Walden v. Fiore and the Federal Courts: Rethinking FRCP 4(k)(1)(A) and Stafford v. Briggs

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Abstract

If it were not so common, the reasoning in Walden v. Fiore would seem bizarre: the jurisdiction of a federal court over a federal claim against a federal agent depends on how much power the constitution allows the state of Nevada. This strange result is, of course, the result of FRCP 4(k)(1)(A), which, in most cases, makes the jurisdiction of a federal district court co-extensive with the jurisdiction of a state court of general jurisdiction in the same district. Less obviously, the outcome in Walden v. Fiore reflects Stafford v. Briggs, which, contrary to the plain language of the federal venue statute, held that a Bivens action could not be brought in the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides. Walden v. Fiore thus provides an opportunity to revisit the wisdom of FRCP 4(k)(1)(A) and Stafford v. Briggs. FRCP 4(k)(1)(A) should be revised in cases involving federal law to allow jurisdiction in any federal district court. Venue, however, should be restricted to ensure that the most convenient forum is chosen, taking into account convenience to both plaintiff and defendant. In cases involving alleged misconduct by federal officers, where the U.S. can easily defend in any district, plaintiffs should be allowed to sue in his or her home district.
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If it were not so common, the reasoning in Walden v. Fiore² would seem bizarre: the jurisdiction of a federal court over a federal claim against a federal agent depends on how much power the constitution allows the state of Nevada. This strange result is, of course, the result of FRCP 4(k)(1)(A), which, in most cases, makes the jurisdiction of a federal district court co-extensive with the jurisdiction of a state court of general jurisdiction in the same district. Less obviously, the outcome in Walden v. Fiore reflects Stafford v. Briggs³ which, contrary to the plain language of the federal venue statute,⁴ held that a Bivens action could not be brought in the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides. Walden v. Fiore thus provides an opportunity to revisit the wisdom of both FRCP 4(k)(1)(A) and Stafford v. Briggs⁵.

1. Rethinking FRCP 4(k)(1)(A)

FRCP 4(k)(1) states:

Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant: (A) who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located.

Since the jurisdiction of a state court of general jurisdiction is determined by the state’s long-arm statute and the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, FRCP 4(k)(1)(A) means that the jurisdiction of a federal court is constrained by a state statute and a constitutional amendment designed to limit state

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³ 444 U.S. 527 (1980).
⁴ 28 U.S.C. 1391(e).
power. Most long-arm statutes give state courts, either explicitly or by judicial construction, the full power allowed by the US Constitution, so the only real constraint on state court jurisdiction, and thus on personal jurisdiction in federal court, is the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution. Although the Court has made clear that constitutional constraints on state court jurisdiction come from the Due Process clause, the Court has made federalism an integral part of its Due Process jurisprudence by stating that a defendant has a liberty interest in being subjected only to lawful judgments. Thus, personal jurisdiction in state court depends on the constitutional limits on a state court’s legitimate power. So, by virtue of FRCP 4(k)(1)(A), personal jurisdiction in federal district court also usually depends on those same limits on state court power.

Subjecting federal courts to state court limits might make sense if state court limits were based on fairness and the convenience. Since travel to federal and state courts in the same location would impose an equal hardship on the parties and witnesses, imposing the same convenience-based constraints courts in both systems would be logical. Nevertheless, over the last half-century, the Supreme Court has increasingly turned away from a fairness interpretation of constitutional constraints on personal jurisdiction. Instead, the Court has focused on defining the extent of sovereignty. Most importantly, it has defined legitimate governmental power as a quid pro quo. A government can only assert jurisdiction if the defendant received something in return, that is, if the defendant “purposefully availed” itself of the benefits of the government that established the court.

6 *Stafford*, 134 S. Ct. at 1121; See also article cites supra n. _. FRCP 4(k)(1)(A) was created by the 1993 amendments to the FRCP. Nevertheless, even before 1993, FRCP 4(e) and 4(f) had the same effect. Leslie M. Kelleher, “The December 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures—A Critical Analysis,” 12 Touro Law Review 7, 31-32 (1995).


8 *Hanson v. Denkla*, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 1238 (1958) (“These restrictions are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.”); *World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson*, 100 S. Ct. 559, 564 (1980) (Due Process “protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States through their courts do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.”); *McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro*, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011) (Kennedy, J. plurality opinion) (“Personal jurisdiction, of course, restricts judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty, for due process protects the individual’s right to be subject only to lawful power. But whether a judicial judgment is lawful depends on whether the sovereign has authority to render it.”)(internal quotation marks and references removed).

9 When federal law explicitly provides for nationwide service of process, when a party is joined under FRCP 14 or 19, and when there is no state court with jurisdiction over a federal claim, limits on state court power no longer apply. See FRCP 4(k)(1)(B), (C), and 4(k)(2).

10 *Walden v. Fiore*, 134 S. Ct. at 1122 (“Due process limits on the State’s adjudicative authority principally protect the liberty of the nonresident defendant—not the convenience of plaintiffs or third parties.”).

11 See supra n. _ and infra n. _. See also *Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes*, “Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in a Twenty-First Century World,” 64 Fla. L. Rev 387, 387 (2012) (arguing that the “conceptual core” of personal jurisdiction remains “limiting the scope of governmental authority to those establishing the requisite relationship with the sovereign”); *Alan Erbsen*, “Impersonal Jurisdiction,” 60 Emory L. J. 1, 6 (2010) (“[Q]uestions about whether the Constitution limits personal jurisdiction in state court are difficult because they implicate the allocation of regulatory authority between coequal states in a federal system”).

12 *Hanson v. Denkla*, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 1240 (1958) (“It is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”); *Daimler AG v. Bauman*, 134 S. Ct. 746, 755 (“*International Shoe ...
very different constitutional constraints for federal and state courts. A state court can constitutionally assert jurisdiction only if the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the benefits of that state. Federal courts can constitutionally assert jurisdiction if the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the benefits of the United States.\textsuperscript{13} That means that if the purposeful availment requirement is satisfied for any state, it is also satisfied for any federal court. That is, a defendant who purposefully availed itself of California can be constitutionally haled into federal court in Massachusetts, Alaska, or Hawaii. In addition, there are probably situations where a federal court has jurisdiction but no state court would.\textsuperscript{14}

The constitutional authority of a federal court to assert jurisdiction based on contacts with any part of the United States is the justification for statutes that give the federal courts “nationwide service of process” and thus nationwide personal jurisdiction in antitrust, securities, and some other areas of federal law.\textsuperscript{15} Nevertheless, Congress and the federal rule makers have chosen not to give similar authority to federal courts in other areas of law.\textsuperscript{16} As discussed below, it makes sense to restrict federal court jurisdiction so as not to give plaintiffs complete choice of forum and so as not to subject defendants to litigation in inconvenient fora. The question, however, is whether FRCP 4(k)(1)(A) is the best way to restrict plaintiff choice and ensure a convenient forum. That is, does it make sense to constrain federal courts by imposing on them the very same restrictions imposed on state courts, even though the reasons to constrain federal courts (-curbing forum shopping and ensuring convenience) have little to do with the reasons the Court has used to limit state court jurisdiction (federalism limits on state court authority)?

Before discussing appropriate constraints on the power of federal district courts, it should be noted that those constraints could be imposed either by limits on jurisdiction or by limits on venue. It makes little difference which doctrinal hook is used. Since a key policy at issue is convenience to the parties, which has traditionally been the concern of venue, the rest of this article will propose that federal district courts be given personal jurisdiction in federal question cases to the full extent allowed by the 5\textsuperscript{th} Amendment, and that constraints be imposed by venue statutes.\textsuperscript{17}


\textsuperscript{14} McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789; FRCP 4(k)(2).

\textsuperscript{15} Alan Erbsen, “Impersonal Jurisdiction,” 60 Emory L. J. 1, 49-52 (2010); John T. Parry, “Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction after Bauman and Fiore,” forthcoming in Lewis & Clark L. Rev (2015) (”With respect to federal questions, the regulatory interest of the federal government easily justifies special personal jurisdiction rules for federal courts.”); See also supra n. _.

\textsuperscript{16} One exception is FRCP 4(k)(2), which allows service of process anywhere for claims arising under federal law, if “the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s court of general jurisdiction.”

\textsuperscript{17} The extension of personal jurisdiction could be accomplished simply by deleting FRCP 4(k)(2)(A). See below for a proposed venue statute. As discussed in John Parry’s contribution to this symposium, [add citation] the 5\textsuperscript{th} Amendment may also require that the forum meet minimal standards for convenience, in which case a venue statute constraining forum choice (or at least authorizing transfer) would be constitutionally required if jurisdiction were based solely on an analysis of whether the defendant had purposefully availed itself of the U.S.
From a pragmatic standpoint, there are two reasons to constrict venue in federal district courts: economizing on litigation costs and preventing forum selling. Forum selling will be discussed in the last paragraph of this section. That venue rules should economize on litigation costs is relatively obvious. Plaintiffs should not be able to choose a court that imposes significant costs on defendants and witnesses, at least not without good reason. Nevertheless, there is also little justification for structuring venue rules that focus exclusively or primarily on convenience to the defendant. While the Due Process Clause may require that jurisdictional analysis focus on the defendant, there is no reason that venue must do so. To the extent that venue focuses on litigation costs, it should weigh equally costs imposed on everyone — plaintiffs, defendants, and witnesses. Unfortunately, a rule that stipulated that “venue shall be appropriate in and only in the district that minimizes litigation costs,” would be impractical, because it may not be apparent at the outset of a case which district would minimize litigation costs.

So the best option would be to draft rules that would select the cost-minimizing district in most cases, with discretion to the district court to transfer the case when the rules have failed to select the most convenient forum. The current venue statute, 28 U.S.C. 1391, does not serve these purposes, because 1391(b)(1) makes venue dependent on residence, and 1391(c)(2) defines residence of a corporation by referring to personal jurisdiction. The current venue statute thus imports sovereignty notions that, as discussed above, are not appropriate for determining which federal court should hear a case. A venue rule for cases arising under federal law might look something like the following:

**Venue for claims arising under federal law**

a) A civil action of which the district court shall have original jurisdiction not founded on 28 U.S.C. 1332 may be brought:

i) in the judicial district in which most plaintiffs and most defendants reside, or

ii) if there is no district satisfying subsection (a)(i), then in the judicial district in which some plaintiffs and/or some defendants reside, if that district is also the district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or if that district is also the place where the injury was suffered, or if that district is also...

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18 Daniel Klerman, “Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction,” Journal of Legal Analysis (2014) Advance Access at doi: 10.1093/jla/lau007. That article also discusses a third pragmatic reason to constrict jurisdiction or venue: preventing adjudication that is biased against out-of-state parties. That concern, however, is not relevant to federal courts generally, and especially when they are applying federal law. See Section 5 of that article.

19 But see Geoffrey P. Miller, “A New Procedure for State Court Personal Jurisdiction,” New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper (2013) (arguing that Congress should grant “federal district courts the full judicial power authorized by the Constitution coupled with discretion to dismiss, transfer or remand cases when it appears that some other forum is more adequate for resolving the controversy.”)

20 This proposed statute would not govern venue in diversity cases. In a prior article, I argued for a similar focus on convenience and the prevention of forum selling in diversity cases as well. Daniel Klerman, “Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction,” Journal of Legal Analysis (2014) Advance Access at doi: 10.1093/jla/lau007. Nevertheless, for diversity cases there are additional reasons that might suggest that federal and state courts in the same location should have jurisdiction over the same set of disputes. For example, under *Klaxon v. Stentor*, 313 U.S. 487 (1941), allowing federal district court jurisdiction when a state court in the same state would not have jurisdiction could change substantive law. Robert Haskell Abrams, “Power, Convenience and the Elimination of Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts,” 58 Indiana L. Rev. 1, 28-29 (1982).
district in which a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the litigation is situated, or

iii) if there is no district satisfying subsection (a)(i) or (a)(ii), then in the judicial district in which the most plaintiffs or most defendants reside.

b) For the purposes of this statute:

i) a natural person resides in the district in which that person dwells at the time the lawsuit is filed, even if that place is not the person’s domicile.

ii) an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued in its common name under applicable law, whether or not it be incorporated, shall be deemed to reside in the district where such entity has its principal place of business.

iii) the federal government or agents of the federal government acting in their official capacity or under color of law shall be deemed to reside in every judicial district.

iv) a natural person not resident in the United States shall be deemed to reside in every judicial district.

v) an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued in its common name under applicable law, whether or not it be incorporated, that does not have its principal place of business in the United States shall be deemed to reside in the district where such entity has its principal place of business in the United States, or, if it has no place of business in the United States, it shall be deemed to reside in every judicial district.

c) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action of which the district court has original jurisdiction not founded on 28 U.S.C. 1332 to any other district or division.

d) 28 U.S.C. 1391 shall apply only to cases in which the district court has original jurisdiction founded on 28 U.S.C. 1332.

Others more experienced in statutory drafting can probably draft a better statute, but several aspects of the proposed statute are worthy of note. For reasons that will be discussed further below relating to forum selling, the statute gives the plaintiff very little choice. In a given case, there is at most one district that could satisfy (a)(i), and if there is a district that satisfies (a)(i), that is the only district for which venue would be proper. Similarly, there are relatively few districts satisfying (a)(ii), and if such districts exist, the plaintiff must choose one of those districts, assuming, of course, that no district satisfies (a)(i). In addition, it should be noted that residence is defined differently than in 28 U.S.C. 1391.

It might, for example, be wise to integrate the proposed statute into the existing venue statute, 28 U.S.C. 1391. In addition, if the above statute were passed, 28 U.S.C. 1391 would need to be amended to make clear that it applies only to diversity cases.
In 28 U.S.C. 1391(c)(1), residence for individuals is equated with domicile. Domicile, however, is not a good proxy for convenience, because one may be domiciled in a place that would be very inconvenient to litigate. For example, college students are often domiciled where their parents live, even if they spend most of their time closer to their university. Similarly, in contrast to 1391(c)(2), the statute defines residence for corporations in terms of principal place of business but not place of incorporation, because, for most corporations, their place of incorporation has little relationship to their actual business activities and thus would not be a convenient place to litigate. Section (c) of the statute, which gives the district court the power to transfer the case to any other district or division is important, because no set of rules can select the most convenient forum in every case. There are too many facts to consider, and, perhaps more importantly, many of the facts can be manipulated by the plaintiff by joining (or not joining) additional plaintiffs or defendants. In order to prevent the plaintiff from being able to de facto select any district it pleases, it is important to ensure that the district court has discretion to transfer.

As noted above, a second reason to restrict venue in federal courts is to prevent forum selling. As Greg Reilly and I argue elsewhere, if plaintiffs are given too many possible fora in which to sue, there is a danger that judges in some districts may tilt the law in a pro-plaintiff direction in order to attract more cases. While most judges have little interest in increasing their caseload, and while most judges would not distort the law to attract more cases even if they wanted to hear more, it only takes a few motivated judges to create problems for the entire country. A prime example involves patents and the Eastern District of Texas. The patent venue statute has been interpreted to allow patentees to sue for infringement in any district where the infringing product is sold. For nationally distributed products, this means that patent plaintiffs can sue in any district. Judges in the Eastern District of Texas, in order to attract interesting cases, increase their prestige, and benefit the local economy, have distorted the rules and practices relating to case management, joinder, discovery, transfer, and summary judgment in order to attract patent litigation to their district. As a result, nearly a quarter of all patent infringement cases were filed in the Eastern District of Texas in 2012 and 2013. According to Lynn LoPucki, bankruptcy judges in the District of Delaware have similarly distorted bankruptcy law and procedure to attract large bankruptcy filings, and Klerman and Reilly document other examples as well. The best way to prevent forum selling is to restrict the number places plaintiffs can sue and thus to restrict the number of courts that can potentially compete for any given suit. The statute proposed above does so by restricting venue.

2. Rethinking Stafford v. Briggs

In cases involving suits against federal officers, Congress recognized many of the arguments discussed in the prior section when it enacted 28 U.S.C. 1391(e). In particular, under that statute, venue takes into account the convenience of the plaintiff as well as the convenience of the defendant and thus allows the plaintiff to sue where he or she resides. 28 U.S.C. 1391(e) reads, in relevant part:

A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency acting thereof in his official capacity or under color of legal authority . . . . may . . . be brought in any judicial district in which (A) a defendant in the action resides, (B) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (C) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action.

By its plain language, this statute would seem to have made the District of Nevada a proper venue in Walden v. Fiore, because Walden was sued for seizing Fiore’s cash while “acting under color of legal authority” as a DEA agent at the Atlanta airport.26

Nevertheless, in Stafford v. Briggs, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 1391(e) did not apply to suits for damages. Chief Justice Burger acknowledged that the broad language of the statute, which refers to any “civil action” and to actions “under color of legal authority,” would seem to encompass the Bivens actions, which were the subject of both Stafford and Walden.27 Nevertheless, Chief Justice Burger interpreted the legislative history as evincing Congressional intent to expand venue only for cases involving injunctive relief. In dissent, Justice Stewart argued that “1391(e) means what it says, and . . . thus applies as well to a suit for damages . . . .”28 In addition, Justice Stewart examined the legislative history and found both a Committee Report and a contemporaneous interpretation by Attorney General Katzenbach indicating that the legislation was intended to cover suits for damages.29 If the case were decided today, when the justices pay much more attention to statutory text and are less inclined to rely on ambiguous legislative history, it seems likely that the case would have come out differently.

Stafford’s narrow reading of 1391(e) should be overturned by the Court or Congress. It is an erroneous interpretation of the statute, and, for the reasons discussed in the prior section, it is bad policy. In most cases involving suits against federal agents, the agent will be represented by the Department of Justice, which can easily defend actions in any district. While the federal government has discretion not to represent a federal official,30 it certainly has the power to do so and thus to limit the financial burden on federal officials. While it is true that an agent will sometimes be required to travel to

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26 It is an interesting question whether the fact that Walden was a “police officer for the city of Covington, Georgia” working “as a deputized agent” of the DEA, 134 S. Ct. at 1119, means that he was not a “an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof” for the purposes of 1391(e). I am not aware of any case law on that point, although the fact that the Department of Justice provided representation to Walden under 28 C.F.R. 50.15 and 50.16 indicates that they considered him a federal official or federal employee, because those provisions apply only to “present and former federal officials and employees.” 28 C.F.R. 50.15(a). It is also unclear whether, in addition to satisfying 1391(e), Walden would also have had to satisfy personal jurisdiction as reflected in FRCP 4(k)(1)(A). It seems unlikely that he would, because 1391(e)(2) states that service may be made “beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action was brought,” thus obviating the need to rely on FRCP(4)(k)(1) and its limits on personal jurisdiction. See Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. at 553 n. 5 (1980)(Stewart, J., dissenting).

27 Id at 535-36.

28 Id at 545.

29 Id at 551-52; For a similar critique of Stafford, see Barry W. Fissel, “Venue... Stafford v Briggs....” 49 U. Cin. L. Rev 675, 684, 688-89 (1980) (criticizing the Burger’s opinion “for the slight weight it gave the plain meaning of the statutory language” and “its misleading treatment of the legislative history,” although concluding that the decision “is probably correct” because passage of “the Tort Claims Act amendments would have rendered the Court’s decision moot.” The amendments to the FTCA that Fissel referred to were never enacted).

30 28 C.F.R. 50.15. In Walden v. Fiore, Walden was represented by the Department of Justice in the district court and in the initial proceedings before the Ninth Circuit. In the 9th Circuit rehearing en banc and in the Supreme Court, Walden was represented by “private counsel ad federal expense” under 28 C.F.R. 50.16
testify at trial, most cases settle, and the government can easily reimburse federal agents for their travel expenses. As noted above, in cases involving federal law, where minimizing litigation costs is the dominant concern, the convenience of the plaintiff and defendant should have equal weight. Since there is a U.S. Attorney’s Office in every district, it is generally much easier for the government to defend in the district where the plaintiff resides than for the plaintiff, especially an individual plaintiff, to have to sue where a relevant act or omission occurred or where the government official who is the defendant resides. Therefore, when convenience to the plaintiff and defendant are weighed equally, the most appropriate forum will usually be where the plaintiff resides. Of course, if it turns out that another district would be more convenient, the district court judge should use her discretion under the proposed statute to transfer the case to the more convenient district.

In the venue statute proposed above, the plaintiff must bring the case in the district where the plaintiff resides. In contrast, the 28 U.S.C. 1391(e) gives the plaintiff the choice to bring the case where she resides, where substantial events or omissions took place, or where the defendant resides. The proposed statute has the advantage of constraining plaintiff choice and thus preventing forum selling. On the other hand, forum selling does not seem to be a problem in cases against the government or government officials, so giving the plaintiff more choice, as 1391(e) does, would also probably be fine. Either 1391(e) or the proposed venue statute would be better than current law, which leaves jurisdiction and venue to 4(k)(1)(A) and 1391(b). Those provisions are inappropriate, because they reflect the constitutional and sovereignty concerns that inform state court jurisdiction, rather than issues of convenience of forum selling that should influence cases in federal court.

3. Conclusion.

Walden v. Fiore provides courts, commentators, and legislators an opportunity to rethink jurisdiction and venue in federal court in cases involving federal law, and especially in cases involving alleged misconduct by federal agents. Jurisdiction in such cases is currently determined by FRCP 4(k)(1)(A), which means that the appropriate forum must satisfy constraints on state court jurisdiction. State court constraints are irrelevant to cases in federal court, because limits on state courts are based on notions of state sovereignty which do not apply to federal courts. When determining the appropriate federal court for cases involving federal law, the main goals should be to discourage forum selling and to minimize litigation costs. Forum selling can be prevented by ensuring that the plaintiff has relatively few choices about where to bring the suit. Litigation costs are minimized by considering convenience to the plaintiff, defendant, and witnesses equally. In contrast, current provisions relating to jurisdiction and venue consider focus almost exclusively on the defendant and sometimes give the plaintiff wide choice of forum.

In cases involving alleged misconduct by federal agents, the venue statute, 28 U.S.C. 1391(e), already moves beyond the defendant-centered analysis typical of jurisdiction and venue in private cases. Nevertheless, this sensible provision does not currently apply to Bivens actions, because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Stafford v. Briggs. Nevertheless, because that case’s legal reasoning was weak and because of the strong policy arguments in favor of more liberal venue, it would be appropriate for the Court to overrule that case or for Congress to enact legislation overriding it.

31 This is the combined effect of sections (a)(1) and (b)(3).