, at 503 & n.49 (noting that in the cases establishing the doctrine, “the Supreme Court declared that Congress and the Executive Branch possessed a ‘plenary immigration power,’ and that exercises of this power largely were immune from judicial oversight”) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724, 730 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889)).
218 Milligan, 71 U.S. at 115, 122.
219 Milligan and Quirin both addressed claims that a criminal rather than a military trial was the proper forum for addressing the government’s suspicions. Id. at 118; Quirin, 317 U.S. at 40-45.
220 Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 474 (holding that “a factual inquiry into the circumstances of Hamdi’s capture would be inappropriate” and rejecting “any evaluation of the accuracy of the executive branch’s determination that a person is an enemy combatant”). Hamdi allegedly fought on the side of the Taliban during the United States’ military action in Afghanistan. Id. at 460. Hamdi was “captured or transferred into the custody of the United States” in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 and transported from Afghanistan to Camp X-Ray at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in January 2002. Id. When the authorities there learned of his citizenship, he was transferred to the Norfolk Naval Station Brig in Virginia. Id.
221 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 699. Padilla is suspected of conspiring with al Qaeda to build a radiological bomb and set it off in the United States. Id. at 700. In May 2002, Padilla was arrested in Chicago on a material witness warrant related to a grand jury investigation into al Qaeda’s role in the September 11 attacks. Id. at 699, 700. The following month, President Bush ordered the Secretary of Defense to take custody of Padilla. Id. at 700.
222 Id. at 699.
A.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld

The Fourth Circuit generated three panel opinions in *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*. The first (“Hamdi I”) held that Hamdi’s father had standing to bring a habeas petition on his son’s behalf. Hamdi II reversed the district court’s order granting unmonitored access to counsel. Hamdi III held that Hamdi’s detention was constitutional. It is the second and third opinions which are of interest here. In those decisions, the Fourth Circuit applied the plenary power doctrine for the first time to a U.S. citizen detained as an enemy belligerent.

1. The Membership Test and the Pseudo-Citizen

*Hamdi III*’s first holding, that the court had jurisdiction to review Hamdi’s habeas petition, gathered him into the fold of American citizenship and invoked principles of equality among citizens from constitutional doctrine. It stated that “Hamdi’s petition falls squarely within the Great Writ’s purview, since he is an American citizen challenging his summary detention for reasons of state necessity.” It declared that the Bill of Rights “applies to American citizens regardless of race, color, or creed...” concluding that “[t]he detention of United States citizens must be subject to judicial review.”

Consistent with *Milligan*, at this juncture U.S. citizenship appears to have an elevating effect on the scope of constitutional protections. It is the presence of American citizenship that invokes the power of the Bill of Rights: “Drawing on the Bill of Rights’ historic guarantees, the judiciary plays its distinctive role in our constitutional structure when it reviews the detention of American citizens by their own government.” The Bill of Rights becomes a “lens through which we recognize ourselves” as the nation becomes more

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224 *Id.* at 600 n.1.
226 *Id.* at 279.
228 *Id.* at 470-71.
229 *Hamdi II*, 296 F.3d at 281; *Hamdi III*, 316 F.3d at 465.
230 *Hamdi III*, 316 F.3d at 465.
231 Scholars have at times defined citizenship as the rights required to attain “full and equal membership.” Charles Lund Black, *Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law* 33-66 (1969) (defining citizenship as “the right to be treated fairly when one is the object of action by that government of which one is also a part”). See also Kenneth Karst, *Belonging to America: Equal Citizenship and the Constitution* 1-61, 173-242 (1989) (describing “equal citizenship” as a core principle of constitutional thought); Bosniak, *Citizenship, supra note __*, at 450 (citing Judith N. Shklar, *American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion* 1 (1991)).
232 *Hamdi III*, 316 F.3d at 465.
233 *Id.*
234 *Id.* at 464 (citing *Milligan*, 71 U.S. at 120).
235 *Id.*
diverse – a way of identifying the citizen despite the increased diversity of “race, color, or creed.” Calling on equal citizenship principles forestalls any doubts that Hamdi’s race, color, or religion might be the basis for excluding him from the circle of citizenship.

In tension with this declaration of equal citizenship is the opinion’s later application of the membership test which parallels the analysis in Quirin. Upon reaching the merits, the Fourth Circuit’s portrayal of Hamdi abruptly transforms him from a citizen-insider to a pseudo-citizen with illusory citizenship. The opinion is littered with question marks about Hamdi’s status. The court begins the analysis by stating that “Hamdi is apparently an American citizen,” suggesting a need to look below the surface for a more accurate impression. In its description of Hamdi’s background, the opinion more directly questions Hamdi’s claim to citizenship:

Hamdi apparently was born in Louisiana but left for Saudi Arabia when he was a small child. Although initially detained in Afghanistan and then Guantanamo Bay, Hamdi was transferred to the Norfolk Naval Station Brig after it was discovered that he may not have renounced his American citizenship. This characterization of Hamdi’s history divorces him from anything but a tenuous connection with the United States. The statement that Hamdi “may not have renounced his American citizenship” likely refers, as in Quirin, to whether Hamdi’s had given up his U.S. citizenship status. It suggests that Hamdi’s failure to cast off his citizenship was merely an oversight on his part. It also implies that the accidental retention of his citizenship, like a clerical error, might be easily remedied.

The court’s description distinguishes Hamdi from the archetypal citizen described in Milligan. Milligan’s twenty years living in the loyal state of Indiana, his continued presence in a state not hostile to the government, and his presence amidst the upstanding citizenry of Indiana contrast sharply with Hamdi’s fleeting presence in Louisiana, his residence in a country that the United States has invaded, and the accident of birth that resulted in his citizenship. This biographical sketch of Hamdi suggests a much greater resemblance to Haupt as the citizen saboteur in Quirin than to Milligan as a member of the Indiana community.

The court’s holding — that Hamdi’s detention is constitutional because he was captured in an active war zone in a foreign country — is

\footnotesize{236 Id.  
237 Id. at 462 (emphasis added).  
238 Id. at 460.  
239 Id. This statement appears in all of the Hamdi opinions. See Hamdi I, 294 F.3d at 601; Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 280.  
241 Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 459 (holding that because “it is undisputed that Hamdi was captured in a zone of active combat in a foreign theater of conflict,” his detention was constitutional regardless of his current presence}
consistent with the opinion’s portrayal of Hamdi’s inferior citizenship. Hamdi’s alleged presence in an active war zone may well provide support for conferring military jurisdiction. Still, the case “arises out of” his military detention inside the United States, and he has been in the United States throughout the course of judicial review of his petition.

The opinion’s recurring emphasis on Hamdi’s presence on foreign ground overrides his presence in the United States, instead drawing connections between Hamdi’s citizenship and that foreign territory. Whenever Hamdi’s citizenship status appears in the opinion, so too does foreign geography. From the initial framing of the issue, the opinion repeatedly locates Hamdi outside the United States. Hamdi is “not ‘any American citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant’ by the government; he is an American citizen captured and detained by American allied forces in a foreign theater of war.” The court defines “the specific context” of the decision with reference to Hamdi’s foreign location: “that of the undisputed detention of a citizen during a combat operation undertaken in a foreign country and a determination by the executive that the citizen was allied with enemy forces.”

The recurring references in *Hamdi III* to Hamdi’s presence in foreign territory connect him to that territory despite his citizenship and his presence in the United States.

242 Id. at 460.
243 Id. (“Although initially detained in Afghanistan and then Guantanamo Bay, Hamdi was transferred to the Norfolk Naval Station Brig after it was discovered that he may not have renounced his American citizenship”; “Hamdi is a citizen of the United States who was residing in Afghanistan”; “Although acknowledging that Hamdi was seized in Afghanistan …the petition alleges that ‘as an American citizen, … Hamdi enjoys the full protections of the Constitution’”; id. at 462 (“Yaser Esam Hamdi is apparently an American citizen. He was also captured by allied forces in Afghanistan”); 465 (“the undisputed detention of a citizen during a combat operation undertaken in a foreign country”), 471 (“Hamdi’s American citizenship has entitled him to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus” followed closely by: “Hamdi’s petition alleges that he was a resident of and seized in Afghanistan”), 473 (addressing “whether, because he is an American citizen currently detained on American soil by the military, Hamdi can be heard . . . to rebut the . . . ‘enemy combatant’ designation. We hold that no evidentiary hearing . . . is necessary . . . because . . . Hamdi was captured in a zone of active combat operations in a foreign country”), 475 (“One who takes up arms against the United States in a foreign theater of war, regardless of his citizenship, may properly be designated an enemy combatant”), 476 (“despite his status as an American citizen currently detained on American soil, Hamdi is not entitled to challenge the facts . . . . Where . . . a habeas petitioner has been designated an enemy combatant and it is undisputed that he was captured in an zone of active combat operations abroad”), 476 (“Hamdi is not ‘any American citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant’ by the government; he is an American citizen captured and detained by American allied forces in a foreign theater of war”).
These connections and characterizations are more than just rhetorical devices to bolster the court’s holding. The characterization of Hamdi as having no true link to the United States and the questioning of his status as a citizen reveal an understanding that despite Hamdi’s citizenship, he is essentially an alien. This depiction of Hamdi opens the way for the application of norms traditionally applied to non-citizens, including the plenary power doctrine.

2. Plenary Power and the Application of Non-Citizen Norms

Hamdi represents the first time that a court has explicitly applied the plenary power doctrine to U.S. citizens detained in the United States under the suspicion that they are unlawful enemy combatants. Citing Curtiss-Wright, the Fourth Circuit declared in Hamdi II that “the Supreme Court has shown great deference to the political branches when called upon to decide cases implicating sensitive matters of foreign policy, national security, or military affairs” and that the President has “delicate, plenary and exclusive power . . . as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations.” The court extended that plenary power to “military designations of individuals as enemy combatants in times of active hostilities, as well as to their detention after capture on the field of battle.” The opinion concludes that Hamdi is not entitled to “the safeguards that all Americans have come to expect in criminal prosecutions.” This open reliance on the plenary power doctrine is a significant step from Quirin’s nominal adherence to an enumerated power doctrine and its submerged use of the plenary power doctrine.

As in Quirin, the exclusion of the citizen from the social contract and the subsequent use of the plenary power doctrine make way for precedent governing non-citizens that results in diminished constitutional rights. As a prelude to the denial of habeas, Hamdi III drew an analogy to the executive’s power “to deport or detain alien enemies during the duration of hostilities . . .” Accompanied by a reference to Ludecke v. Watkins, which addressed

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247 Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 281 (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319-20).
248 Id. (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320).
249 Id. The opinion sought to locate that plenary power in the enumerated powers of the Constitution: “Indeed, Articles I and II prominently assign to Congress and the President the shared responsibility for military affairs. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; art. II, § 2. In accordance with this constitutional text, the Supreme Court has shown great deference to the political branches when called upon to decide cases implicating sensitive matters of foreign policy, national security, or military affairs.” Id. at 281.
250 Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 465.
252 Id. at 463.
the internment and deportation during World War II of enemy aliens deemed dangerous by the Attorney General.\textsuperscript{253} it places Hamdi squarely on the non-citizen side of the citizenship line. Similarly, the court cited as a source for the term “enemy combatant” In re Yamashita,\textsuperscript{254} which denied the habeas petition of a non-citizen.\textsuperscript{255} Finally, it considered and rejected as insufficiently deferential the legal standard governing the detention of criminal aliens detained in the United States.\textsuperscript{256}

The Fourth Circuit’s rejection of the legitimacy of Hamdi’s citizenship reveals itself in its reliance on these non-citizen cases. Like Quirin, Hamdi places citizens and aliens on the same level and creates a category of pseudo-citizens to whom standards governing non-citizens apply.

### B. Padilla v. Rumsfeld

In Padilla, the Second Circuit held that military detention of an American citizen seized on American soil outside a zone of combat was unconstitutional without explicit Congressional approval.\textsuperscript{257} The majority opinion departed from Hamdi’s analysis in three ways. First, it did not evaluate the petitioner’s association with a foreign community to distinguish citizens entitled to constitutional protections from pseudo-citizens who are not. Second, it rejected the application of the plenary power doctrine to a citizen in Padilla’s circumstances.\textsuperscript{258} Third, principles and precedent governing non-citizens do not drive the majority opinion. In contrast, the dissent reintroduces all of these analytical modes and would hold the detention constitutional upon a minimal evidentiary showing.\textsuperscript{259}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{253} Id. at 463 & n.3 (citing Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 173).
  \item \textsuperscript{254} Id. at 463 & n.3 (citing Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 7).
  \item \textsuperscript{255} Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 26 (denying habeas petition of Japanese general and holding that the Executive had authority to use a military commission after hostilities had ended and before peace had been declared).
  \item \textsuperscript{256} Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 473 (holding that “a factual inquiry into the circumstances of Hamdi’s capture would be inappropriate” and rejecting “any evaluation of the accuracy of the executive branch’s determination that a person is an enemy combatant”); see id. at 474 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 306 (2001)). The Fourth Circuit rejected Hamdi’s contention based on St. Cyr that at least “some evidence” must support a determination that a citizen was an enemy combatant, instead deferring to allegations in the executive branch’s declaration without providing Hamdi an opportunity to rebut them. Id. By applying a lower standard of evidence to Hamdi than that required to detain immigrants without a trial, see St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 306, the opinion erected a hierarchy of membership in which citizens accused as enemy combatants inherit the bottom rung. At the top are U.S. citizens holding full membership in the citizenry who are entitled to the “reasonable doubt” evidentiary standard of a criminal trial. Below them are criminal aliens awaiting deportation who are entitled to review of whether there is “some evidence” to support the detention. Id. at 306. At the bottom are U.S. citizens alleged to be enemy combatants, entitled to no review at all.
  \item \textsuperscript{257} Padilla, 352 F.3d at 699. The district court had held that the detention was constitutional once the federal government produced “some evidence” that Padilla was an unlawful enemy combatant. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 256 F. Supp. 2d 564, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying the “some evidence” standard drawn from cases establishing the constitutional rights of detained aliens).
  \item \textsuperscript{258} Padilla, 352 F.3d at 711-18.
  \item \textsuperscript{259} Id. at 730 (Wesley, J., dissenting).\end{itemize}
1. Padilla and the Prototypical Citizen

In contrast to Hamdi, the Second Circuit’s characterization of Padilla emphatically affirmed his citizenship. Padilla’s first appearance in the opinion emphasizes his nationality and his presence in the United States: “On May 8, 2002, Jose Padilla, an American citizen, flew on his American passport from Pakistan, via Switzerland, to Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport.”\(^{260}\) The repetitive invocation of the term “American,” the evidence of his citizenship in his passport, and the ease with which he entered the United States highlight the strength of Padilla’s connection with the U.S. citizenry. The link between Padilla’s citizenship and the United States is most clear in the opinion’s characterization of Padilla as the archetypal “American citizen” on “American soil.”\(^{261}\) The majority repeatedly draws connections between Padilla, his citizenship and his physical presence in the United States that contrast with the Fourth Circuit’s identification of Hamdi with foreign territory.\(^{262}\)

Absent from Padilla is the kind of analysis of Padilla’s connection to the United States or to an aberrant or enemy group that appeared in Hamdi, Quirin, and the immigrant and Native American plenary power cases. Based on Padilla’s formal citizenship status alone, the majority includes him as a member of the citizenry “entitled to the constitutional protections extended to other citizens.”\(^{263}\) It rejects the government’s attempt to apply the membership test in Quirin, stating that it is “not persuaded” by the government’s assertion of “factual parallels between the Quirin saboteurs and Padilla.”\(^{264}\)

The majority’s depiction of Padilla as the prototypical citizen stands in stark contrast to the dissent’s exclusion of him from the citizenry. Judge Wesley’s “U.S. citizens” require executive protection from “acts of belligerency on U.S. soil that would cause [them] harm”\(^{265}\) rather than constitutional protection against executive power. Padilla is not a member of

\(^{260}\) Id. at 699.

\(^{261}\) Id.

\(^{262}\) Id at 698 (“Jose Padilla, an American citizen held by military authorities as an enemy combatant”; “an American citizen seized on American soil”), 699 (“American citizens on American soil”), 702 (“Does the President have the authority to designate as an enemy combatant an American citizen captured within the United States . . .”), 711 (“our review is limited to the case of an American citizen arrested in the United States”), 712 (“we find that the President lacks inherent constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief to detain American citizens on American soil outside a zone of combat”, “the Joint Resolution does not authorize the President to detain American citizens seized on American soil”), 713 (“whether the Constitution gives the President the power to detain an American citizen seized in this country”), 721 (“the President, acting alone, possesses no inherent constitutional authority to detain American citizens seized within the United States, away from a zone of combat”) 721 n.29 (holding that the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers are not plenary “in the context of a domestic seizure of an American citizen”), 722 (“the authority to use military force” does not include “the authority to detain American citizens seized on American soil”), 723 (“The plain language of the Joint Resolution contains nothing authorizing the detention of American citizens captured on United States soil”), 724 (“the President’s inherent constitutional powers do not extend to the detention . . . of an American citizen seized within the country away from a zone of combat”).

\(^{263}\) Id. at 724.

\(^{264}\) Id. at 716 n.26.

\(^{265}\) Id. at 727 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
the citizenry; rather, he is the impending harm. He is “a terrorist citizen dangerously close to a violent or destructive act on U.S. soil,” a “U.S. citizen who is alleged to have ties to the belligerent and who is part of a plan for belligerency on U.S. soil,” and, in an evocative transformation from person to object, “a loaded weapon of al Qaeda.”

The majority opinion in Padilla applies the second level of the social contract in much the way that Milligan did. As in Milligan, the collective constitutional interests of national and state communities play a part in the decision. The opinion’s reasoning that the Constitution requires explicit congressional action for Padilla’s military detention parallels Milligan’s concern that a military trial would bypass the collective voice of the nation: Congress had “declared penalties against the offences charged, provided for their punishment, and directed [the civil courts] to hear and determine them.”

Moreover, as in Milligan, the executive’s imposition of military control in Padilla usurped a civilian grand jury’s constitutional role. The court describes Padilla’s arrest “in connection with a grand jury investigation of the terrorist attacks of September 11” and describes the executive’s interruption of those proceedings. Reminiscent of Milligan’s reluctance to undercut the competence of the Indiana grand jury, the Second Circuit twice invokes the grand jury as a constitutional route for proceedings regarding Padilla.

2. Plenary Power and Law Governing Non-Citizens

Having constructed an image of Padilla as a member of the American citizenry in the United States, the majority rejects the government’s claim that

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266 Id. at 728.
267 Id. at 730. Judge Wesley would have affirmed the district court’s opinion. Id. at 726. As in Quirin, Hamdi, and the nineteenth century plenary power cases, the district court applied the plenary power doctrine after a fact-based test for membership in the citizenry. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 571-74. Judge Mukasey depicted Padilla as sharply breaking with the law-abiding citizens of the United States and turning instead to a foreign and hostile community. Id. Padilla rejected the laws of his birthplace by committing murder as a teenager, changed his name to one distinctly Middle Eastern, changed his residence to Egypt, and traveled to Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan where he allegedly met with al Qaeda. Id. at 572. This description of Padilla is sandwiched between a description of the September 11 attacks, the government’s allegations that Padilla associated with al Qaeda, and a description of the 1998 al Qaeda bombings of United States embassies. Id. at 570-75.
268 Id. at 699.
269 Id.; see also Milligan, 71 U.S. at 122. Padilla steers clear of holding that congressional authorization would render the detention constitutional: “Nor do we express any opinion as to the hypothetical situation of a congressionally authorized detention of an American citizen.” Padilla, 352 F.3d at 699.
270 Id. ordering Padilla’s release from military custody and suggesting that Padilla could be “transferred to the appropriate civilian authorities who can bring criminal charges against him. If appropriate, he can also be held as a material witness in connection with grand jury proceedings.”; id. at 711 (stating “he arrived in New York as a material witness in a grand jury investigation related to the September 11 attacks and departed an enemy combatant”).
detaining Padilla is within the President’s plenary power.\textsuperscript{273} It confines the plenary power doctrine to cases involving “external affairs” and characterizes this case as one involving “internal affairs” over which the President cannot exercise unilateral power.\textsuperscript{274}

Unlike the Fourth Circuit’s analogies to alien enemies and its consideration of standards governing the detention of criminal aliens,\textsuperscript{275} Padilla does not rely upon principles governing non-citizens. This, too, is in tension with the dissent. Judge Wesley’s dissent argues for a hearing to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support Padilla’s military detention, using the standard from \textit{Zadvydas v. Davis}\textsuperscript{276} which required “some evidence” to justify indefinite detention of deportable aliens.\textsuperscript{277}

\textit{Hamdi} and \textit{Padilla} present different factual contexts, involving different conduct, different geographical boundaries and different allegations of involvement with forces opposing the United States. The paramount significance of membership principles, however, is common to both. The \textit{Padilla} majority’s inclusion of Padilla within the realm of the citizenry, and the Fourth Circuit’s exclusion of Hamdi from that realm, indicate the powerful role that social contract and membership principles play in defining constitutional rights. \textit{Hamdi}’s application of the \textit{Quirin} test for citizenship, and \textit{Padilla}’s eschewal of that test, lead to completely different outcomes.

\section*{III. Conclusion: The Implications of Pseudo-Citizenship and the Application of Law Governing Non-Citizens}

The debate surrounding the enemy combatant cases tends to polarize around the proper balance that decisionmakers should strike between national security and individual liberty. Many courts and scholars have argued that the executive and legislative branches need flexibility to act quickly to curtail a threat to the nation when an individual is suspected of having acted against the interests of the nation.\textsuperscript{278} Others have argued that the criminal process is sufficient to protect us against the actions of citizens who are unlawful

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{273} Id. at 713-14 (noting the government’s claim that the President had “inherent executive authority” to detain Padilla) (citing \textit{Curtiss-Wright}, 299 U.S. at 319, 320).
\item \textsuperscript{274} Id. at 721 & n.29.
\item \textsuperscript{275} \textit{Hamdi III}, 316 F.3d at 463 76; see supra notes \_ and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{276} \textit{Zadvydas v. Davis}, 533 U.S. 678, 691-97 (2001).
\item \textsuperscript{277} \textit{Padilla}, 352 F.3d at 733 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
\end{itemize}
combatants. This debate is dangerously anemic without an assessment of the consequences to citizens and citizenship of a membership test that creates different levels of constitutional protection. Is there a benefit to isolating a class of citizens whose claim to full citizenship is perceived as questionable? Are there implications for the citizenship as a whole when rules traditionally applied to aliens apply to citizens? Are there implications for non-citizens?

A. The Supreme Court: Predictions and Implications

First among these questions is what the impact of the membership test might be on the Supreme Court’s forthcoming decisions in *Hamdi* and *Padilla*. These cases may lead the Supreme Court to confront for the first time whether the plenary power doctrine applies to U.S. citizens in the United States suspected to be unlawful combatants. The Court will almost certainly confront, implicitly or explicitly, the divergent approaches in the two cases to using membership theory to decide the scope of constitutional protections against federal plenary power.

Applying a membership test may lead the Supreme Court to affirm both cases. If the Court were to follow *Quirin* in applying membership criteria, it would likely conclude that Hamdi lacks sufficient association with a U.S. community. His ties to Louisiana, where he was born, are weak because he left there when he was a small child. His connection to other countries is likely to be seen as stronger: he allegedly lived in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan after leaving the United States and was detained outside of this country.

Padilla presents a more difficult case. On the surface, his connection with the United States seems stronger. He was born in Brooklyn, New York, grew up in New York City and Chicago, lived in Florida, and has family in the United States. Like Milligan, he has resided for a significant time in the United States, did not reside in enemy territory, was arrested here, and on the

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279 E.g., Michael Greenberger, *Is Criminal Justice a Casualty of the Bush Administration’s “War on Terror”?,* 31 HUM. RTS. 19, 21 (Winter 2004); see Issacharoff & Pildes, *supra* note __ at 31 (detailing the argument that no person is subject to detention without a criminal trial). If criminal conviction is a marker of success, then providing the constitutional protections of a criminal trial to John Walker Lindh and Timothy McVeigh supports this view. See *United States v. Lindh*, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, 565, 567 (E.D. Va. 2002); *United States v. McVeigh*, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998). Lindh was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment because, like Hamdi, he allegedly fought for the Taliban against forces allied with the United States. *Id.*; see also *United States v. Lindh*, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 548-52, 564-68 (E.D.Va. 2002) (denying Lindh’s motions to dismiss on several constitutional grounds, including challenges under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments). Nor did the criminal process fail in the case of Timothy McVeigh’s bombing of an Oklahoma City federal building. *McVeigh*, 153 F.3d at 1176. Perhaps of greater concern would have been a decision to classify the initial suspects as pseudo-citizens and subject them to a military tribunal: Arab-Americans who were initially detained after the Oklahoma City bombing. *See* Kevin R. Johnson, *The Case Against Race Profiling In Immigration Enforcement*, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675, 727 (Fall 2000).

280 *Hamdi III*, 316 F.3d at 464.

281 *Id.*

282 *Padilla*, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 572. *See also* Guerrero et al., *supra* note __; Serrano,*supra* note __.
surface had strong ties to people and places in this country.\footnote{283}{Id.}

Yet there is a competing set of facts that could lead to a different conclusion about the quality of Padilla’s citizenship. In 1998, Padilla allegedly left Florida to live in Egypt, changed his name to Abdullah al Muhajir, and converted from Roman Catholicism to Islam at some point along the way.\footnote{284}{Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 572; see also Serrano, supra note __.}

One conclusion that the membership test may suggest is that he re-shaped his identity in a way that distanced him from the United States and from his own citizenship.

Considering the two cases together, it is unlikely that the Court will view the two petitioners as foreigners in the way that the Fourth Circuit did Hamdi, nor as the archetypal citizens that Padilla represented in the Second Circuit’s majority opinion. It is more likely that the Court will apply some version of the membership criteria that will result in less than full citizenship for both. In that case, I predict that the Court will apply the plenary power doctrine but in a way that is less deferential than when the doctrine is applied to non-citizens. It may permit greater judicial review of executive action, but allow the use of standards for non-citizens to govern the scope of federal power over citizens.

The critical question, then, is whether the use of a membership test does more good than harm. Does the membership test work? Do the criteria test for the attributes that we seek in citizens of the United States, and does the test protect us from citizens who mean to do the country harm? Courts seem to use the membership test to protect the members of the social contract from fellow citizens who align themselves with an enemy. The test, at bottom, seems intended to act as a screening device to weed out those who are formally citizens but who are more likely than the majority to act in a way that is disloyal to the nation. It is, at its core, a loyalty test.\footnote{285}{Seen this way, the enemy combatant cases represent a struggle for dominance between two different dimensions of citizenship: citizenship conceived of as formal legal status versus citizenship as identity or solidarity with a nation state. Bosniak, Citizenship, supra note __, at 455; see also Spectar, supra note __, at 271-72 (describing citizenship theories); see also Rubenstein & Adler, supra note __, at 522. If the formal legal status of the citizen is viewed as more important than identity or solidarity in the enemy combatant cases, then constitutional benefits will follow as soon as the individual establishes citizenship. Bosniak, Citizenship, supra note __, at 463-64. See also Charles L. Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REV. 3, 8-10 (1970). (articulating three critical aspects of rights-based citizenship: “First, citizenship is the right to be heard and counted on public affairs, the right to vote on equal terms, to speak, and to hold office when legitimately chosen. . . . Second, citizenship means the right to be treated fairly when one is the object of action by that government of which one is also a part. . . . Thirdly, citizenship is the broad right to lead a private life.”) If, on the other hand, identity and solidarity with the nation-state is paramount, the cases suggest that the citizen’s loyalty must be tested before the citizen is entitled to the benefits of societal membership: constitutional rights.}

Is a loyalty test what we need to adequately protect the nation against disloyal individuals with formal citizenship status?\footnote{286}{See generally, Victor C. Romero, Proxies for Loyalty in Constitutional Immigration Law: Citizenship and Race after September 11 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 871 (2003).} If we assume that the membership test and the pseudo-citizen category provide some measure of
protection to the nation, are there negative consequences that we should be concerned about? Both citizens and non-citizens stand to experience an impact from these cases.

B. Citizens

The enemy combatant cases upset three common understandings about U.S. citizenship: (1) that citizenship imbues the citizen with constitutional rights and privileges that are greater than those granted to non-citizens,287 (2) that those rights and privileges apply to all citizens equally,288 and (3) that citizenship, once acquired by birth or naturalization, is a virtually permanent and stable status.289

A category of pseudo-citizens for whom constitutional protections are equal to or lesser than those of non-citizens challenges each of those understandings. Applying to citizens legal principles that were originally created to govern non-citizens challenges the first understanding that citizens have greater constitutional rights than non-citizens. Establishing a hierarchy in which full citizens are entitled to greater constitutional protections than pseudo-citizens challenges the second understanding that constitutional benefits apply equally to all citizens. Redefining citizenship to create a hybrid citizen/non-citizen category unsettles citizens’ expectations of the permanency and stability of their citizenship status.

The framework of the membership test seems to ameliorate these concerns in part. Most citizens have sufficient ties to the national community so that they would escape the pseudo-citizen category. However, the use of membership criteria in the unlawful combatant cases is not explicit, and its contours are vague defined. Courts may apply the membership test one way or another to support the result they find attractive. Citizens may become less certain about the level of power that the federal government has, which may create uncertainty about who they can associate with and what they can say or do.

Nevertheless, the majority of citizens will not be directly affected by the malleability of citizenship categories. Of greatest concern are citizens on the margins of membership, those likely to be perceived as less than full citizens. For them, the use of the plenary power doctrine in the current enemy combatant cases raises troubling questions. The membership test and the categorizations that spring from it have their roots in the origins of the plenary

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288 See Black, supra note __, at 33-66; Karst, supra note __, at 173-242; Bosniak, Citizenship, supra note __, at 450.

power doctrine. There is a danger that the doctrine’s historical use to exclude certain groups like the Chinese and Native Americans may find echoes in decisions concerning certain groups, like Arabs and Muslims, who are currently perceived with suspicion.290

Exacerbating this danger is that the pseudo-citizen category upsets established norms about the permanency of citizenship. Outside of the enemy combatant context, it is the citizen, and not the government, who has control over her citizenship status. The pseudo-citizen category and the membership test undermine the principle that a citizen cannot lose her citizenship status unintentionally. In Afroyim v. Rusk, the Supreme Court placed the burden on the government to prove that the citizen intended to renounce her citizenship.291 Afroyim requires the government, in effect, to explicitly alter the individual’s formal citizenship status before it may treat the citizen as a non-citizen. Classifying the citizens in Quirin and Hamdi as pseudo-citizens allowed the government to apply rules governing non-citizens without bearing its burden of altering the individual’s formal citizenship status. When the Fourth Circuit accepted without rebuttal the President’s designation of Hamdi


Korematsu did not apply the plenary power doctrine. See id. at 216 (applying “rigid scrutiny” to the racial classification). But some scholars and judges, including Chief Justice Rehnquist, have suggested that similar military action could warrant judicial deference to the executive and legislative branches. See Rehnquist, supra note __, at 222-24 (1998); Earl Warren, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE MILITARY, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 192 (1962); Richard A. Posner, THE TRUTH ABOUT OUR LIBERTIES, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 4, 6 (Summer 2002); Richard A. Posner, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 171 (2001) (“powerful norms of legal justice, such as the nondiscrimination principle, can bend to practical exigencies, [including] winning a war”). See also Joo, supra note __, at 24-25 (critiquing the viewpoints of these authors). The plenary power doctrine stands ready for such an application.

291 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257-68(1967). Cases in which the government has attempted to revoke an individual’s citizenship have raised this same tension between formal citizenship status and citizenship as identity or solidarity. See Aleinikoff, supra note __, at 1473-75. These cases involved conduct by citizens that similarly reflected disloyalty to the United States, such as serving in the armed forces of Cuba after the Castro revolution, see United States ex rel. Marks v. Esperdy, 315 F.2d 673, 676 (2d Cir. 1963), aff’d sub nom. Marks v. Esperdy, 377 U.S. 214 (1964), swearing allegiance to another government, Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980), or voting in a foreign election, Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 257-68.
as an enemy combatant and applied the plenary power doctrine, it presumed, counter to *Afroyim*, that Hamdi intended to renounce his citizenship and any identification or solidarity with the nation.

C. Non-Citizens

The impact on non-citizens is more attenuated but no less significant. The application to citizens of rules governing non-citizens reaffirms the lower level of constitutional protections accorded to non-citizens as well as their exclusion from the social contract. The greatest concern that these cases raise is that the rules being applied to citizens were originally crafted for non-citizens, without the foresight that they might later cross the citizenship divide. David Cole has observed that immigration law acts as a testing ground for rules that would be unacceptable to the citizenry at the time. In times of national stress, those rules come to be applied to citizens as well.

Thus, the enemy combatant cases suggest that we need to be cautious about the rules we craft for non-citizens. Relying too heavily on a formal distinction between citizens and non-citizens will fail to anticipate the effect on citizens of rules now being crafted for non-citizens. If courts break down the division between citizen and non-citizen in ways that lessen constitutional protections for both, then we all must be concerned about the rules that apply to enemy combatants, whether citizen or alien.

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292 *Hamdi III*, 316 F.3d at 466 ().
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296 *Id.* at 959.
297 Hiroshi Motomura, *Immigration and We The People After September 11*, 66 ALB. L. REV. 413, 422 (2003) ("What is really troubling about the government's response to September 11 has not been that the government is treating citizens and non-citizens differently. Rather, it is that current policies treat many citizens as if they were non-citizens—at least if we look beyond a narrow, legalistic definition of what it means to be a U.S. citizen").