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Adam Feldman and Alexander Kappner

Abstract

The Supreme Court annually grants approximately 5% of the petitions to hear cases it receives. It denies petitions from the federal government, from large corporations, and from high-profile attorneys. The decisions of which petitions for writ of certiorari the Court grants sets the Court’s agenda each term and defines the issues which the Court will engage. With such a low likelihood that the Court hears any particular case, what makes a petition more or less likely to be granted? The focus of much of the existing scholarship on certiorari deals with the theoretical underpinnings of these judicial decisions. In this paper we set out to add to the empirical study of certiorari by examining an expansive, original dataset of the 93,000 petitions for certiorari between the 2001 and the start of the 2015 Supreme Court Terms. This allows us to investigate decisions made during and directly preceding the Roberts Court. The empirical examination focuses on several factors that are thought to affect certiorari decisions, mainly focusing on the individuals and entities involved in the certiorari petitions. These include the lower court that most recently heard the case, the parties, the attorneys, law firms, and the participation of amicus curiae. We look at success from both sides of the litigation: both in respect to petitioners and respondents. The findings in this paper are designed to add to our understanding of the extent that these individuals and entities factor into the likelihood of certiorari grants and denials. They are also designed to locate the specific individuals and entities that made the largest impact on certiorari decisions for the 2001 through 2015 Supreme Court Terms.

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January 14, 2016

Abstract

The bulk of the Supreme Court’s decisions are made when the justices decide whether or not to grant petitions for certiorari. These decisions set the Court’s agenda each term and define the issues which the Court will engage. The focus of much of the existing scholarship on certiorari deals with the theoretical underpinnings of these judicial decisions.

In this paper we set out to add to the empirical study of certiorari by examining an expansive, original dataset of the 93,000 petitions for certiorari between the 2001 and the start of the 2015 Supreme Court Terms. This allows us to investigate decisions made during and directly preceding the Roberts Court.

The empirical examination focuses on several factors that are thought to affect certiorari decisions, mainly focusing on the individuals and entities involved in the certiorari petitions. These include the lower court that most recently heard the case, the parties, the attorneys, law firms, and the participation of amicus curiae. We look at success from both sides of the litigation: both in respect to petitioners and respondents.

The findings in this paper are designed to add to our understanding of the extent that these individuals and entities factor into the likelihood of certiorari grants and denials. They are also designed to locate the specific individuals and entities that made the largest impact on certiorari decisions for the 2001 through 2015 Supreme Court Terms.

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1 Introduction

In what has become a common recent trope, each June the Supreme Court announces its most anticipated decisions.¹ These decisions deal with controversial topics ranging from abortion and contraception to universal healthcare and marriage equality.² For the casual observer, it would appear that the bulk of the Court’s work is in deciding these cases. Based on numbers alone, however, this could not be further from the truth. During the 2013 Supreme Court term, for instance, 7,326 writs of certiorari (cert) were filed with the Supreme Court.³ The Court only granted plenary review in 76 or approximately 1% of these cases.⁴

The Supreme Court typically does not hear cases on first impression. It only does so through its power of original jurisdiction in limited instances, predominately dealing with disputes between two states.⁵ The Court lacks discretion on whether or not to take cases on appeal, but this too is limited to a particularly small class of cases that are authorized by specific statute.⁶

The Supreme Court hears cases on cert, the most common method of bringing cases to the Court, only after all other sources of appeal to lower courts are exhausted. After a decision is rendered by the lower court, a

⁴Id.
⁵The Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction power is limited in Article 3 §2 of the Constitution to “Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party.” In the 2014 term the two cases on the Court’s docket under original jurisdiction were *Kansas v. Nebraska*, 126 Orig. (2014) and *United States v. California*, 5 Orig. (2014). In 2013 there were no cases on the Courts docket under original jurisdiction.
⁶The Court is seldom presented with cases on direct appeal. These appeals are limited by statute to specific situations under 28 USCS §1253, which states, “Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.” In practice the types of cases that come to the Supreme Court on direct appeal from this act are limited to suits under three statutes: “(1) 28 USCS §2281, suits to enjoin enforcement of state statutes or administrative orders on grounds of unconstitutionality; (2) 28 USCS §2282, suits to enjoin enforcement of federal statutes on grounds of unconstitutionality; and (3) 28 USCS §2325, suits to enjoin enforcement of certain orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission.” (26 L. Ed. 2d 947, 2012). As a practical matter the Supreme Court hears fewer than one direct appeal annually.
party has 90 days to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.\(^7\)

There are no cut-and-dry rules which bind the Court to grant certiorari in certain cases as these writs are purely discretionary. The Supreme Court does provide some guidance in its rules for what types of issues are more relevant for Supreme Court review but it is not bound by them.\(^8\)

Of the petitions the Court receives, the vast majority currently are in forma pauperis (IFP). Litigants without sufficient funds to bring lawsuits to the Supreme Court may be granted in-forma pauperis status, where filing fees and associated costs are waived.\(^9\) Most of these filings come from incarcerated prisoners. Although in-forma pauperis filings make up the bulk of petitions for certiorari to the Court, these petitions are granted much less frequently than paid petitions.\(^10\)

After the petitions for certiorari are filed each year, the Supreme Court Justices and, more importantly, their clerks must wade through thousands of petitions and accompanying briefs. The clerks often draft memoranda about the merits of the various petitions that can play large roles in shaping the justices’ decisions on certiorari.\(^11\) Due to the high volume of filings each year, the justices and clerks need shorthand methods to decide which cases to accept on cert. Several pieces of information may be particularly helpful in these decisions. Previous empirical studies support the proposition that while a very low percentage of petitions for certiorari are granted on the aggregate, when lawyers and law firms with extensive Supreme Court experience file these positions, the chance of success substantially increases.\(^12\)

\(^7\)See sup. ct. r. 13.1.

\(^8\)These factors listed in sup. ct. r. 10 include: “(a)A United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important matter; has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory power; (b)A state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a United States court of appeals; (c)A state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.”

\(^9\)See 28 u.s.c §1915.

\(^10\)See e.g. Christina Lane, Pay Up Or Shut Up: The Supreme Court’s Prospective Denial of in Forma Pauperis Petitions, 98 nw. u. l. rev. 335 (2003).


\(^12\)H. W. Perry, Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme Court (1991); Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters before and within the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 georgetown law j. 1487, 1512-13 (2008) (describing the importance of experienced Supreme Court
Secondarily the Court may use the lower court where the case was previously heard and the Court’s perceived alignment of views with that court, as well as amicus curiae briefs filed at the cert stage to assist in gauging whether or not to grant certiorari.13 Based on the number of factors that may influence the justices’ certiorari decisions and the limited time the justices and clerks have to make these decisions, the Court needs effective cues to help process this heap of information.

More than any Supreme Court preceding it, the Roberts Court has to deal with an ever-increasing number of petitions for certiorari.14 It does so while at the same time decreasing the overall number of cases it hears on average per term.15 This reinforces the importance that the Court makes the right decisions of which cases to hear. The importance of the cases the Court grants for review is further underscored by the perception that this Chief Justice makes strategic decisions in order to manage his own reputation and that of the current Court.16 If the Chief Justice is truly legacy oriented, then many certiorari decisions will be affected by this interest, as the Chief Justice leads the conferences among the justices where the list of cases the Court will decide for the term is agreed upon. By choosing to hear certain cases with specific facts, the Court decides which issues it will tackle and which to avoid. In doing so the Court must decide between issues that are more or less controversial and more or less salient to the general public.

This paper confronts the issue of how the recent Supreme Court sets its agenda by analyzing docket reports the 93,000 petitions that the Court decided on between the 2001 and the start of the 2015 terms. It uses an original dataset that combines information about attorneys involved in each petition, law firms, lower court, amicus curiae briefs, and parties. This dataset allows us to empirically test some of the prevalent hypotheses for the agenda setting stage including the relationship between each of these factors and the likelihood of certiorari success.

This paper not only shows the relative advantages (or disadvantages) that these factors provide, but also looks to the micro-level to distinguish advocates placing their names on the petitions for certiorari); Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 1109 (1988); Kevin T. McGuire & Gregory A. Caldeira, Lawyers, Organized Interests, and the Law of Obscenity: Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court, 87 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 717 (1993).

13Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal & Donald Songer, Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 101 (2000).

14See Lazarus, supra n. 12.

15See Id. at 1503.

16James L. Gibson & Michael Nelson, Change in Institutional Support for the US Supreme Court: Is the Court’s Legitimacy Imperiled by the Decisions it Makes? Available at SSRN 2466422 (Forthcoming 2014).
the individual actors that are most successful in the certiorari stage. By comparing the relative success of individual attorneys, law firms, and parties, this paper sets out to determine the players that assist the Court in setting its agenda.

The paper proceeds as follows: In the following section the paper discusses the importance of attorneys, parties, lower courts, and amicus curiae in setting the Court’s agenda. These factors align with the hypotheses that we test with our dataset. We then go through our methodology and describe the data gathering in greater detail as well as how we work with such an extensive dataset. The third section contains analyses of the components of interest in order to assess the main factors that come to bear on certiorari as well as the individual actors behind these factors. The concluding section discusses the implications of this study on our understanding of the certiorari process and for the relationship between the Court and its decision stimuli at perhaps the most significant phase in the Court’s annual calendar.

2 Factors as Cues

Although there are no hard and fast rules that justices follow when deciding whether or not to grant certiorari, Supreme Court Rule 10 provides clues as to what the Court is looking for in certiorari petitions. The main point in this Rule is that the Court is looking for cases with decision conflicts between lower courts.\(^{17}\) Other factors such as justices’ personal policy preferences as well as justices’ views on the role of the Supreme Court may also affect the justices’ votes on certiorari.\(^{18}\)

The justices rely on clerks to provide memos that outline the key points of certiorari petitions and recommend whether or not the justices should grant them. Clerks have exerted influence on the justices’ certiorari decisions since at least the mid-20th century, yet the extent of this influence is not wholly clear. To avoid redundancy in the clerks’ work, a “cert pool” was established wherein one memorandum is drafted by a clerk for each case and presented to all justices, rather than clerks in each chamber individually reviewing each petition.\(^{19}\) The justices may put less emphasis on the clerks’ conclusions if they have less faith in the clerks from other

\(^{17}\)See supra, n. 8.

\(^{18}\)See Margaret Meriweather Cordray & Richard Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. ULQ 389, 410-418 (2004).

\(^{19}\)See Barbara Palmer, Bermuda Triangle—the Cert Pool and its Influence Over the Supreme Court’s Agenda, the, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 105 (2001).
chambers.\textsuperscript{20} Still, some scholars see the “cert pool” as affording the clerks too great a power as they are independently delegated petitions to present to all justices in the pool, and some justices make their decisions partially or entirely based on these memos.\textsuperscript{21}

In terms of the cert vote, petitions must convince a minority of justices or four of nine to vote in favor of granting the petition. This is known as the “Rule of 4.”\textsuperscript{22} Many attorneys who submit petitions to the Supreme Court strategize based on these procedures and some have developed specific tactics based on them.\textsuperscript{23}

The view that certain case characteristics independently enhance the likelihood of the justices granting certiorari is known as “cue theory.”\textsuperscript{24} Many different permutations of cue theory have been asserted over the years. An important development in this theory helped to link the cues designed to influence the justices and clerks’ behavior.\textsuperscript{25} By linking the behavior of the clerks to that of the justices, the existence of specific cues influencing the justices’ votes can be inferred. Other studies relay that certain factors, such as the attorney on the certiorari petition, work as a strong cue for the justices’ decisions.\textsuperscript{26}

This paper empirically examines these factors on a large scale. The

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\textsuperscript{20}David L. Weiden & Artemus Ward, \textit{sorcerers’ apprentices: 100 years of law clerks at the united states supreme court} 126 (2006) (describing clerks’ views that their influence on the certiorari process has declined with the rise of the cert pool).
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\textsuperscript{23}See Lazarus, supra n. 12 at 1512-13 (describing the increasing number of petitions for certiorari coming from expert Supreme Court attorneys); see also Susan Brodie Haire, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Roger Hartley, \textit{Attorney Expertise, Litigant Success, and Judicial Decisionmaking in the US Courts of Appeals}, law soc. rev. 667 (1999) (describing the benefits of attorney specialization for attorney success).
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\textsuperscript{24}Joseph Tanenhaus et al., \textit{The Supreme Court’s Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory}, 111 JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 127 (1963) (setting the foundation for cue theory); S. Sidney Ulmer, William Hintze & Louise Kirklosky, \textit{The Decision to Grant Or Deny Certiorari: Further Consideration of Cue Theory}, law soc. rev. 637 (1972) (looking more expansively at the variables that are cues for the justices); Donald R. Songer, \textit{Concern for Policy Outputs as a Cue for Supreme Court Decisions on Certiorari}, 41 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICALS 1185 (1979) (examining the importance of the potential merits decision as a cue for the justices’ certiorari votes).
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\textsuperscript{25}Perry, supra n. 12 (providing interviews with Supreme Court clerks that describe interactions within their chamber and how their perceptions of the justices influenced their assessments at the certiorari stage).
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\textsuperscript{26}Vanessa A. Baird, \textit{answering the call of the court: how justices and litigants set the supreme court agenda} 24-27 (2007).
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factors explored in this paper are treated as potential cues for the justices and if they have the hypothesized effect, they should lead to systematic, statistically significant differences in the justices’ decisions at the certiorari stage.

2.1 Attorneys and Law Firms

Some attorneys and law firms are anecdotally noted for their success at the certiorari stage. What do these actors possess that others lack? We posit multiple rationale for such differential success. Unlike experience trying cases before the Supreme Court, experience drafting certiorari petitions does not necessarily increase the likelihood of drafting successful petitions. Without a good vehicle for the Supreme Court, parties or lawyers may draft petition after petition that is denied. If experience is not the key differentiating factor, then what is?

Perhaps not experience in the practice of law generally, but experience in the certiorari process specifically leads to greater success on cert. For one thing, success likely breeds success, as clients seek out those attorneys that were successful with cert petitions in the past. This allows specific attorneys to become more selective in which cases to take and thus to pick more potential winners.

Attorneys that have attained notoriety for success on certiorari generally work in firms or practice groups that specialize at the Supreme Court level. Many of these attorneys worked in the Office of Solicitor General (OSG) and several worked as Solicitor General (SG) prior to returning


to the private sector. As the number of attorneys with a high level of Supreme Court experience began to rise in the 1980’s, the phrase “Supreme Court Bar” was coined to refer to this group of high-caliber attorneys. The general success of the Supreme Court Bar is documented at both the certiorari and merits levels. Past studies do not disaggregate down to the firm or attorney level, nor do they examine such an extensive dataset. With data broken down to the individual level we are able to assess the extent of the Supreme Court Bar’s success at certiorari with greater precision.

These attorneys also often represent clients that are repeat players in the Supreme Court. The advantage of representing these repeat players stems from their ability to bear greater costs and the ability to focus on gains in the aggregate through repeat litigation and by shifting the course of the law over time. Members of the Supreme Court Bar may derive an advantage from their institutional standing as well as from their developed skill in the unique area of bringing cases to the Supreme Court. An attorney’s credibility that derives from cumulative experience in the Supreme Court also goes a long way in establishing credibility before the justices.

Accumulated practice before the Supreme Court allows attorneys to develop specialized knowledge of the justices and their specific predilections as well as to develop relationships with the justices that other attorneys lack. Exposure to the Court also provides attorneys with insight into what to include and exclude from their petitions. This includes what the Court might find useful and consequently the type of material that will draw attention on certiorari. Many experienced Supreme Court attorneys also clerked for Supreme Court Justices which provides them with intimate knowledge of justices that others lack.

Previous work experience in the Office of the Solicitor General provides attorneys with both unparalleled Supreme Court litigation experience as well as greater knowledge of the justices. The justices hold the OSG in

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30 See McGuire (1993) supra n. 27.
31 See e.g. John G. Roberts, Oral Advocacy and the Re-emergence of a Supreme Court Bar, 30 JOURNAL OF SUPREME COURT HISTORY 68 (2005).
32 See Lazarus, supra n. 12; McGuire (1995) supra n. 27.
35 See Carter G. Phillips, Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court, 15 T. M. COOLEY L. REV. 177, 189-90 (1998) (explaining that the attorneys with little experience may present information not sought by the justices or their clerks).
such high esteem that they often invite the SG to file amicus briefs in cases in which the government is not directly involved in order to get the OSG’s assessment of a case or the government’s position on an issue. In cases where the justices need a better explanation of the facts, issues, or arguments, the justices often turn to the SG’s brief to provide these insights with hopes that the assessment will be as objective as possible notwithstanding the SG’s role as an advocate.

Supreme Court Bar attorneys may somewhat diminish the strength and influence of the OSG due its practitioners’ extensive litigation experience. For many years OSG attorneys were the predominant repeat players in the Court, yet with the presence of Supreme Court Bar attorneys, equally or more experienced attorneys are now regularly involved in litigating Supreme Court cases. These attorneys have the resources to extensively research and prepare briefs in a variety of case areas.

Law firms focused on Supreme Court litigation attempt to accumulate top attorneys. Even the justices see a potential advantage to employing the service of these firms. Still, Supreme Court specialists in big-law firms do not necessarily have the same insight at the ground level as local attorneys. Such local insight may not, however, play a great role in the Court’s initial process of weeding out petitions for certiorari if the clerks and justices predominately pay attention to the names of the lawyers and law firms on the petitions.

40See Lazarus supra n.11 at 1546; But see Salokar supra n. 38 at 25 (describing how the SG still performs more successfully than other litigators both in opposing petitions and in bringing petitions to the Court).
41See McGuire (1993) supra n. 27 (documenting the rise of experienced Supreme Court practitioners in private law practice); See also Roberts supra n. 6 at 77 (dating the reemergence of the Supreme Court Bar to approximately 1980).
42See Lazarus supra n. 12 at 1549 (describing how members of the Supreme Court Bar have a distinct resource advantage).
43Warren E. Burger, Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to our System of Justice, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227, 231 (1973) (“...we see that clients who can afford such lawyers-in the big firms or in the many excellent medium-size firms or indeed among this country’s skilled solo practitioners-are well served by lawyers”); But see William H. Rehnquist, Legal Profession Today, the, 62 IND. L. J. 151, 152 (1986) (describing a dissatisfaction with big-law firm work at both the associate and partner levels).
44Christine M. Macey, Referral is Not Required: How Inexperienced Supreme Court Advocates can Fulfill their Ethical Obligations, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 979, 995 (2009) (discussing how the justices may occasionally prefer the informational expertise of local attorneys to that of experienced Supreme Court practitioners).
2.2 Lower Courts

The lower court source of a case conveys subtle information that may affect the justices’ certiorari decisions. There are a limited number of courts that try cases prior to the Supreme Court. While cases can come to the Supreme Court from federal and state courts, the bulk of the Supreme Court’s docket tends to be filled with cases from the United States Courts of Appeal.

Sitting atop the judicial hierarchy, the Supreme Court ensures the binding effect of its rulings beyond the case at hand by enforcing lower court compliance with its legal opinions. It does so by reversing rulings that conflict with Supreme Court precedent.45 This view has several theoretical roots. First, under the principal-agent model, as the principal in the judicial hierarchy the Supreme Court maintains its supremacy and keeps the lower courts in check with its rulings.46 There is also a more nuanced strategic theory of judicial behavior that not only presumes the Court wants to maintain compliance with its rulings, but also that the justices’ are further motivated by a desire to see their preferences effectuated through lower court compliance.47

Strategic and preference based theories of judging extend this argument further noting the possibility that the Supreme Court places extra scrutiny on petitions coming from lower courts deemed more ideologically distant.48

With our data we can test how the rate of certiorari grants varies depending on which lower court previously ruled on the case. We can do this with state courts as well as with federal courts of appeal. Looking beyond

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45See e.g. Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal & Donald Songer, Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 101 (2000) (suggesting that the Supreme Court is more likely to grant certiorari from courts when that court makes greater deviations from Supreme Court precedent).

46See Id. at 102.

47See Id. at 104; See also Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 673 (1994) (describing that lower courts may have conflicting preferences and relative strength of each court’s preferences affects each court’s incentive structure); Udi Sommer, SUPREME COURT AGENDA SETTING: STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR DURING CASE SELECTION 29-30 (First Ed. 2014); Jeffrey R. Lax, Certiorari and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy Discretion, Reputation and the Rule of Four, 15 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 61 (2003) (formally modeling the relationship between court levels based on different utility functions).

48One way to do this is by comparing the median ideological scores for the Supreme Court and the lower court of interest. See Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS, AND ORGANIZATION 303 (2007) (placing ideal points across separate institutions on the same scale so that the Supreme Courts, Congress, and courts of appeals’ scores are comparable to one another).
the number of petitions per circuit at the percentage of certiorari grants per circuit provides additional insight into the level of accord between the court levels as well as evidence of whether the Supreme Court takes this principal-agent relationship seriously.

2.3 Parties

The justices and clerks on the Supreme Court can make quick assessments of the likely merits of a certiorari petition based on the attorney on the petition. The parties on the petition has the potential to further supplement the justices’ and clerks’ initial assessments of a case. Some repeat parties might cue the Court’s attention in a similar way to the attorneys on the petitions.

According to our theory, the party on the petition for certiorari should also weigh on the Court’s decision. One way that it may do so is based on the party type. Courts at all levels including the Supreme Court show preferences towards litigants with greater resources.\textsuperscript{49} Similar to the theory of lawyer-based cues, justices and clerks may form opinions about repeat-player parties that affect their decisions on certiorari. For instance, if certain parties historically bring cases worthy of certiorari, or are often listed as opposing parties on favorable certiorari petitions, then the Court may develop preconceptions of the relevance of petitions that list these parties.

On one hand, the Court may have preferences for certain party types during certain time periods.\textsuperscript{50} If the Court is concerned with policy in certain areas then it may disproportionately grant certiorari to certain party types in order to rule on such cases. The justices’ favoritism towards certain party types has the potential to lead to, or at least appear as, preferences for certain parties’ petitions. This is most evident with parties that have filed multiple successful certiorari petitions in the Supreme Court.

Along these lines the most common and successful repeat-player both on certiorari and on the merits is the United States Government. This

\textsuperscript{49} See generally Galanter supra n. 33 at 9 (setting forth the theory of litigation advantages due to the disparity of resources between the “haves” and “have nots”); See also Ryan C. Black & Christina L. Boyd, US Supreme Court Agenda Setting and the Role of Litigant Status, 28 JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS, AND ORGANIZATION 286, 305-06 (2012) (describing that party types with greater resources are more successful in their petitions as well as more successful in their oppositions to petitions).

\textsuperscript{50} The Roberts Court, for example, is known for its interest in business-related cases. See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 1431, 1471 (2013) (“The Court is taking more cases in which the business litigant lost in the lower court and reversing more of these-giving rise to the paradox that a decision in which certiorari is granted when the lower court decision was anti-business is more likely to be reversed than one in which the lower court decision was pro-business.”)
dovetails with the success of the SG, who is the lawyer that represents the United States Government before the Supreme Court.\footnote{\textit{See} Salokar \textit{supra} n. 38 at 25 (describing that based on the number of cases the SG bring on behalf of the U.S. Government, there is an inherent advantage because the SG can select cases that are most likely to meet the clerks and justices’ certiorari criteria).}

Just as the U.S. Government is at an advantage in filing petitions for certiorari, IFP litigants or those without sufficient funds to pay for a petition are at a disadvantage.\footnote{Litigants without sufficient funds to pay for a petition may have the associated fees waived. \textit{Sup. Ct. R. 39}.} As the number of IFP petitions (which are generally filed by incarcerated prisoners) far exceeds that of paid petitions, and since IFP petitions predominately name the United States as the opposing party, the SG has to decide whether or not to respond to these petitions.\footnote{\textit{See} David C. Thompson & Melanie Wachtell, \textit{An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for Response and the Call for the Views of the Solicitor General}, 16 \textit{George Mason Law Review} 237 (2009) (presenting information that the SG voluntarily responded to only 10% of IFP petitions in 1999 compared to a 32% response rate in paid cases).} The low response rate corresponds to the findings of studies that show the justices themselves spend only a modicum of time reviewing individual IFP petitions.\footnote{\textit{See} Donald R. Songer, \textit{Concern for Policy Outputs as a Cue for Supreme Court Decisions on Certiorari}, 41 \textit{The Journal of Politics} 1185 (1979) \textit{citing} Gerhard Casper and Richard A. Posner, \textit{The Workload of the Supreme Court} 65-66 (1967).} Just as IFP petitions constitute the bulk of the filings on an annual basis and are generally unsuccessful, paid petitions are more successful relative to IFP petitions even though the vast majority of paid petitions are denied as well.\footnote{\textit{See} Thompson and Wachtell, \textit{supra} n. 53 at 241 (describing that in the 2005-2006 Term, the Court only granted certiorari in 1% of all petitions, but granted certiorari and oral argument in 4% of paid petitions).}

\section*{2.4 Salience, Certiorari, and Strategy}

What makes a case “cert worthy”? With so many petitions at the Court’s disposal, the individuals directly involved in the case cannot provide sufficient information about the value of hearing a case in every instance. Additional cues parlay the likelihood that the case involves an issue of significant substance to the clerks and justices. One such cue is when non-parties take the time and energy to file amicus curiae briefs at the certiorari stage. These briefs are a consequential cue because not only are they voluntary, but since certiorari is not guaranteed, they may not play a role at all if the Court does not deem the case relevant for other reasons.Seen in another light, however, amicus briefs at the certiorari stage can and often do signal the importance of a case to the Court for the exact reason that...
non-parties engage in them without any guaranteed reward.\textsuperscript{56}

Aside from the amicus briefs filed at this stage of the case, the parties’ institutional ties may signal the importance of the case. When government actors are involved in cases the strategic stakes are raised for the justices.\textsuperscript{57} The types of cases that the Court takes on certiorari may also vary depending on the involvement of other governmental actors.\textsuperscript{58} When these governmental actors are present, policy-minded justices are likely to consider the policy implications of their decision of whether or not to grant certiorari.\textsuperscript{59}

The presence of the SG also directly signals the government’s position on an issue. Not only is there an inherent assumption that the SG will only become engaged in important cases, but the SG’s position as petitioner or respondent on certiorari also should specifically affect the likelihood that policy-minded justices will vote for or against certiorari.\textsuperscript{60}

Case salience may combine with other factors to influence the Court’s certiorari decisions. While experienced attorneys may be retained to oppose certiorari in certain circumstances, their presence can have the opposite effect of signalling a case’s importance.\textsuperscript{61} Similarly, studies show that amicus briefs filed for the parties opposing certiorari in fact enhance the likelihood

\textsuperscript{56}Caldeira and Wright, \textit{supra} n. 12 at 1118 (presenting findings that an increasing number of amicus briefs filed at the certiorari stage increases the likelihood of the Court granting cert, even if the briefs are filed in support of the party opposing certiorari); \textit{see also} Perry \textit{supra} n. 12 at 120, 133; Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, \textit{Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court: The Collision of Policy and Jurisprudence}, 71 \textit{The Journal of Politics} 1062, 1072 (2009) (describing that the presence of amicus briefs at the certiorari stage increases the likelihood that justices expected to grant certiorari on policy grounds will actually grant certiorari); Baird \textit{supra} n. 26 at 763-66 (describing how politically salient decisions may lead to an increase in amicus filings in subsequent terms as well).

\textsuperscript{57}See Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, \textit{The Choices Justices Make} 82-88 (1998) (discussing the influence of other governmental actors on the justices decisions).

\textsuperscript{58}See Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Jennifer Nicoll Victor, \textit{Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the United States Supreme Court: An Empirical Assessment}, 39 \textit{Harv. J. on Legis.} 395, 428 (2002) (providing evidence that that the Court is more likely to take statutory cases when it confronts a more favorable Congress and vice-versa with taking constitutional cases).

\textsuperscript{59}See Black and Owens \textit{supra} n. 56 at 1072 (finding that justices were more likely to grant certiorari when their predicted policy preferences align with the direction the policy would move if the petitioning party succeeds on the merits).

\textsuperscript{60}See Michael A. Bailey, Brian Kamoie & Forrest Maltzman, \textit{Signals from the Tenth Justice: The Political Role of the Solicitor General in Supreme Court Decision Making}, 49 \textit{Am. J. Polit. Sci.} 72 (2005) (presenting evidence that the justices are more likely to grant certiorari when they are ideologically aligned with the president in office who appointed the SG than when they are not ideologically aligned).

of the Court granting certiorari as they indicate the importance of cases to others beyond the direct parties.\textsuperscript{62} Based on this evidence, those opposing certiorari are likely working against their interests by acting in any way to highlight a case’s salience.

Ironically, the same actor that often signals the salience of a case, the SG, may also have a blunting effect on the Court’s desire to grant certiorari. While the SG’s presence in a case is generally one of the strongest indicators of a case’s importance, the justices’ also pay close attention to the points conveyed by the SG.\textsuperscript{63} The SG, through direct participation or as an amici, is uniquely situated to provide the Court with jurisprudential reasons to deny certiorari. Even though the SG’s presence may indicate the relevance of a case to the Court, a persuasive argument by the SG can influence the justices in the other direction.

Based on our theory and available evidence Table 1 provides several expectations for the factors we expect to have the greatest impact on either increasing or decreasing the likelihood of the Court granting certiorari.

While we expect that success breeds success in the Supreme Court so

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<th>Factor</th>
<th>Petitioner</th>
<th>Respondent</th>
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<td>Supreme Court Big-Law Practitioner/Firm</td>
<td>Large Increase</td>
<td>Increase</td>
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<tr>
<td>Solicitor General (merits attorney)</td>
<td>Large Increase</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amicus Briefs (generally)</td>
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<td>Amicus Briefs (Solicitor General)</td>
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that experienced attorneys from specialized practices should have a much higher than average cert grant rate, we also predict that these attorneys will not fare as successfully in opposing cert. If the presence of these attorneys and firms signals the salience of a case, then their presence opposing cert should have a similar, albeit somewhat more tempered effect.

The presence of the Solicitor General, however, is expected to have a different effect. Where the SG files an amicus brief in support of the respondent, the Court should be cognizant of the reasons the SG provides for denying cert and so the signal given off by the SG’s presence should be moderated by the SG’s arguments. Also, the SG’s arguments and presence either as an attorney for the cert petitioner or as amicus curiae should make a grant of cert significantly more likely.

\textsuperscript{62}See Caldeira and Wright supra n. 12 at 84; see also Timothy S. Bishop, Opposing Certiorari in the US Supreme Court, 20 Litigation 31 (1993).

3 Methods

This paper looks at the Court’s certiorari decisions from the 2001 through the 2015 Supreme Court Terms. To do this, we examine the 93,000 Supreme Court docket reports. While large-scale analyses of certiorari decisions are not inherently novel, this paper looks at a much larger dataset than was used in other, past efforts, and looks at the individual actors involved with more empirical precision and particularity.64

The goal of this paper is equally expansive. With this vast dataset we set out to show what features lead to success (or failure) on certiorari. The data allow us to pinpoint the relevance of these factors and the individual actors during the Roberts Courts years and the few years preceding.

Supreme Court docket reports contain various pieces of information relevant to our inquiry. These include the names of the petitioner and respondent parties, the lawyers and the law firms for both parties as well as their contact information, all joined parties and their representation, the most recent lower court to hear the case, the case number, the date of any Supreme Court dispositions as well as the dispositions themselves, and all orders and proceedings including all briefs filed in the case.

The following example from our dataset will illustrate the information collected for each case: In the 2010-2011 Term, the Court denied certiorari in the case Alaska Airlines v. Eid.65 The lawyer on the petition for Alaska

64There have been various attempts to examine certiorari decisions empirically. See e.g. Thompson and Wachtell supra n. 53 (examining approximately 31,000 petitions for certiorari between the 2001 and 2004 Supreme Court Terms and focusing on when the Court calls for a response or calls for the views of the SG); Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and the Supreme Court Agenda: An Empirical Analysis, 54 Okla. L. Rev. 727 (2001) (looking at 318 randomly selected paid petitions for statutory certiorari raising equal protection arguments between the 1981 and 1987 Terms); Robert M. Lawless, An Empirical Analysis of Bankruptcy Certiorari, 62 Missouri Law Review (1997) (analyzing 611 certiorari petitions involving issues of federal bankruptcy law from the 1980 through 1995 Terms); Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, Strategy in Supreme Court Case Selection: The Relationship between Certiorari and the Merits, 69 Ohio St. L.J 1 (2008); Cordray & Cordray, supra n. 18; Lazarus supra n. 12; Emily Grant, Scott A. Hendrickson & Michael S. Lynch, The Ideological Divide: Conflict and the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decision, 60 Cleveland State Law Review 559 (2012) (focusing on a random sample of cases between the 1986 and 1994 Terms where the petition for certiorari presented a conflict between federal courts of appeal). Several studies narrow the data by focusing on petitions where the justices’ individual votes are available through justices’ papers that later were made public. See e.g. Nancy C. Staudt, Agenda Setting in Supreme Court Tax Cases: Lessons from the Blackmun Papers, 52 Buff. L. Rev. 889 (2004); Black and Boyd, supra n. 49; Ryan C. Black, Christina L. Boyd & Amanda C. Bryan, Revisiting the Influence of Law Clerks on the US Supreme Court’s Agenda-Setting Process, 98 Marq. L. Rev. 75 (2014); Black and Owens (2009), supra n. 56; Ryan J. Owens, The Separation of Powers and Supreme Court Agenda Setting, 54 Am. J. Polit. Sci. 412 (2010).

65No. 10-962, cert. denied (May, 2 2011).
Airlines was Deane E. Maynard from Morrison & Foerster’s Washington D.C. Office and the lawyers for Azza Eid were Gilbert Gaynor, a solo practitioner from Santa Barbara, CA as well as Elain J. Goldenberg from Jenner & Block’s Washington D.C. Office. Three briefs for amicus curiae were filed prior to the Court’s ruling on certiorari from the Air Line Pilots Association, the Air Transport Association of America, and Professors Paul Dempsey and Pablo Mendes de Leon. The most recent lower court was the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which came to a decision on July 30, 2010 and denied a rehearing on October 26, 2010. The Supreme Court docketed the case on January 27, 2011 and denied certiorari on May 2, 2011.

We compiled this information for all cases docketed between the 2001 and the 2015 Terms. With this information we are able to gauge the importance of these factors in our large N-analysis and the most influential components of each variable on the individual level. We also are able to determine trends over time and to locate shifts in the importance of these factors over the course of the period we analyze.

4 Cert Factors

The factors that affect the likelihood that the Court will grant cert in a particular case are mainly elements of the case itself. We distinguish again between elements intrinsic and extrinsic to the case by separating them into those that relate directly to representation and those that do not. Doing so we focus on the non-representational factors first. These include the petitioning party, lower court, and the extent of amicus curiae involvement. We then examine factors directly related to representation. These include the attorneys and law firms, broken into various segments such as petitioning and responding parties, as well as by focusing specifically on the Solicitor General’s performance. Parsing the cert related attributes in these ways allows us to test how these factors affect the likelihood that the Court will grant cert. To illustrate the influence of these factors, we grouped and sorted the dataset by each and show the top entries.

4.1 Non-Representation Related Factors That Count

We begin by examining the most frequent petitioners in the Supreme Court. In Figure 1, we show “repeat players”, defined as parties with at least four petitioning party, lower court, and the extent of amicus curiae involvement. In line with the stated purpose of this paper, we only looked only at amicus briefs filed prior to the Court’s cert decision in a case.

In our analyses we focus on the principal petitioning and respondent attorneys and law firms in the case who are listed first in the Supreme Court’s docket.
petitions and with greater than 25% success at certiorari. These repeat players and their number of petitions are displayed in Figure 1.

Figure 1: “Repeat Player” Petitioners By Number Of Cert Petitions

These repeat players tend to cluster into different party types. The range of the number of petitions from these petitioners is from four to fourteen, with the State of Arizona filing the most.

Along with Arizona, the other states in this figure include Washington and Maryland. The entity with the second most petitions in this figure is associated with the first. The second most petitions were filed in the name of Dora Schriro who was Director of Arizona’s Department of Correction. The remainder of these repeat-players are corporations or groups. The types of cases brought by these companies varies substantially from Microsoft’s focus on patent and technology issues, to CSX Transportation’s focus on torts and liability. To explore the success of these petitioners, Figure 2 shows the rates of successful petitions filed by the repeat players identified in Figure 1.

Starting with the most successful petitioner in the group, Maryland had a 75.0% success rate at cert.68 The next three petitioners on the list

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68We do not include petitions summarily disposed of, whether based on other cert decisions or by parties’ stipulation, when calculating success counts for attorneys and law firms’ unless otherwise noted. If we had, Bank of America would have both filed the most petitions in Figure 1 and topped the list of most successful petitioners in Figure 2 with a 91% success rate. Bank of America’s success is mainly due to the Supreme Court’s cert grant in Bank of America v. Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. 1995 (2015) and the cases linked to it. Twenty of Bank of America’s successful petitions were granted and summarily disposed of based on the Court’s decision in Bank of America v. Caulkett.
- Union Pacific Railroad, Mohawk Industries, and CSX Transportation - each had a 50.0% cert success rate.

The next set of petitioners - Norfolk Southern Railway, Utility Air Regulatory Group, and Washington State - each were successful with 40.0% of their cert petitions. The last three petitioners to make this list - Arizona, Dora Schriro, and Microsoft - had cert grant rates of 35.7%, 33.3%, and 28.6% respectively. The stark contrast between those rates to the average rate of cert grant for paid petitions, 5.0%, illustrates the significant advantage these repeat players enjoy.\(^6^9\)

While certain parties’ Supreme Court experience may lead to improved petition grant rates, there are a slew of other important factors to consider and, as will be apparent when examining attorneys’ success in filing petitions, the absence of states’ attorneys is quite apparent.

Another consequential aspect in the likelihood of a cert petition’s success is the lower court that most recently ruled on the case. The Court has varying levels of experience handling petitions from the large number of courts below. The Supreme Court traditionally grants the most cert petitions from the United States Courts of Appeal. Figure 3 shows the number of petitions from the lower courts where the greatest number of petitions to the Supreme Court originated.

The figure shows all courts where more than 500 petitions originated. Thus, while the twenty courts that appear in Figure 3, the total number is pared down from the 482 courts where petitions originated during the

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\(^6^9\)Summary cert grants and denials based on the decisions in other cases were removed from this calculation.
time-frame of this paper.

Along with the federal courts of appeal, several state supreme courts appear in this mix. The presence of courts of appeal from Texas and California that handle mostly criminal cases provides evidence of the high rate of petitions from state court criminal decisions. This is especially true in cases dealing with capital crimes. California also has two courts listed, the California Supreme Court and the California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District, along with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal that encompasses California along with several other western states.

The population served by a given court largely explains the courts with the most filings. The Ninth Circuit covers appeals from the largest portion of the population of the Courts of Appeal and has the largest number of petitions with 12,027. The Fifth Circuit is the only other court that heard over 10,000 petitions with 10,308. State courts with the most petitions include the California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District with 795, the Supreme Court of California with 766, and the Supreme Court of Florida with 752. The other states with state courts represented in the figure include Illinois, Texas and Virginia as well as the District of Columbia. Figure 4 examines the cert grants rates from the courts shown in Figure 3.\footnote{We created an Appendix with Figures 3 and 4 replicated but split between IFP and paid cases.}

Looking at the results for cert grants, there are three clusters of grant rates.\footnote{There is a fourth cluster when cases where cert was granted and summarily decided...}
Another aspect of this figure that might stick out is the relatively high rate of grants for petitions from the D.C. and Federal Circuits (the courts that compose the second cluster), especially when compared to that of the Ninth Circuit.\textsuperscript{72} Past studies show the the high rate at which the Supreme Court reverses Ninth Circuit decisions relative to the other courts of appeal.\textsuperscript{73} As an initial matter then, it is important to distinguish between what leads to cert grants and what leads to reversals on the merits. The Supreme Court may monitor decisions from the Ninth Circuit more closely than those from other lower courts.\textsuperscript{74} By contrast the high rate of cert grants to cases from the D.C. Circuit may have more to do with the im-

\textsuperscript{72}The cert grant rates for cases petitioned from the D.C. and Federal Circuits are 6.5\% and 5.8\% respectively, while the rate from the Ninth Circuit is 3.2\%.

\textsuperscript{73}See e.g. Kevin M. Scott, \textit{Supreme Court Reversals of the Ninth Circuit}, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 341 (2006).

\textsuperscript{74}See Cameron, Songer, and Segal \textit{supra} n. 45 (providing an ideological distance explanation as a rationale for the Supreme Court’s differential monitoring of the courts of appeal).
portance of these cases since the D.C. Circuit deals with highly politicized issues more geared to Supreme Court adjudication than those from other circuit courts.\textsuperscript{75}

The rate of cert grants to petitions from the United States Courts of Appeals are generally higher than the rates for petitions from state courts. Additional state courts with high grant rates including the Supreme Court of Florida and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, handle many death penalty cases which are eventually petitioned to the United States Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{76}

Sitting below the middle cluster of values that spans from the Eighth Circuit to the Supreme Court of California are the Appellate Court of Illinois for the First District and the D.C. Court of Appeals. Petitions from these two courts are granted at lower rates than those arising from any of the other courts in the figure. The grant rate for cases arising in the D.C. Court of Appeals is .2\% and the grant rate is .3\% for cases from the Illinois court.

4.2 Representation-Based Factors: Attorneys

Representation at the cert stage can be analyzed based on each of the three principal actors: attorneys, law firms, and amicus curiae. We look at how all three forms of support affect the chances of cert success and the likelihood of defending against cert. There is also an institutional element to cert decisions. Many of the petitions involve state and/or federal government entities. In some of the analyses in this paper we look at government cert filings alongside the petitions filed by all other entities. In other situations we look specifically at non-governmental or at government-only filings.

To begin our assessment of attorneys, Figure 5 shows the attorneys with the most cert filings during the years covered in this paper, starting at 100 cert petitions. This figure only excludes attorneys working in the OSG.

From this figure, it is clear that the most active attorneys at the cert stage are state government attorneys. The attorneys with the top three most filings - Philip Lynch, Donna Coltharp, and Judy Madewell - all worked for the Office of the Federal Public Defender in the Western Dis-
trict of Texas. Lynch filed the most petitions with 224 followed by Coltharp and Madewell with 222 and 211 petitions respectively. The attorney with the fourth most petitions, Stephen Gordon was an Assistant Federal Public Defender in North Carolina. With the number of IFP petitions soaring ahead of those for paid petitions, these public defense attorneys have petitions constantly moving through their offices.

There is one unique attorney in the figure, Carter Phillips, who once worked in the OSG at the federal level and subsequently returned to big-law private practice. Phillips filed 117 cert petitions. Aside from Phillips in fact, the remainder of the attorneys in the figure worked or work in an Office of the Federal Public Defender with the majority of attorneys in Figure 5 based in Texas. Although this figure paints a picture of where many cert filings originate, it does not provide information regarding these attorneys’ successes with their cert petitions. Figure 6 looks at their relative success rates.

There is a very large gap between Phillips’ 16.2% success rate and the success of the rest of the attorneys in the figure whose values all fall below 2%. What explains this large differential? Perhaps the biggest reason is that of the attorneys in the figure, only Phillips worked in the OSG and has strong institutional support as well as a lengthy record of Supreme Court success.

Phillips remains one of the most powerful attorneys outside of the OSG. One metric to gauge this is by the number of amicus curiae briefs filed in

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77 The next most successful attorney in this figure is H. Michael Sokolow with a 1.3% cert grant rate.
cases he tries. We are interested in both supporting and opposing amicus briefs as the literature suggests both types lead to higher cert grant rates. Figure 7 below shows the non-OSG attorneys with the greatest overall number of amicus briefs filed in their cases. The minimum number of amicus briefs for an attorney in this figure is 30.

In private practice, Paul Clement is the petitioning attorney with the most such briefs with 150 amicus briefs filed in his cases. Phillips is second on this list with 135 amicus briefs.

The practitioners on this list are among the elite attorneys in Supreme Court practice. Prior-SGs in this figure include Clement, Theodore Olson, Seth Waxman, Gregory Garre, Neal Kaytal, and Walter Dellinger. Each has extensive experience both at the cert and merits phases of Supreme Court cases. The high level of amicus involvement is related to the salience of their cases and to the cases’ broad policy implications.

Though amicus involvement does not guarantee cert success, it is an indicator of a strongly supported interest. The relationship between successful big-law attorneys and amicus briefs is evident from this figure. All of the attorneys in Figure 7 work in big-law practices. The level of amicus support underscores that these attorneys often handle the most high profile cases. The figure also highlights links between amicus support and attorneys that formerly worked in the OSG as two of the top attorneys, Clement and Olson both worked as SG during the period of this paper.

Though examining the total of amicus briefs in cases an attorney takes on conveys the general, overall salience of an attorney’s cases, a second metric, amicus support on a per-case basis presents a way to better control
for attorneys that take on heavier caseloads. Figure 8 shows the per-case amicus involvement for the attorneys in Figure 7.

Although there are consistencies between Figures 7 and 8, there is also noticeable variation. Paul Clement has the most amicus briefs on a per-case basis with 2.6 which is consistent with his position on the list of attorneys with the most overall amicus involvement. In this figure, even with Carter Phillips’ association with a large number of amicus briefs, his caseload pulls him lower on the list of per-case support as he is associated 1.2. In contrast, the large number of amicus briefs filed in Michael Kellogg’s cases raises him to the second highest on a per-case basis with 2.2 briefs per-case. The next attorney on the list is Maureen Mahoney with 2.1 amicus briefs per-case, followed by E. Joshua Rosenkranz with 2.0 amicus briefs per-case. The attorney with the fewest amicus briefs per-case in this figure is Seth Waxman with 0.9.

The amicus briefs per-case metric gives an initial sense of the attorneys that bring the most salient cases to the Supreme Court. This size of this measure is primarily driven by the perceptions of interests groups seeking to convey certain policy positions and to reach specific outcomes. This provides a sense of the importance of these attorneys’ cases to external actors.

There is a strong and possibly not so surprising similarity between this group of attorneys and the most successful attorneys in the Supreme Court at the cert stage. To begin analyzing the most successful Supreme Court attorneys, we look at the attorneys with the most successful cert petitions.
Figure 8: Associated Amicus Briefs Per-Case For Petitioning Attorneys (Non-OSG)

Note: Reference line at .05 which is the mean number of amicus briefs per case for all attorneys in the dataset.

Figure 9 shows the number of petitions filed by these attorneys. The limits we set on attorneys in Figure 9 are that they filed more than 25 petitions for cert with minimally a 15% cert grant rate. Perhaps not surprisingly, Carter Phillips tops the list for number of filings at 117. Phillips was the only big-law attorney on the list of attorneys with the most petitions and had the second most amicus briefs filed in cases where he was petitioner.

After Phillips there is a precipitous drop off to the next attorney in Figure 9. The attorney with the next most cert filings in this figure is Thomas Goldstein with 78.

To assess these attorneys’ true success we next focus on their success rates in terms of cert grants per-petition they file. Figure 10 presents these rates.

The top performing attorney at the cert level is Jeffrey Fisher from Stanford Law School’s Supreme Court Litigation Clinic. Fisher’s cert grant rate is 29.1%. Fisher filed the fourth most petitions of these successful attorneys with 55. Seth Waxman and Andrew Pincus are next in the figure and fare similarly to one another with 26.4% and 25.9% success at the cert phase respectively. Paul Clement was the next best performing attorney after Waxman with 23.2% success. Carter Phillips who filed the most petitions of this group had a 16.2% rate of cert grants for this period.

This measure for attorney success focuses on attorneys with strong
records across the years of this paper. This time-frame, however, may not convey the successful attorneys who have established themselves more recently as cert experts. To examine if there are “rising star” cert attorneys or those that are successful over the most recent years we created figures similar to Figures 9 and 10 with data for the 2012-2015 terms. Figure 11 shows the petition counts for attorneys that filed more than five cert petitions with greater than 20% success for the 2012-2015 terms.

The three successful attorneys with the most filings are the same for the period of 2012-2015 as they are for the entirety of 2001-2015. The main difference in the more recent years is that Paul Clement far exceeds all other petitioners with the most cert filings. Clement filed 39 cert petitions between 2012 and 2015 while the attorney with the next most filings is Carter Phillips with 20. Attorneys who meet the parameters of this figure but were not included in prior attorney figures for successful attorneys include John Bursch, Kannon Shanmugam, and John Elwood. We present their success rates for the 2012 through 2015 terms in Figure 12.

Two attorneys that stand out in terms of success rates for these years are two of the attorneys that did not meet the requirements for the earlier figures: John Elwood and Kanon Shanmugam. Elwood works in the Washington D.C. Office of Vinson & Elkins. Although he was not one of the most active cert attorneys in this group, his success rate was far higher than any of the other attorneys at 50.0% (three of his six cert petitions for this period were granted). Shanmugam has a history of government work, working in the OSG prior to joining his current firm Williams & Connolly.
While not as successful as Elwood on a per petition basis, Shanmugam filed more petitions with eleven of which four or more than 36.4% were granted. Along with attempting to convince the Court to grant cert in cases, the other main, and diametrically opposite, role of attorneys at this stage is opposing cert. An attorney may succeed at the cert phase by convincing the Court to grant cert as well as by convincing the Court not to grant cert in cases where they represent the opposing party. With this in mind we are interested both in petitioning and in responding attorneys. Figure 13 looks at the attorneys that were listed as respondents the most times at the cert stage. The lower bound for the number of times an attorney was listed as a respondent in this figure is 300.

After Clement and Verrilli, three more Solicitors General - Elena Kagan, Neal Kaytal, and Gregory Garre - were each listed as respondent in more than 2,000 cases. Next is prior-Acting Solicitor General Edwin Kneedler was also listed as a cert respondent 560 times. Kneedler worked in the
Figure 11: Most Successful Cert Attorneys 2012-2015: Number of Petitions (non-OSG)

The figure shows the number of petitions filed by various attorneys from 2012 to 2015, excluding those who worked for the Office of Solicitor General (OSG). The attorneys listed include Paul D. Clement, Carter G. Phillips, Thomas C. Goldstein, John J. Bursch, Jeffrey L. Fisher, Kannon K. Shanmugam, David C. Frederick, Miguel A. Estrada, and John P. Elwood. The number of petitions filed ranges from 0 to 40.

OSG and was Acting Solicitor General of the United States from January until March 2009 between the appointments of Gregory Garre and Elena Kagan. The first non-OSG attorney on this list is Ronald Eisenberg who works in the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office. Eisenberg was listed as respondent in 555 cases.

The remaining attorneys in Figure 13 worked for state governments. Robert Krauss and Celia Terenzio both worked in Florida’s Office of Attorney General. Krauss was respondent on 457 petitions while Terenzio was listed as respondent on 326. Michael Glick was in the Illinois Office of Attorney General and Thomas Casey as well as John Bursch both worked as Michigan’s Solicitor General. Glick was respondent on 403 petitions and Casey was listed on 333 petitions.

Based on the numbers in Figure 13 the attorneys most often listed as respondents are in federal and state governments. Each of these attorneys’ success rate as respondent is well over 90%. This is due at least in part to the high level of IFP petitions filed against the federal and state governments and the Court’s propensity to deny such petitions. In turn this leaves little variation between governmental attorneys in their success at responding to cert petitions. To better gauge success at responding to petitions we examine non-governmental attorneys that focus on paid petitions.

Figure 14 presents the most successful attorneys in responding to cert petitions excluding attorneys representing the federal and state governments. The figure looks at the number of responses to cert filed by these attorneys. To generate this figure we limit our results to non-governmental

http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lss/197
attorneys that were successful in defending against more than twelve cert petitions with a success rate over more than 50%.

There is a relatively narrow range to the number of responses these attorneys filed as is evident from Figure 14. Paul Clement responded to the most cert petitions with 34 responses while Robert Long had the fewest responses in the figure at 13. These attorneys are predominately lawyers from well-known big-law practices. Many overlap with the most successful petitioning attorneys. These attorneys include Carter Phillips, Paul Clement, Andrew Pincus, Theodore Olson, Charles Rothfeld, and Christopher Landau.

There is one notable caveat in this figure. M. Hope Keating and Andrew Lindemann both work in private practice, yet they their clients are those traditionally handled by state attorneys. Keating practices in Greenberg Traurig’s Florida office. All of her cert responses involve cases where the Florida Bar or a related entity is respondent. Similarly, Andrew Lindemann works at Davidson & Lindemann, a civil trial practice in Columbia South Carolina. Lindemann’s cert responses were written for clients including and related to the South Carolina Department of Corrections, the Town of Hollywood and County of Richland South Carolina, the South Carolina Department of Mental Health, the South Carolina Department of Social Services, and the Camden Police Department. While we do not remove Keating and Lindemann from this figure because they technically do not fall outside of the figure’s limitations we also think their responses to cert are more in line with those from state government attorneys than
with those filed by the remainder of the attorneys in Figures 14 and 15. Figure 15 below shows the success rates in terms of cert denials for the attorneys listed in Figure 14.

Based on our caveat for respondent attorneys there are two ways to view Figure 15. The first is that based on the figure’s express limits, M. Hope Keating and Andrew Lindemann are the two top non-governmental attorneys for cert responses. The Court denied cert in all 14 cases where Keating responded to petitions and Lindemann had a 96.2% cert denial rate in the 25 cases where he was the respondent attorney.

Focusing on similar representation, however, leads to the the second view of Figure 15. When we look at the most successful attorneys in terms of cert responses and eliminate the two attorneys with mainly state clients, Christopher Landau is the top performing attorney. Landau is a big-law attorney that works in Kirkland & Ellis’ Washington D.C. Office. Landau’s cert denial rate is 94.7% in the 18 cases in which he was listed as the respondent attorney. Unlike the previously discussed attorneys who mainly represent state clients, Landau’s Supreme Court clients include private entities such as National Geographic, ConAgra Foods, and Allstate Insurance.

After Landau, the next most successful attorneys are Charles Rothfeld and Miguel Estrada. Rothfeld was in the middle of the attorneys in this figure for his number cert responses with 15 while Estrada responded to 21. Their respective rates of cert denial are 80.0% and 90.5%.

Finally the two most active cert petitioners in this figure were also two of the top three most active cert respondent attorneys - Paul Clement and
Carter Phillips. Although both had cert denial rates well above the 50% threshold, their success rates were towards the bottom of the attorneys in the figure. Clement had the second lowest denial rate at 61.8% and Phillips recorded the third lowest rate with 62.5%.

The final way we examine cert success is by focusing on petitions filed by United States Solicitors General. We generally removed SGs from prior figures because as attorneys serving in the Executive Branch of the federal government, they tend not to be regarded as similarly situated to attorneys in private practice. This distinction is apparent in SGs success over time as documented in previous studies.\(^\text{78}\) We, therefore, analyze SGs’ success separately from that of other attorneys. To create a lower limit for attorneys on OSG filings we set the minimum number of cert petitions for an OSG cert petitioner to fifteen. The number of cert petitions filed by the SGs during the years of our paper are shown in Figure 16.

The number of petitions these SGs file obviously correlates with the length of their tenures as SG. Since Paul Clement and Donald Verrilli served in this post the longest of the attorneys included in the figure, they filed the most petitions as SG at 65 and 74 respectively. Theodore Olson who was SG at the beginning and preceding the first Supreme Court Term covered in the paper filed 23 petitions as SG that we included in our analyses. Elena Kagan filed 17 cert petitions and Neal Kaytal filed 16. The success

\(^{78}\) See supra n. 32.
Figure 15: Most Successful Respondent Attorneys: Cert Denial Rate (Non-Governmental)

Note: * = Non-governmental attorney with primarily or all state-related clients.

Figure 16: Number of Cert Petitions Filed by Solicitors General

Note: Excludes these attorneys’ non-OSG petitions for cert.

The SGs’ success rates, as predicted, far exceed even the top performing attorneys in private practice. All of the SGs had greater than 65% rates of
Figure 17: Solicitor General Success Rates for Cert Petitions

Note: Excludes these attorneys’ non-OSG petitions for cert.

cert grants. The most successful SG during this period was Elena Kagan. Based on her 17 cert petitions during this period of this paper her success rate was 76.5%. Next is Neal Kaytal. Kaytal was granted cert in 75.0% of the 16 petitions he filed. After Kaytal is Paul Clement who was successful in 72.3% of his cert petitions. Theodore Olson had a 68.2% cert success rate. Finally, the most recent SG in this paper, Donald Verrilli had a 67.6% success cert grant rate for petitions he filed.

4.3 Representation-Based Factors: Law Firms

These profiles of attorney success at cert provide an analysis of one dimension of representation. A related but different dimension is given by comparing law firms’ success at the cert stage. Law firms are the organizations that employ the attorneys who ultimately file the petitions for cert. Their goal is not only individual success, but the aggregate success of their attorneys. One necessary aspect for a successful firm, therefore, is to attract top-level attorneys. Currently, many of these top-level Supreme Court attorneys once worked in the OSG.

For a firm to be successful in the Supreme Court there is a requisite organizational component that attracts clients. Clients may be allured by the quality of attorneys at a firm but also by a firm’s notoriety for creating a successful Supreme Court practice. In the analyses below, we look at similar cert success metrics to the ones we applied to attorneys, only now
applied to law firms.

We begin by looking at the law firms with the most Supreme Court cert experience. Figure 18 contains these law firms. In this figure we examine all non-state or federal governmental practices with more than fifty cert filings.

Figure 18: Number of Filed Petitions for Law Firms with Most Cert Petitions (Non-Governmental)

The firms with the most cert filings are strongly driven by a few experienced Supreme Court attorneys. This is most visible with Sidley Austin as the firm with the most cert filings. Carter Phillips who filed the most non-OSG cert petitions of the successful attorneys works in Sidley Austin’s Washington D.C. Office. Of Sidley’s 189 cert petitions, 117 were filed by Phillips.

Among the remaining firms, even when the majority of the petitions aren’t driven by a single attorney, there is often an attorney or several attorneys noted for their Supreme Court expertise. Mayer Brown has the second most cert petitions with 133. Andrew Pincus alone filed about one in five of all of Mayer Brown’s petitions. WilmerHale has Seth Waxman. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher has both Theodore Olson and Miguel Estrada. This pattern continues on for many of the other firms with a high number of cert petitions.

High petition counts tell us which firms are most active at the cert stage of Supreme Court litigation, but aside from potentially adding to a firm’s name recognition in this arena, they do not inform us of a firm’s likelihood of success. As was shown with attorneys, amicus involvement in
cases points to cases’ generalized importance beyond the immediate parties and, in the aggregate, can serve as an indicator of an attorney or firm’s prominence. Similar to our examination of attorneys, we look to overall counts of amicus briefs in specific law firms’ cases as a means to show the salience of their cases. Figure 19 presents these results.

Figure 19: Petitioning Firms with Most Associated Amicus Briefs (Non-Governmental)

We set the threshold in Figure 19 for the minimum number of amicus curiae briefs to 40. As with Figure 18, the majority of these are big-law firms with specialized Supreme Court practices. Here, however, there are also a few outliers from this norm that are still highly touted for their Supreme Court litigation expertise.

To begin, many of the firms with the most cert filings are also retained in cases with amicus filings. Gibson Dunn and Sidley Austin are at the top of both metrics indicating that not only do both file many petitions, but that they file petitions in important cases as determined by amici involvement. Along with these two firms, Bancroft PLLC, Mayer Brown, Jones Day, and Latham & Watkins are next on the list of firms.

Other noted firms and groups in this figure fall outside of big-law practice. All but one case, in which Stanford’s Supreme Court Law Clinic represented the petitioner, had four or more amicus filings. Lastly, rights advocating groups with strong Supreme Court presences - the Pacific Legal Foundation and the Alliance Defending Freedom - make the cut for petitioning firms with the most overall amicus involvement.

As with attorneys, we also control for the number of petitions filed by these firms by examining the amicus filings on a per-case basis. This
information is provided in Figure 20.

Figure 20: Petitioning Firms’ Associated Amicus Briefs Per-Case (Non-Governmental)

Paul Clement’s firm, Bancroft PLLC tops the list for petitioning firms with the most amicus involvement on a per-case basis with 2.4. There is a large margin between the amicus involvement in Bancroft’s cases and the next group in the figure, Alliance Defending Freedom, which averages 1.8 amicus briefs in cases where it is the petitioning firm. The next firm in the figure is Gibson Dunn with a per-case amicus brief average of 1.7.

We next look to the most successful law firms at the Supreme Court’s cert stage. We first examine the number of aggregate, successful cert filings by these firms. The parameters we set for these firms is that they filed more than 25 cert petitions and had a success rate of greater than 15% of their filings. Our theory suggests an association between factors such as amicus filings and cert success, as well as between successful Supreme Court attorneys and the firms where they house their practices. Both of these relationships are discernible in the petition counts for the most successful law firms as depicted in Figure 21.

Firms that filed the most cert petitions in Figure 21 align with our results for the most successful attorneys. Carter Phillips, who works in Sidley Austin’s Washington D.C. Office had the most attorney filings of the successful attorney grouping. Next, Mayer Brown has experienced Supreme Court litigator Andrew Pincus. The 27 petitions Pincus filed during the period of this paper constitute a significant fraction of Mayer Brown’s 133 cert petitions. This is similarly the case with Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher and its arsenal of top Supreme Court litigators including Theodore Olson.
Similar to the findings for attorneys, law firms’ success with their aggregate cert filings does not guarantee success on a per-case basis. In Figure 22, we examine the most successful law firms by looking at cert grant rates for their petitions.

Thomas Goldstein’s firm, Goldstein & Russell is the most successful firm, winning grants with 30.0% of their 60 petitions. Latham & Watkins is close behind with cert grants in 28.3% of its 60 cert petitions. Other firms with 25% or greater success at cert include Stanford Law School’s Supreme Court Litigation Clinic and Robbins, Russell, Englert both with 27.0% success at cert. The last firm to meet the parameters for these top firms is the highest filer, Sidley Austin, with 15.9% cert grant success.

The large difference in the overall number of cert filings from these successful firms is also notable. This number ranges from 189 for Sidley Austin petitions to 27 petitions from MoloLamken. This range in the overall number of cert filings may well play into a firm’s cert success as large increases in this number may have an adverse effect on a firm’s overall cert success rate.

To convey the law firms that were successful in recent years, we created Figures 23 and 24. These figures look at the most successful law firms for the 2012-2015 terms. The limits we set for these figures are that the firm or group is non-governmental, it filed more than five cert petitions, and had greater than 20% success for the 2012-2015 terms.

Several of the most successful firms for 2012-2015 were also successful for the earlier terms covered in this paper. Bancroft PLLC moved up in
terms of its relative number of cert petitions filed and this is predominately attributable to Paul Clement’s cert filings. Goldstein & Russell also moved higher in terms of its number of cert filings relative to the other most successful firms for this period. The firms or groups that fit the parameters for this figure which were not examined in previous figures tended to file fewer petitions during this period than the repeat firms that carry over from the other figures. These firms or groups not previously examined include Vinson & Elkins, Goodwin Procter, University of Virginia, Ropes & Gray, and Baker Botts. Figure 24 shows the success rates for these firms.

Figure 24 presents parallels with Figure 12, which looks at cert grant rates for the most successful petitioning attorneys from 2012 to 2015. Notably, Vinson & Elkins is the most successful firm for this period. It won cert grants in three of eight or 37.5% of its petitions. The attorney on all three petitions was John Elwood.

The next set of firms all had 33.3% cert success during this period. Three of the five of these firms were not in Figure 22 (examining the most successful firms across all terms covered in this paper) including Ropes & Gray, University of Virginia, and Baker Botts. The two firms that were mentioned in Figure 22 are Williams & Connolly and Robbins Russell. The rise in Williams & Connolly’s success coincides with Kanon Shanmugam’s individual success filing cert petitions during these years. Vinson & Elkins’ and Williams & Connolly’s high cert grant rates for 2012 to 2015 taken together show that one effective cert attorney may drive a top firms’ cert success for these limited years.
Looking at the other side of cert litigation, we also focus on the firms that are most successful at defending against cert in Figures 25 and 26. For these firms we only examine non-governmental firms that defended against more than 25 cert petitions, with more than 70% of such petitions denied.

Many of the most successful petitioning law firms carry over into our findings for the most successful cert respondent firms. Those with high counts of cert petitions such as WilmerHale, Gibson Dunn, Jones Day, and Mayer Brown also were involved in large numbers of cert responses with 87, 74, 65, and 59 cert responses respectively. There are also a handful of big-law firms in this figure that we have not examined in other analyses including Reed Smith and Holland & Knight.

This figure shows that there are at least two clusters of firms in terms of the number of cert responses. The break-point between these two groups is between Kirkland & Ellis with 53 cert responses and Public Citizen Litigation with 39 cert responses with Ogletree Deakins’s 45 responses fitting in between the two clusters. This difference in number of cert responses indicates that there is a tiered system at the top of the successful firms with a group of seven of the most successful law firms in this area handling the bulk of cert responses for the overall group.

The firms of the two attorneys who handled primarily state government responses to cert are also present in this figure. Greenberg Traurig and Davidson & Lindemann both meet the criteria for top law firms by cert responses but as with their attorneys, this statistic needs to be scrutinized with an understanding that these firms’ clients are mostly state actors.
With this in mind we next look to the cert denial rates for these top cert response law firms.

With a 97.2% cert denial rate, Holland & Knight is the most successful firm in defending against cert. Holland & Knight handled 36 cert responses of which 35 cert petitions were denied. Reed Smith falls just behind Holland & Knight with a 97.1% cert denial rate based on denials in 33 of 34 petitions. After Reed Smith we have the two law firms handling mainly state responses, Davidson & Lindemann and Greenberg Traurig. In terms of raw percentages, both had cert denial rates very close to that of Reed Smith with 96.6% and 96.4% respectively. After these firms, Ogletree Deakins and Winston & Strawn have cert denial rates of 95.6% and 93.1%. The last two firms with greater than 90% cert denial rates are Kirkland & Ellis and Morgan, Lewis & Bockius with 92.5% and 90.6% cert denial rates respectively.
Figure 25: Count of Cert Responses for Most Successful Law Firms Defending Against Cert (Non-Governmental)

Note: * = Non-governmental firms with primarily or all state-related clients.

Figure 26: Success Rate of Most Successful Law Firms Defending Against Cert (Non-Governmental)

Note: * = Non-governmental firms with primarily or all state-related clients.
5 Discussion and Conclusion

Even though we look at many different factors that impact the likelihood of cert success in this paper, these factors tend to pinpoint similar players. Top attorneys are often (and understandably) related to top law firms. Successful cert petitioning attorneys and firms are often present in our findings for successful respondent attorneys and firms. Groups tend to file more amicus briefs supporting and opposing cert when these attorneys and firms have a stake in the litigation. Also, many of the same lower courts were the last courts to hear cases constituting the most salient petitions.

There are notable differences when the federal or state governments are involved. Case salience is immediately apparent when the SG files cert petitions. The majority of state petitions for cert are filed by public defenders on behalf of indigent petitioners. Both types of government must respond to a glut of petitions against them, also mainly from IFP petitioners. The influx of IFP petitions against government respondents likely augments the governments’ high rates of success defending against cert.

Although our analyses disaggregate the various components that affect the likelihood of the Court granting cert, and the similarities between the entities in the analyses show that there are successful repeat-players that are often involved in these petitions, these analyses are nonetheless separate. We want, however, to be able to see how these various moving parts function simultaneously. To do so we examine the cases between the 2001 and 2015 Supreme Court Terms with the greatest number of amicus briefs filed at the cert stage. These cases are shown in Figure 27.

These cases tended to generate much press even as the Supreme Court was deciding whether or not to grant them cert. They dealt with issues salient to large portions of the population. The federal government was involved at some level in most of these cases. The SG represented the respondent in Deaton v. United States, Campa v. United States, Textron v. United States, Arizona v. United States, and Mingo Logan Coal v. EPA. The SG also represented the petitioner in United States v.


80 No. 03-701, cert. denied (Apr. 5, 2004).
81 No. 08-987, cert. denied (June 15, 2009).
82 No. 09-750, cert. denied (May 24, 2010).
The SG filed amicus curiae briefs in *Hollingsworth v. Perry*,\(^8\) *Spoke v. Robins*,\(^8\) *MGM v. Grokster*,\(^8\) *Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International*,\(^8\) and in *Microsoft v. i4i Limited Partnership*.\(^9\) Additionally, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce filed amicus briefs in *DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno*,\(^9\) *Exxon v. Baker*,\(^9\) and in *American Electric Power v. Connecticut*.\(^9\)

All of these petitions were on the paid docket. Also, all of the lower courts for these cases for United States Courts of Appeal with six cases coming from the Ninth Circuit.

Examining the petitioners’ representation, many of the attorneys and firms were noted in our previous analyses. Attorneys for the petitioners include Thomas Goldstein (twice), Andrew Pincus, Carter Phillips, Kannon Shanmugam, Paul Clement, Walter Dellinger, Theodore Olson, and Paul Clement, as well as Donald Verrilli as SG. Petitioners’ law firms include Akin Gump (twice), Mayer Brown, Sidley Austin (twice), Williams & Connolly, Bancroft PLLC, Gibson Dunn (twice), O’Melveny & Myers,

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\(^{8\text{a}}\)133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
\(^{8\text{b}}\)135 S.Ct. 1892 (2015).
\(^{8\text{c}}\)125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
\(^{8\text{d}}\)134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
\(^{8\text{e}}\)131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
\(9\text{a}\)128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
\(9\text{b}\)131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
and Jenner & Block.

The respondents’ representation in these cases includes Theodore Olson and Neal Kaytal in private practice, as well as SGs Theodore Olson, Elena Kagan, and Donald Verrilli. Along with the OSG, the firms representing respondents include Gibson Dunn, Davis, Wright, Tremaine, and Hogan Lovells.

The Court granted nine of seventeen of these petitions for cert. The SG wrote the response briefs for four of the eight cases where cert was denied. Both of these factors accord with our theory that the Court is likely to pay close attention to the SG’s arguments on cert. If this is correct, when the federal government is the respondent, the Court is going to take a close look at the SG’s points. This helps to explain why the Court might deny cert in these cases even when there is apparent salience based on the number of amicus briefs.

What does the information from this figure tell us? The results in Figure 23 help to confirm our assumptions about the factors involved in cert and their relationship to one another. The federal government is often directly or indirectly involved in the most salient cases. So are the top cert attorneys and law firms. The lower courts that previously heard these cases are the United States Courts of Appeal. Finally, the outcomes are primarily cert grants, especially when the SG does not argue for cert denial.

This is not to say that our findings help us predict cert outcomes, only that they help us make more informed predictions about the likelihood of cert grants. Like most Supreme Court practices, the actual cert voting process is generally kept secret from public scrutiny. Without a more direct means to observe the justices’ decisions on cert we mainly have to base our analyses and assumptions on the available data. This data is at the heart of this paper’s analyses and drives our findings regarding cert success.

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6 Appendix

6.1 Dataset Methodology

The dataset was created by programmatically accessing the official electronic docket of the Supreme Court available on http://www.supremecourt.gov/. The Supreme Court states that all cases since the beginning of the 2001 term are entirely accessible.

First, the journal files were downloaded from http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/journal.aspx for all terms. These files were then processed to extract all case numbers. Then, the docket entries were downloaded from http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/docket-number.html. As unfortunately, no machine-format access is available, these documents were then processed with a series of pattern-matching regular expressions to classify their petition type, attorney name and other parameters investigated in this study.

To prevent firm name changes or minor variations in spellings from causing differences in the outcome of our analyses, the attorney names were then divided into similarity groups by using a locality-based hash function.\(^95\)

Finally, in some instances, the Supreme Court remands large numbers of cases upon deciding a substantially similar case. To prevent these “sweeping remands” from inflating the cert numbers, cases that were remanded “in light of” another decision were excluded from the majority of our analyses.

6.2 Lower Courts Statistics by Case Type

Figure 28: Lower Court Counts by Case Type
Figure 29: Cert Grant Percentage for Lower Courts with Most Cert Petitions by Case Type