Rational Reasonableness: Toward a Positive Theory of Public Reason

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Abstract

Why is it important for people to agree on and articulate shared reasons for just laws, rather than whatever reasons they personally find compelling? What, if any, practical role does public reason play in liberal democratic politics? We argue that the practical role of public reason can be better appreciated by examining the structural similarities in normative and positive political theory. Specifically, we consider the analytical parallels between Rawls’ account of political liberalism and a rational choice model of legal order recently proposed by Hadfield & Weingast (2011). The positive model proposes that a shared system of reasoning – a common logic – plays a key role in coordinating a stable equilibrium when legal rules depend on decentralized collective enforcement efforts by individual agents. The common logic enables individuals to predict how others will behave in the face of wrongful conduct and incentivizes participation in costly collective punishments by reassuring agents that their personal concerns will be taken into account in the resulting equilibrium. Rawls’s theory of political liberalism, we argue, is based on a comparable recognition that citizens in a pluralistic society face a practical as well as a moral problem in sustaining a stable political conception of justice. How can individual citizens have confidence that others will reciprocate their commitment to support fair and reasonable governing principles that depart from their own ideal conceptions of truth and value? Citizens face a practical problem of mutual assurance that public reason helps them solve by making individual ongoing commitments to a political conception of justice a matter of common knowledge. The solution, on both views, requires citizens’ reciprocal commitment to basing law on a system of shared public reasons. Both views thus place public reason at the core of liberal democratic politics in conditions of diversity, and for quite similar reasons. Our argument illustrates the (often) complementary roles of positive and values-based analysis in constitutional (in the broadest sense) design.
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Toward a Positive Theory of Public Reason

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I. Introduction

The Practical Challenge

The liberal idea of public reason, as developed by John Rawls and others, generates tremendous controversy, which is echoed in much actual political debate. Many members of the US Supreme Court and other public officials frequently seem to agree with Rawls that laws touching on constitutional basics ought to be supported by reasons that all citizens can share. Religious reasons, about which citizens reasonably and deeply disagree, cannot be the basis for a reciprocal commitment to living under laws justified and acceptable to all.

In response, religious citizens and their advocates, including many political and legal theorists, argue that the idea of public reason is gratuitously censorious. It inhibits some citizens’ expression of their basic values on the most important political questions, provokes unnecessary conflict, and robs public debate of possible insight.2

Perhaps most surprisingly, it is often not clear what is at stake in this controversy. Public reason is often defended as part of “ideal theory -- Rawls’s ideal of a “well-ordered society” – and a virtue of good citizens and deliberation. But that ideal is remote, and critics advance alternative conceptions of civic virtue, often involving recognition of, and openness to, difference. Why not focus on encouraging

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support for just laws irrespective of people’s reasons? Why is it important for people to agree on and articulate shared reasons for just laws, rather than whatever reasons they personally find compelling? What, if any, practical role does public reason play in liberal democratic politics?

In this paper, we suggest that the practical role of public reason can be better appreciated by examining the confluence of normative\(^3\) and positive political theory: distinct streams of research representing methodological approaches sometimes treated as antithetical. The normative approach is represented here by the well-known Rawlsian contractualist approach, which defends public reason as an aspect of political morality in a diverse constitutional democracy. With respect to the normative model of public reason, we do not simply channel Rawls but offer a critical interpretation which Macedo has defended elsewhere\(^4\); “Rawlsians” do not always agree and the aim here is to advance the most powerful view, not necessarily the one closest Rawls’s intentions. By positive political theory we mean rational choice or game theory, a framework of analysis based on the simplifying assumption that individuals are economically rational. This latter approach is represented here by a model developed by Gillian Hadfield and Barry Weingast.\(^5\) These two quite distinct approaches converge on strikingly similar accounts of public reason.

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\(^3\) We recognize that “normative” and “moral” are not synonymous. Normative systems that generate standards for assessment and reasons for action need not be moral. A system of public morality is, however, a socially normative system, and public recognition of its socially normative character is crucial to its success. See infra at XX.


We agree with Robert D. Putnam that the truth in political science is likely to lie at the confluence of different streams of research.\(^6\) An examination of the structural similarities of these differing modes of analysis will help explain why public reason is of practical importance to democratic politics. Our argument also seeks to illustrate what we believe is the (often) complementary roles of positive and values-based analysis in constitutional (in the broadest sense) design.\(^7\)

The two frameworks of analysis that we deploy here, and set in mutual dialogue, share a common problematic. Citizens in a pluralistic liberal society—who by assumption do not all share a single conception of the good—face a practical as well as a moral problem. How can they have confidence that others will reciprocate their commitment to supporting governing principles that depart from their own ideal conceptions of truth and value in order to be reasonable to all? Citizens face a practical problem of mutual assurance that public reason helps them solve.\(^8\) The solution, on both views, requires citizens’ reciprocal commitment to basing law on a system of shared reasons. Both views place public reason at the core of liberal democratic politics in conditions of diversity, and for quite similar reasons, as we will see.

Although political liberalism is fundamentally normative, it incorporates two central positive (predictive or behavioral) elements that give rise to the problem of mutual assurance, and create an important link to positive political theory. The first

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\(^7\) We mean “small c” “constitutional,” referring to the design of the basic institutions of a political community, see Walter F. Murphy, *Constitutional Democracy: Creating and Maintaining a Just Political Order* (2006).

is *rationality*: people are assumed to be capable of forming an idea of the good (religious or secular), formulating plans to pursue the good and then acting in a manner consistent with that plan. Rawls clearly understands rationality as a moral capacity that helps define our basic interests, yet it is also a practical constraint on what is achievable in a political community: we must consider it in predicting how people will in fact behave and which institutional arrangements will in fact be stable.

The second positive element in Rawls’ theory is the idea of *stability*. For a political conception of justice to provide the cooperative framework for a political community, it must be sufficiently stable “to persist and gain adherents over time within a just basic structure . . . if a conception fails to be stable, it is futile to try and realize it”. Working out a political conception of justice in conditions of religious and ethical pluralism takes time and hard work; what citizens need is not a fleeting consensus but a stable, reliable, mutually assured framework for political interaction.

Like rationality, stability is thus a practical constraint on the set of feasible political conceptions of justice. Given the behavioral premise that people are rational and care about and seek to achieve their personal conception of the good (or their “comprehensive doctrine” of truth and value as a whole), we have to anticipate that they will only be willing to participate in and support the institutions and interactions required by a political conception of justice if they can be reasonably assured that they will benefit as a result. To the extent that their

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participation requires them to bear costs or forego aspects of their own pursuit of
the good to benefit others, we expect rational agents to look for assurance that
others will do the same for them. As Hadfield and Weingast emphasize, in the
absence of a practical, behaviorally realistic, resolution of this mutual assurance
problem, a political conception cannot be stable and hence cannot be a reasonable
proposal for the basis for political life.

To these positive elements, Rawls adds essential normative ones. In a
reasonably well-ordered society, people are not only rational, they are also
*reasonable*, that is, willing to seek fair terms for social cooperation given the
assurance that others will likewise do so. Moreover, Rawls hopes that a reasonable
political conception can be not merely stable but *stable for the right reasons*: that is,
stable because based on a shared public moral conception of justice that stands up
to critical scrutiny from all quarters while furnishing a freestanding or independent
rationale that “address[es] each citizen’s reason, as explained within its own
framework”. Rawls’ theory is squarely normative, and yet the practical concern
with stability is never far from view.

This is where public reason and reciprocity come in. The public reasons offered
in support of a political conception of justice are a *specific kind of moral reasons:
addressed to one’s fellow citizens with the aim of furnishing a shared justificatory
ground for common principles. Public reasons are those that are offered in public as
an appropriate basis of fair cooperation, supported by evidence and forms of
reasoning that are widely available. The practice of public reason manifests

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10 *Political Liberalism* 143.
participants’ understanding of political relationships as *essentially reciprocal relations* among people of *equal standing*: I will support the exercise of political power over you only according to shared reasons acceptable to you in the expectation that you are similarly motivated to appeal only to shared reasons acceptable to me to justify the exercise of political power over me. The motive to be relied upon for such other-regarding concern, Rawls tells us, is not altruism but reasonableness: the willingness to cooperate with others on fair terms given the assurance that they will likewise do so. Public reason, understood as a reciprocal practice among actual citizens, has both moral and practical (or positive) content: by offering public reasons for laws touching on important rights or questions of justice, we reassure one another of our cooperation on fair terms that we can all share. A reciprocal commitment to fair cooperation justified on the basis of public reasons—a normative commitment conditional on others’ normative commitments—thus forms the basis for the legitimate exercise of power according to political liberalism. Public reasons are the building blocks of an autonomous public political morality.

Interestingly, or so we think, the Hadfield-Weingast model predicts that purely rational agents operating under conditions of normative diversity will discern the advantages of cooperating on the basis of general rules informed by a system of shared reasons. Self-interested but forward-looking citizens will arrive at a shared logic of cooperation that is independent of each one’s personal conception of the good (or idiosyncratic logic). As we will see, the positive model helps explicate the practical role of a democratic practice of public reason: the positive version is not
quite stability for the right reasons but rather, as we explain below, stability for (and via) shared reasons. The positive model of Hadfield and Weingast usefully draws attention to the inescapable role of ordinary citizens in sustaining just laws, and this informs our interpretation of public reasons’ normative role.

**Decentralized Enforcement: Citizens’ Wide Role**

Our analysis rests on an idea that is often neglected in discussions of public reason, namely the idea of decentralized enforcement. In much recent work in political theory and law, the object of concern is the coercive power of modern states. The exercise of this coercive power over individuals is said to give rise to the problem of political legitimacy: the need to justify the way that power is used to the individuals who are subject to it. Recent events in the Middle East remind us quite dramatically, however, that political regimes that rely for law enforcement exclusively on coercive force and fear have little claim to legitimacy and may prove quite fragile. A just regime depends not only on the exercise of power by a centralized authority but more pervasively on individual citizens’ free and willing “policing” behavior, broadly understood to include very many forms of support and encouragement, or disapproval and censure. Citizens who criticize and shun, or simply censure, those who violate the rights of others are engaged in policing behavior, as are (unfortunately) citizens who engage in mob violence against those who are exercising their (putative) rights. In either instance, individuals can feel secure in their rights only insofar as they can count on the widespread support of their fellow citizens. This is the crux of our claim for the practical importance of the reciprocal practice of public reason: by giving public reasons and demanding them
from others, we reassure one another of our joint commitment to the shared project of public justice. By taking seriously the practical constraints of rationality and stability, and drawing on the insights of positive theory, as developed by Hadfield and Weingast, we gain a clearer understanding of the central importance to justice of citizens deploying public reasons as ways of manifesting their support for fair cooperation.

We put the role of citizens in supporting justice at center stage: justice, to be effective, must figure in citizens’ day-to-day interactions. The security of citizens’ rights, especially members of minority groups, depends upon widespread support for those rights. African Americans are not secure in their equal liberties to use public accommodations, women are insecure in their equal standing in the workplace, gay and lesbian students are not equal in the security of their persons, unless they can count on their fellow citizens to join in support of their just entitlements: not only at the polls on election day, but on street corners, in associations and workplaces, and at restaurants and other public accommodations. Our analysis thus connects with those who have argued that citizen play a crucial role in sustaining democratic justice.11

The emphasis on decentralized enforcement is a central feature and key insight of the Hadfield-Weingast model. They demonstrate that the characteristic features of legal order and the rule of law, securing compliance with rules that promote

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individual and collective welfare, can be secured not principally by a centralized
authority but by the widespread participation of individuals in decentralized
enforcement mechanisms. Such mechanisms include overt collective punishments
such as boycotts, protests and refusals to deal with someone with a reputation for
rule violations, as well as more subtle and self-mediated mechanisms such as shame
or guilt. Decentralized punishments pose two key challenges in a rational actor
model. First, participating in the punishment must leave the participant better off,
over all, than not participating. Second, in light of diverse interpretations of what
conduct is wrongful and hence what conduct warrants punishment, participants
need a coordinating device to ensure that they engage in punishments if and only if
sufficient others will do the same. Hadfield & Weingast argue that that latter
constraint sets up the role for a common logic of wrongfulness to guide individuals
in assessing what is right or wrong, punishable or not. The former, incentive,
constraint is then met only if this common logic is sufficiently protective of
individual participants’ interests to improve individuals’ well-being relative to the
world in which coordinated punishments fail.

The key assumption of the positive model that helps us understand the
importance of public reason is the recognition that in order to coordinate the
participants in a community dependent on decentralized enforcement of rules and
principles expressing judgments of right and wrong, the common logic must be
publicly accessible. Indeed, in game theoretic terms, it must be common knowledge:
everyone must know that everyone knows that everyone is looking to the same
logic, and reaching the same (or similar) conclusions, in order to decide what is
wrong and what will call forth collective punishment. The requirement that a form of reasoning about right and wrong—what a community considers punishable and what it considers permissible—be common knowledge gives us the central role of public reason: a system of reasons that all can participate in and in which participation can be manifest to all.\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{The Plan of the Paper}

Our paper is organized as follows. In Section II we lay out the normative conception of public reason in political liberalism and identify its key elements. Section III presents an account of Hadfield and Weingast’s positive model of the role of a common logic in achieving equilibrium in a regime dependent on decentralized enforcement by citizens. In Section IV we draw out the structural similarities of the positive and normative models, showing how the twin constraints of rationality and stability suggest a key role for public reason as an essential coordinating device in society that depends on decentralized support for the political conception of justice. In Section V we explore how the positive and normative accounts might interact, arguing that the richer attributes of the normative view concerning individuals—not only rational but also reasonable—and stability—not merely stable for shared reasons but stable for right reasons—can be understood as playing a positive role (or, awkwardly, making a positive contribution to the positive model). The stability of a regime based exclusively on the behavior of conventionally rational individuals may furnish the basis for the evolution of a more robust form of stability. This more

\textsuperscript{12}On the importance of common knowledge, we have benefitted from Michael Suk-Young Chwe, \textit{Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge} (2001).
robust form of stability is stability based not merely on mutual advantage and an
instrumental commitment to a common logic of coordination, but on internalized
values of reciprocity and reasonableness that support fair cooperation for its own
sake and not merely instrumentally. A society populated by reasonable individuals
is one that enjoys widespread voluntary, rather than enforced, fidelity to the
political conception of justice. In a concluding postscript we link the preceding
discussion to the politics of rights in modern democracies.

II. Public Reasons as Public Morality

Political Legitimacy: Public Reason’s Purely Principled Role?

Some normative theorists might think our inquiry into the role played by public
reason in a liberal political community is somewhat beside the point: public reason
is needed to address the problem of political legitimacy in a diverse society. As
Rawls put it:

Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all
citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in
the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and
rational. ... And since the exercise of political power itself must be
legitimate, the ideal of citizenship imposes a moral, not a legal duty—
the duty of civility—to be able to explain to one another on those
fundamental questions how the principles and policies they advocate
and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason.13

Given reasonable pluralism, this view holds, we cannot hope to generate a shared
justifying rationale for law based on particular religious or philosophical grounds.

We must resort, therefore, to public reasons that are freestanding, and derived from
widely affirmed ideas in our public political culture, suitably reformulated into a  

13 Political Liberalism217.

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coherent and defensible conception of justice. If the problem of political legitimacy can only be solved via public reasons, then the need for public reason is clear.

However, as Macedo explains elsewhere, critics have noticed that the problem of legitimacy can be addressed without public reason. Scholars such as Christopher Eberle and Gerald Gaus reject what they call “consensus” conceptions of legitimacy—depending on a shared public rationale for principles of justice or a constitution—in favor of “convergence” conceptions that allow for plural rationales to undergird a system of law. These critics or revisionists agree that a system of laws should be justified to everyone, but insist that it need not be the same justification for everyone. So long as different religious and ethical communities have their own justifications that converge in support of a system of law there is no need for a shared basis or a common logic of public reasons.

The critics have a point: it is possible that the legitimacy of law could be established on the basis of a plurality of differing rationales. If the critics are right, then public reason is unnecessary for the legitimacy of liberal political community. So what, if any, role does public reason play? We shift from a purely principled account to present an account of public reason’s practical role. The work of public reason can be better understood, we claim, if we attend to the key practical constraints of rationality and stability: a political conception of justice is unlikely to be stable if it lacks the support of a fairly robust democratic practice of public reason. So let us proceed.

14 For a development of the distinction between “convergence” and “consensus” views see Fred D’Agostino, *Free Public Reason: Making It Up As We Go Along* (1996).
In Rawls’ conception of justice, citizens in a pluralistic liberal society are to conduct their public political discussions of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice within the framework of what each sincerely regards as a reasonable political conception of justice, a conception that expresses political values that others as free and equal also might reasonably be expected reasonably to endorse.\textsuperscript{15}

For Rawls, the moral obligation of public reason expresses the reciprocity inherent in the political relations among free and equal citizens in a constitutional democracy: “if we argue that [for example] the religious liberty of some citizens is to be denied, we must give them reasons they can not only understand. . . but reasons we might reasonably expect that they as free and equal might reasonably also accept.”\textsuperscript{16} A commitment to appeal to public reasons—reasons that are offered in public as an appropriate basis of fair cooperation, supported by evidence and forms of reasoning that are widely available—expresses an understanding of political relationships as essentially reciprocal.

Rawls says that the motives to be relied upon are reasonableness and reciprocity.

One aspect of reasonableness, according to political liberalism, is acknowledging the fact that because there is a plurality of reasonable comprehensive religious and philosophical worldviews, it would be unreasonable to base law on any one conception of the truth as a whole. Another aspect of reasonableness is \textit{reciprocity}, understood in normative terms here as the \textit{willingness to cooperate with others on fair terms given the assurance that they will likewise do so}. Reciprocity is a moral motive of a particular sort: neither self-abnegating altruism nor mere self-interest.
The reasonable person committed to reciprocal cooperation on fair terms expects political institutions to advance his or her interests fairly along with others. Reciprocity—as a normative commitment conditional on others’ normative commitments—thus forms the basis for the legitimate exercise of power.

In developing the argument for why citizens in a pluralistic society should offer public reasons that satisfy the criterion of reciprocity, Rawls appeals to the idea of “stability for the right reasons.” For a political conception to provide the framework for a political system that honors the limits imposed by the obligation of public reason, it must be sufficiently stable “to persist and gain adherents over time within a just basic structure”. The positive or practical aspect of this requirement is evident: “if a conception fails to be stable, it is futile to try and realize it”. Working out a particular political conception of justice in conditions of religious and ethical pluralism takes time and hard work; a fleeting consensus cannot provide a stable, reliable framework for political interaction. But as the basis for a system of justice in a pluralistic liberal society, stability in Rawls’s conception must also be understood in normative terms. Not just any stable solution will do. Stability must be secured by giving all citizens a basis for continued support of the political conception of justice that “address[es] each citizen’s reason, as explained within its own framework”. The public reasons offered in support of a political conception of justice are a specific kind of moral reasons: addressed to one’s fellow citizens as furnishing a shared ground for thinking about commonly justified principles.

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17 Id. 143.
18 Id. 142.
19 Id. p. 143.
Rawls’s account of stability rests on two complex ideas, which together allow us to reconcile the need for common principles and institutions with the “permanent fact of reasonable pluralism.” First is the idea of a *shared political conception of justice* formulated in public reasons. Second is the idea that the political conception may gain the support of an *overlapping consensus* of the many religious and philosophical comprehensive doctrines that citizens espouse. We take these two key elements of Rawls’s theory of stable political liberalism in turn.

First, then, is the idea of a shared political conception of justice formulated in public reasons. We formulate a public conception of justice on the basis of reasons and evidence that we think others ought also to accept. The right sorts of reasons will include the reasonably settled findings of science (among those who examine them carefully), and moral reasons whose force does not depend on embracing a particular religious or philosophical framework. The raw materials for a shared conception of justice are drawn from the public culture of decent constitutional systems: we look for moral convictions that have widespread currency but that are also good candidates for being defensible, sound, and capable of standing up to criticism over time. The wrongness of racial and other forms of discrimination, for example, is one good place to start, as is the importance of religious toleration.20 We knit such convictions into a coherent and powerful system of ideas – a public political conception of justice. Rawls develops his political conception of justice based on the idea of society as a system of fair cooperation among free and equal citizens understood as having two basic moral powers (for a conception of the good,

and a conception of justice). In effect, his two principles of justice unpack and argue for the normative power of a specific conception of those familiar ideas (fair cooperation, citizens as free and equal, etc.). The account is meant to resonate deeply with our political culture but also stand up to critical scrutiny from all quarters.

Second comes the idea of an overlapping consensus. Political liberalism, as already noted, takes it as a fact about the modern world that under conditions of freedom people will come to espouse a wide range of ideas about what is true in matters of faith and philosophy. Pluralism with respect to our deepest and broadest religious and philosophical conceptions seems a permanent condition and not unreasonable. An overlapping consensus models the idea that we can accept this pluralism while nevertheless supporting shared principles of justice. Insofar as our differing “comprehensive conceptions” of truth and value allow us to endorse an independent shared political conception of justice, and each of us conceives of our differing rational aims (our highest ideals and widest conceptions of truth and value) as supportive of or congruent with the shared conception of justice, an overlapping consensus obtains.

In substance, Rawls defends the priority of a list of basic rights, a guarantee of what he calls fair equality of opportunity, and a further principle arguing for a fair sharing of the benefits of social cooperation (so that the least well off group tends to be maximally advantaged). The resulting theory of ideal justice is controversial: it is not simply a report on what most Americans think, but rather a critical moral theory arguing for the best interpretation of core ideas in our public tradition. However,
we can also identify a wider “family of liberal political conceptions” containing some shared basic features: an agenda of basic rights whose protection has special priority, and the public provision of at least a basic array of social welfare institutions. It is realistic to expect all major groups in politics to at least espouse one version or another of the family of reasonable political conceptions so defined.21

Importantly, Rawls does not propose that public political conceptions of justice are simply the overlap or common denominator shared by all of the reasonable comprehensive doctrines that exist in society. If our shared account of justice was merely this overlap, then it would be contingent on the happenstance of common elements among existing doctrines or the particular configuration of power among competing views. Rather, the shared political conception is worked out as a freestanding conception that is capable of gaining the continual endorsement of individuals and groups who entertain “conflicting and incommensurable”22 conceptions of the good. If we failed to formulate our political conception as freestanding, it would be dependent upon the current shape of our own religious or philosophical views, or, if formulated as a compromise among the major such conceptions in society, it would be dependent on the current balance of forces among them. In those cases, our commitments to fair terms of cooperation would be contingent and fragile: my commitment would be contingent upon religious or philosophical standards of truth and sources of authority that most of my fellow citizens will regard as opaque, arbitrary, or false.

21 Political Liberalism, xix-l.
22 Id. 135.
Similarly, the political conception of justice Rawls proposes is a complete conception that is capable of addressing all basic questions of justice in its own terms. My commitment to completeness means that if some difficult public question arises I will not abandon the search for a resolution based on shared reasons even if my personal non-public views furnish a ready answer. Here again, the point is to remove contingencies that would otherwise render fragile or tentative my commitment to cooperation on fair terms that I can share with my fellows. In Rawls's well-ordered society, we all regard the public political conception as an independent framework of thought with a logic of its own: as a freestanding and complete conception that each of us can enter into as an equal, in spite of our differences of faith and ethics, to work out how our shared political morality should be interpreted and applied.23

In these core ideas of an overlapping consensus and a shared freestanding and complete political conception of justice we find a careful weaving of positive and normative elements. These include a positive requirement of practical stability: if a political conception of justice cannot, in fact, gain the endorsement of a diverse set of individuals then it cannot plausibly form the basis for a well-ordered society. This requirement of practical stability is built on a further positive consideration,

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23 The public political conception is not entirely insulated from the influence of our personal conceptions of truth and value. Each of us must regard the shared project of constructing a mutually acceptable public political morality from the standpoint of our own values and beliefs as a whole: we endorse a version of that shared morality in light of everything we believe in. This naturally leads to some “personalization” of the public view. Realistically, the best we can hope for, as Rawls says, is that most citizens will converge on one among a family of reasonable liberal conceptions, with some core liberal and democratic features. That is sufficient. All of this is consistent with a presumptive or provisional commitment to advancing and abiding by a public political conception of justice that is understood to have an autonomy and integrity of its own, given its public political role. See Rawls's discussion of the “three stage sequence,” in his Political Liberalism, 385-95.
namely the behavioral fact that normal human beings are rational: they form *and pursue* their own conception of the good life. Rawls recognizes “human nature and its natural psychology” as constraints: “We cannot say anything we want [about viable conceptions of persons and ideals of citizenship], since the account has to meet the practical needs of political life and reasoned thought about it.” (PL 87) It makes little sense, therefore, to propose a political conception that rational individuals cannot see as consistent with their personal conceptions of the good *in light of* the shared project of sustaining a well-ordered and just society. A public conception of justice may become a practical possibility only after generations of political development. In the early stages of a given political order agreement is liable to be possible only on a narrower set of extremely urgent shared commitments: say, to peaceful co-existence, and procedures for resolving disputes.

The persons to whom the theory of justice is addressed under political liberalism are not exclusively rational; they are also *reasonable*. In the language of the economist, they possess preferences such that they “desire for its own sake a social world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can accept.” (PL 50) Likewise, the political conception devised by such reasonable agents should be one that is not merely stable as a practical matter, but rather, *stable for the right—shared public moral—reasons*. The aim is not merely an order based on a particular concatenation of social and political forces with state-enforced penalties to induce compliance (PL 142), nor an agreement on procedures alone.

The positive concepts of rationality and stability are thus both modified in Rawls by the normative concept of reasonableness. What is reasonable operates as a
constraint on unalloyed rationality: the unreasonable pursue in politics private
conceptions or comprehensive doctrines without sufficient regard for fairness
towards others with whom one shares a social world. Reasonableness also
constrains us to consider a subset of stable political conceptions of justice by
insisting that the consensus be based on the reciprocal subscription to shared
principles and not mere bargaining power.

Political liberalism’s reciprocity, Rawls insists, is “not the idea of mutual
advantage.” (PL 17) Mutual advantage recognizes only the individualized pursuit of
the rational and not the fundamentally social, and self-consciously social, efforts to
secure justice among those recognized as free and equal. Stability for the right
reasons requires that the political conception be one that is robust to changes in the
distribution of power among comprehensive doctrines (PL xliii); it is not based on
merely the current balance of forces, or a contingent compromise that is liable to
being overturned as the relative power of groups shift. It is, rather, based on a
principled commitment to cooperation on fair terms among people understood as
free and equal. As such, it should be stable across many future contingencies, and
the ebb and flow of power among groups.

[ ] Justice as fairness abstracts from the knowledge of citizens’ determinate
conceptions of the good and proceeds from shared political conceptions of
society and the person that are required in applying the ideals and principles
of practical reason. So while a political conception of justice addresses the
fact of reasonable pluralism, it is not political in the wrong way: that is, its
form and content are not affected by the existing balance of power between
comprehensive doctrines. Nor do its principles strike a compromise between
the more dominant ones.24

24 Id. 141-42.
For Rawls, the constraints of reasonableness and reciprocity are crucial for working out a just basis for a diverse political community. They help define the public relations of citizens:

It is by the reasonable that we enter as equals the public world of others and stand ready to propose, or accept, as the case may be, fair terms of cooperation with them. . . . Insofar as we are reasonable, we are ready to work out the framework for the public social world.  

A political conception of justice can only be worked out among those who self-consciously recognize the challenges of identifying a shared conception in the face of such diversity of views. It would be unreasonable for a person, who accepts the fact of reasonable pluralism and yet desires to live in a peaceful society in which groups no longer contest for dominance over others, to insist on principles of justice that simply reflect his or her own particular comprehensive conception of what is true.

Because reasonableness and reciprocity are fundamentally public concepts for Rawls, the obligation of offering public reasons is also fundamental. The constraints on the exercise of rationality, backed by a shared commitment to stability for the right reasons, cannot be satisfied without a shared public logic of what is fair and reasonable. The right reasons that support stability are those that satisfy the criterion of reciprocity: they express "political values that that others as free and equal also might reasonably be expected reasonably to endorse". Public reason is the dynamic medium through which we construct and confirm, collectively, the set of values that satisfy the normative constraints of reciprocity among reasonable citizens.

25 Id. 53.
26 Id. I-li.

http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/art127
Public reasons do important practical work in a system that depends on decentralized enforcement by furnishing grounds for mutual assurance that makes actual participation in enforcement more likely. As Macedo argues elsewhere\(^{27}\), those critics who defend “convergence” approaches—that is, who hope for convergence on shared rules of justice without shared reasons (as opposed to “consensus” views, such as ours)—fail to acknowledge the practical work that shared reasons do in helping to secure actual compliance and enforcement.

Political liberalism’s normative reciprocity as expressed in the obligation of public reason is not to be confused with reciprocity as a purely positive concept, which is rooted in predictions about actual costs and potential benefits given a particular distribution of citizens’ views. Nevertheless, the positive logic of coordination to secure reciprocal efforts to enforce a set of value-creating rules and principles for behavior helps us to understand what public reason is for. We turn to such a positive account now.

### III. A positive model of decentralized enforcement

In political liberalism, the normative and the positive are complementary, and both are necessary. Thus the concept of reciprocity, Rawls tells us, “lies between the idea of impartiality, which is altruistic (as moved by the general good), and the idea of mutual advantage understood as everyone’s being advantaged” as evaluated by each individual’s own conception of the good (PL 50). Similarly the concept of the person in Rawls’ account is both reasonable and rational and neither concept can subsume the other. The persons who sustain the stability of the

\(^{27}\text{Macedo, Public Reason, supra n. XX}\)
political conception of justice cannot be exclusively rational: they must be motivated by more than the pursuit of their personal conception of the good. But they also are not to be understood as exclusively motivated by considerations of the public good. Rawls’ liberal citizens balance between the pursuit of their own ends and the general good by taking on the shared project of “work[ing] out the framework for the public social world”.\textsuperscript{28} Citizens who actively support the political conception of justice have what Rawls’ calls a “reasonable moral psychology”: they are motivated by the desire to act as the conception requires; “when they believe that institutions or social practices are just, or fair (as these conceptions specify), they are ready and willing to do their part in those arrangements” provided there is reciprocity, that is, “reasonable assurance that others will also do their part”.\textsuperscript{29}

But we are left with a question. On what grounds should we expect that people with a reasonable moral psychology, and the necessary conception-dependent desires, will predominate in a liberal political community? Rawls’ answer to this question appeals to the educational effects of well-ordered institutions: “those who grow up under just basic institutions acquire a sense of justice and a reasoned allegiance to those institutions sufficient to render them stable”.\textsuperscript{30} This makes sense if we assume that we already have just institutions that secure general support. But it begs the question of how reasonable people and just institutions arise. For a population of people cannot grow up under basic just institutions unless those institutions are already reasonably just and stable. Since

\textsuperscript{28} Political Liberalism, 53.
\textsuperscript{29} Id. 86
\textsuperscript{30} Id., 142.
justice depends on citizens’ willingness to participate in reciprocal public reason giving and demanding, the question is critical.

Rawls suggests a positive account of how the stable just world in which citizens are constituted as reasonable citizens by their education and participation in just institutions might come about. He talks at one point about the transition from a *modus vivendi* (essentially, a peace treaty based on a balance of forces) to a “constitutional consensus” and then ultimately to a more principled public moral conception, a well-ordered society. Here the main focus is on how people with differing and conflicting comprehensive doctrines might at first establish terms of co-existence based on a balance of forces, and later on a richer set of procedural values (rights of participation and representation) that help stabilize cooperative relations. The standards internal to a procedural (or constitutional) consensus may attract greater support and allegiance over time and develop a life and logic of their own. A shared political morality of principles and conceptions, may eventually come about that treats reasonable persons with differing conceptions of the good as equally entitled to equal liberty and distributive fairness, supported by an overlapping consensus: a shared commitment to a public morality of justice no longer dependent on the current distribution of power.

As a positive account, however, this is suggestive only. It does not explain why a society based on a balance of power will come to shift from an organizing principle of power or interests to one of justice. And indeed this is a fundamental

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31 Id., 158-68.
32 Id., xxiii-xxxii.
problem in practice, as many if not most societies have failed to make such a transition.33

In this section we build on a model of the characteristics of distinctively legal order developed in Hadfield & Weingast (2011) to provide a positive account of the role of public reason in the transition to a normatively-constituted legal order. Hadfield & Weingast begin with the idea that a legal order is, minimally, characterized by an equilibrium in which behavior is patterned on the basis of a deliberately chosen normative classification of conduct, identifying which behaviors are considered wrongful and which are not. Rawls's well-ordered society is an example of a legal order. In it, reasonable citizens follow a set of rules and principles that establish the basis for fair cooperation between free and equal citizens. The rules and principles provide a normative classification of conduct and this normative classification is understood to be the object of deliberation and choice by recognized processes such as a constitutional convention, judicial decisions and legislation.

Positive political analysis assumes only that individuals are rational: in the same sense that Rawls intends it and economists understand it. The agents in Hadfield and Weingast’s model are purely rational with conventional preferences: they are motivated solely by reference to their personal assessment of what is good. They are not motivated by other-regarding concerns to assist fellow citizens when threatened with unfair treatment. But as rational agents they are capable of seeing that the world in which there is coordination to effectively punish certain behaviors

and not others might be better for them than one that lacks such coordination. A rational agent, even one who expects others to coordinate, will care about two things in deciding whether to participate in collective punishments coordinated by a common logic. One is the extent to which the common logic converges with the agent’s idiosyncratic logic: will a system of community punishment coordinated by the common logic help deter enough of the wrongs, and promote enough of the goods, that the individual agent would like to see deterred or promoted? Another is, will participation impose too many costs or require the individual to compromise choices too much? Rational agents must, in other words, weigh the benefits and costs of coordination against what they can achieve in the absence of coordination.\(^{34}\)

The Hadfield-Weingast model derives an equilibrium in which rational individuals adopt as a set of behavior-guiding principles a common logic that does not perfectly coincide with anyone’s personal assessment of the good, but which must, to be stable, reflect to a significant extent how diverse others see the world. Most importantly, the model explains in positive terms how rational individuals will seek to adopt a system of shared reasons and principles that is—like liberal public reason—freestanding, complete, and embraced as a matter of common knowledge. By exploring the connections between this positive model and liberalism’s normative account, we attempt systematically to connect positive rationality to a morally richer model of fair cooperation.

The positive model focuses on an idea often neglected in theories of legal order: the central role played by decentralized—as opposed to state—enforcement

\(^{34}\) Rawls suggests something similar in his stylized “three stage sequence,” 395 *Theory of Justice.*
of the rules that constitute legal order. We refer here to the wide variety of ways in which individuals impose costs large and small on themselves and others who violate norms, or confer benefits on those who comply with norms. Someone who violates a norm might worry about the reactions of others, if detected, or might even feel guilty—and so avoid violations even when the chances of detection are slim. Others who observe violations might engage in behaviors that make the violator feel ashamed. Or they might withdraw cooperation and support—refusing to take in an outlaw or boycotting a local business, for example. Violators may be punished by people passing on negative appraisals of their conduct; thus acquiring a bad reputation, they may have difficulty finding people with whom to trade or socialize. Although centralized coercive enforcement of rules by the state often plays a key role as a backstop for decentralized enforcement, legal systems cannot afford to rely exclusively on the threat of coercive enforcement to achieve high levels of compliance. States that cannot rely on their citizens to cooperate in enforcement efforts must spend substantial resources monitoring and adjudicating behavior and/or employ substantial, disproportionate, penalties to compensate for the likelihood that much non-compliance goes undetected or unproved. Coercion-based legal orders are inefficient and fragile, in positive terms, and morally illegitimate.

Decentralized enforcement poses a fundamental problem of coordination. Most collective punishments require a critical mass of participants to make the costs to an individual manageable and/or to make the threat of punishment effective in deterring non-compliance. Boycotts, protests and retaliation are effective only when significant numbers participate. Passing on negative information about a
trading partner has a greater effect on the partner’s reputation—and thus greater capacity to deter bad behavior—if those receiving the information evaluate it in a similar light. Indeed, “gossip” can often be understood as a way of expressing and reinforcing shared norms of conduct, by using the relevant standards to report on or inquire into the conduct of a third party. It typically assumes that one’s interlocutors share one’s evaluative standards because, if they do not, one’s praise or criticism of another may suggest that one’s own standards are deviant or improper and this may redound to one’s own detriment. Even if the ‘punishment’ mechanism is based on internalized standards, and so voluntary, the evaluation of what a given set of norms require and the maintenance of commitment to those standards depends for many people on how they expect others to respond.

Collective punishment requires individuals to share common beliefs about what behavior warrants punishment. Both potential wrongdoers and citizens who might participate in punishment need to make reasonably reliable predictions about whether and when sufficient others will join in punishment. But if, as it seems reasonable to presume, individuals are diverse in their personal assessments of what is ‘wrong’—if they each possess what Hadfield & Weingast call an *idiosyncratic logic* for assessing wrongfulness, which is significantly inaccessible to others—how can they coordinate?

There is a second challenge that a system that relies on collective punishment must meet. An agent who knows *how* to coordinate punishment with others—when to criticize someone in trading or other social relations, when to boycott, when to show up at a protest, etc.—still must decide *whether* participating
in punishment is worth it. Punishing someone, even oneself, is costly. It may entail giving up a relationship or trading partnership that is otherwise beneficial, spending time at a protest, or running the risk of harming one’s own reputation if criticism of another is perceived as unfair, unreasonable or unwarranted. Given the preferences conventionally posited in economic models—that is, in the absence of personal preferences that directly value compliance with norms and participation in punishment of others in order to uphold those norms—a rational agent needs to identify a benefit to outweigh the costs of compliance and punishment.

Any stable legal order relying on decentralized enforcement among purely rational individuals with conventional preferences has to solve these two problems: coordinating punishment efforts and providing individuals with an incentive to incur the cost of participating in costly punishment. In this positive approach, stability is modeled as equilibrium. In equilibrium no individual has an incentive to depart from equilibrium behavior—refraining from wrongful conduct him or herself and punishing those who do act wrongfully against others—on the assumption that all others are behaving in the same way.

Ideally, rational individuals would like to see the common logic exactly replicate his or her personal idiosyncratic logic. The same is true for purely rational individuals on Rawls’s account: their rational good is also defined by their own comprehensive ethical or religious conceptions, which for them define the truth as a whole. The most immediately attractive option for a given individual would be for politics to take its bearings from one’s own comprehensive/ideal viewpoint. But both models assume diversity of such viewpoints. There is, as Rawls emphasizes,
the fact of reasonable pluralism. So everyone knows that circumstances do not permit anyone to act effectively as dictator. As a consequence, if—as we presume—a well-ordered and stable pluralistic society depends at least to some extent on the willingness of ordinary citizens to participate in upholding the rules and principles that make order possible, then rational agents know that there is no feasible alternative to seeking the free and willing cooperation of others. The problem is to find a solution that will sufficiently engage the interests of all (or sufficiently many to make punishments effective) to induce them to participate.

In Hadfield and Weingast’s model, enforcement can be coordinated among a diverse set of individuals by a common logic. A common logic is a publicly accessible a system of rules, principles, and reasons for classifying behavior as wrongful or not. The function of the common logic is to produce common knowledge classifications of behavior as warranting punishment or not. Looking to the common logic, and knowing that all others are also looking to the common logic, to decide whether to punish particular actions of fellow citizens—to speak badly of them, to withdraw fellowship or trade, to ostracize them or take affirmative steps to protest—individuals are able to predict the participation of others in these punishment efforts.

Hadfield & Weingast demonstrate that an equilibrium legal order that solves the coordination and incentive problems of decentralized enforcement can be achieved by an institution that supplies a common logic possessing many of the attributes that we intuitively associate with the rule of law:

• Public accessibility and impersonal reasoning that allows any agent to implement the logic to reach a common classification
• **Public reasoning** that allows all agents to observe how the institution implements the logic in new circumstances

• **Open process** that allows heterogeneous agents to introduce idiosyncratic information and reasoning into public reasoning

• **Immanent and generalizable** principles that allow classification of circumstances that the institution initially cannot anticipate

• **Unique classifications** that can coordinate expectations in the manner of a focal point. This requires both a single logic and, ultimately, a single classification of particular circumstances.

• Given the potential for ambiguity, an authoritative steward of the logic, able to definitively resolve ambiguities and conflicts arising from the implementation of the logic.

• **Generality** that ensures that the logic applies to the circumstances and values of all agents required to punish if punishment is to be effective.

• **Stability** that allows an agent contemplating participation in punishment of a wrong done to someone else to anticipate that the logic will remain the coordinating logic in the future in the event that this agent is the potential victim of wrongful conduct.

It is important to understand how these normatively attractive attributes solve, in a positive sense, the coordination and incentive problems in a system with decentralized enforcement. Consider the coordination problem first. Clearly, for a common logic to generate common knowledge classifications—providing a basis for individuals to predict when others will participate in punishment—it needs to be **publicly accessible**. But this requires more than mere publication of the relevant standards. An impersonal system of reasoning that is invariant to the identity of the person engaged in the reasoning furthers the aims of public accessibility and hence common knowledge by ensuring that any of the participants with diverse conceptions of the good can take up the common logic. In addition, **uniqueness**—which can be generated by an authoritative steward such as a supreme court—helps people to coordinate on assessments of conduct by reducing ambiguity about what
the common logic classifies as wrongful. Of course, the steward, to be successful, must offer interpretations of the common logic that participants are prepared to go along with. Authoritative stewardship is not a substitute for decentralized enforcement but a way to facilitate coordination on shared standards of conduct.

Now consider the incentive problem facing potential punishers in a decentralized system. Solving this problem requires that individuals examining the common logic, and deciding whether to participate in punishing wrongs defined by the common logic, find in it assurance that their own circumstances and concerns would be considered if they were personally involved. If they are going to incur the cost of helping to deter wrongs against a fellow citizen, as rational agents, they will be looking for assurance that wrongs against them will also be addressed in turn. A classification system that is open to individual input, in the sense that it will admit consideration of an individual’s perspective in an effort to reconcile personal concerns with the common logic, serves this purpose. This is analogous to individualized due process, and the guarantee that individuals or groups who disagree with the way their rights are being interpreted will have their day in court. Similarly, it is also often helpful if the common logic is not altogether rigidly formulated in terms of specifics: insofar as it is, at certain points at least, formulated in terms of abstract and generalizable principles it may be better able to be adapted to new and unforeseen factors and considerations and thus to accommodate the interests of a wider individuals.\textsuperscript{35} A system of classification that is general—

\textsuperscript{35} Of course, there is a well-known discussion of the relative advantages of specific and rigid, vs. abstract and general, constitutional provisions. If small states in a federal system, for example, require reassurance that they will have adequate representation, it may not be enough to guarantee
meaning that it is addressed to the concerns of all of those who are essential to an effective decentralized enforcement system—also serves to give individuals confidence that their interests will be taken into account in devising the protections and freedoms of the common logic. Stability helps to generate an expectation that the rules are not going to change significantly between the time an individual makes decisions about helping to punish others and when that individual may need assistance himself or herself; this supports the individual's incentive to participate in punishment.

Rational agents know that their own personal ideals (or idiosyncratic logic) are not candidates for being a social standard for coordination, due to the fact of diversity. When they decide to participate in enforcement of the rules established by the common logic, they are doing so in the spirit of accommodation: the common logic must protect their interests sufficiently but it cannot be expected to reflect their private thinking in every case. Rational agents in this model are willing to subscribe to a system of reasoning that must be, if it is to do what they want it to do, independent of their own personal ideals. Like public reason on the liberal model, the common logic must have logic of its own.

Equilibrium in the Hadfield-Weingast model depends on ongoing communication among agents to confirm that the common logic continues to be sufficiently attractive to each to garner their support. In formal game theory terms, they "adequate" representation in a constitutional document. They may, rather, want it to be specified that every state gets two Senators regardless of population. On the other hand, with respect to other areas of controversy it makes more sense to rely on abstract standards that allow for contestation and adaptation over time, concerning, for example, what constitutes an "unreasonable" search or seizure. For an excellent discussion see Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (2001)
this is what makes the equilibrium "sub-game perfect"; informally, it is what makes the collective threat to punish credible. If an agent decides not to punish action that is classified as wrongful by the common logic, then other agents interpret this to mean that the agent no longer supports the common logic. They in turn will be less likely to punish because they do not wish to find themselves punishing when there are too few others prepared to join in. Individuals in the positive model must communicate publicly to one other their ongoing commitment to the common logic.

Thus, on the positive model that we draw on here, purely rational agents with conventional preferences have an incentive to subscribe to a shared system of normative reasoning so long as they have confidence that it is simultaneously responsive to their concerns and to the concerns of diverse others (on whom they depend for a stable system of enforcement that generates legal order.) The positive model has striking similarities to liberal public reason.

IV. **Structural Similarities**

Notwithstanding the fact that moral agents have a richer set of motivations, which include a desire to cooperate on fair terms given the assurance that others will likewise do so, there are striking parallels between the positive and normative models. Indeed, beginning with the minimal positive assumptions of rationality and practical stability, the positive model winds up with an account of institutions and social arrangements that seem conducive to the emergence of reasonable individuals, understood in the moral sense of those willing to cooperate on fair terms with diverse others. Or so we seek to suggest in what follows.
Let us survey the key components of liberal public reason and their correlates in the positive model described above.

**A Public Political Conception of Justice**

The centerpiece of Rawls’s theory is a public political conception of justice. It is political in the sense that it is worked out in the awareness of its function to secure a stable framework in which reasonable individuals can enjoy fair terms of social cooperation in the conditions of reasonable pluralism.

The common logic in Hadfield & Weingast’s model is also worked out in the awareness of its function to coordinate a common knowledge understanding of what is right and what is wrong. It provides the framework for the enforcement of the rules of social life that allow individuals to achieve a better outcome for themselves by coordinating with diverse others.

**Overlapping Consensus**

On both the positive and the normative account, a stable common logic (or public political conception of justice) must secure the support of an “overlapping consensus” of the major differing idiosyncratic logics, personal ideals, or “comprehensive doctrines” that citizens espouse. That is, the shared logic of coordination (or fair cooperation) cannot be too far from or greatly at odds with citizens understanding of their rational good (or their “comprehensive doctrines”). In both accounts, citizens must be able to see some compatibility or congruence between the shared public logic of coordination and their personal aims and values.

Individual agents recognize that all face the same incentives: to participate in collective punishment but only if the coordinated result makes them better off.
according to their personal calculus, or, on the moralized version, is acceptable from people’s differing comprehensive standpoints. The only feasible common logics are those that enlist the participation of diverse others in a common logic of shared laws that they can regard as reasonable for all. They will seek out a basis for collective action (coordination and collective enforcement) as a “framework for the public social world” (PL 53) that can be endorsed by others in light of their own personal conception of the good. An interest-based explanation provides a positive foundation for stability of a legal order that must exhibit an overlapping consensus analogous to the one that Rawls posits if it is to enlist the willing support of a sufficient number of citizens.

A Freestanding and Complete Conception of Justice

In order to secure an overlapping consensus, Rawls emphasizes that the public political conception of justice must be freestanding and complete if it is to be stable. It cannot be derivative of or dependent on any particular comprehensive doctrine. For Rawls the reason is normative: the political conception of justice must, if it is to be stable for the right reasons, not reflect a particular balance of power among existing comprehensive doctrines. Nor can it be dependent on the particular configuration of beliefs in existing doctrines. If it is to meet the normative criteria imposed by respect for all citizens as free and equal, it must treat all doctrines equally. Thus it cannot be controlled or filled in by any single doctrine.

The common logic in Hadfield & Weingast is also freestanding and complete. Rational agents will be unwilling to incur the costs of supporting a common logic and participating in enforcement if the logic is subject to the control of any
particular set of individuals. This is why Hadfield & Weingast argue that equilibrium legal order can be supported by an institution that provides a common logic that is general, impersonal and open to consideration of how idiosyncratic reasoning can be reconciled with common reasoning. Rational agents will be more likely to persist in supporting a common logic if its principles are generalizable and so capable of responding to their idiosyncratic and potentially unknown or evolving interests. This common logic must be regarded as complete so that its gaps are not subject to being filled in by ad hoc reasoning based on purely personal considerations.

The positive model suggests an account based in equilibrium for the stability of a shared logic that is freestanding and complete. In a world in which people have a choice about whether to support a common logic or not, there is potential competition among alternative logics. A common logic that better achieves the characteristic of standing free from the control of any one set of individuals and their idiosyncratic views is more likely to be robust to the vagaries of change and to secure the type of support necessary to persist.

*Reasonable Moral Psychology*

One of the challenges for Rawls’s theory is an account of the motivation of citizens to support just institutions. Rawls posits the development of a reasonable moral psychology, in which individuals’ rational self-interest is regulated by an internalized concern for treating others fairly. As for how the preferences of the rational individual come to be regulated in this way, he suggests only that individuals who are raised in just institutions will come to value fairness and justice
for its own sake. As we have already noted, this raises the puzzle of how the just institutions that can produce moral agents come about in the first place.

The positive model suggests a relationship between rationality and a reasonable moral psychology. The model presumes that individuals are exclusively self-interested in the conventional sense: they do not place value per se on respecting the equal worth and dignity of others or supporting just institutions for the sake of justice alone. But these agents nonetheless come to act as if they valued fairness for its own sake: willingly punishing wrongs done to others, wrongs judged by a public conception of what is right or fair. With an eye to the future benefits of cooperation, they can see that they are personally better off when social life is organized on the basis of an effective shared logic. These are not mere quid pro quo exchanges, each of which is expected to be mutually advantageous. Participants recognize that the common logic will in some instances depart from their private evaluation of what is best. In this sense, rational agents are willing to act reasonably: not because their preferences have been modified, but because they recognize that the value of cooperation on shared terms, and also the fact that diversity precludes cooperation on the terms that they might personally ideally prefer (more on this below).

*Stability for Shared Reasons But Not Right Reasons*

We might think of the positive version as displaying *stability for shared reasons*: the reasons arise from the practical/prudential need for a shared logic to stabilize coordination for the sake of mutual advantage. “Shared reasons” on the positive model are not Rawls’s “right reasons.” Fairness as such and other moral
notions do not enter the purely positive account: rational individuals are not as such motivated to act based on Scanlon’s reasons that others could not reasonably reject.⁴⁶ Although rational agents, as we have seen, will have an incentive to participate in a framework in which they act to protect the interests of others and subscribe to a system of public moral reasoning that treats people fairly, the stability of the equilibrium is never fully removed from individual calculus. If private valuation shifts so that the equilibrium secured by the common logic no longer generates private benefits to justify the cost of supporting the institution, then individuals will withdraw their support. This threat of withdrawal, in fact, is a key reason why Hadfield & Weingast suggest that the institution providing the common logic will have an incentive to ensure that the logic is as open and compatible with idiosyncratic views as possible. But it does mean that the rational agents in the positive model do not support the institutions purely out of a commitment to the pursuit of justice for its own sake, as Rawls’ reasonable agents do.

While there are structural similarities between the two models, we do not say that the positive model replicates Rawlsian conclusions. That is, the equilibrium point of the positive model should be expected to fall short of liberal justice. This can be seen by attending to a feature of the positive model we have not yet emphasized. The common logic must be general and open with respect to the interests not necessarily of all citizens, but only those that are essential to the efficacy of decentralized enforcement. If women and slaves, for example, lack

⁴⁶ See T.M. Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other* (1998).
capacity to deliver penalties—if they have no discretion to withhold benefits and so
no threat to punish by withdrawing cooperation, say—then their interests can be
excluded from the common logic. The equilibrium would still be stable, but here it is
plain that this is not stability for the right, that is morally defensible, reasons. The
equilibrium in positive theory depends on the configuration of power in society.

Reciprocity as a Virtue of Citizenship

The positive model provides an account whereby rational agents who seek to
coordinate collective punishments in order to secure their own well being will, as
much as possible, practice a form of reciprocity. This is not, as already mentioned,
a narrow form of quid pro quo reciprocity whereby individuals make implicit
bilateral contracts in which each participant expects a return after each exchange.
Rather, this is a generalized reciprocity, whereby people aid their fellows in the
expectation of more diffuse compensation as the beneficiaries of similar
cooperativeness from others in the future as needed. (Bowles & Gintis (2004) call
this “strong reciprocity”) This robust form of generalized reciprocity only becomes
possible based on the rich shared logic and institutional framework that expressly
generates normative principles for when others are entitled to the cooperation of
their fellows, securing as much of their personal interest as is compatible with
similar assurances for all. Although self-interest limits the extent to which rational
individuals are willing to contribute, Hadfield and Weingast suppose that
participants are willing to perform now in the hope of future returns, so long as
there is general support for a cooperative logic, in words and deeds. This system

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37 See the helpful discussion in Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (1996), chs. 1-3.
requires public affirmation of the common logic along with appropriate actions. A commitment to joint enforcement of the terms of cooperation takes place in the shadow of the future, rooted in a common logic that must be impersonal and freestanding if it is to endure. Rational actors are thus led to consider others’ perspectives as well as their own, and to affirm this publicly.

The reciprocity of positive theory is not moral: people are not motivated essentially by fairness, or a desire to act on the basis of principles that others could not reasonably reject. But to some degree they act as if they are so motivated, at least vis a vis those whose participation is needed to sustain the shared logic of cooperation. Participants in the positive model exhibit a kind of purely rational reasonableness and reciprocity: to sustain a shared logic of cooperation that sufficient numbers of others will also be prepared to support they exhibit their willingness to compromise with others. They treat the shared logic as a normative system—one generating reasons for compliance, and standards of assessment—though not a moral system (more on this distinction below). Participants on the positive model exhibit prudential reasonableness: treating others’ interests as deserving of their respect and support, in the expectation that others will behave likewise to them.

Public Reason and the Virtues of Listening

The positive model helps to make clear the important practical work done by an enduring system of public reason. Indeed, the persistence of the equilibrium in the Hadfield & Weingast model depends on participants’ willingness to engage in both punishment of wrongdoers and appropriate communicative action. The social
order is characterized by dynamic pluralism, and this helps generate the need for a shared logic of cooperation. Conditions change, as do people's understandings of their own values and those of others. By participating in collective punishment, consistently over time whenever the need arises, and doing so on the basis of an avowed commitment to a common logic (or public conception), individuals signal to their fellows that the common logic continues to be acceptable to them. Failure to participate degrades the stability of the equilibrium by leading others to suspect that the regime is less likely to be coordinated by the existing common logic in the future. This encourages wrongdoers and discourages enforcers, who—even if they themselves continue to find the common logic acceptable—are unwilling to bear the costs of punishment with a dwindling number of compatriots. The common logic fails in its coordinating function if this communicative component is lost.

While individuals' idiosyncratic reasons (or personal conception of the good) cannot serve a coordinating function, this does not mean that they have no place in public discourse. The positive model emphasizes that public reason does not entail a negative obligation to disavow idiosyncratic views; rather, it entails only an affirmative obligation to take on the task of integrating those views into a common language of reasons. And this is why idiosyncratic reasons are insufficient to support the stability of the well-ordered politically liberal community. Even if I share the idiosyncratic view that you expound, my interest in continued support for our shared framework rests on my confidence that a justification can be offered that is sufficiently acceptable to all those who play a role in supporting the framework.

38 We are indebted to Nir Eyal for this point.
So this is what I need to hear, and what I will do my best to offer. This is what the freestanding and impersonal common logic provides and why we would predict that rational agents will appeal to it in order to ensure its continued vitality as the basis for valuable social cooperation.

V. From Positive to Moral and Back Again: Rational and Fair Cooperation.

So far we have seen how various requirements, rooted in positive theory, are structurally similar to parallel ideas rooted in a political morality. Of course, agents’ motivations differ categorically on the two versions. In the one case, rational agents pursue their self-interest in what Tocqueville called an “enlightened” way: by recognizing the advantages of a stable logic of coordination with others.39 On the other account, morally motivated agents recognize the virtues of setting aside certain long-disputed religious and philosophical issues in favor of principles of fair cooperation that can be justified to, and secure the support of, reasonable people with similar motivations. Nevertheless, the considerable structural similarities between the positive and moral versions suggest ways of thinking about how normatively motivated citizens who are moved by moral considerations as such might emerge from an environment that is governed exclusively by the positive forces of rationality and practical stability. And there might be a “return trip,” so to speak, whereby agents who bring a moral sensibility to bear on previously interest-based coordination improve on the outcomes available to rational agents.

On both the positive and the normative models we are exploring here, law is understood as a human creation that must respond to the claims of diverse individuals by furnishing them with shared reasons for compliance or participation in joint enforcement. On both views, the working of a system of authoritative law depends upon widespread endorsement of the value of cooperation on the basis of reciprocally shared reasons. Both views look toward widespread participation in a shared discursive and justificatory enterprise, as crucial for mutual assurance. Good reasons on both views are “we” reasons: reasons that are good for us as co-participants in a joint enterprise. Both models, finally, regard the systems of shared reasons that each generates as freestanding and complete – autonomous and integral systems of ideas – that are also open to input from citizens’ differing idiosyncratic non-public systems of belief. And yet, on the positive model, public justification is conducted in the framework of mutual advantage, while on the normative model, mutual justification is on the basis of public moral claims.

In this section we consider the relationship and interactions of the two logics: How far can a positive, game theoretic, logic take us in the direction of public morality? And, after we cross the bridge to moral judgment, how might the return trip reveal ways in which the introduction of a moral dimension strengthens – or weakens -- the positive logic of coordination? Is progression in the direction of moralized social norms itself suggested by the positive logic?

We raise here the prospect that a common logic of cooperation grounded in mutual advantage could at first become stable for interest-based reasons—as the Hadfield-Weingast model suggests—in a world populated exclusively by rational
agents with conventional preferences. Subsequently, however, agents who participate in a freestanding common logic of cooperation based on the rationality of seeking a shared set of principles that can be endorsed by diverse others, may then come over time to make additional justificatory demands on one another. Some might introduce avowedly moral ideas of fairness, equity, and the freedom and equality of participants, and such categories might gain a grip on participants via the working of what Rawls calls a “reasonable moral psychology.” That is, such categories might be recognized as furnishing grounds for claims that require response in the appropriate, moral register: based on what fair or equitable cooperation requires, and what is rightfully mine or yours. We ask here specifically about the relationship between positive analysis and liberal democratic political morality.

_Law, Normativity, and Morality_

We have so far elided the distinction between “normative” and “moral” in relation to law; however, we now need to say something about their relation. We acknowledge that these matters are highly contested, the boundary is often fuzzy, and our account is brief.

The positive model predicts the emergence and stability of a normative system (the common logic of cooperation) but not necessarily one that is moral. Normative systems generate standards of conduct that are available to be deployed in social life as general guides to conduct. Normative systems are necessarily social and evaluative, but they are not necessarily moral; moral systems, such as Rawls’s,

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40 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 85-6.
are a subset of normative systems. Similarly, normative systems may be formal, with institutionalized authorities and formal rules, such as is the case with law, but they may be informal, like etiquette.⁴¹

A fairly clear example of a normative system that is generally not regarded as reflecting moral categories and judgments (or at least serious ones) is etiquette: not picking your teeth in public, chewing with your mouth open, or reaching across others for food at the table. The reason for “hedging” on the issue of whether etiquette is moral in nature is that its rules often do involve a very general moral aim: showing adequate consideration for others, admittedly in ways that are culturally specific. Self-consciously constructed normative systems may be even further from morality. An example would be a code of healthy eating – such as the food pyramid – that a group of people embrace for guiding and evaluating food consumption. Systems of rules and principles, and supporting practices and institutions, might be designed with an eye to furthering the aims of the healthy eating group. Understood as a normative system – and not only a set of “tips” for healthy eating – we would imagine participants praising those who follow the guidelines and criticizing those who do not. Treating the rules and principles of healthy eating as a normative system would be a way of strengthening participants’ capacity to resist temptations such as too many rich desserts. Normative systems in society—dedicated to healthful living, etiquette, athletic competition, improved public speaking— will often help individuals coordinate so as to advance joint

⁴¹ We have benefitted from Bernard Gert, “Morality,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (online).
purposes and intentions. But they need not be based in morality, or have much to do with morality.

Moral categories of assessment typically also have a special sort of categorical bindingness—that is, they are not chosen, and they apply to us regardless of our specific plans and purposes—and they are often thought to be overriding. Each of us is entitled to decide for ourselves whether to regulate our conduct on the basis of the imperatives of healthful eating and, leaving aside our dependents, we do no wrong to others by eating unhealthily. However, we are not entitled in the same way to decide to do without morality: we are required categorically to observe our moral duties to others. These might involve not harming them, or assisting them when they are in dire need and we have a surplus. Precisely which considerations generate moral “oughts” is contested, and depends on one’s particular conception of morality. A utilitarian will say that we are obliged to act to maximize the net sum of happiness. A contractarian such as Scanlon will say that we ought to treat others on the basis of reasons and principles that they could not reasonably reject. Other-regarding morality is what we owe to other people generally as a matter of imperative duty, whether we like it or not. Political morality, on the liberal democratic understanding, is what we owe to out fellow citizens as moral equals.

What about law? H.L.A. Hart and other legal positivists have long argued that legal systems may be understood as normative—as generating standards for

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42 Scanlon, note xxx, supra.
assessment and even criticism-- but not necessarily moral. To describe some course of action as legally required does not mean that it is morally required. With that we agree.

An essential feature of a legal system, related to its normativity, is that participants take an “internal attitude” toward the rules and norms that it generates: not simply recognizing that they exist, as would an anthropologist in observing an alien society, but rather recognizing that valid legal rules and principles supply them with standards for assessment and reasons for action. Indeed, the reasons for action supplied by valid law are “exclusionary”, which is to say that with respect to a given issue or policy, the existence of a valid law provides us with a reason that excludes or displaces the reasons we would otherwise have, for example, our own best personal judgment on the issue.

We think that the sort of normativity represented by the “internal attitude” to law, and the exclusionary reasons furnished by valid law, are similar to the attitude that rational actors would have to the shared logic in the positive model. So long as agents conclude that the coordinated equilibrium is better for them than the uncoordinated outcome, the shared logic that serves the instrumental coordinating function suggested by the Hadfield-Weingast model is treated as authoritative and as displacing reasons arising from individuals’ personal idiosyncratic logics. And, indeed, the rational participants in Hadfield and Weingast’s community of law would take an internal attitude toward its common logic in evaluating the correct

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44 Hart argues that a legal system may exist where only the officials who operate the system take an internal attitude toward it, see xxx, supra.
response (punish or not) to potentially wrongful behavior: the relevant question to be asked is no longer what do “I” think, or what does “he” think; it is, what do “we” think, according to our shared logic of coordination based on law? The positive logic of coordination, based as it is on mutual advantage, does not as such give rise to moral obligations. The agents who conclude that they are personally better off abandoning the coordinated outcome are, in this model, free to do so without censure.

Legal systems are often understood to be normative in the same sense as we see reflected in the positive model: as generating standards of assessment and reasons, not necessarily moral, for action, and as requiring some range of actors to take the “internal point of view” toward the system. We would go further, however, and argue that legal systems are often properly understood as moral in several important respects.45

First, important parts of legal systems overlap with moral demands: criminal law prohibitions on harm to others, for example, represent both legal and moral requirements. Many legal rights codify and clarify individuals’ basic moral claims against one another.

But, second and more broadly, the whole purpose of a system of law is to help a diverse group of individuals to coordinate on common courses of action in conditions of moral diversity, and this will include a wide range of common moral plans and purposes. There is no need for law in a simple homogenous world governed by spontaneous norms, but in conditions of diversity, even morally well-

45 We have benefitted from the discussion in Andrei Marmor, Philosophy of Law (2011), esp. ch. 4.
disposed individuals need authoritative institutions to clarify and codify what they owe to one another. As John Finnis puts it, “Intelligence and dedication, skill and commitment ... multiply the problems of coordination, by giving the group more possible orientations, commitments, projects ‘priorities,’ and procedures to choose from.” A sufficient condition for law is disagreement among well-intentioned and conscientious people; as Finnis says, law “would have a completely adequate rationale in a world of saints.” Systems of law advance vitally important human purposes and common goods of all sorts by allowing communities to render authoritative judgments and determinations.

So it is hardly surprising that there generally are moral reasons for complying with, and working for the improvement of, decent systems of law that reasonably approximate to justice, even if much of the content of law in such systems is not derived directly from morality. Moreover, as beneficiaries of others’ compliance we can have a moral obligation to do our part in turn to sustain the system: a duty of reciprocity not to “free ride” on others’ actions.

So we think that there are significant overlaps between law and morality, and that law serves vital human interests and purposes. Nevertheless, neither is reducible to the other. We recognize that there is often a gap between legal and moral claims and entitlements: people often have moral claims on others that are not legal claims. And the law may protect forms of conduct that are immoral (refusing assistance to the needy, for example.)

Positive Roots for Normativity

46 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 232, 269 (1980).
The positive model suggests that rational agents with conventional preferences can develop a shared, neutral, and freestanding evaluative system for judging conduct. The logic is normative: it classifies behavior as good or bad, wrongful or not, acceptable or not, punishable or not. This system of classifications is generated, on the positive model, for instrumental purposes: to achieve a set of relationships with others that all judge to make them better off. Participants accept two key facts: the existence of diversity in private evaluative systems and the dependence of each on the others for enforcing compliance with norms that promote valuable social cooperation. In doing so they exploit what some evolutionary theorists call humankind’s “cognitive niche”: the capacity to employ abstract reasoning and language to achieve better outcomes through sociality, communication and cooperation. The common logic is such an enterprise. The common logic and supporting institutions thus provides otherwise diverse individuals with a shared normative system that is equally available to all.

Individual preferences in the positive model remain those of economic rationality. The internal view is adopted for instrumental purposes: securing the benefits of the coordinated outcome that the agent prefers, on self-interested grounds, to the alternative world without coordination. So, the extension of equal treatment to women or gays or African Americans, or the inclusion of persons with severe handicaps, will depend in the positive model on the projected costs and benefits for interested participants. This makes the stability of the resulting equilibrium still a contingent matter: the content of the common logic is responsive

to the particular distributions of power and interests in the population. As we noted, if women and slaves are not needed for effective enforcement, the positive model predicts that their interests will be missing from the common logic. This is the gap between stability in the positive sense and stability in the moral sense; stability for shared instrumental reasons and stability for the morally right reasons.

The movement to genuinely moral standards of assessment depends on participants being willing to transcend mere calculations of interest in favor of taking seriously the demands of fairness, individuals’ moral entitlements, or the public good as such. Then the inclusion of African Americans, women, or gays will turn not simply on whether this leads to better outcomes for sufficient numbers of individual participants but public convictions concerning just treatment.

Adam Smith, in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, paints an interesting picture of how moral sensibilities might emerge from thinking about how others regard us. Normal humans, Smith claimed, are inherently sociable creatures who desire not only to be thought well of but indeed *to merit being thought well of*. Thus, it is not only disadvantageous but inherently disagreeable to be conscious that one is an object of merited disapprobation in the eyes of others. As creatures with complex mental capacities, Smith suggests, we can form abstract ideas about meritorious forms of conduct: as these become the bases of shared social standards of assessment, we form desires to act according to meritorious criteria, and to be known to do so. This suggests a path from the positive to the moral: from stability for instrumental reasons to stability for the right reasons.

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If preferences—desires—are modified in this way, if we cross the bridge from an instrumental normativity that promotes our interests to an authentic morality rooted in concern for others, then principles for inclusion or equal treatment will no longer be contingent on the power of particular groups. Authentic concerns for the welfare of others or the requirements of justice do not depend on perceptions of a benefit for oneself. Moral judgments may be essential for justifying the inclusion of those who lack the power to significantly assist in decentralized enforcement.

A crucial bridge is crossed, as Smith recognized, when we can imagine participants in systems of social norms reflecting upon the forms of conduct that will win the approval not only of actual spectators, but of an ideal “impartial spectator” who sees our interactions clearly and fair-mindedly, as would an ideal judge: who judges wisely and well, and not necessarily as the majority of others in our society judge. We act based on a certain form of critical morality when we seek the approval of an ideal spectator who sees clearly and judges impartially. Such considerations will naturally be introduced into discussions of actual moral rules, in part because conflicting interpretations of social rules are inevitable, and also, proposals for revision. In the face of such proposals the questions arises: what should the rules be? In any group of cooperators for mutual benefit, the question is liable to arise: in deciding on the rules that govern all, what should be the touchstone for public decision concerning the rules? Equal shares? Maximizing aggregate well-being (or wealth)? Or some more complex standards of fair distribution?
This is precisely the function of a common logic, in a pluralistic community that cannot resolve such questions in regular face-to-face deliberation and choice. It expresses reasons for action in a shared language of approbation, not mere observation or indifference. If I am articulating to my fellows why they should join me in shunning a bad actor, in the language of the common logic, I may claim that a failure to do one’s part is not only disadvantageous but unfair: normative public reasoning and language provide me with a currency of reasons for assigning and expressing forms of approval and disapproval that entail potent evaluative attitudes in participants and spectators. The public normative language of assessment furnishes the vehicle for assigning a reputation and circulating it as a matter of common knowledge.

The citizens in the stable equilibrium posited by Hadfield and Weingast, we suggest, can be expected over time to enlist the assistance of praise and blame, reputation, and then conscience in a manner similar to that described by Smith: we judge others and are conscious of being judged ourselves, and so we come naturally to inspect ourselves as if by others. The further progression to an ethics of critical moral judgment represents a shift in motivation. Critical morality might be represented, as Smith did in the later revised editions of his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* – as an “impartial spectator” capable of taking a critical attitude toward social categories and public opinion: “candid and equitable” or disinterested, recognizing the difference between what is praised in one’s society and what is truly
praiseworthy. Moral judgment does not simply register the voice of others or the dictates of individual or collective advantage.

The public moral judgments registered in public reason are similar: proposed principles of social justice must be tested against the strongest available competitor moral and political theories to discern which provides the strongest candidate principles – on the moral merits – for describing what we owe one another as equal participants in a shared social and political order. On the liberal account, we seek to formulate principles of social justice that can gain widespread assent but that are also sound (and acceptable) based on our best understanding of what we owe to one another as moral agents: as cooperators like us capable of acting on fair terms of cooperation.

The Stability of Publicly Reasoned Political Morality

We want to say a final word about the nature of the stability that may be possible in a world that is populated by agents that are not only rational and rationally reasonable, but also moral. Moral agents in Rawls’s sense support the political conception of justice because, and to the extent that, it reflects a fair system of cooperation, and answers to other principles of political morality. In the Hadfield-Weingast model, such agents act collectively to punish those who transgress shared terms of cooperation as a means of confirming on an ongoing basis their commitment to the normative categories of the common logic. As a positive matter the movement from a purely positive logic to a system of shared reasons and decentralized enforcement that is understood to be normative by

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49Id., ch. 2.
participants. represents not only a transition in the nature of stability—towards stability for shared reasons—but also a deepening of the grounds of stability, and a more robust equilibrium. When agents’ preferences are transformed, such that they internalize moral (and not merely socially normative) standards and thereby come to desire to act fairly in a regime of reciprocal fairness, the costs and benefits of compliance and enforcement are similarly transformed. Voluntary compliance will then gain the further support from consciousness of joint participation in a moral community. This reduces the need for social punishment and the losses inevitably associated with detection and sanctioning. Even where social sanctioning continues to play a role—as it will in many instances—the costs of punishing transgressions is reduced, diminished by the positive benefit one derives from acting in a manner consistent with one’s endorsement of the public moral system. Note too that the costs of being punished rise when one is the object of moral disapproval: one is then conscious of others’ moral disapproval, and this is bound to be especially painful to normally reflective agents, as Smith observed. []

When one’s motives for compliance and also enforcement are rooted in one’s moral judgments and evaluative principles, and not only in one’s interest-based calculations, they are much more deeply rooted in and integral to our entire evaluative system: at a more profound level in the way we see ourselves and the world around us. This could of course have several downsides: flexibility might be reduced and intolerance could become more of a danger. Insofar as shared norms help mark the boundaries of particular groups, the moralization of norms may go
along with group mobilization for violence.\textsuperscript{50} In the face of deeply moralized religious intolerance, social observers extol the cooling effects of interest-based calculations.\textsuperscript{51} We simply have to admit that this is a conceivable danger. The presence in society of a great diversity of religious and philosophical world-views may be helpful insofar as individuals thereby recognize that their public moral commitments are not the whole of their beliefs about what is right and wrong, good and evil.

However, there are also features of the liberal democratic normative model that specifically help guard against moralized intolerance. First of all, there is the priority given to liberty: citizens in liberal democracies are frequently highly sensitive to improper restraints on expression, even when these are merely normative rather than legal. Moreover, it will be recalled that citizens who agree on a shared logic of coordination nevertheless continue to espouse a wide array of diverse personal evaluative systems, including differing religious and philosophical views. Both models (positive and moral) regard the shared system of reasons and principles as freestanding and complete on its own terms – as a distinctive autonomous and integral system – but also as open, in an appropriate way, to criticism and input from citizens’ differing idiosyncratic non-public systems of belief, that is, from complaints or objections arising from people’s religious views or ethical ideals. Full public deliberation must include moments when citizens assess the shared principles from the personal standpoint of their beliefs as a whole. Each

\textsuperscript{50} See the important account in Russell Hardin, \textit{One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict} (1995).

\textsuperscript{51} For a wonderful account, see Albert O. Hirschman, \textit{The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph} (1997).
of us must be able to assure ourselves that we can live, in good conscience, with the deliverances of an autonomous system of public reasons, even while we also affirm the autonomy and integrity of the public system of ideas.

This duality of normative commitments is an important critical check on any conclusions that are reached by the shared public logic. The wide diversity of normative communities – religious and other associations and groups of all sorts – will nurture critical perspectives that will frequently contend with one another and challenge reigning convictions. Given a healthy set of public institutions and political culture, it can be hoped that the arc of the history of such contests bends toward greater justice.\textsuperscript{52}

\section*{VI. Conclusion}

This long argument has tried to display some ways in which public reason can be seen to play an important and constitutive role in the path from a \textit{modus vivendi}, to a more robust form of stability for the right reasons. The Hadfield-Weingast model argues that purely self-interested rational agents engaged in various forms of social cooperation will develop the institution of a neutral common logic that helps them to coordinate the enforcement of norms that promote their individual well-being. Self-interested but enlightened agents who can see beyond the immediate present can recognize the value of stable forms of cooperation guided by the rule of law supplemented by a shared logic of reasons and principles that all can share as equals while differing about their personal evaluative standards or conceptions of the good.

\textsuperscript{52}To borrow from a valuable essay by Joshua Cohen, see \textit{The Arc of History, and other Essays} (2010).
A shared system of public reasons thus constitutes a shared fund of common meanings that agents engaged in cooperation can express to one another to signal their mutual commitment to cooperation on shared mutually intelligible terms. Shared, public reasons solve a problem of mutual assurance as a matter of common knowledge, making it rational for agents to participate in joint enforcement. This seems to us very much the sort of work that public reason understood as a public morality also performs, save that the agents now share a morally evaluative language of fair cooperation. The addition of this normative dimension makes sense from a positive standpoint: now participants in social cooperation have available a richer and more powerful set of categories for evaluating one another’s, and one’s own, conduct and expressing either approval or disapproval. Our capacity to mutually assess and sanction and reward is thereby deepened, and the bonds of social cooperation ought thereby to be strengthened.

Without collapsing the categorical difference between positive and normative analysis, we think these two perspectives prove to be mutually complementary here. Positive analysis strengthens the case for public reason understood in normative terms. And the development of standards of moral assessment makes sense from a positive point of view.

Postscript: Public Reasons and the Politics of Rights and Political Inclusion

Cooperative moral virtues might develop out of more fully self-interested cooperative relations in the ways described above: as devices for stabilizing cooperation by signaling good performance and bad, and generating (via...
reputation) public knowledge of one another’s fitness for cooperative relations. It is helpful to have a “code of good conduct,” and if the point of that is to facilitate mutually agreeable cooperation the code needs to be common knowledge and it needs to be regarded by the community as normative, that is, as generating reasons for action and as providing a basis for praise or criticism.

Equal rights enshrined in law seem well-designed to play a central role in the politics that emerges from practices of reciprocity and public reason amidst diversity. A bill of rights or a schedule of legal rights express in clear and vivid terms the fundamental interests of individuals that political institutions must secure for all as a condition of being regarded as legitimate or minimally acceptable. A system of rights answer to all of the positive criteria that the positive model of Hadfield and Weingast specify for a rule of law system: generality, public accessibility, authoritative stewardship, openness to input from individuals, etc. Rights are, moreover, among the features of a legal system of the greatest interest to individuals. As Ronald Dworkin suggested, they have the character of “trump cards” that, when invoked in politics, have a uniquely urgent, peremptory quality. Considerations of mere interests and the politics of bargaining and log-rolling are required to give way in favor of the more principled considerations designated by rights. By codifying in clear and simple language the equal and fundamental entitlements of each and every citizen, rights provide a shared account of the paramount privileges of membership in a political community.

Rights often have a unique legibility in political systems. Declarations of rights put people on notice as to which claims they can demand against
governments and one another. Protecting and securing citizens’ rights is a fundamental task of government: a top priority, and not an option or merely one goal to be weighed against others (except in situations of crisis or extraordinary threat). But rights are also central features of the reciprocal expectations that we have of one another. All rights-holders have reason to raise alarms when political institutions or private associations threaten rights, or that at least is the hope. Where rights can be regarded as secure against the tides of change, people will have an incentive to adjust their plans and purposes – indeed their beliefs as a whole – to incorporate the anchors against uncertainty furnished by rights.

Rights provide highly visible and salient markers of our equal standing and status: when they are secure, it means that each of us can demand certain basic forms of decent treatment as equals. Their violation is a cause for general alarm. Each of us is expected to be, and has an interest in being, alert to rights violations. Rights protected by politically independent courts and, increasingly, international institutions, are central features of our public morality that work as accessible, visible, easily recalled markers of everyone’s basic claims against state and society, including democratically organized legislatures; they furnish common knowledge of the terms of all citizens equal standing. The wide public recognition of rights should help enlist citizens’ voluntary cooperation in the shared enterprise of politics.

Rights seem essential to democracy on account of their role in securing each citizen’s equal status and dignity. They do not simply shape and bound political power, they create a democratic social world, as Joel Feinberg nicely elaborates:

Legal claim-rights are indispensably valuable possessions. A world without claim-rights, no matter how full of benevolence and
devotion to duty, would suffer an immense moral impoverishment. Persons would no longer hope for decent treatment from others on the ground of desert or rightful claim. ...

A claim right, on the other hand, can be urged, pressed, or rightly demanded against other persons. In appropriate circumstances the right-holder can “urgently, peremptorily, or insistently” call for rights, or assert them authoritatively, confidently, unabashedly. Rights are not mere gifts or favors, motivated by love or pity, for which gratitude is the sole fitting response. A right is something that can be demanded or insisted upon without embarrassment or shame. When that to which one as a right is not forthcoming, the appropriate reaction is indignation; when it is duly given there is no reason for gratitude, since it is simply one’s own due that one received. A world with claim-rights is one in which all persons, as actual or potential claimants, are dignified in the view of others. No amount of love and compassion, or obedience to higher authority, or noblesse oblige, can substitute for those values.53

The US Constitution originally did not contain a Bill of Rights. James Madison thought declarations of rights were “mere parchment barriers”: the real security for rights was to be found in limitations on national power and the countervailing power of rivalrous institutions in a system of divided powers. Nevertheless, in response to an appeal by Thomas Jefferson and the complaints of Antifederalists, Madison conceded that declarations of rights could have important educative and stabilizing effects: “The political truths declared in that solemn manner acquire by degrees the character of fundamental maxims of free Government, and as they become incorporated with the national sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and passion.”54

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53 Joel Feinberg, 58-59, Social Philosophy (1973); and see the excellent discussion in Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and Foreign Policy (1980), chapter 1.
54 Letter to Thomas Jefferson, October 17, 1788; accessed on line http://www.constitution.org/jm/17881017_bor.htm
The great historical role of rights, including human rights, has been in extending and solidifying the equal basic standing of individuals in politics. But, equally obviously, the rhetorical power of rights and their extension has not been shaped only by the logic of interests. True, the practical need for coordination with sufficient numbers of others pushes in the direction of generality in law for the sake of fostering greater inclusion or “buy-in”: we need to enlist a sufficient number of our fellows. But that logic, based on mutual advantage, has a limit: at some point, marginal groups are too insignificant and inconsequential for their willing participation to matter from the standpoint of effective cooperation. If the severely handicapped, for example, are to be treated with dignity and provided with assistance in leading decent lives, it is unlikely to be the consequence of the logic of interests and mutual advantage. It will need the support of moral judgments and sentiments concerning essential human dignity and the duty of the relatively well-endowed to assist those disadvantaged by the natural lottery.

The public moral logic built on the conception of citizens as free and equal rights holders provides independent moral resources that have proven capable of tremendous growth. The rights of free and equal citizens are powerful components of political morality precisely because of their simplicity and broad appeal, and the fact that their abstraction permits extension to new circumstances, albeit, not without contestation.