Direct Democracy and Public Choice

Elizabeth Garrett*
Public choice, with its focus on interest groups, relationships among institutions, and the importance of procedures and institutions in shaping policies, has been a significant influence on the literature studying direct democracy. Direct democracy encompasses two methods of providing voters with direct lawmaking authority – the initiative and the referendum – as well as a third method of directly influencing lawmakers outside of the regular electoral process – the recall. Twenty-seven states provide for the initiative, the popular referendum or both; and the legislative referendum is required in every state for adoption of constitutional amendments. When one considers that about half of the nation’s cities also provide for some form of direct democracy, it is not surprising to find that 70 percent of Americans live in a state or city or both that allows them access to direct democracy. This chapter will discuss the contributions of public choice to our understanding of direct democracy in three areas: 1) the role of organized interest groups and the influence of money; 2) the ability of citizens to vote competently on initiatives and therefore enact policies that align with their preferences; and 3) the strategic behavior of political actors in a hybrid democracy where initiatives can shape candidate elections and where the successful implementation of direct democracy depends on the actions of often hostile elected and public officials.
Direct democracy encompasses two methods of providing voters with direct lawmaking authority – the initiative and the referendum – as well as a third method of directly influencing lawmakers outside of the regular electoral process – the recall. The initiative allows a certain percentage of the electorate to petition to place a statute or constitutional amendment on the ballot. With the direct initiative, the proposed statute or constitutional amendment is placed on the ballot automatically once proponents gather the required number of signatures. With the less common indirect initiative, the proposal is submitted to the legislature first so that lawmakers have an opportunity to pass the proposed law or amendment before the people vote. If the legislature fails to pass it, or adopts a significantly changed version, then the proposal is put before the people for a vote. The referendum allows the people to intervene after the legislature has acted on a proposal; in this process, voters are asked to approve or disapprove a law or constitutional amendment that the legislature has already passed. The popular referendum, like the initiative, allows the people to trigger popular consideration of an enactment through a petition drive. In the more common legislative referendum, the legislature places before the electorate a proposed law or constitutional amendment for their approval or disapproval. State constitutions may require a referendum on constitutional amendments or certain bond proposals before they can go into effect. Finally, the recall allows the people to vote on whether an elected official can continue her service until the next regular election. Again, a petition drive is the method used to trigger a recall. The recall is much more common on the local level than on the state level; fewer than one-third of the states allow for the recall of state-level public officials (Cronin 1989).

In the United States, direct democracy is available only on the state and local levels. The mechanisms of direct democracy date back to 1898 when South Dakota amended its state constitution to include the initiative and popular referendum. Historically, support for direct democracy is associated with the progressive and populist movements at the turn of the 20th Century. It stemmed from these reformers’ view that legislatures were controlled by political machines and business interests, such as the railroad companies, mining interests and public utilities, and therefore legislators were not appropriately responsive to the will of the majority (Cronin 1989; Magleby 1984). Progressives sought a way for the people to circumvent these interests and through popular votes to directly adopt certain substantive policies as well as government reforms, such as the direct primary, direct election of U.S. senators, and nonpartisan elections. Smith and Fridkin (2008) have found that states with greater interparty

*Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, Political Science and Policy, Planning and Development, University of Southern California; Co-Director of the USC/Caltech Center for the Study of Law and Politics. I appreciate helpful comments of Dan Farber, John Ferejohn, Clay Gillette, Andrei Marmor, Ken Miller, Anne Joseph O’Connell, Dan Smith, and participants at the Searle Law and Political Economy Workshop at Northwestern Law School and the Colloquium on Law, Economics and Politics at NYU Law School, and the excellent research assistance of David Lourie.
legislative competition and weaker party organizations were more likely to adopt the initiative process, which was typically passed as a constitutional amendment put on the ballot by the legislature. They suggest that relatively strong minority parties used direct democracy as a way to dilute the institutional power of majority parties with weaker organizational structures; in addition, reform-minded governors in this era often led the push for the initiative (p. 345).

Twenty-seven states provide for the initiative, the popular referendum or both (Waters 2003, p. 12); and the legislative referendum is required in every state except Delaware for adoption of constitutional amendments. When one considers that about half of the nation’s cities also provide for some form of direct democracy, it is not surprising to find that 70 percent of Americans live in a state or city or both that allows them access to direct democracy (Matsusaka 2004, p. 1). At the state level, 60 percent of the initiative activity takes place in six states: Arizona, California, Colorado, North Dakota, Oregon and Washington (Waters 2003, p. 7). From 1904, when the first statewide initiative appeared on Oregon’s ballot, through 2007, there have been 2,236 statewide initiatives, and 908 (41 percent) of these passed (Initiative and Referendum Institute 2008). Since the success of California’s Proposition 13 that cut property taxes in 1978, the use of the initiative has increased substantially; more initiatives were proposed and passed in the 1990s than ever before, and the first decade of the 21st Century is likely to see comparable activity. The use of the direct constitutional initiative has increased much more substantially than the use of the direct statutory initiative during this time, within the sixteen states that offer both forms of lawmaking (Krislov and Katz 2008, p. 307).

The increasing use of direct democracy at the state level since Proposition 13 has increased the scholarly attention to this form of governance. Public choice has been particularly influential because of its concern with agency problems in the relationship between elected officials and voters, and its awareness of the possibility that relatively small, organized groups can unduly sway legislative outcomes. The initiative process offers a way for voters/principals to policy their wayward legislative agents. Moreover, public choice scholars have long focused on the role of interest groups in policymaking, relationships among governance institutions, and the importance of procedures and institutions in shaping policies – all issues relevant to the study of direct democracy. Insights from public choice demonstrate that the initiative process cannot be assessed meaningfully in isolation; rather, it must be studied as it interacts with representative institutions. Moreover, legislators and the traditional legislative process are profoundly affected by the presence of robust direct democracy. Therefore, the appropriate frame for any analysis of direct democracy is that of ‘hybrid democracy’ (Garrett 2005a). The notion of hybrid democracy – democracy that is neither wholly representative nor wholly direct, but a mixture of the two – captures the complex combination of direct and

1 Use of referendums is also on the rise worldwide; they have been held recently on every continent except Antarctica (DuVivier 2006). The United States is one of the few major democracies never to have held a national referendum.
representative institutions at the state and local levels, which also influences national politics.2

The influence of public choice can be seen as well in the less negative view of the initiative process in recent scholarship. Initially, scholars were often extremely critical of direct democracy, arguing that it allowed the majority to tyrannize minority groups and was almost certain to lead to suboptimal policy outcomes (see, for example, Eule 1990; Linde 1994; Magleby 1984). They affirmed the view of Madison in Federalist #10 that direct democracy was not only unworkable on a large scale, but also undesirable because it empowered majority factions swayed by prejudice and emotion to oppress unpopular minorities. Public choice literature, with its emphasis on the power of minority factions, highlights the limitations of representative institutions that may be more solicitous of the interests of the powerful and the organized than of the public welfare. Recent scholarship realistically contrasts representative bodies and the initiative process, analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of both. The conclusions do not necessarily point in the direction of eliminating direct democracy. Instead, the lens of hybrid democracy suggests that both forms of governance could interact in positive or negative ways – and that reforms might be possible that would strengthen both parts of our hybrid system.

This chapter will discuss the contributions of public choice to our understanding of direct democracy in three areas: 1) the role of organized interest groups and the influence of money; 2) the ability of citizens to vote competently on initiatives and therefore enact policies that align with their preferences; and 3) the strategic behavior of political actors in a hybrid democracy in which initiatives can shape candidate elections and the successful implementation of direct democracy usually depends on the actions of often hostile elected and public officials. Much of the work discussed here is theoretical analysis by public choice scholars. Empirical work remains in the early stages, but it represents one of the most promising avenues for future study from the political economy perspective. Throughout this chapter, I will primarily discuss the direct initiative process at the state level, which tends to be the institution of direct democracy mainly studied in the United States.

I. Interest groups and the role of money

Although the progressive and populist reformers responsible for adoption of direct democracy were active long before public choice became influential in the academy, both groups offer similar diagnoses of the problems hindering legislatures from passing public-regarding legislation. Both point to the disproportionate influence of relatively small, organized and wealthy special interests on the policy choices made by legislators. While they may not have articulated the elegant theory of Mancur Olson (1965) to explain why such interest groups could effectively exercise clout in the legislative branch, proponents of direct democracy at the turn of the last century believed that state

---

2 In their comparative analysis, Mendelsohn and Parkin (2001) use the term ‘referendum democracy’ to capture this idea. The reality that world wide ‘referendums … [are] intricately intertwined with the institutions and agents of representative democracy,’ including being used by ‘competing elites (including elected representatives) … to further their own agendas’ (p. 4).
legislators, together with party bosses, were systematically favoring well-heeled corporate interests such as the railroads and mining companies. Their solution was to establish governance mechanisms that they believed only majorities could use effectively. They thought that the initiative, referendum and recall allowed ordinary citizens to bypass a legislature beholden to special interests, forcefully reminding lawmakers of the will of the majority outside the regular election cycle.

Certainly, the progressive and populist advocates for direct democracy were not the first public choice theorists, nor would they have subscribed wholeheartedly to the conclusions many public choice scholars reach about the political process. For example, these reformers supported direct democracy as a way not just to open up the political process to greater majoritarian influence, but also to enable voters to educate themselves on policy and encourage them to become more civically engaged (Smith and Tolbert 2004, p. xvi). In contrast, public choice scholarship leads us to be skeptical of claims that adopting the initiative will motivate voters to spend substantial time trying to influence political outcomes, given the small likelihood that their particular contribution will matter to any outcome and the reality that any benefits of political action will be shared widely, including by those who free-ride on the activist’s costly effort.

This section focuses on the concern shared by the early proponents of direct democracy and public choice scholars: the influence of relatively small interest groups in the political process. First, I will discuss scholarship that suggests the initiative process succeeds in influencing the legislative process so that policy outcomes are closer to the preferences of the majority. Second, I will turn to the flip side of hybrid democracy and assess the role of organized interest groups in using the methods of direct democracy. Although organized groups continue to play a disproportionately influential role in the initiative process, the kind of group that can take advantage of this process is likely different from the kind of group that succeeds in achieving its objectives through traditional legislation. Finally, I will address a related aspect of direct democracy: the role of money in the initiative process.

A. Empowering majorities through direct democracy

One of the main focuses of scholarly attention has been to provide theoretical frameworks to predict whether the presence of the initiative affects policy outcomes – adopted through both direct democracy and the traditional lawmaking process – so they are more closely aligned to the preferences of the majority. This preoccupation with the question of whether the initiative benefits the many or the few, to use Matsusaka’s phrasing (2004), is not surprising because empowering the majority against special interests was the primary objective of those who advocated for direct democracy in the states. Generally, the literature predicts that direct democracy will influence policy outcomes toward the preferences of the majority, and empirical studies support that conclusion. The general tendency toward majoritarian outcomes depends on certain conditions, however, such as the representativeness of the people who turn out to vote in an initiative race and the ability of voters to cast their ballots competently, that is, in line with their preferences. In addition, there are significant limits on the power of the median voter in direct democracy, most notably by the ability of proposers of initiatives...
to make take-it-or-leave-it offers (Romer and Rosenthal 1978) that voters may prefer to
the status quo but that do not represent their preferred policy outcomes.3

Using game theory, Gerber (1996) explains why the possibility of the initiative
process not only produces direct legislation that aligns with the preferences of the
majority (or, more precisely, the median voter), but also induces legislators to move
policy outcomes closer to the will of the majority. The idea is intuitively appealing:
strategic legislators, knowing that an initiative could force policy to a position favored by
a majority of voters but far from their own preferences, will move policy somewhat
closer to that favored by the median voter in order to head off the initiative. The policy
they choose will not be as extreme as reformers favor, but it will be close enough to the
median voter’s preference to eliminate the threat of direct democracy. Thus, the mere
possibility of an initiative will influence policy outcomes adopted through the traditional
legislative process without the need for an actual popular vote. As Gerber concludes, the
initiative process therefore acts as a constraint on legislative actors to shape their
behavior so that outcomes are closer to voters’ preferences – it is a mechanism to reduce
principal-agent slack.

Divergence between the principals (voters) and their agent-lawmakers is likely for
various reasons. First, voters face substantial monitoring costs, and they may not be able
effectively to sanction wayward lawmakers, depending on the amount of competition in a
particular race. Second, candidates are ‘bundles’ of issues, so a voter might decide to
support a candidate because, on balance, her positions more closely track the voter’s
preferences even though the lawmaker’s position on a particular issue is far from the
voter’s (Besley and Coate 2000). The initiative process, which allows citizens to separate
out individual policies and threaten to vote on them individually, provides a mechanism
to reduce principal-agent slack on a few issues. More empirical work is required to
identify those issues that are not likely to play a determinative role in a candidate election
but which will spark the possibility of an initiative. Besley and Coate suggest such issues
are likely to be ones salient only to a minority of voters, perhaps the political elite or a
wealthy interest group, who can provide crucial campaign support to a candidate who
shares their views, but who cannot prevail in an initiative fight (p. 21). These issues will
differ from election to election, but could include subjects like bilingual education, gun
control regulations, and immigration issues – all the subject of recent initiatives in many
states. Third, lawmakers’ decisions and initiative outcomes may diverge because they
reflect the preferences of different groups of people. Although outcomes on ballot
measures reflect the preferences of the median voter (at least of the group that turns out to
vote in that election), lawmakers may take account of the preferences of residents in their
districts, a group that includes people who voted in the last election and people who may
come to vote in the future. Although they will certainly weigh more heavily the views of those
who reliably go to the polls to vote, representatives have incentives also to consider the
preferences of their constituents more generally.

---

3 The problem of sequential elimination agendas caused by the structure of the initiative process may also
lead to a policy equilibrium that the majority does not favor in the aggregate even if most voters supported
each individual policy decision (Kousser and McCubbins 2005). This problem is discussed in Part II.B.
The influence on the legislature from the presence of an initiative process is the “indirect” influence of direct democracy, and it underscores the need for the perspective of hybrid democracy. Indeed, game theory suggests that if legislators and initiative proponents have full information about voter preferences, no direct legislation will be necessary because legislators will always move policy outcomes to the point at which majority of voters will be satisfied and therefore unwilling to pass an initiative on the topic. Lawmakers know that the initiative process is costly, as will be described in more detail below, and they take account of those costs in determining how far to move policy toward the preference of the median voter. Of course, initiatives appear in the real world, sometimes frequently, suggesting that political actors do not have full information and may make mistakes in predicting the reaction of policy entrepreneurs who are willing to bankroll an initiative campaign or of the voters who will turn out to vote on the proposal. Even with full information, lawmakers may allow certain issues to be decided by popular vote because they wish to avoid the responsibility for making a controversial decision. Moreover, in most states, certain decisions, such as issuing bonds, have to be ratified or made initially by the people.

Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) use a theoretical approach similar to Gerber’s, but they introduce the assumption that legislators may be uncertain about voter preferences. Given uncertainty, under some conditions, the presence of an initiative process may actually result in legislatures’ enacting policies further from the median voter’s preference than would be the case in the absence of direct democracy. When the legislator is uncertain about voters’ preferences, a group with extreme views may be able to successfully use the threat of an initiative to force legislative outcomes closer to its preferences – but even further from the median voter’s ideal point than the status quo. This might be more likely, for example, in states like California that allow initiatives to appear on primary or special election ballots (Waters 2003, p. 24); the turnout at such elections may not accurately represent the overall electorate. Under these conditions, “when moderate interest groups make the proposals, the voters are better off, but voters can be made worse off when extreme interest groups appear” (p. 415). The Matsusaka/McCarty model leads to the conclusion that conditions under which the initiative makes voters worse off are probably less frequently present than the conditions under which voters benefit. But the authors underscore that the political environment – including uncertainty, the extent of the principal/agent slack between voters and their representatives, and the extent of divergence among the preferences of lawmakers, voters and interest groups – matters to the outcome.

Perhaps the most significant constraint on the ability of voters to move policy to the point preferred by the median voter even in a hybrid democracy is the power of the initiative proposer to determine what questions are placed on the ballot and the content of the proposals. The direct initiative, which in most states cannot be amended or changed between the time signatures are gathered and the vote occurs, is essentially a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Such offers significantly empower the agenda-setter in policy making (Romer and Rosenthal 1978). As long as the median voter views the proposed initiative as an improvement over the status quo, she will vote for the ballot measure, even if it is not entirely congruent with her policy preferences. Moreover, if the status quo diverges substantially from the preferences of the median voter, then the proponents of the
initiative need to make the voters only slightly better off – while possibly making themselves significantly better off – to succeed at the polls. As I will discuss further in Part I.C., certain organized groups with access to financial resources are virtually assured ballot access; thus, they have the means to take advantage of the power of take-it-or-leave-it offers, exerting disproportionate influence over the subject matter and content of ballot measures.

Understanding that an initiative process has both direct and indirect effects, influencing policy outcomes even when an initiative is not actually enacted but is only threatened, shapes the empirical work testing whether outcomes in initiative states differ systematically from outcomes in states without a robust initiative process. Researchers must compare all legislation – direct and traditional – between initiative states and non-initiative states to determine whether the initiative process leads to different outcomes.

1. Fiscal and tax policies

Not surprisingly given the influence of public choice, one area of focus for such studies is state fiscal policies. Public choice scholars have long argued that relatively small, organized groups have substantial influence over tax and spending decisions of legislatures, which leads to greater spending and either higher taxes or larger deficits (or both) than the majority of voters would prefer (see, for example, Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Niskanen 1971). Matsusaka (2004) provides the most extensive empirical test of whether direct democracy exerts influence over state fiscal decisions and, if so, whether that influence is in the direction of the majority’s preferences or of some other organized, relatively small interest groups that use the initiative to their advantage. Using data from the states and several large cities in a cross-sectional analysis, Matsusaka finds that the presence of the initiative process has led to three systemic effects on fiscal policy in the last three decades of the twentieth century: lower overall spending by state and local governments; decentralization as spending has shifted away from state government control and toward local governments; and a reduction of broad-based taxes with an increased use of user fees and charges (Chapter 3). Using opinion poll data, he demonstrates that these changes correspond to the preferences of a majority of the public, concluding that the initiative process favors majoritarian outcomes with respect to tax and spending decisions.

Some empirical work, discussed further in Section III.B., assesses differences in the design of political institutions; these studies are motivated by the suspicion that a particularly powerful special interest in the traditional legislative process is the legislators themselves who favor political institutions which increase the possibility of their continued reelection. A subset of these studies target differences among features of institutional design primarily aimed to constrain lawmakers in their spending and taxing decisions. Tolbert (1998) finds that states with initiatives are significantly more likely to have tax and expenditure limits and supermajority voting rules for tax increases than non-initiative states. Matsusaka’s analysis of opinion poll data (2004) suggests that such fiscal limitations reflect majority preferences about the level of spending and taxation and the structure of taxation; however, the evidence that these institutions succeed in reducing spending independently of legislative will to do so is mixed (compare Kousser, McCubbins and Rozga 2008 (little effect of tax and expenditure limits on spending) with
Knight 2000 (significant reduction in state taxes from supermajority voting requirements)).

2. **Other policies**

Other empirical work has studied particular social policies, and again scholars have found that the outcomes are closer to the preferences of the median voter in states with direct democracy than in states without such institutions. For example, Gerber (1999) obtains this result with respect to death penalty laws and parental consent for abortion laws (pp. 122-35); and Matsusaka (2007a) finds the laws concerning seven policy issues, including various abortion laws, death penalty laws, English-only laws, job discrimination laws and same-sex marriage laws, are different in initiative and non-initiative states, with the former having policies closer to the outcomes favored by a majority. When he analyzes these issues, along with a few others like term limits and the estate tax, he finds that policies in states with the initiative process were 17 to 19 percent more likely to converge with majoritarian preferences than policies in states without direct democracy (Matsusaka 2007b).

These conclusions with respect to social issues, some which have implications for racial and ethnic minority groups, women, and gays and lesbians, bring up the question that primarily concerned legal scholars writing about direct democracy before the current rigorous analysis provided by those working from a political economy perspective (see, for example, Bell 1978). Namely, the concern raised is whether these policies that appear to more closely reflect the preferences of the majority inappropriately burden the rights of minorities.

3. **Policies affecting ethnic, racial and other minority groups**

How do we know when vindicating the will of the majority becomes oppressing the rights of the minority? One answer is that judicial review is available with respect to direct legislation, just as it is with respect to traditional legislation, some of which may be affected by the presence of direct democracy. Just as legislators may sometimes pass legislation that violates the equal protection or due process guarantees of the Constitution, so can the people. In those cases, courts have the power to invalidate all or part of the statute or state constitutional provision that ignores constitutional protections. The frequency of judicial invalidation of direct legislation suggests that judges are willing to exercise their power of judicial review in this arena, notwithstanding demonstrated popular support for the policy. Between 1960 and 1999, for example, more than half (52 percent) of 163 statewide initiatives in California, Oregon, Washington, and Colorado approved by voters were challenged in court after the election, and courts nullified more than half (55 percent) of the challenged measures in part or in their entirety, for a total invalidation rate of 28 percent (Miller 2005, pp. 155-56). Not all of these decisions were based on violations of federal constitutional guarantees; a significant number invalidated the initiatives because they violated state constitutional requirements for initiative lawmaking, such as the single subject requirement (discussed below in Part II.B.) (Miller 2009, Chap. 4).
Even with active judicial review, direct democracy would be open to criticism if the evidence suggested a systematic tendency to enact unacceptably oppressive laws relative to the legislative process. One reason Madison and the founders favored representative democracy characterized by political institutions designed to make enacting laws difficult was to guard against the tyranny of the majority. The vetogates throughout the legislative process – including committees, bicameral consideration, rules governing debate and amendment, and some supermajoritarian voting requirements – are designed to slow legislation and even to block enactment of the vast majority of proposed bills. In practice, they also operate to empower economic or social minority groups to protect their interests through strategic use of the vetogates to block proposals that would affect them negatively. The initiative process lacks these vetogates; thus, it allows less filtering of the immediate desires of the majority, potentially exposing minorities to discriminatory and unfair legislation that would never survive the legislative process.

The evidence on this issue is mixed. One of the first studies found that, of all ballot measures discriminating against minority groups, over three-fourths of them passed, a figure well above the passage rate for initiatives generally (Gamble 1997). It may be the case, however, that different types of minority groups have different experiences with direct democracy. For example, a study focusing on all initiatives in California, not just those that were explicitly aimed at racial minorities, demonstrates that the majority of Latino, Asian American and African American voters were on the winning side of the vote, although Latinos were less likely to vote for the winning side than the other two racial groups (Hajnal, Gerber and Louch 2002). This study also determines that the few initiatives in California that were targeted at particular minority groups were more likely to aim at Latinos than at blacks or Asian Americans.

Donovan and Bowler’s study (1998) of anti-gay and anti-lesbian initiatives finds a much lower passage rate than Gamble did with respect to initiatives limiting minority rights generally; they determined that only 18 percent with anti-minority policy outcomes were enacted on the state and local level between 1972 and 1996 (p. 1022). This rate is also significantly lower than the passage rate for all initiatives. Moreover, virtually all of the few initiatives that have passed and can be characterized as anti-minority have been invalidated by courts (Donovan and Bowler 2004, p. 140). A more recent study of initiatives involving gay and lesbian civil rights compares both representative and direct democracy and finds that this minority group fares better in representative institutions than in popular votes (Haider-Markel, Querze & Lindaman 2007). This study also draws into question the results of Donovan and Bowler (1998) with respect to the initiative process, concluding instead that 71 percent of 143 ballot measures affecting gays and lesbians, between 1972 and 2005, resulted in losses of their civil rights.

Other scholarship has moved beyond policy outcomes to examine the effect of direct democracy on the larger political climate affecting civil rights. Wenzel, Donovan and Bowler (1998) examine how direct democracy, and the campaigns surrounding anti-minority initiatives, may affect public opinion about those groups. Using data about citizens’ views before and after initiatives, they conclude that public opinion becomes less tolerant toward racial minorities, particularly the opinions of Republican voters toward immigrants. These effects on the political environment cannot be undone by
judicial review striking down anti-minority initiatives that run afoul of constitutional protections. On the other hand, some have argued that one consequence of the use of initiatives in California to target racial groups in the 1990s was a voter backlash against the Republican Party, which was seen as the main force behind that strategy (Bowler, Segura and Nicholson 2006; see also Smith and Tolbert 2007, pp. 426-29). This reaction benefited the Democratic Party, and therefore may have enhanced the ability of the legislature to enact policies that tend to be supported by the groups targeted by the initiatives.

One limitation of the studies is that most assess the influence of initiatives solely through the passage rate of the initiatives themselves and thus do not also take account of policies enacted by the legislature. This narrow focus limits the results in at least two ways. First, ‘[i]f the threat of direct legislation makes legislators more responsive to anti-minority views in the population, then analyzing only direct effects will understate the anti-minority potential of direct legislation institutions’ (Gerber and Hug 1999, p. 7). Second, ‘[i]f votes on anti-minority direct legislation lead legislators to compensate affected minorities by passing more protective legislation, then analyzing only direct effects will overstate the anti-minority potential of direct legislation institutions’ (ibid). In short, scholars must include the interactions among government institutions to obtain a full sense of the interplay between initiatives and minority rights. In short, the consequences for minority groups of a robust initiative process as part of the institutions of governance are complicated and mixed, and they require further study by public choice scholars employing a sophisticated awareness of interest group interaction and voter behavior.

B. Interest groups that succeed in the initiative process

One of the key contributions of public choice scholarship is the importance of collective action in shaping policy outcomes. Although this insight was hardly original, public choice theorists have developed a rich literature describing the characteristics of groups likely to exert policy-making influence. Just as in the traditional legislative realm, organized groups are likely to have a substantial effect on the outcomes adopted as a result of the initiative process. Organization and money are crucial to petition drives, for example, as well as to successful campaigns. The key question is whether different sorts of interest groups from those with clout in the legislature can harness the power of the initiative process, and whether those groups are more likely to reflect most voters’ preferences. In that case, the majority is empowered by the presence of direct democracy because the process strengthens interest groups that better represent them, and perhaps because the initiative encourages the formation of groups reflecting broader-based concerns than the groups that tend to dominate the traditional legislative arena.

Gerber (1999) has produced the most systematic scholarship identifying the kinds of interest groups that wield the power of direct democracy most effectively to adopt new policy either directly through popular lawmaking or indirectly by pressuring lawmakers. Gerber views interest groups as choosing among various methods of influence and selecting those that promise them the greatest chance of achieving their policy objectives. Different kinds of groups have different kinds of monetary and human resources, and they will use their assets to intervene in the policy process in ways most likely to
maximize their influence. Economic groups – like business interests and trade associations – have substantial monetary resources but often relatively restricted membership bases. In contrast, citizen groups – like broad-based ideological groups and, in Gerber’s classification system, labor unions – have substantial human resources and in some instances monetary resources. With sufficient financial resources, broad-based citizen groups can effectively use the initiative process to change policy so that it is closer to their preferences either through actually passing direct legislation or credibly threatening to do so. Economic interests are better suited to deploying their substantial financial resources to block change proposed through the initiative and therefore to preserve the status quo. Although occasionally economic interests will try to use the initiative process to enact change they favor when they identify an issue that will also resonate with substantial numbers of voters, they should fare systematically less well in the realm of direct democracy than citizen groups will. Although some have questioned Gerber’s classification of groups (see, for example, Smith 2004, p. 104), her conclusions that interest groups choose to pursue policies through the governance institutions that play to their strengths and that we should expect certain types of groups to succeed more often in the initiative process and others to succeed more often in the legislature are persuasive.

Gerber’s empirical work supports these conclusions. Her survey of six hundred interest groups reveals that interest groups rationally select mechanisms to influence policy depending on which are best matched to their characteristics. The groups empowered by direct democracy may be systematically different from those that can exert clout in the traditional legislative realm. Citizen groups rely more frequently on direct democracy to change policy (Chapter 5). If a citizen group finds its objectives stymied in the legislature because a well-heeled economic group has effectively bottled up a vetogate, then that group in an initiative state can take advantage of the possibilities of hybrid democracy by turning to direct democracy to adopt policy. This change in strategy may not be available to an economic group that often cannot rely on the support of the voters if it is forced to resort to the polls. Although the citizen group must also command sufficient financial resources to overcome hurdles to direct legislation like signature gathering, its ability to propose a policy that resonates with the majority of voters and its command over substantial human resources may allow it to succeed in a way that economic interests cannot. Her analysis of campaign spending by the various types of groups finds that ‘initiatives that received majority support from citizen interests passed at a significantly higher rate than those that received majority support from economic interests’ and that ‘the set of successful initiatives received a greater share of supporting contributions from citizen interests than from economic interests, whereas unsuccessful initiatives received a much larger share of supporting contributions from economic interests’ (pp. 119-20).

Not only can the presence of direct democracy provide certain groups greater leverage to influence policy, but the initiative process itself shapes interest groups. Hybrid democratic institutions lead to a different constellation of interest groups than do purely representative democratic institutions. One extension from Gerber’s work is to analyze whether the presence of the initiative actually increases the mobilization of citizen groups in states with robust mechanisms of direct democracy relative to states
without popular lawmaking. Boehmke (2002) has found that not only are citizen groups more active in initiative states, but such states also have a greater diversity of interest groups with more active citizen groups in the mix. ‘The numbers indicated that direct initiative provisions increase the proportion of citizen groups from 28% to 33% of a state’s total interest group population’ (p. 842). A change of this sort in the interest group environment will affect both parts of hybrid democracy, as the new groups are also able to exert influence in the legislature through mobilizing voters, shaping campaigns, and using the threat of direct legislation. After all, the strength of citizen groups – that their policy objectives are shared by many voters – will influence re-election-minded lawmakers if they believe the groups have influence over voter decisions in candidate elections as well as in initiative battles.

Moreover, interest group leaders understand that they can use initiatives to change the internal dynamics of their groups, as well as to affect the fates of competing interest groups. Citizens who become engaged with an issue in a petition drive or through involvement in a ballot measure campaign may stay involved with the interest group as it pursues other objectives on its agenda, or they may provide financial resources that can be spent by group leaders on other projects. Citizens living initiative states are more likely to contribute money to interest groups, but are not more inclined to contribute to political parties or candidates, than are citizens of non-initiative states (Smith and Tolbert 2004, p. 110).

C. The influence of money in the initiative process

Wherever interest groups are involved in politics, money can be found as well. And it can be found in substantial quantities in the initiative process: in 1998, $400 million was spent nationwide on ballot questions, compared to $326 million spent in the 2000 presidential campaign overall (Matsusaka 2005, p. 191). Fewer campaign laws restrict the flow of money to initiative campaigns, compared to candidate campaigns in which limitations on contributions are the norm. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the First Amendment forbids states from limiting the amount of money spent to support or to oppose a ballot measure and from restricting contributions to issue committees (Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981)). The Supreme Court has also ruled that states cannot prohibit advocates of a ballot measure from paying petition circulators (Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988)), although some lower courts have allowed states to prohibit compensating circulators on a per-signature basis (Gloger 2006). Initiative and referendum campaigns are primarily regulated through disclosure laws, and states vary with respect to the effectiveness of their laws in ensuring timely, full disclosure of the groups behind expenditures in direct democracy. The increasing involvement of candidates in ballot measure campaigns (see Part III.A.) may provide an opportunity to justify restrictions on campaign contributions, at least when applied to candidate-controlled issue committees, through the state interest in eliminating quid pro

---

4 See also Smith and Tolbert 2004, pp. 99-102 (also finding greater diversity of interest groups in states where there is more usage of the initiative process).
To accurately gauge the influence of money spent in direct democracy, it is important to focus on each of the two stages of an initiative campaign – the petition drive and the election campaign – because money has different effects depending on the stage.

1. Petition drives and ballot access

One substantial expense for ballot measure proponents is money spent to qualify a question for the ballot through signature gathering. In campaigns with little broadcast advertising, signature gathering is generally the largest campaign expense. For example, data from California reveal that in 65 percent of initiatives qualifying for the ballot between 1980 and 1988, proponents spent more during the qualifying stage than for any other aspect of the campaign (Donovan, Bowler, McCuan and Fernandez 1998, p. 97, citing Price 1988). Petition drives using paid circulators can cost $2-3 million in California, and some firms will offer money-back guarantees for a sufficient price (Gloger 2006; Garrett 1999, pp. 1851-53). Although some grassroots groups can still mount successful petition drives using volunteer circulators, many resort to paid workers for greater certainty of ballot access. Quite simply, money is a sufficient, though not yet necessary, condition for ballot access.

Although qualification for the ballot does not ensure that a proposal will be enacted, ballot access itself carries several advantages (Garrett and Gerber 2001). As I noted in Part I.A., wealthy groups and individuals can play the important role of agenda-setter in direct democracy – a role that public choice teaches provides a substantial advantage in policy formulation. A successful petition drive can draw the attention of the public and policymakers to an issue, thereby affecting the state and sometimes the national policy agendas. The public tends to pay more attention to issues when they are framed by the excitement of a contest. For example, term limits for state and federal legislators became a prominent issue in the 1990s because of the initiative process, and debates on other social issues like affirmative action and same-sex marriage have been fueled and shaped by initiative campaigns.

In addition, ballot access is a prerequisite to a vote, so unless a group can credibly demonstrate that it is likely to qualify the measure, the legislature will not feel much pressure to change the status quo. The surest way to success in gathering signatures, even for groups with substantial human resources, is money. This reality may suggest that only a subset of Gerber’s citizen groups – those that can afford to pay petition gatherers – will be able to play the bargaining game with the legislature and win. Further study differentiating among citizen groups on the basis of their access to some level of financial

---

5 This is the traditional state interest justifying campaign finance regulation in campaign elections. See *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (per curiam); *McConnell v. Federal Election Commission*, 540 U.S. 93, 150-52 (2003).
resources as well as grassroots support may shed further light on this question. Of course, grassroots support may translate into access to funding, especially as the Internet allows groups to raise significant money through small donations from many interested citizens (de Figueiredo and Garrett 2005). Sophisticated use of web-based fundraising, however, also demands expertise and financial commitment.

It is not only broad-based groups that can bargain with the legislature. Wealthy individuals or groups pushing an issue that will resonate with voters have the ability to influence policy through the threat of initiative. This occurred in 1998, when a group of Silicon Valley entrepreneurs spent $3.5 million to qualify a charter schools initiative and accumulated millions more to spend in a campaign (Garrett 1999, pp. 1859-61). The group agreed to pull the measure from the ballot if the legislature and Governor adopted a compromise proposal over the opposition of an interest group that is particularly influential in the legislative process – teachers’ unions. Given the entrepreneurs’ demonstrated ability to navigate through a petition drive, their access to the resources necessary to mount a formidable campaign, and their advocacy of an issue that was likely to garner voter approval, the compromise was enacted, and the initiative did not appear on the ballot. Interestingly, this process of negotiation ameliorated the take-it-or-leave-it nature of the initiative process, although these wealthy Californians still had the advantage of the agenda-setter in dictating the subject matter for the legislative compromise. Although the outcome on this particular issue probably reflected the preferences of the median voter, it is not necessarily the case that voters would have identified charter schools as the most pressing educational reform.

Reformers often decry the influence of money in ballot access, but the typical reform proposal – to increase the number of signatures required to put a measure on the ballot – would increase the power of well-heeled groups who could continue to pay the higher price of admission. A public choice perspective suggests that other reforms would be more likely to combat the problem directly. For example, Lowenstein (1999) has proposed reducing the number of signatures to qualify a measure, but then requiring that the petitions be located a certain public buildings, like fire stations, libraries, and schools, so that voters must travel to sign them. Although wealthy groups could still promise transportation to potential signers, only those who strongly supported placing the measure on the ballot would be likely to spend the time necessary to sign the petition. Alternatively, reforms could reduce the cost of obtaining signatures so that more groups, particularly those with grassroots appeal, could afford it. For example, if petitions could be signed on the Internet, then groups could use relatively inexpensive techniques to encourage voters to add their support to the virtual petition. If the logistical challenges of such a reform (for example, verification of the authenticity of the signature and other anti-fraud devices) can be overcome, then the number of signatures required for access should be substantially increased to ensure that only measures with significant support are presented to the voters on Election Day.

2. The initiative campaign

The second stage of the initiative process is the campaign itself, which begins during the petition drive and stretches to Election Day. Money also plays a role in the outcomes of ballot contests, but the picture here is more complicated. In an early influential study
inspired by public choice methods, Lowenstein (1982) found that between 1968 and 1980 in California, where spending levels exceeded $250,000 and one side had a two-to-one spending advantage, opposition committees defeated 90 percent of the measures they opposed, and proponents won 64 percent of the time. Other studies replicated these findings (Owens and Wade 1986, pp. 684-87; Magleby 1984, p. 147), leading to the conclusion that money was more effective in defeating initiatives than in passing them.

Recently, however, public choice scholarship has drawn these long-accepted conclusions into question. Stratmann (2006) focuses on the money spent for media advertisements, and, most crucially, he includes the endogeneity of spending in his analysis of initiative campaigns. Spending in initiatives campaigns is endogenous because a group supporting a measure that is not doing well will spend less, while a group sponsoring an initiative that is likely to succeed may spend more to ensure that victory. Previous studies had not considered this endogeneity, nor had they used the sort of detailed information regarding television advertising available to Stratmann. He concludes that both opposing and supporting campaign spending has a statistically significant impact on outcomes, with supporting expenditures having a larger marginal impact than spending by opponents (p. 798). It is clear that more work is required to fully understand the relationship between spending and electoral outcomes in direct democracy. For example, it may be that the timing of the expenditures affects outcomes; one could hypothesize that the ability to infuse money into an initiative campaign at a particularly crucial time, perhaps close to the election or in response to the other side’s spending, could be particularly influential.

Studies have also shown that who is spending the money may have as much to do with its effect as does the amount of funding, relative to the spending by the groups on the other side. Gerber’s analysis of different kinds of interest groups concludes that economic interests most effectively deploy their financial resources in the context of direct democracy to protect the status quo by defeating popular initiatives and referendums (Gerber 1999, pp. 101-20). Through substantial negative spending, economic groups can convince voters that the proposed policy change may have unexpected deleterious results and thus provoke a ‘defensive no’ vote as voters opt to keep the status quo that they know (Bowler and Donovan 1998, pp. 53-55). Indeed, ‘voters prefer to stick with policies whose consequences they have experienced, … rather than risk voting for a new initiative whose consequences may be very bad. Thus, spending vast sums of money to defeat an initiative may make voters sufficiently confused and uncertain that they vote against it’ (Lupia and Matsusaka 2004, p. 471). This result is consistent with the earlier studies by Lowenstein and others on the influence of spending by opponents in direct democracy.

Moreover, significant spending by certain economic groups in favor of a ballot measure may actually increase the chance that the initiative will be defeated. To test this, Garrett and Gerber (2001) study 63 statewide ballot measures in California and determine whether the spending was mainly from large contributions ($10,000 and higher), which tend to come from economic interests, or from money provided through smaller contributions, which they assume are more reflective of citizen interests. They find that the greater the share of large opposing contributions, the lower the support the ballot
question receives. Interestingly, although not statistically significant, the findings also suggest that ‘measures that receive a greater share of large supporting contributions are less successful than those that receive relatively more small contributions’ (p. 89). This conclusion supports the argument made by Bowler and Donovan (1998) that heavy, one-sided spending to support an initiative may actually cause voters to vote ‘no’ if the spending reveals that an unpopular economic group, such as a cigarette manufacturer, a gambling interest, or an insurance company, is behind the initiative (p. 147). Thus, disclosure of spending in an initiative campaign by groups with well-known reputations may provide information to voters that helps them cast their ballots competently.

II. Voters and direct democracy

The perspective of public choice has been necessary to move away from the idealized vision of the voter that motivated the progressive movement’s support of the initiative process and to develop a more realistic view of voters’ capabilities. Given the high cost of becoming informed about every issue presented on the ballot, it is unlikely that many voters will develop the knowledge to reach an informed judgment before they vote. Even a voter who is civically engaged with respect to one or two ballot measures is unlikely to have full information on all the questions and races on the ballot. Few voters will wade through the lengthy explanations provided in voter information pamphlets, which in some cities can run to more than 1,000 pages (Garrett and McCubbins 2008, pp. 55-56). One of the most influential insights from public choice is that, in light of information costs and the low probability of being influential in policy making, it would be irrational for voters to spend their time to become experts (Downs 1957). The conclusion, however, is not necessarily the pessimistic one that voters cannot vote in accordance with their preferences. Instead, public choice scholars have worked to understand the role of voting cues, or heuristics, in enabling voters to vote competently.

A second issue relating to voters is how the decisions they make are structured. Social choice theory teaches that decision making on one issue at a time, presented as a binary choice between each proposal and the status quo, may lead to irrational outcomes as a result of sequential elimination agendas (Kousser and McCubbins 2005). This structure may also lead to overall policy that the median voter does not support, even if each individual ballot measure outcome reflect her preferences. Reforms to respond to this decision making pathology are less straightforward than those empowering voters to vote competently with limited information, but they may still be possible if we take advantage of the institutions of hybrid democracy.

A. Voter competence and voting cues

Voters are competent ‘if they cast the same votes they would have cast had they possessed all available knowledge about the policy consequences of their decision’ (Gerber and Lupia 1999, p. 149). If voters have full information and the capacity to assess the validity of that information, they can vote competently; however, public choice scholarship underscores that few voters will have or develop this level of knowledge and understanding. In the absence of encyclopedic information, voters must find effective substitutes to allow them to make competent decisions. Scholarship on voting cues initially focused on candidate elections. Drawing on public choice work, Popkin (1994)
develops a theory of low-information rationality that emphasizes voters’ use of shortcuts
drawn from information they encounter in the course of their everyday lives and other
readily available information.

Initiative campaigns may provide even less information for voters than candidate
races because ballot measures are not often explicitly linked to political parties, denying
voters the cue of partisanship. Moreover, candidates may not be visible in an initiative
campaign, depriving voters of cues linked to personalities and ideology. As I will discuss
in Part III.A., political parties and candidates are not entirely absent from direct
democracy as these strategic political actors increasingly use the initiative process to
further their policy agenda or to improve their chances of winning in candidate elections.
Thus, voters who know of candidate or party endorsements may be able to use these
shortcuts to decide whether to support or oppose a ballot measure, but these cues will not
be provided directly on the ballot, and they are not necessarily part of every initiative
campaign.

In initiative elections, an effective voter shortcut is provided by information
revealing the positions of various groups with respect to the ballot measure. For voting
cues to promote voter competence, the voter must be able to identify which groups
support or oppose a particular initiative and then determine the group with whom the
voter has common interests. In his study of the 1988 California insurance initiatives,
Lupia (1994) demonstrates that voters can learn from endorsements publicized during
initiative campaigns. In the late 1980s, the nation’s third highest insurance rates had
prompted Californians to demand reform, but strong insurance and attorney lobbies
ensured that any legislative proposal died in committee. Consumer activists turned to the
initiative process, prompting competing initiatives from trial lawyers and the insurance
industry; on Election Day, voters faced five different initiatives on the subject. Total
spending in the campaigns was more than $82 million, revealing an aggressive campaign
to publicize positions.

Although the plethora of ballot measures was no doubt confusing, the presence of
well-funded campaigns and known endorsers with publicly recognizable reputations
enabled uninformed voters to use shortcuts to vote as if they were informed. Lupia
compares voters who knew nothing about the initiatives’ details but knew the insurance
industry’s position with voters who were models of civic virtue in that they consistently
gave correct answers to detailed questions about the ballot measures. He also considers a
third group of voters who knew nothing about the ballot questions or about the insurance
companies’ preference. The first two groups exhibited similar voting patterns –
demonstrating that the voting cue substituted for encyclopedic information – while the
ignorant voters had entirely different voting patterns.

Not all endorsements will promote voter competence. The general conditions
under which voters can learn from endorsements are derived and tested experimentally by
Lupia and McCubbins (1998). They demonstrate that for a voter to learn from the

---

Lupia and McCubbins conducted laboratory experiments using undergraduate students. Most tests
involved one “principal” and one “speaker” and concerned a coin toss that the principal did not witness but
statements of an endorser, the voter must believe that an endorser is both knowledgeable and trustworthy. Trust requires one of four additional conditions: 1) the listener and endorser must have common interests; 2) there must be a threat of verification imposed upon the endorser; 3) the endorser must face penalties for lying; or 4) there must be observable, costly effort on the part of the endorser. The conditions for trust must be established between a speaker and a specific audience, which need not include the voter who is observing the interaction. For learning to occur, however, it is critical that the voter understands the relationship between an endorser and the audience to whom she is speaking. If a speaker makes a statement to an audience that regards her as trusted endorser, then all listeners can be ‘flies on the wall’ and learn from that statement as long as they are aware of the relationship between the speaker and audience and know that the conditions for trust are met (Boudreau, Lupia, McCubbins and Rodriguez 2007). The presence of the conditions for trust is a separate requirement from whether an observer knows the conditions are met; both are necessary.

With this as a framework, it seems likely that at least two kinds of groups might provide effective voting cues under certain conditions. First, ideological groups are those that actively work to develop reputations and to publicize clear-cut positions on particular issues. Groups like the National Rifle Association, the Sierra Club, Common Cause and the National Organization for Women have an incentive to make sure that the public knows what they stand for so that they can attract members who will pay dues and so they can influence policy. Leaders of these groups can be trusted to take positions on ballot measures consistent with their ideological commitments because inconsistency will undermine the effectiveness of their organization by diluting their brand name. Further, they face punishment from their members who will cease to support them with monetary and human resources if they stray from their ideological commitments. The amount of money that they spend in an issue campaign signals voters about the intensity of their support or opposition, another valuable piece of information. If voters know what interests ideological groups represent and whether they have common (or opposing) interests, they can use such information as a voting shortcut when the groups have taken a public position on a ballot measure.

Second, the endorsement of economic groups, like the insurance industry in Lupia’s study of ballot measures, can aid cue takers. Economic groups differ from ideological organizations because their primary objective is making a profit by running a successful business; their positions on policies flow from their economic self-interest. Again, citizens can often determine whether they have common interests with an economic group that has taken a position on a ballot measure and can therefore use this information to vote competently. For example, voters may be able to make accurate decisions about their vote if they know the position of a cigarette manufacturer on an initiative dealing with smoking regulation; indeed, in a 1994 initiative campaign, many voters decided to oppose the so-called ‘antismoking’ measure when they learned that Philip Morris had spent $13 million in support of the measure. Other cues were available needed information about in order to make a prediction of the outcome. Nominal payoffs (around one dollar) were used to reward certain behavior. Further study of conditions that facilitate voter learning is necessary using more sophisticated experiments and real-world settings.
in that election as well, including the opposition of former U.S. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, who has a reputation for seeking ways to reduce smoking (Bowler and Donovan 1998, p. 61). Koop may be a rare example of an individual with a brand name whose communications could meet the conditions for trust; his career in public health was characterized by unrelenting work to reduce the incidence of smoking among Americans.

Additional work on voting cues is required to determine which cues are most likely to promote competent decision making and which may lead voters to choices inconsistent with their preferences. For example, Lau and Redlawsk (2006) study voting cues used in candidate elections and find that certain heuristics ‘do seem to contribute to the probability of a correct vote, but only in particularly difficult choice situations and/or only for political experts’ (p. 250). It is not surprising that those who are more politically sophisticated are better able to use shortcuts to vote competently. The key questions are which shortcuts can also help ordinary voters, and how that information can be provided in useful ways that catch their attention. With the increasing importance of the Internet in political campaigns, public choice scholars must also turn their attention to this new method of communication to determine whether it facilitates the use of effective cues, or whether it introduces untrustworthy information into the political environment or threatens information overload.

Moreover, Lupia’s influential study of insurance initiatives was based on campaigns where spending was high so voting cues were well-publicized. Future work must focus on issue campaigns that provide less salient or less trustworthy voting cues or cues on only one side of the measure; for example, direct democracy often determines how local governments deploy resources for infrastructure, but the information environment may be very different on the local level than on the state level (Garrett and McCubbins 2008). In addition, more study is needed to understand the role played by information intermediaries – the press, opponents, interest groups, and political parties – in structuring public information so that it can more easily serve as the foundation for effective voting cues. In some cases, these intermediaries may act as verification agents by signaling to voters that the cue is a credible one (Lupia and McCubbins 1998, p. 42).

Public choice scholarship on voting shortcuts should form the foundation for disclosure laws regulating direct democracy. Some groups will eagerly and widely disclose information about their financial and other support of ballot measures because they want to provide signals to voters who share their preferences. Mandatory disclosure laws of groups active in initiative races and the amount of money they are spending remain important, however, to ensure disclosure in all cases that will enhance voter competence. Some groups know that their endorsements of initiatives provide shortcuts for voters who disagree with them, as well as to those who share their interests. Ideological groups such as the National Rifle Association or NARAL Pro-Choice America and economic groups like cigarette manufacturers and the gambling industry understand that publicizing their positions beyond their members may work counter to their goals. Thus, they may seek to target their endorsements so that the information reaches only supporters, perhaps by publicizing support mainly in member newsletters or in targeted emails. Wider and systematic dissemination is crucial, therefore, to improve
the competence of all voters, including those who would react negatively to the signal because they are aware they have opposing interests to the group.\footnote{One of the costs of disclosure is possible retaliation against groups that support unpopular political positions. Although the jurisprudence provides some protection for groups that face threats of physical violence or serious economic reprisals (see Garrett and Smith 2005, pp. 302-03), the decision of some groups representing gays and lesbians to encourage boycotts and other actions against those who contributed to the 2008 referendum banning same-sex marriage in California has rekindled the debate about disclosure in the initiative process (Lott and Smith 2008).}

Disclosure laws must be well crafted to combat deception, another tactic used by groups that fear voter backlash to their involvement. Case studies of group endorsements in initiative campaigns reveal instances of groups hiding behind innocuous sounding names or names that sound like groups with established brand names to send misleading signals to voters. In 2002 in California, for example, real estate developers contributed substantial amounts of money to support two initiatives through a group called the Conservation Action Fund (Garrett and Smith 2005, pp. 314-15). One of the initiatives passed, and one failed, but we cannot be confident that people voted competently because of the difficulty they faced in learning of the extent to which developers bankrolled the so-called environmental initiatives. Of course, voters could have dismissed endorsements from this unknown group as untrustworthy; however, the concern is that they may be misled by certain names, or that they may be denied useful information through the use of these veiled political actors. In some cases, these deceptions would be revealed even without mandatory disclosure laws; for example, if a group tries to misappropriate the brand name of an existing group, then the legitimate group will work to correct any misinformation and protect its valuable reputation. Properly designed disclosure laws, however, seek to ensure accurate information even in cases where no credible ideological group or other information intermediary works to correct the record.

The study of voting cues, particularly recent work that draws on cognitive studies that describe the limits of rationality, also provides guidance for the structure of disclosure statutes. Public choice has long been influenced by the realization that people are ‘boundedly rational information processors’ (Simon 1956); ordinary people have cognitive limits and cannot understand and use unlimited amounts of information. If disclosure laws merely add to the noise in the political environment, then they may be counterproductive, overwhelming voters and drowning out trustworthy endorsements in the cacophony.\footnote{Compare Grossman 1981 (discussing similar issues in context of disclosure about economic goods).} Given that attention is limited and must be selectively focused, disclosure statutes should be designed to provide limited credible information that can serve as the basis of effective voting cues. It is not the case that more disclosure will necessarily empower voters; it may overwhelm them.

Additional work is required to understand the relationship between widespread use of certain voting cues and harmful information cascades. Information cascades, which are not necessarily harmful, can occur when individuals act on the basis of others’ behavior, rather than on their own information and judgment (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch 1998). In many cases, individuals take actions that are informative to others and therefore produce positive externalities; however, at some point, an information
cascade occurs when more and more people begin only to ‘follow the herd’ (Talley 1999). Disclosure statutes promoting the use of shortcuts could increased the risk of harmful cascades if the availability of this information causes people who now develop private information about electoral choices to use instead just the voting cue. The effect of disclosure statutes on cascades is complicated: although the literature suggests that sometimes disclosure leads to more voters merely following the herd, resulting in negative cascades, in other circumstances, disclosure may disrupt herding because it provides new trustworthy information (Garrett 2003, pp. 1045-47).

B. The structure of decision making in direct democracy

One response to the problem of complexity that threatens to undermine voter competence has been to impose single subject rules on initiatives. Most states with the initiative process require that each initiative contain only a single subject (Downey, Hargrove and Locklin 2004); many localities that allow or require citizen involvement in certain kinds of lawmaking also restrict ballot measures to one subject or one project to be bond-financed. Increasingly, at least on the state level, courts are more aggressively enforcing single subject requirements (Lowenstein 2002). Although the purpose behind the single-subject rule may be laudable, the requirement is not particularly effective at achieving this purpose, and it may structure voters’ decisions in ways that lead to sub-optimal policy.

The single subject rule is a blunt instrument to combat voter confusion: very complicated initiatives may encompass only one subject, and relatively simple proposals may involve more than one subject (Hasen 2006). Moreover, voter confusion often results from the appearance on the ballot of competing ballot initiatives on the same subject, a tactic often used by opponents of the first initiative. Because savvy political actors know that voters frequently react to confusion by voting ‘no’ on both measures, opponents of a particular initiative may work to qualify a competing measure in the hope that it will either result in both being defeated or in the more favorable competing measure being enacted instead of the initial proposal. Voter confusion that results from competing ballot initiatives is left untouched by single subject requirements.

One effect of single subject rules is that they make it difficult for voters to make tradeoffs among various policies. Just as with the single subject rule that is often applied in the state legislative environment, the rule targets logrolling (Cooter and Gilbert 2008). It eliminates, or at least diminishes, the ability of initiative drafters to place before the people one proposal that includes tradeoffs among several different policies and that must be accepted or rejected in its entirety. This prospect of logrolling may be most disturbing when drafters combine a very popular proposal with one that could not garner majority support, forcing voters to take the bitter with the sweet. The single subject requirement protects voters from this choice, requiring them to vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on each aspect of the deal presented to them as individual initiative proposals. This format also ensures that the decision on each ballot measure more likely reflects the preference of the median voter who has been asked to decide on a unidimensional policy (Cooter 2000, pp. 145-47).
The problem posed by single subject rules, however, is the mirror image of this benefit. A voter’s preference on an individual ballot measure may be determined by the result on the other measures being voted on simultaneously; yet, the single subject requirement prevents the proposals from being tied together, and the simultaneity of decision making denies voters important information. Consider a ballot with three bond measures: one to construct a hospital, one to build a museum, and one to fund a park. A voter might prefer to fund only one, and she also might prefer that the project funded be the hospital. But if the hospital bond is going to fail, then perhaps the voter would favor funding the park but not the museum. How is she to vote if all three are on the ballot at the same time, and she cannot be sure that the bond for the hospital will receive sufficient support? The very structure of American direct democracy that protects this voter from being presented with a take-it-or-leave proposal that has already made tradeoffs among subjects also prevents her from making informed tradeoffs when she votes. Importantly, this is a problem distinct from cues and voter competence, previously discussed. A voter may have sufficient cues to know how she would vote on each initiative and how she would prioritize among measures, but the format of direct democracy does not allow her the information she requires to implement her priorities and does not provide a structure conducive to policy tradeoffs.

Kousser and McCubbins (2006) have characterized initiatives as prone to the social choice problem of sequential elimination agendas. This pathology occurs ‘when votes are held one after another, defeated options are removed from consideration, and the winning issue moves on to the next round of voting. The core problem with sequential elimination agendas is that they do not allow citizens to compare directly all of the alternatives and, therefore, do not allow them to make tradeoffs among their options’ (pp. 963-64). When citizens are presented sequential elimination agendas over time and do not adequately consider tradeoffs, not only among initiatives on the same ballot but those that appear across several elections, they are likely to adopt policies that are contradictory and likely to result in welfare-reducing economic, social or political consequences. Moreover, the decisions made in this manner may result in an aggregate policy that the median voter would not support, even if she supported the outcome with respect to each individual ballot measure. Consider, again, the three bond measures to fund a hospital, a park and a museum, considered on the same ballot. A majority of voters may support all three, but a majority may not support this overall level of bond indebtedness or this aggregate level of government involvement in public projects (Garrett and McCubbins 2008, p. 41).

Legislatures more easily solve these problems, even when single-subject rules apply to them, because legislators can craft compromises, make tradeoffs, and logroll

---

9 Cooter and Gilbert (2008) seek to solve this problem, at least partially, by defining ‘subject’ as ‘a set of policy proposals over which a majority of voters has insufficiently separable preferences’ (p. 30). They provide examples of separable policies (e.g., emissions standards on a pollutant and parental notification requirements for minors to obtain an abortion) and inseparable policies (e.g., a ban on same-sex marriage and a ban on same-sex civil actions). The example in the text demonstrates, however, the difficulty of applying this test. The three bond proposals could be characterized as separable because they deal with three very different projects, or inseparable because they affect the overall fiscal policy of a jurisdiction.
either within an omnibus bill or across bills. Solutions are more difficult in direct democracy because a repeal or relaxation of the single subject rule would not eliminate the existence of sequential elimination agendas. One solution is to combine the initiative process with an independent commission that would consider various proposals, make tradeoffs among related options, and then present the resulting compromise to the people for ratification (see, for example, Thompson 2002). This reform also has the advantage of vesting authority in an entity with expertise, whose support for a particular proposal can provide a voting cue. In addition, the use of a commission may reduce the take-it-or-leave-it feature of direct democracy because a proposal can be changed as a result of public input during the commission’s deliberation process.

Commissions have been combined with direct democracy in one area of complex policy tradeoffs where legislators suffer from a conflict of interest that may keep them from adopting policies that voters prefer: the design of electoral and other democratic institutions. In New Zealand, for example, voters discarded the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system for parliamentary elections in favor of a mixed member proportional (MMP) system through a two-stage referendum process that presented them with several options for reform. In 1986, a commission on the electoral system recommended that MMP, based on the German system, replace the FPTP process (Palmer and Palmer 2004, p. 13). In 1992, voters were asked in a non-binding referendum two questions: first, whether they wanted to replace FPTP, and, second, which among four possible alternatives they preferred. In this election, 85 percent rejected FPTP, and 70 percent chose the commission’s recommendation as their first choice among the alternatives. In the binding referendum the following year, voters were presented a binary choice between the status quo and the MMP system; 54 percent voted in favor of the new arrangement. This example demonstrates that there is nothing inherent in direct democracy that requires voters to make binary decisions sequentially if such a structure is likely to lead to sub-optimal policy.

Another possible structure would combine a Citizens’ Assembly, like that used in British Columbia in 2004-05 to consider complex electoral reform, with a popular vote on any recommendation (Archer 2004). The Citizens’ Assembly allows a representative sample of voters to consider complicated tradeoffs and to be informed by expert staff and witnesses. The resulting proposal can then be presented to the voters in a binary format, allowing them to retain the status quo or adopt the proposed reform. Single subject rules should not restrain such an assembly from making tradeoffs among various aspects of electoral reform or presenting a comprehensive proposal to voters, although the arena of possible compromise should be clearly defined in the initial charge to the assembly. The experience of British Columbia in its use of the Citizens’ Assembly is noteworthy because the resulting referendum did not receive the support required for passage. Although the proposal for a single transferable vote system received over 57 percent support overall and a simple majority in all but two districts, the voting rule required it to garner 60 percent support (as well as a simple majority in 60 percent of the 79 electoral districts) (Warren and Pearse 2008, pp. 6-7). However, the strong support for the change proposed by the Assembly sparked an ongoing discussion about significant reform of British Columbia’s FPTP electoral system, and the government will submit the proposal.
again to the people in a May 2009 referendum that will be accompanied by a
government-funded campaign on both sides.

Another response to the need to make complex tradeoffs but still allow some
element of popular input would be to adopt a structure that ensures some legislative
involvement, like the indirect initiative. Garrett and McCubbins (2007) have proposed a
‘dual path initiative process’ in which reformers qualify a brief policy statement, and then
the actual statutory or constitutional text is drafted during a period before the vote in
which other groups and the legislature are provided opportunities for input and
counterproposals. Under this dual track process, initiative proponents need not accept
changes suggested by the legislature or other groups, although this period provides the
opportunity to catch drafting errors, discover consequences of the proposal that may have
been initially overlooked, and compromise with lawmakers to enact a mutually
acceptable reform.

III. Political interactions in hybrid democracy

Public choice scholars pay particular attention to the interplay among political
institutions; they understand that political actors strategically work to achieve their goals
no matter what structures they face. In a hybrid democracy, there are many possibilities
for interactions between institutions of representative government and direct democracy.
Indeed, the previous discussion suggests one important relationship: the initiative
process can be changed so that the legislature is provided a formal role or so that
independent commissions can consider complex policy tradeoffs before a measure is
submitted for a popular vote. In this section, I will describe three more interactions
between institutions of direct and representative democracy: 1) the relationship between
candidates and ballot measures in campaigns; 2) the promise of direct democracy as a
way to reform democratic institutions; and 3) the problem of implementing policies
enacted through the initiative process given the likely opposition to the reform by
political actors charged with execution of policy.

A. Initiative spillover effects in candidate elections

It is increasingly clear that in hybrid elections with both candidates and initiative races on
the same ballot, the two parts of the election significantly affect each other. For example,
initiatives increase overall voter turnout. Smith and Tolbert (2004) find that in
presidential elections, each ballot measure boosts turnout by half a percentage, and, in
midterm elections, each ballot measure increases turnout by 1.2 percent (p. 40). Studying
high-salience initiatives, M. Smith (2001) finds a larger effect on turnout in midterm
elections, about four points, but no boost in turnout from initiatives on the ballot during
presidential elections. The additional voters are motivated to come to the polls by the
topic of the initiative, so the increased turnout will not affect other races randomly but
will disproportionately benefit particular candidates whose ideology corresponds to that
of the additional voters.

Furthermore, initiatives on the ballot during a candidate election make certain
issues salient and thus shape voters’ evaluation of the candidates in races up and down
the ballot, even if the issues would not otherwise be part of the campaign for that
particular office (Nicholson 2005). This priming effect underscores the importance of ballot access discussed previously in Part I.C. If access is guaranteed to groups with sufficient financial resources, it means that these well-funded groups not only have an advantage in placing their issue before voters for adoption, but it also results in their having substantial impact on the issues that will shape the campaign agenda for candidates. To the extent that this agenda does not reflect the real concerns of ordinary people, this influence does not result in a campaign defined by issues that most voters would prefer to see addressed.

One example of state ballot measures that affected federal candidate races occurred in 2004 when several states considered measures that defined marriage as a relationship available only to heterosexual couples. Although these ballot questions had grassroots support in many states and were a reaction to the legalization of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts and the attempt in San Francisco to allow these marriages, it appears that there was also a coordinated effort to ensure that they appeared on the ballot in battleground states in the presidential race so that they might affect turnout in ways that would benefit President George W. Bush (Kousser and McCubbins 2005). Some political strategists and scholars have identified the ballot measure as crucial to Bush’s victory in Ohio, a state necessary for his Electoral College victory (Garrett 2006). Certainly, the initiatives helped reinforce the “values” agenda that the Republican Party hoped would shape the national debate in ways that would benefit its candidates at all levels of government. 10 The anti-same-sex marriage measures almost certainly determined the outcome of the senatorial race in Kentucky; Republican incumbent Jim Bunning won a narrow victory thanks to rural voters energized by the ballot measure (Garrett 2006, p. 230).

Strategic political actors are very aware of the possibility that spillover effects from initiative campaigns will affect candidate races. Some public choice scholars have emphasized the negative consequences of this with respect to the policies enacted by initiatives associated with candidates. For example, Kousser and McCubbins (2005) decry the effect of ‘crypto-initiatives’ on public policy; crypto-initiatives are ballot measures used by candidates, parties, and other political actors solely or primarily to influence the outcomes in candidate elections. Politicians using crypto-initiatives are mainly attentive to the initiatives’ effect on the dynamics of the campaign, such as voter turnout or the content of the issue agenda, not whether they are well-drafted or represent beneficial reform. Therefore, according to Kousser and McCubbins, the policies embodied in these measures are unlikely to enhance public welfare or to effectively achieve beneficial goals.

In 1984, Governor Pete Wilson of California may have used a couple of crypto-initiatives – the country’s harshest three-strikes law and an initiative that would have

---

10 Of course, these sorts of initiatives can be double-edged swords, also causing voters who strongly oppose them to come to the polls. These voters are likely to vote against the candidates associated with the measure (see Campbell and Monson 2008, discussing this phenomenon with the 2004 anti-same-sex marriage initiatives). The trick for candidates using such ballot measures to affect turnout is to find issues that motivate their supporters without creating a strong, negative reaction in other voters.
denied public services to undocumented workers – to convince dubious conservatives in the Republican Party that he was not too moderate for their support (Garrett 2005b). To the extent that Wilson and others cared more about how these initiatives shaped the results of candidate elections than about how they changed public policy, these measures would be considered crypto-initiatives. Perhaps that explains why the three-strikes law is so harsh or why Proposition 187 was later overturned as unconstitutional – their proponents did not spend enough time on them to ensure they worked well or survived judicial challenge. On the other hand, proponents of the two measures would likely have disputed that they were insufficiently attentive to the policy consequences of their initiatives, arguing that they supported them on the merits. They may well have seen the initiatives as serving two objectives: enacting policies favored by a majority of Californians but opposed by a Democratic state legislature, and only secondarily as assisting Wilson in his quest for reelection or aiding other Republican candidates. The initial supporters of Proposition 187 were likely primarily motivated by their support for the policy, but the measure qualified for the ballot thanks to funding by the California Republican Party that allowed advocates to hire paid signature gatherers. Party officials saw the measure as a way to shape the campaign agenda and as an engine for fundraising in candidate elections (Nicholson 2005, p. 96).

Decrying the use of initiatives by candidates and parties as largely the cynical manipulation of the electoral process by sophisticated candidates and party operatives overlooks the beneficial spillover effects that ballot measures can produce. Coordinating a candidate campaign with an initiative can allow politicians to make more credible policy commitments to voters (Garrett 2005b). Usually, promises made during a campaign are ‘cheap talk’ because politicians know that they are unlikely to be punished in the future for a broken promise or, at the least, they discount that possibility because they are more concerned with the current election campaign. Public choice scholars have noted that there are very few ways for a candidate to credibly commit during a campaign to a particular course of action once she is in office (see, for example, Levmore 1996). Although incumbents have a record that voters can use to assess the trustworthiness of any position taken during a campaign, challengers, particularly those without prior public service, may find it difficult to convince voters of their credibility. However, if a candidate spends time or money on an initiative, she sends a costly, and therefore more trustworthy, signal of her views on the issue.¹¹

Matsusaka (2008) notes that voters can use initiatives generally to constrain politicians with respect to certain policies, thereby allowing constituents to better monitor officials when they act in the unconstrained realms. This suggests a different spillover effect, one that affects the voters’ ability to enforce campaign promises that are unrelated to a particular ballot measure supported or sponsored by the candidate. Using his model

¹¹ For example, Jerry Brown’s campaign for California governor as a political reformer was enhanced because he championed the Political Reform Act of 1974 that appeared on the same ballot (Schrag 2004, p. 226). By approving the reform act at the same time they elected Brown as governor, voters could be more confident that he could not easily back away from his campaign promises. Of course, the structure of decision making – simultaneous votes for the governorship and on the initiative – meant that voters could not be confident that both outcomes would occur.
of the effects of initiatives on executive behavior, Matsusaka concludes that ‘by taking
some issues out of the hands of elected officials and deciding them directly, the initiative
seems to enable voters to more effectively sanction their representatives for poor
performance on issues that remain under their control’ (p. _). In this way, initiatives
solve some problems of principal-agent slack that are inherent in representative
institutions.

Another positive effect of an explicit relationship between candidates and ballot
measures relates to the previous discussion of voting cues in Part II.A. If voters are
aware that a candidate or a political party supports an initiative, this information imports
the familiar and helpful cue of party affiliation and ideology into direct democracy.
Political party leaders are very aware of the strength of this voting shortcut, and they
work to provide this information in salient ways, knowing that the party cue will not be
present on the ballot itself for initiatives in the way that it is for candidates. Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger, whose political career has been tied to his use of direct
democracy, clearly understands the strength of his endorsement for some voters. In 2004,
when Schwarzenegger’s popularity with voters was high, the California Republican Party
spent approximately $2 million to send out five million slate mailers informing voters of
the Governor’s position on ten of sixteen measures on the general election ballot (Garrett
2005b, p. 989). Party officials no doubt hoped that recipients would bring the slate
mailer to the polls with them or would use it at home when filling out absentee ballots.
This would compensate for the absence of ballot notations, just as the endorsement of an
initiative by party officials or elected officials in a voter pamphlet provides information
in a format likely to be used at the time a vote is cast.

In addition, because parties are increasingly active in initiative campaigns (Hasen
2000), they may help to solve the problems caused by the structure of decision making
and sequential elimination agendas. Budge (2001) argues that parties, with their
comprehensive platforms, can ‘improve the overall policy coherence of single-issue
balloting by tying it in with the overall governmental program supported at the previous
election’ (p. 86). Parties can provide structure across single-issue campaigns in direct
democracy just as they provide consistency and coherence in the legislative branch.
More work is required to determine the ability of parties to enable voters to overcome the
problems of sequential elimination agendas in direct democracy, particularly in the
United States where political parties play different roles than they do in the parliamentary
systems that Budge also considered, and to determine when additional structures like
commissions and citizens’ assemblies might be warranted.

In short, the interaction between candidates and initiatives is not necessarily as
negative for policy making as Kousser and McCubbins argue in their indictment of
crypto-initiatives and can improve decision making in both realms. However, the
realization that some ballot measures are primarily seen by proponents as ways to achieve
goals other than to enact public-regarding policy should raise questions with regard to
their effect on social welfare. The threat of crypto-initiatives combined with the presence
of decision-making pathologies caused by sequential elimination agendas and other flaws
discussed in Part II.B. at least raise the question of whether outcomes of direct democracy
are likely to systematically undermine welfare.
Even if these fears are well-founded, the solution of discarding direct democracy altogether seems extreme. Rather, the better response would be to adopt reforms targeting the problems caused by crypto-initiatives. For example, if the concern is that some measures linked to candidate elections are likely to enact welfare-reducing policies, then rules designed to minimize their effects could be adopted. Some ill-considered initiatives, like Proposition 187, are struck down by courts because they infringe on constitutional rights or they violate some state procedural requirement designed to protect the integrity of direct democracy. But not all welfare-reducing policy is unconstitutional, so additional reforms may be necessary. Accordingly, Garrett and McCubbins (2007) argue that all statutory initiatives should be subject to revision or repeal by the legislator, albeit with some protection such as supermajority vote requirements,\(^\text{12}\) and constitutional initiatives should include sunset provisions so that they would expire after ten years unless reenacted (pp. 329-32). A sunset requirement would ensure that policies are reconsidered after some experience with them, with the option of readopting them without change, making modifications to respond to new information, or allowing them to expire. Such a provision might have allowed a softening of California’s three strikes law, which was at least partly used to further candidate campaigns when it was enacted, although it is noteworthy that voters were not willing to revise this law when given the opportunity in 2004. The advantage of a sunset provision is that it allows voters the opportunity at a later time to sort between crypto-initiatives that they regret having enacted and policies that conform to their preferences.

B. Hybrid democracy and the design of democratic institutions

Just as political actors use mechanisms of direct democracy to achieve their electoral goals, they also seek to manipulate other democratic institutions to achieve their objectives. Thus, for example, they will generally resist reforms that would increase the competition they face on Election Day, that would hinder their ability to raise funds for their campaigns, or that would limit their ability to retain their elected positions for many years. Although relatively durable constitutional provisions set up some of the institutions that shape the electoral and representative processes, gaps in the requirements for institutional design remain even in state constitutions, which provide considerably more detail than the federal constitution. Over time, as political actors find ways within the established framework to achieve goals that serve their self-interest more than the public interest, public sentiment may support reforms such as campaign finance regulations, lobbying disclosure, term limits, blanket or nonpartisan primaries, or redistricting commissions. Lawmakers themselves are unlikely to embrace such reforms because they would be constrained by them and because that are uncertain how the changes would affect the dynamics of their reelection campaigns. Given this inherent conflict of interest – made clear by scholars using public choice theory to analyze legislative behavior (see, for example, Issacharoff and Pildes 1998) – direct democracy

\(^\text{12}\) All states except California allow legislatures the ability to modify statutory initiatives; in California, statutory initiatives are insulated from subsequent legislative involvement unless the initiative specifically allows it. Some other states prohibit outright repeal, at least for some period of time, by requiring supermajority votes to repeal or amend laws enacted by initiative, or they require that any amendment further the purposes of the initiative (Garrett and McCubbins 2007, pp. 328-29).
seems a particularly attractive route through which to consider and adopt changes to
democratic institutions. Even scholars who are generally skeptical about the initiative
process are more willing to envision a role for direct action by the people in determining
questions of institutional design (see, for example, Thompson 2005, pp. 158-60).

Again, insights from public choice about the conflict of interest faced by
legislators in this arena echo the arguments made by progressives who originally
supported the initiative process. Early supporters identified the problem of a ‘lawmaking
monopoly’ (Sullivan 1892, p. 100) and saw direct democracy as a way to circumvent
self-interested legislators and political bosses who would block governance reforms such
as the direct primary and anti-corruption laws. Although one target of initiative
advocates at the turn of the last century was corporate interests who exercised
disproportionate power in state legislatures, progressives also took aim at political party
elites and legislators who were seen as growing rich and powerful at the expense of the
citizens they were supposed to serve (Smith and Tolbert 2004, p. 113).

In a similar vein, it appears that the modern initiative process is being used to
combat growing polarization in the political realm, to attack anticompetitive electoral
structures, and to realign institutions so that they produce outcomes more consistent with
the preference of the ordinary voters. Issacharoff (2004) has called the use of initiatives
to change democratic institutions in the last decade or so as the ‘rebellion of the median
voter’ (p. 416). Just as public choice literature identifies the indirect effect of direct
democracy on policy outcomes in the legislature – making them more consistent with the
median voter’s preferences – it also suggests that there will be similar direct and indirect
effects on changes affecting the design of democratic institutions when the legislature no
longer has monopoly control over the formulation and enactment of policies in this realm.

Scholars influenced by public choice have begun to test empirically whether there
are systematic differences between electoral and representative structures in states with
robust direct democracy and states without the initiative process. Just as with the work
on policy outcomes, the focus of study must not only be on the reforms adopted by the
initiative process, but also on laws adopted by the legislature in the shadow of the
initiative process. Findings so far have demonstrated that the differences in electoral
design are less substantial than one might expect. Tolbert (1998) finds that states
characterized by frequent use of the initiative are more likely to adopt legislative term
limits, state tax and expenditure limits, and supermajority voting rules for tax increases.
Persily and Cully Anderson (2005) do not discover empirical support for ‘strong claims
that are made often about legislative capture inhibiting reform’ (p. 1034), but they find
that legislative term limits would not have been adopted without the initiative process.
Moreover, they determine that the initiative plays a role – albeit often an indirect one – in
the adoption of public financing for legislative campaigns and independent redistricting
commissions. Pippen, Bowler and Donovan (2002) find that initiative states are more
likely to have laws restricting campaign contributions and more heavily regulating
contributions to candidates from political parties and PACs. Matsusaka’s (2006) study of
fourteen different kinds of laws related to electoral reform concludes that the initiative
process has been essential only for legislative term limits. Controlling for region,
demography and ideology, he determines that, with respect to redistricting commissions,
the differences between initiative and non-initiative states cannot be attributed to the availability of direct democracy. Smith (2008) similarly finds legislative term limits as the reform most closely associated with the initiative process. Although a handful of other reforms, such as bans on party-line voting, campaign finance disclosure, redistricting commissions and no-excuse absentee ballots, are also more likely in initiative states, two-thirds of the reforms studied by Smith were unaffected by the presence of direct democracy.

Substantially more work is required to determine whether differences in the design of democratic institutions between initiative states and non-initiative states are really as limited as the initial scholarship suggests. If these findings are reinforced by further analysis, one could conclude that the public does not actually want different institutional designs for democratic institutions, but largely prefers current arrangements that tend to suppress competition (Matsusaka 2006, p. 168). However, further consideration must be given to different explanations provided by public choice theory for the failure of the initiative process in practice to live up to the hopes of reformers. Reform proposals are often advocated by grassroots ‘good government’ groups like Common Cause and Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) that may have access to sufficient numbers of motivated volunteers to succeed in the petition drive, but that do not have overflowing coffers to mount expensive advertising campaigns. They may be opposed, however, by incumbent politicians and political parties who can raise money to fund opposition campaigns. As discussed in Part I.C., well-funded opposition campaigns often are successful in convincing people to vote ‘no’ perhaps only as a defensive reaction to the amount of noise in the campaign. One study of initiatives to establish independent redistricting commissions has concluded that the initiatives succeed only when unusual events make it difficult for the majority party to run a successful opposition drive, or when strong media support counterbalances a well-funded opposition campaign (Stephanopoulos 2007, p. 382). In contrast, the more successful term limit proposals have tended to find support from individuals who provide substantial funding (Young 1993), and their effect on incumbents may be more easily understood by busy voters who find it difficult to see the link, if any exists, between greater electoral competition and changes in policy outcomes.

13 For example, in 2005 California Proposition 77, a redistricting proposal, had support from groups such as Common Cause but faced better-financed opposition, led by several incumbent politicians who helped defeat the measure by nearly 20 points. See Campaign Finance: Proposition 77 – Reapportionment. Initiative Constitutional Amendment, available at http://cal-access.ss.ca.gov/Campaign/Measures/Detail.aspx?id=1276356&session=2005 (last visited Aug. 1, 2008). However, Californians passed a different redistricting plan, Proposition 11, in 2008. Notably, some incumbent politicians, including Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, supported the 2008 measure. There was a large discrepancy between the spending of proponents and opponents of Proposition 11; proponents raised approximately $14 million whereas opponents raised slightly under $1 million. Major support for Proposition 11 came not only from Schwarzenegger, but also from wealthy individuals such as New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Charles Munger of Berkshire Hathaway Corporation, who alone gave $1 million to the Yes on 11 campaign. See Campaign Finance: Proposition 011 – Redistricting. Constitutional Amendment and Statute, available at http://cal-access.ss.ca.gov/Campaign/Measures/Detail.aspx?id=1303165&session=2007 (last visited Jan. 6, 2009).
A second hurdle facing initiatives proposing comprehensive reform of the electoral process may be the single subject rule. Often proposals to redesign electoral institutions encompass a variety of reforms. Perhaps this packaging results from logrolling to attract sufficient votes to win at the polls, but it may also be an inevitable feature of reform proposals in this realm. Reformers are aware that self-interested legislators will attempt to circumvent new rules to continue to achieve their objectives; thus, effective reform may require changes to many features of institutional design. The more comprehensive the proposal, however, the greater the risk that the initiative will run afoul of the constitutional single subject rule. For example, in 1999, the California Supreme Court ruled that a proposal explicitly targeting legislator self-interest violated the single subject requirement because it dealt with redistricting as well as changing the rules regarding legislators’ salaries and expense reimbursements (\textit{Senate v. Jones}, 998 P.2d 1089 (Cal. 1999)). This case presented particularly persuasive evidence that the provision relating to salaries and reimbursements was added to attract voters, with redistricting reform as the real objective (Lowenstein 2002, pp. 39, 41). Nonetheless, a credible argument could be made that all parts of the proposal were designed to address the problem of legislative self-dealing and thus could be considered as serving a single subject.

In more questionable decision, the Florida Supreme Court found a redistricting initiative violated the single subject rule because it dealt with both state and federal legislative seats and because it both set up a redistricting commission and set out new standards to guide the commission in drawing district lines (\textit{Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re: Independent Nonpartisan Commission to Apportion Legislative and Congressional Districts which Replaces Apportionment by Legislature}, 926 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 2006)). Under a test for determining a ‘single subject’ proposed by Cooter and Gilbert (2008), this proposal would certainly be considered as dealing with one subject because voters’ preferences on the various provisions would not be separable, i.e., voters would not be able to ‘decide how to vote on one [policy] without knowing the outcome of the vote on the other’ (p. 31).

Of course, not all sweeping electoral reforms adopted by initiative are found to violate the single subject requirement. For example, the influential and broad Political Reform Act of 1974 with rules regulating campaign finance and lobbying in California survived such a challenge (\textit{Fair Political Practices Commission v. Superior Court}, 599 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1979)). However, in general, the judiciary’s combined mistrust of the initiative process and of innovative political structures more generally (Garrett 2001) may lead courts to look favorably on challenges to reform initiatives, whether brought under the single subject rubric or some other legal theory. Knowing that they are likely to prevail either in a well-financed opposition campaign or in a subsequent court challenge, legislative incumbents and political party leaders may not feel much pressure from the indirect influence of direct democracy.

Again, a creative use of the possibilities of hybrid democracy might allow reform of political institutions that is not unduly influenced by self-interested lawmakers and that can be drafted in suitably comprehensive form without raising concerns about voter confusion or unseemly logrolling. The commission used in New Zealand and the
Citizens’ Assembly established in British Columbia provide models for mechanisms to consider and draft far-reaching reform, with the final proposal submitted to the people for a vote. Although some have recommended this path for reform in the U.S. (see, for example, Thompson 2002, pp. 168-70; Ferejohn 2008), the same obstacles that inhibit changing redistricting practices, campaign finance and lobbying rules and other features of democratic institutions will stand in the way of creating a new institution, insulated from political control, to consider and propose comprehensive reform. Establishing such bodies would require either legislative involvement or would have to succeed as an initiative proposal (if not considered so far-reaching as to be a constitutional revision, not amenable to the initiative process (Garrett and McCubbins 2007, p. 312 n.35)), over the likely vociferous opposition of entrenched political players.

C. The challenge of effectively implementing initiatives

Just as the foregoing discussion raised the problem of resistance by lawmakers and party elites to proposals changing the design of electoral and representative institutions, entrenched political players often stand in the way of implementing a successful initiative. A primary reason that reformers resort to direct democracy is to circumvent lawmakers or other officials who use the vetogates in the traditional representative process to block change, perhaps because it conflicts with their self-interest or because it is opposed by influential special interests. These officials are not likely to eagerly or aggressively work to follow a public mandate when they opposed the change in the first place. One irony of direct democracy is that the policy changes most likely to succeed in the initiative process are precisely those that are least likely to be implemented and enforced (Gerber, Lupia and McCubbins 2004). Implementation agents know that they face little threat of sanction for failure to faithfully execute the initiative. The people, having succeeded in passing a new policy, assume that government officials will follow their directions. They do not have the ability, or often the interest, to monitor implementation by the legislative and executive branches.

Failure of public officials to implement initiatives is different from a judicial decision striking down an initiative, although both deny the people their will as expressed at the ballot box. As discussed in Part I.A.’s description of protections afforded to minority groups, courts act to negate initiatives when they are convinced that a popular law is unconstitutional or otherwise legally flawed. The people cannot get what they want because their desires conflict with larger principles and values, such as individual rights guaranteed by the federal constitution. The problem of the failure of public officials to implement an initiative is another manifestation of the principal-agent slack problem that motivated the decision to resort to the initiative process in the first place. Passage of an initiative does not magically transform the preferences of officials who had resisted the change initially, and public choice teaches that they will continue to try to achieve their objectives to the greatest extent possible under the new institutional arrangements.

In their analysis of the experience with 11 initiatives in California, Gerber, Lupia, McCubbins and Kiewiet (2002) find that certain conditions in the political environment allow government officials to undermine or ignore initiatives more easily. First, substantial technical or political costs will lead to lower levels of compliance because the
net value of implementation is reduced. Second, if implementers face significant sanctions for noncompliance, they are more likely to work to effectively implement the initiative. Third, when it is easier for the public or others who support the initiative to observe compliance, it is more likely that officials will comply. Fourth, the more the number of people required for successful implementation, the more the likelihood of full compliance falls to zero.

This framework helps predict which initiatives will face serious implementation problems and which will go into effect relatively fully and easily. For example, a measure mandating term limits for all legislators is likely to be fully enforced. Challengers and other intermediaries have strong incentives to monitor behavior and bring attention to any violations. Moreover, determining whether a term limit proposal has been ignored is straightforward and unambiguous. A comprehensive education reform that is enacted at the ballot box, however, is unlikely to be fully or effectively implemented. It will rely on the efforts of many people – bureaucrats in the Department of Education, principals and (often unionized) teachers, and sometimes lawmakers to ensure funding or pass additional implementing legislation – most of whom likely resisted change in the first instance. It will be difficult for the public to monitor compliance throughout the state, and even if a few reformers with intense preferences do pay attention, remain organized and have resources after the campaign is over, it may not be clear how to hold those who undermine the initiative accountable.

Bali (2003) expands the analysis of the implementation problem to include additional factors such as voter preferences, local demographics and institutional capacity. She studies the reaction of local school districts to California’s initiative aimed to reduce or eliminate bilingual classes. An important factor in compliance was the preferences of leaders, that is, schools with a superintendent of Hispanic origin had higher levels of bilingual enrollments. Voter support or opposition to the initiative in the particular district also affected the extent of compliance. This suggests that public officials who resist implementation may actually be responding to voter preferences, but they are focusing only on their constituents, not the overall statewide vote. A related study of the decisions of state legislators to overturn the results of term limits ballot initiatives also revealed that a legislator’s vote to repeal a popularly-enacted law was related to the support for or opposition to the measure in the legislator’s own district (D.A. Smith 2001). In addition, Bali finds that institutional factors played a significant role in compliance, with lower levels of compliance in large school districts, districts with larger bureaucracies and urban school districts.

Public choice scholarship on the implementation problem counsels advocates of an initiative to draft straightforward policies that rely on as few implementation agents as possible. It also indicates that compliance may differ across the state depending on the level of support for the measure by voters in particular districts or areas and on the level of opposition of local bureaucrats. Nevertheless, some ballot measures are inevitably complicated or will be effective only with the assistance of many public officials. To ensure better compliance in these cases, Garrett and McCubbins (2007, pp. 333-39) have proposed establishing a statewide Citizens Initiative Implementation Oversight Commission (CIIOC), comprised of members appointed through the initiative process.
They note that, since the adoption of direct democracy, some successfully-implemented initiatives have been overseen by oversight commissions specifically vested with the power to ensure compliance with the initiative. For example, the Political Reform Act of 1974 in California established the Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) with five members to oversee and administer the Act. Various provisions of the law ensure that the FPPC remains independent and has sufficient funding to carry out its work; it has played a significant role in ensuring compliance with popularly-enacted campaign finance and lobbying reforms that work to constrain elected officials and candidates for office. The 2004 stem cell initiative in California, Proposition 71, established an Independent Citizens Oversight Committee to award grants to researchers and institutions engaged in cutting-edge stem cell research. Arguably, a citizens oversight board was less necessary in this case; most California lawmakers also support stem cell research, but the initiative was required by the state constitution in order to issue bonds, which were authorized up to $3 billion. Nonetheless, it seems likely that the decisions made by the citizens oversight board, which includes patient advocates, leaders of educational institutions, representatives from business and the person who was the main force behind the initiative, have been different from those that would have been made by a more traditional administrative agency. Furthermore, it is doubtful that lawmakers would have delegated these decisions to a commission with the characteristics of the current citizens oversight board.

Drawing on the experience with initiative-specific commissions, Garrett and McCubbins propose a single citizens commission to oversee implementation of all statewide initiatives. Under their proposal, each initiative proposal would be required to name one representative to serve on the CIIOC if the initiative is enacted; each representative would serve for a ten-year term. The CIIOC would have a professional staff and would be assured a level of certain level of funding so that lawmakers could not undermine it by starving it of funds. The CIIOC would have the ability to hold hearings, issue reports and otherwise publicize the level of implementation of initiatives, as well as to bring other enforcement actions. The advantage of one entity to oversee compliance with all successful initiatives is that the commission will include a wide range of viewpoints among its members; they will have in common only their use of the initiative process and will not necessarily share policy or other ideological goals. Thus, any decision to pursue enforcement will be the result of compromise among CIIOC commissioners; the requirement of collective action by people of diverse perspectives will serve as an internal constraint. This oversight is different from the work done by initiative-specific commissions, which are often the administrative agencies with jurisdiction to implement a particular reform.

A CIIOC will alter the conditions surrounding enforcement of ballot measures to make it more likely that compliance will occur. It reduces monitoring costs, increases the chance that recalcitrant officials will be sanctioned, and tilts the political and technical costs in favor of implementation. It is informed by the insights of public choice, in particular, by the awareness that institutional design can change the behavior of public officials by adjusting the costs and benefits of particular actions and can work to address agency problems inherent in a system of representative democracy.
Conclusion

Over the last two decades, public choice scholarship has contributed substantially to a more sophisticated understanding of the effects of direct democracy in our hybrid system. However, more work, including empirical study, remains to be done on issues like the role of money in the initiative process, the effect of direct democracy on interest groups and vice versa, and the reasons that initiative states and non-initiative states do not diverge more substantially with respect to the design of democratic institutions. More attention should be paid to direct democracy on the local level, where popular votes play a vital role in shaping infrastructure, schools, land use decisions and other policies that affect the daily lives of Americans. Moreover, the focus of scholars should not end with the outcome on Election Day but should extend to an analysis of initiative implementation. All of these avenues for study must take into account the reality of hybrid democracy, which provides opportunities for political actors to take advantage of institutional features to strategically respond to initiatives, but which also creates possibilities for reforms to ensure that both direct democracy and representative democracy work to improve public accountability to voters and yield welfare-enhancing policies.

References


Pippen, John, Shaun Bowler and Todd Donovan (2002), ‘Election Reform and Direct Democracy: Campaign Finance Regulations in the American States’, American Political Science Research, 30 (6), 559-82.


Schrag, Peter (2004), Paradise Lost: California’s Experience, America’s Future, Berkeley: University of California Press.


Sullivan, James W. (1892), Direct Legislation by the Citizenship through the Initiative and Referendum, Charleston, SC: BiblioBazaar.


