

University of Illinois College of Law
Law and Economics Working Papers

Year 2006

Paper 55

Locking in Democracy: Constitutions,
Commitment and International Law

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Abstract

National constitutions exhibit a wide variety of approaches to international law. Some constitutions provide that customary international law is directly incorporated into the constitutional order, while others do not even mention customary international law. Some constitutions establish elaborate treaty-making processes, while others have relatively simple processes involving one or two actors. We have to date very little theory as to why countries differ on these dimensions. This article draws on the literature on constitutions as pre-commitment devices, and examines the unique features of international law that facilitate policy entrenchment. It argues that constitution-writers design the interface with international law to facilitate an optimal level of commitment. In particular, international law is useful to constitution-writers in new democracies, who have relatively limited domestic mechanisms to commit themselves to policies. The article draws on a new database of national constitutions to provide empirical evidence for these propositions.

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Introduction

During the Fall of 2005, ordinary citizens and political leaders in Iraq, the United States and elsewhere debated complex issues of institutional design in the process of adopting the Iraqi Constitution. Little-noticed in the discussions, however, was a seemingly minor change in the rights provisions applicable to Iraqi citizens. Whereas Iraq's Transitional Administrative Law had guaranteed Iraqis a wide array of rights in international law, including customary international law,¹ the adopted Constitution only guaranteed rights in treaties endorsed by Iraq and not in conflict with the principles of the constitution.² The new constitution thus changed the relationship between the domestic order and the international legal order, moving away from a broadly internationalist model toward one in which national consent was key to obligation.

The Iraqi case prompts general questions about constitutional design and international law. Under what circumstances will constitution-drafters allow customary international law to be directly binding in the domestic legal order? Constitutional

¹ The text guarantees Iraqis "the rights stipulated in international treaties and agreements, other instruments of international law that Iraq has signed and to which it has acceded, and others that are deemed binding upon it, and in the law of nations." LAW OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD (Transitional Administrative Law) ART. 23 available at <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html> (last checked March 2, 2006.)

² CONST. OF IRAQ, ART. 44 (2005).

designers also have to make determinations about how much to facilitate committing the state to international obligations. Is treaty making a relatively simple process, requiring assent by one or two constitutional actors? Or is it complex, involving multiple actors, supermajorities and public involvement before external commitment can be effected? These questions of constitutional design may be linked. Some states, for example, make customary international law directly binding but have difficult processes of treaty enactment that result in agreements of lower legal status than domestic law. Others may make treaties directly applicable and superior to statutes, but refuse to give customary international law direct effect in the legal system. Why would states differ along these dimensions?

These questions implicate the intersection of recently burgeoning literatures on comparative constitutional law and institutional design³ international law and international relations.⁴ Oddly, none of these literatures has yet addressed the question of why states open their domestic order to international law⁵ and there is no real positive

³Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., *DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW* 3, 23-29 (2002); Norman Dorsen et al., *COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS* (2003); Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet, *COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW* (1999); Francois Venter, *CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON: JAPAN, GERMANY, CANADA AND SOUTH AFRICA AS CONSTITUTIONAL STATES* (2000); See also Robert D. Cooter, *THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION* (2000); Giovanni Sartori, *COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING: AN INQUIRY INTO STRUCTURES, INCENTIVES AND OUTCOMES 195-97* (1997); Dennis Mueller, *CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY* (1996).

⁴ Kenneth Abbott, *Toward a Richer Institutionalism for International Law and Policy*, 1 *J. INT'L L. AND INT'L REL'NS* 9 (2004); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, *International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda*, 87 *AM. J. INT'L L.* 205 (1993). Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello & Stepan Wood, *International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship*, 92 *AM. J. INT'L L.* 367 (1998); *Special Issue: Legalization and World Politics*, 54 *INT'L ORG.* (Summer 2000); Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, *International Law, International Relations and Compliance*, in *HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS* (W. Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002).

⁵ One exception from a constitutional theory perspective is Mattias Kumm, *Democratic Constitutionalism and the Status of International Law: Towards an Integrative Constitutional*

theory.⁶ A vast literature concerns the effects of international law on domestic governance.⁷ A smaller literature concerns the effects of domestic institutions on international cooperation.⁸ This paper seeks to tackle both problems in a unified framework treating international commitment as a function of domestic constitutional design.

I approach the problem from the perspective of positive constitutional theory that sees constitutions as pre-commitment devices. Constitutions are acts of self-binding, wherein politicians structure the action of future politicians. By constraining choices to be made at a later time, constitutions can help to resolve current political problems and empower future politics. I focus specifically on the pre-commitment functions of international law provisions, noting that they are distinct from other forms of constitutional precommitment in that they offer a means of placing policies beyond the

Theory of Natural and International Law, paper on file with author; see also, *The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis*, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 907 (2004). See also John Setear, *Treaty, Custom, Iteration and Public Choice*, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 715 (2005).

⁶ See, e.g., Ian Brownlie, *PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW* 51 (5th ed. 1998) (noting that “(t)he whole subject resists generalization...”); John H. Jackson, *Status of Treaties in the Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis*, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310, 313-15 (1992) (noting that linguistic and interpretive factors may discourage direct application of international norms); Terence Daintith, *Is International Law the Enemy of National Democracy?* in *AMBIGUITY IN THE RULE OF LAW: THE INTERFACE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS* 115, 116 (Thomas A.J.A. Vandamme and Jan-Herman Reestman, eds., 2001) (comparative measurement “an impossible task”).

⁷ *The Impact of International Law on Domestic Governance*, 97 AM. SOC. INT'L L. PROC. 133 (2003); Saskia Sassen, *State & Economic Globalization: Any Implications for International Law?* 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 109 (2000); Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, *The Promise of Institutionalist Theory*, 20 INT'L SECURITY 39 (1995); Robert Keohane and Helen V. Milner, eds., *INTERNATIONALIZATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS* (1996).

⁸ Helen Milner, *INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INFORMATION* (1997); Daniel Drezner, *LOCATING THE PROPER AUTHORITIES: THE INTERACTION OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS* (2002); Peter B. Evans et al. eds., *DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS* (1993); Robert Putnam, *Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games*, 42 INT'L ORG. 427, 451 (1988); Lisa L. Martin, *DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENTS* (2000).

control of any domestic actor. This may make the commitments more effective in some circumstances. I then examine the particular functions of customary international law and treaty provisions as precommitment devices. This perspective helps to illuminate several puzzles in the domestic constitutional treatment of international law, including why it is that states treat custom and treaties differently, and why only certain kinds of states make international law directly binding in the domestic legal order.

Before proceeding, I should make clear that my emphasis throughout is on the *domestic* functions of international law. International law scholars have devoted some recent attention on the design of international agreements.⁹ With only a couple of exceptions, the conventional view is to follow the realist assumption of states as billiard balls and analyze international agreement between them. The realist assumption of the state as a unitary actor is no doubt easier for modeling.¹⁰ But it is clearly less accurate. This article follows the two recent contributions of Raustiala and Brewster, who begin to develop a framework for understanding the domestic bases of international law.¹¹ This

⁹ Andrew Guzman, *The Design of International Agreements*, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 612 (2005); Andrew Guzman, *The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms*, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (2002); Kal Raustiala, *Form & Substance in International Agreements*, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 581 (2005).

¹⁰ Eric Posner, *International Law and the Disaggregated State*, 32 FL. ST. U. L. REV. (2005); Peter J. Spiro, *Disaggregating U.S. Interests in International Law*, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 204 (2004); see also Alexander Thompson, *Applying Rational Choice to International Law: The Promise and the Pitfalls*, 31 J. LEG. STUD. 285 (2002) (discussing methodological considerations).

¹¹ Kal Raustiala, *Form & Substance in International Agreements*, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 581 (2005); Rachel Brewster, *The Domestic Origins of International Agreements*, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 501 (2004). Raustiala and Brewster both focus on the domestic origins of international agreements: Raustiala focuses on the impact of domestic groups on the form and substance of international agreement, while Brewster's emphasis is on the institutional allocation of powers in the domestic constitutional order.

move is methodologically consistent with the broader “liberal” school of international law scholarship.

Once we “unpack” the state, we can see that differences in regime types and structures matter a good deal for the constitutional treatment of international law. International law, I argue, is a particularly useful device for certain kinds of states, namely those that are undergoing a transition to democracy. By bonding the government’s behavior to international standards and raising the price of deviation, international law commitments in the constitution may help to “lock in” democracy domestically by giving important groups more confidence in the regime. On the international plane, new democracies may lack credibility in terms of the ability to deliver on their promises, and more sophisticated provisions for international legal obligation can help to communicate to foreign partners the widespread domestic support for international agreements. In both cases, international law helps to resolve commitment problems for new democracies that may not be as urgent for established democracies or continuing autocracies.

To anticipate the results of the paper, I find some empirical support for the above conjectures. New democracies are systematically more open to customary international law, and provide for treaty-making structures that build on the logic of commitments. This finding demonstrates that international legal commitments have both domestic and international audiences. It also suggests that the scope of international law itself may be determined by domestic constitutional structures, an argument whose implications are explored in the concluding section.

The paper proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the topic by describing the concepts of monism and dualism, which have become conventional ways for international lawyers to speak about the interaction of the domestic and international legal systems. Part II sets out the theory of commitments and explains the relative advantages (and disadvantages) of international law, both customary and that embodied in international agreements. Part III develops empirical implications, which are tested in Part IV. Part V concludes.

I. Monism, Dualism and the Interaction of Domestic and International Legal Orders

A. Monism and Dualism

Monism and dualism are international legal concepts with a long pedigree that seek to describe the relationship between international legal order and the domestic legal order.¹² Briefly, monists see international law and the domestic legal system as part of the same legal order.¹³ International law has a primary place in this unitary legal system, so that domestic legal systems must always conform to the requirements of international law or find themselves in violation. This would be true whether or not domestic legal actors had actively transformed international legal norms into domestic norms in accordance with domestic constitutional rules.

¹² Antonio Cassese, *INTERNATIONAL LAW* 213-17 (2d ed. 2005); Ian Brownlie, *PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW* 31-33 (5th ed. 1998); John H. Jackson, *Status of Treaties in the Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis*, 86 *AM. J. INT'L L.* 310, 313-15 (1992); see also Terence Daintith, *Is International Law the Enemy of National Democracy?* in *AMBIGUITY IN THE RULE OF LAW: THE INTERFACE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS* 115, 116-17 (Thomas A.J.A. Vandamme and Jan-Herman Reestman, eds., 2001).

¹³ Louis Henkin, *INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES* at 64 (1995); Cassese notes another early view of monism that had domestic law as the primary in the relationship. Cassese, *INTERNATIONAL LAW* (2005) at 213-14.

In contrast, dualists viewed the international legal order as distinct, and only penetrating the domestic legal order by explicit consent of the state involved. When the two systems conflict, municipal courts would apply municipal law. This view was especially important in the era of positivism, which viewed the nation-state as the sole unit of political authority and source of legal obligation. From a dualist perspective, the international legal order could purport to bind actors within states but required consent to do so as a matter of domestic law. International legal obligations required transposition into the domestic order to take effect. Absent such transposition, there was the distinct possibility of an action being legal in municipal law but illegal in international law, in which case a dualist would presume that municipal courts should apply municipal law.¹⁴

The rise of dualism, or at least its spread outside the Anglo-American world, paralleled the rise of the modern nation-state. Dualism postulated that national policymakers control the implementation of international law through acts of transposition into the local legal system, a position that was consistent with legal positivism.¹⁵ Sophisticated monists, however, responded that the very concept of the nation-state depended on criteria determined by international law—states obtain their status through recognition by other states.¹⁶

¹⁴ Brownlie, *supra* note 6, at 32. The high point of monist thinking is found in the PCIJ opinion in *Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations*, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 10 (Feb. 21). This opinion asserts that states have a duty to modify national law so as to conform to the requirements of international law. *Id.* at 20.

¹⁵ Yet Kelsen, a leading positivist, was monist of sorts. His theory held that, since national legal orders are dependent on the international order for their ultimate validity, monism was a better conceptual basis for the relationship between legal orders. *GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE* 363-80 (1945); see also Cassese, *supra* note 12, at 216. For a contrary view that international law derives from the domestic legal order see Brownlie, *supra* note 6, at 56 n144.

¹⁶ The classic criteria are a permanent population, government, defined territory, and the capacity to carry on diplomatic relations with other states. International Conference of American States, *Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States* art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933.

The monism/dualism distinction has been out of favor among international lawyers for many years.¹⁷ Many believe that the distinction was strictly theoretical in character, without much impact on state practice or behavior.¹⁸ Others point out that it is too dichotomous, obscuring an array of intermediate positions.¹⁹ In addition, for traditional international lawyers, the distinction was normatively undesirable. International law does not contemplate domestic law as an excuse for non-performance of obligations.²⁰ The strong desire of international lawyers to promote the individual as a subject of international law also led to their disdain for dualism, which privileges state actors.

Yet at the same time, the international legal system as a whole is basically dualist in character.²¹ International judicial and enforcement machinery is underdeveloped in most areas of the law. Most alleged violations of international law are resolved ultimately through domestic courts, and indeed, many international tribunals require exhaustion of domestic remedies before they will exercise jurisdiction. The over-riding consent principle, whereby states are bound only by obligations they have consented to,

¹⁷ Brownlie, *supra* note 6, at 33 (“An increasing number of jurists wish to escape from the dichotomy of monism and dualism.”)

¹⁸ Henkin, *supra* note 13, at 66 (1995); Brownlie, *supra* note 6, at 33; Kumm, *supra* note 5, at 4 (debates were “relatively fruitless.”)

¹⁹ Jackson, *supra* note 12, at 314.

²⁰ Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Art. 27 (states cannot invoke internal law as justification for non-performance of treaty obligations); Art. 46 (violation of internal law cannot be invoked as defense to treaty formation, unless the violation was manifest); *Polish Nationals in Danzig*, PCIJ, Series A/B, no. 44 (1931) at 24.

²¹ Cassese, *supra* note 12, at 217 (“most international rules, to become operative, need to be applied by State officials or individuals within domestic legal systems.”); Henkin, *supra* note 13, at 66 (system “essentially dualist in principle.”)

limits the scope of direct application of international legal rules barring constitutional acquiescence.²²

The most successful international experiment of the postwar period, the European Union, has been able to transform itself from a dualist scheme toward a monist one, in the sense that European obligations are directly applicable in national legal systems.²³ But somewhat paradoxically, the European transformation has been effected only with the close cooperation of national enforcement machinery.²⁴ And on occasion, that enforcement machinery fights back, rejecting the supremacy of European norms.²⁵

In short, monism and dualism are concepts that do not completely describe in positive terms the structure of international law, nor do international legal scholars view them as analytically useful.²⁶ Nevertheless, as a matter of *comparative constitutional law*, rather than international law, the underlying concepts have a good deal of utility. Indeed, in his leading treatise Cassese uses the terms internationalist and nationalist to capture the distinction.²⁷ Viewing internationalist legal orders and nationalist legal orders along a

²² To be sure, there are some areas where the international legal system is structured as to not tolerate diversity in domestic practice or to require any formal act of acceptance to consider the state bound. Obligations *ergo omnes* and the law of *jus cogens* are the basic exceptions here. *Jus cogens* norms are those norms of customary international law against which no derogation is tolerated. The paradigm example is genocide; no treaty allowing genocide would be valid, and every state is obligated to enact legislation that proscribes and punishes genocide. Genocide Convention cite.

²³ Case 26/62 *Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen* ([1963] ECR 1).

²⁴ Alec Stone Sweet, *GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE* (2000); Alec Stone Sweet, *Judicial Authority and Market Integration in Europe*, in *INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC LAW: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES* 98 (Tom Ginsburg and Robert A. Kagan, eds, 2005). Murrah, *Legal Integration and the Use of the Preliminary Ruling Process in the European Union*, 59 *INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION* 399-418 (2005)

²⁵ Maastricht Decision, BVerfGE 89 (1993), reprinted in 33 *I.L.M.* 395 (1994).

²⁶ Brownlie, *supra* note 6, at 55 (theories have “done much to obscure realities.”)

²⁷ Cassese *supra* note 12; see also Kumm, *supra* note 5, at 5.

spectrum allows us to describe the extent to which a constitutional system integrates the international legal system into its normative framework as a direct matter and the extent that it facilitates international cooperation.

B. Status of International Law in the Domestic Order

National constitutional provisions vary widely in terms of their relationship with international law. A further complexity is that monism and dualism can vary with the type of obligation, meaning that a state can be monist with regard to treaty law but dualist with regard to customary international law. For example, the conventional interpretation of the Netherlands Constitution of 1983 places international treaties superior to the Constitution, and explicitly states that statutes that conflict with international law are void.²⁸ But the Dutch Constitution does not give the same status to customary international law. In Germany, Italy and Austria, by contrast, customary international law is superior to domestic statutes, but treaties are equal to domestic statutes, with the last in time rule determining which is valid.²⁹ This is the inverse configuration of the Dutch Constitution. The Constitution of Russia states that the “universally recognized principles and norms of international law as well as international agreements of the Russian Federation shall constitute part of its legal system. If an international agreement of the Russian Federation establishes rules which differ from those stipulated by law,

²⁸ Constitution of 1983, Art.91. 3 ; see Cassese, *supra* note 12, at 229 n.30 for an explanation. Jackson, *supra* note 13 at 334 n.122 argues that Dutch Courts have been reluctant to find any treaties truly supreme over the constitution. One also wonders whether a constitutional amendment purporting to escape treaty commitments would be deemed unconstitutional under this scheme. See Jackson, *supra* note 13, at 332-33.

²⁹ Thomas M. Franck, ed. *DELEGATING STATE POWERS: THE EFFECT OF TREATY REGIMES ON DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY* (2000).

then the rules of international agreement shall apply.”³⁰ France has yet another configuration, in which treaties have higher status than subsequent legislation.³¹ The French constitution is silent on customary international law, however.

With a long tradition of parliamentary supremacy, the United Kingdom would seem to be the paradigm dualist state.³² Parliamentary sovereignty was famously defined by Dicey as “the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and further, that no person or body is recognized by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.”³³ This would presumably include international bodies. Parliament is also free to pass statutes that conflict with prior treaties.

At the same time, customary international law was traditionally viewed as part of the common law, and directly applicable so long as not over-ruled by subsequent statute or judicial decision.³⁴ This is called the doctrine of incorporation, whereby changes in

³⁰ Const. of Russia Art. 15(4). An interesting variant is found in Article 11 of the 1992 Slovak Constitution, stating that “international instruments on human rights and freedoms ratified by the Slovak Republic and promulgated under statutory requirements shall take precedence over national law provided that the international treaties and agreements guarantee great constitutional rights and freedoms.” For a discussion, see Vladlen S. Vereschetin, *New Constitutions and the Old Problem of the Relationship between International Law and National Law*, 7 EUR. J. INT’L L. 29 (1996).

³¹ Cassese, *supra* note 12, at 228; Henkin, *supra* note 13, at 67-8. Dominique Remy-Granger, *The Ambiguities of the State Based on the Rule of Law: A Unitary System à la Française*, in AMBIGUITY IN THE RULE OF LAW: THE INTERFACE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 53-62 (Thomas A.J.A. Vandamme and Jan-Herman Reestman, eds., 2001).

³² Jackson, *supra* note 13.

³³ ALBERT V. DICEY, *THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION* 3-4 (8th ed. 1915).

³⁴ Brownlie, *supra* note 6, at 42-43; Thomas D. Franck and Gregory H. Fox, eds., *INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS* (1996); On the US, Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, *Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position*, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 822 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, *Is International Law Really State Law?*, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1825-26 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman, *Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith*, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 371-72 (1997); Jordan J. Paust, *Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties are Law of the United States*, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 301 (1999).

CIL are automatically “incorporated” into the common law.³⁵ Since the 1870s, some have asserted that the UK has followed the competing doctrine of transformation, such that evidence of some governmental intent to incorporate the international rule into domestic law is required; but the conventional view is that the doctrine of incorporation remains intact.³⁶

The United States Constitution establishes a scheme somewhat similar to that of the UK.³⁷ Customary international law, or the “law of nations”, was traditionally viewed as part of federal common law.³⁸ Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution also gives Congress the power to “define the law of nations.”³⁹ This provision would seem to give the legislative branch primary control over the treatment of custom, but legislation is seldom based on this provision.⁴⁰ Treaties are the Supreme Law of the land according to

³⁵ *Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria*, [1977] Q.B. 529, 553-54.

³⁶ Brownlie, *supra* note 6, at 43-46 (discussing caselaw); *Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria*, [1977] Q.B. 529, 553-54.

³⁷ Curtis A. Bradley, *Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception*, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 530-31 (1999).

³⁸ See the debate following Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, *Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position*, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 822 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, *Is International Law Really State Law?*, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1825-26 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman, *Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith*, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 371-72 (1997); Jordan J. Paust, *Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties are Law of the United States*, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 301 (1999).

³⁹ US CONST., Art. I, Sec.8.

⁴⁰ The sole exception may be the Alien Tort Claims Act, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1996) (noting the power ‘has been little used, and its purport has not been wholly clear.’) Beth Stephens, *Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power To "Define And Punish ... Offenses Against the Law of Nations,"* 42 WM. & Mary L. Rev. 447, 523 (2000).

the supremacy clause, although later in time statutes can supersede them.⁴¹ Thus Congress and the President can together supersede a Treaty adopted by the President and Senate alone. In addition, the doctrine of self-executing treaties governs which treaties require legislation to take effect.

These examples illustrate the great variety of ways in which states treat international law vis-à-vis domestic obligations. There is no necessary relationship between the treatment of customary international law and treaty law, nor any general convergence among states in terms of the manner in which they treat international obligations.⁴²

C. Ease of Obligation

Constitutions also vary widely in the ease with which they allow international obligations to be made by governments. Most readers will be familiar with the United States scheme of making treaties, which involves Senate advice and consent to treaties “made” by the Executive.⁴³ American practice has also developed Congressional-Executive agreements as a mode of international agreement.⁴⁴ Furthermore, since *Missouri v. Holland*,⁴⁵ the treaty process can be used to evade domestic constraints of federalism. A treaty for migratory bird protection which was unconstitutional under

⁴¹ Julian G. Ku, *Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule in Treaties and Federal Statutes*, 80 IND. L. J. 319 (2005); Henkin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 211-12 (2d ed. 1996).

⁴² Cf. Duncan Hollis, *A Comparative Approach to Treaty Law and Practice*, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 1, 8 (D. Hollis, M. R. Blakeslee, L. B. Ederington, eds., 2005)

⁴³ U.S. CONST., Art. II.

⁴⁴ See Louis Henkin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 215-19 (2d. ed., 1996); John Setear, *The President’s Rational Choice of a Treaty’s Preratification Pathway: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreement, or Executive Agreement?* 31 J. LEG. STUD. 5 (2002); Brewster, *supra* note 11.

⁴⁵ 252 U.S. 416 (1920).

commerce clause jurisprudence of the 1920s was now legal. This allows the evasion of domestic constitutional constraints, empowering the national government relative to the states.⁴⁶ Thus, in the United States, treaty-making empowers the executive relative to congress and empowers the national government relative to subnational units, when compared with normal legislative processes.

In other countries, treaty making may be accomplished solely by the executive without legislative approval.⁴⁷ At the other extreme, some countries require the constitutional court to give assent to treaties before they take effect,⁴⁸ while many more countries allow treaties to be challenged before the constitutional court if alleged to violate the constitution.⁴⁹ Approving treaties sometimes requires a referendum. In Switzerland, for example, any 50,000 citizens can submit a request for a referendum on certain treaties.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ See the recent review and critique of the scholarship in Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, *The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause*, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2006).

⁴⁷ This is the case with some treaties under the French Constitution of 1958. Constitution of France (1958), Art. 52. “Important” treaties, including those involving peace, territory, international organizations, or the status of persons, do require legislative approval. *Id.*, Art. 53. See also Constitution of Zambia (1996), Art. 44(2)(d); Constitution of Qatar, Art. 68; Constitution of Mauritania (1991) Art. 37, 78; Constitution of Senegal (2001) Art. 95. See generally Luzius Wildhaber, TREATY-MAKING POWER AND THE CONSTITUTION: AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY 44-45(1971).

⁴⁸ Constitution of Czech Republic (2001) Arts. 10, 49 and 87.2; Constitution of Madagascar (1998), Art. 56, 82.3., 118.

⁴⁹ Constitution of Gabon (1997), Art. 11; Constitution of Armenia (1995) Art. 100.2; 81.2; Constitution of Mongolia (1992) Art. 66.2. See generally Tom Ginsburg, *Ancillary Powers of Constitutional Courts*, in INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC LAW: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES (Tom Ginsburg and Robert Kagan, eds., 2005).

⁵⁰ Constitution of Switzerland, Art. 141.d (treaties that are of unlimited duration, provide for entry into an international organization, and include important legislative provisions or require federal legislation); see also Art. 166.2 (role of parliament).

Related to ease of obligation are provisions on exit.⁵¹ Helfer's recent analysis does an important service by integrating treaty exit with treaty entry.⁵² If obligations are easy to escape, they are politically less risky and therefore less costly to enter into.⁵³ In the United States, for example, the President can unilaterally end treaty obligations even if they were entered into with Senate advice and consent.⁵⁴ The United States system is asymmetric in this regard.⁵⁵ Other countries may utilize the identical process for treaty enactment as for treaty revocation. But most constitutions are silent on the issue of treaty exit.⁵⁶

It is possible to measure the degree of difficulty of treaty-making and exit in different constitutional systems. Ideally one should pay attention to at least four dimensions.⁵⁷ These include the number of actors and voting rules to enact a treaty; the ease of over-riding or exiting treaties as a matter of domestic law; the symmetry between entry and exit; and the relationship of treaties to domestic statutes, including the relative

⁵¹ Laurence R. Helfer, *Exiting Treaties*, 91 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 1579-1648 (2005)

⁵² Helfer, *id.*

⁵³ They are also, therefore, less valuable as commitments, as will be seen in the next section.

⁵⁴ *Goldwater v. Carter*, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). Note that another route for treaty "exit" in the United States is the possibility of enacting subsequent legislation that supersedes the earlier treaty. This allows an ordinary majority in both houses, with presidential assent, to over-rule an earlier commitment by a president and 2/3 of the Senate.

⁵⁵ See John McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, *Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theory*, 89 VA. L. REV. 385 (2003) (arguing that with regard to legislation, the enactment rule of an entrenched provision should be the same as repeal rule.) cf. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermuele, *Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal*, 111 YALE LAW JOURNAL (2002) (norms against legislative entrenchment may prevent efficiency-enhancing legislation).

⁵⁶ The Comparative Constitutions Project at the University of Illinois is currently gathering data on these and other issues concerning the content of formal constitutional texts. Less than 20% of 295 constitutions coded so far, including most current constitutions, mention treaty exit at all. For more information on the project, see <https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/zelkins/constitutions/>

⁵⁷ See also Jackson, *supra* note 13 (nine issues, including negotiation, signing, accepting the treaty, determining validity, implementation, direct applicability, invocability, status of the treaty vis-à-vis domestic law, and ongoing administration of the treaty.)

difficulty of enacting each. In the empirical examination at the end of this paper, we focus primarily on the first of these, ease of entry.

D. Domestic Constitutional Configurations

To summarize, every constitutional system has a particular configuration in terms of how it treats international obligation. We have established that constitutional provisions on international cooperation vary widely among nations.⁵⁸ The tables below array some of the possible choices. For both CIL and treaties, we ask about the domestic status of international law and its direct applicability, and then provide an ideal-type internationalist position, nationalist position, and an intermediate one. We then show how four representative countries deal with the various choices. The United States is relatively nationalist with regard to its treatment of both custom and treaty, but other countries can approach these two forms of international law differently. Germany is internationalist toward custom but relatively more nationalist toward treaties, while the Netherlands has the reverse configuration. Russia, finally, is internationalist with regard to both. The tables represent obvious simplifications: they ignore complexities related to federalist systems, in which sub-federal units may have their own treaty making powers and have distinct treatment of customary international law. The tables also treat all subjects of international law together, whereas actual constitutional schemes may differentiate among types of treaties, with only certain subjects requiring legislative

⁵⁸ Cf. Duncan Hollis, *A Comparative Approach to Treaty law and Practice*, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 1, 8 (D. Hollis, M. R. Blakeslee, L. B. Ederington, eds., 2005) (states show “surprisingly similar approaches” to treaty practice.)

assent.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, as rough approximations, the table demonstrate the diversity in state constitutional practice. The countries are arrayed from what might be characterized as the most nationalist regime among the four (the United States) to the least nationalist (Russia).

⁵⁹ For a useful table describing variation in this regard, see Hollis, *id.*, at 33.

Figure 1: Design Choices and Domestic Configurations

United States

	Internationalist		Nationalist
Status of CIL?	Superior	Equivalent	Inferior
CIL Directly Applicable?	Incorporation	Incorporated at founding only ⁶⁰	Transformation
Status of treaties v. legislation?	Superior	Later-in-time rule	Inferior
Treaties self-executing?	Yes, all	Some	None

Netherlands

	Internationalist		Nationalist
Status of CIL?	Superior	Equivalent	Inferior
CIL Directly Applicable?	Incorporation	Incorporated at founding only	Transformation
Status of treaties v. legislation?	Superior	Later-in-time rule	Inferior
Treaties self-executing?	Yes, all	Some	none

Germany

	Internationalist		Nationalist
Status of CIL?	Superior	Equivalent	Inferior
CIL Directly Applicable?	Incorporation	Incorporated at founding only	Transformation
Status of treaties v. legislation?	Superior	Later-in-time rule	Inferior
Treaties self-executing?	Yes, all	Some	None

Russia

	Internationalist		Nationalist
Status of CIL?	Superior	Equivalent	Inferior
CIL Directly Applicable?	Incorporation	Incorporated at founding only	Transformation
Status of treaties v. legislation?	Superior	Later-in-time rule	Inferior
Treaties self-executing?	Yes, all	Some	none

⁶⁰ Note that we accept, for purposes of this table, the argument made by Professors Bradley and Goldsmith about the role of customary international law in the domestic U.S. order. Bradley and Goldsmith, *supra* n. 34.

II. How international law can affect the domestic legal order

A. Precommitment Theory

Why might these issues of constitutional design vary across countries? We draw on the literature that treats constitutions as mechanisms for making political precommitments.⁶¹ Imagine a constitution written by a single political leader, seeking to establish legitimate authority. The politician can promise to behave in particular ways, for example, not to interfere with the rights of their citizens. But there is no reason for citizens to believe mere promises from their leader. A promise at Time 1 only has value if the promisee believes that it will be obeyed at Time 2. This problem is particularly acute when the politician cannot predict the incentives he or she will face in the future.⁶² If costs and benefits vary in unpredictable ways, the politician's promise to behave in the specified way may be less believable. To paraphrase Stephen Holmes, why should

⁶¹ JON ELSTER, *ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY* 36-111 (1979); STEPHEN HOLMES, *PRECOMMITMENT AND THE PARADOX OF DEMOCRACY*, in JON ELSTER AND RUNE SLAGSTAD, EDS., *CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY* 195 (CAMBRIDGE 1988); STEPHEN HOLMES, *PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY* 134-77 (1995); JON ELSTER, *ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS* 129-41, 157-61 (2000); but see JEREMY WALDRON, *LAW AND DISAGREEMENT* (1998); Jeremy Waldron, *Precommitment and Disagreement*, in *CONSTITUTIONALISM* 271-99 (LARRY ALEXANDER ED., 1998). See discussion in Ran Hirschl, *The Political Origins of the New Constitutionalism*, 11 *IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD.* 71, 77-78 (2004); *Symposium: Precommitment Theory In Bioethics And Constitutional Law*, 81 *TEX. L. REV.* 1751 (2003). Note that commitment and precommitment are utilized interchangeably in these treatments. See William E. Forbath, *The Politics of Constitutional Design: Obduracy and Amendability—A Comment on Ferejohn and Sager* 81 *TEX. L. REV.* 1965, 1966 n.4 (2003).

⁶² See generally GEORGE W. DOWNS AND DAVID M. ROCKE, *OPTIMAL IMPERFECTION: DOMESTIC UNCERTAINTY AND INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS* (1997).

people believe their leader when sober, knowing that sometimes leaders can become drunk and behave quite differently?⁶³

Facing this problem, a rational constitutional designer might realize that it makes sense to limit her own power, in order to obtain the consent of those they govern.

Democratic constitutions can help to serve this role. As Sunstein says, "Democratic constitutions operate as "precommitment strategies" in which nations, aware of problems that are likely to arise, take steps to ensure that those problems will not arise or that they will produce minimal damage if they do."⁶⁴ Constitutions help make the promises credible by imposing costs on those who violate promises.⁶⁵ By tying their own hands, politicians actually can empower their own authority.

There are, however, myriad ways that constitutions can play this role. Elster elaborates how the constitutional provisions function to both constrain politicians, but also to restrain the power of the people.⁶⁶ For example, in the American context, the existence of a bicameral legislature and an executive veto makes legislation more difficult. This can be seen as a device to restrain the "passions" of the people who might

⁶³ STEPHEN HOLMES, *PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY* 135 (1995);

⁶⁴ Cass Sunstein, *WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO* 241 (2001); see also F.A. Hayek, *THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY* 179 (1960) ([The reason for constitutions] is that all men in the pursuit of immediate aims are apt--or, because of the limitation of their intellect, in fact bound--to violate rules of conduct which they would nevertheless wish to see generally observed. Because of the restricted capacity of our minds, our immediate purposes will always loom large, and we will tend to sacrifice long-term advantages to them.) and discussion in A.C. Pritchard and Todd Zywicki, *Finding The Constitution: An Economic Analysis Of Tradition's Role In Constitutional Interpretation*, 77 N.C.L. REV. 409, 447-49 (1999).

⁶⁵ Oliver Williamson, *Credible Commitments--Using Hostages to Support Exchange*, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983); Barry Weingast, *Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets*, 149 J. INST. THEO. ECON. 286 (1993); Barry Weingast, *The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law*, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245 (1997).

⁶⁶ Jon Elster, *Intertemporal Choice and Political Thought*, in *CHOICE OVER TIME* 35 (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992)

otherwise act through legislative majorities in unwise ways.⁶⁷ Article V is another feature of the United States Constitution that has been analyzed as resolving a commitment problem.⁶⁸ More broadly, scholars have long noted that independent courts form a means for politicians to entrench policies and thus resolve problems of credible commitments.⁶⁹

There is no single generic constitutional design which solves the problem in every country because demands for pre-commitment vary. Designers worried about the “passions” of the majority will tie the hands of the majority by making legislation difficult and subject to judicial scrutiny. Designers worried about long-term economic stability may constitutionalize an independent central bank.⁷⁰ Designers that face

⁶⁷ See James Madison, Federalist 48 and 49.

⁶⁸ Samuel Issacharoff, *The Enabling Role of Democratic Constitutionalism: Fixed Rules and Some Implications for Contested Presidential Elections*, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1985, 1998-99 (2003); Donald J. Boudreaux and A.C. Pritchard, *Rewriting The Constitution: An Economic Analysis Of The Constitutional Amendment Process*, 62 FORDHAM L.J. 111 (1993); John Ferejohn and Lawrence Sager, *Commitment and Constitutionalism*, 81 TEXAS L. REV. 1929 (2003); Cooter, *supra* note 3; Mueller, *supra* note 3.

⁶⁹ William Landes, and Richard Posner, *The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective*, 18 J. L. AND ECON. 875 (1975); see also J. Mark Ramseyer, *The Puzzling (In)Dependence Of Courts: A Comparative Approach*, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 721 (1994) (developing a competing electoral explanation); TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES (2003) (insurance model); Matthew Stephenson, *"When the Devil Turns . . .": The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial Review*, 32 J. Leg. Stud. 59-89 (2003) (electoral model); Keith Whittington, *"Interpose Your Friendly Hand": Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court*, 99 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 583, 584 (2005) (describing entrenchment thesis as current political majorities seeking to insulate policies from future majorities.)

⁷⁰ Politicians fear that were they to have unbridled power to adjust monetary policy, they would pursue expansionary policies to secure short term political gains. Recognizing that their short term preferences may diverge from their long term preferences, politicians can establish an independent central bank that can pursue a long term policy insulated from political control. See also William Bernhard, *A Political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence* 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 311 (1998); SYLVIA MAXFIELD, GATEKEEPERS OF GROWTH: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CENTRAL BANKING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1997); Robert Barro and David Gordon, *Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy*, 12 JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS 101 (1983); James E. Alt,

national security threats may seek to make certain rights non-derogable in emergency situations, so as limit the temptations of military government. Designers may set up a variety of independent regulatory commissions to place specific tasks beyond the reach of normal politics.⁷¹

B. International Law as Pre-Commitment

To the extent that international law binds states and limits the options of policymakers, it can serve as a precommitment device. One way to do this is for constitutional designers to specifically incorporate certain policies and international instruments in the constitutional text.⁷² But they can also seek to structure the mechanisms of precommitment available to *later* politicians. By creating rules that facilitate or hinder international agreements, constitutional designers are designing a structure for future pre-commitments by leaders selected through constitutional mechanisms.⁷³

Explicit characterization of international law as a precommitment device is not frequent but is gaining currency within the growing body of interdisciplinary scholarship

Comparative Political Economy: Credibility, Accountability and Institutions, in *POLITICAL SCIENCE: STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE* 147, 152-53 (Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, eds., 2002) (summarizing empirical evidence.)

⁷¹ Our data indicate that human rights commissions and electoral commissions are the most common variants of these bodies, and that their popularity is increasing over time.

⁷² See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF ARGENTINA (1994) Art. 75.22 (American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; Universal Declaration of Human Rights; American Convention on Human Rights; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); CONSTITUTION OF BENIN (1990), preamble (Charter of the United Nations Of 1945; Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights of 1981).

⁷³ One might characterize of these constitutional provisions as meta-commitments, that is rules structuring the commitment process.

linking international law and international relations.⁷⁴ Most literature to date focuses on how commitment works among states that are each presumed to have a single exogenously defined national interest. Precommitment allows states to signal to other states that they are serious about their promises. Certainly not all international agreements among states are precommitments, in the sense of giving up future choices to guard against preference shifts.⁷⁵ States have many other reasons for entering into agreements, including providing information and expressing “cheap talk” in which they seek to induce behavior by others without cost to themselves. But some kinds of agreements certainly act as precommitments.

Take for example, a foreign investor interested in investing capital into a developing country. The government may promise not to expropriate the capital, but even if the investor believes the sincerity of the promise, the time delay between the promise and the performance creates a problem.⁷⁶ The current government may not last as long as the period needed to recoup the investment. Bilateral investment treaties resolve this problem by making the government promise enforceable in international arbitration. The treaty regime makes the government’s commitment more credible.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Steven R. Ratner, *Precommitment Theory and International Law: Starting a Conversation*, 81 TEXAS L. REV. 2055 (2003); Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, *Hard and Soft Law in International Governance*, 54 INT’L ORG. 421(2000); sources cited in *supra* note 5.

⁷⁵ Ratner, *id.*, at 2070-72.

⁷⁶ Technically, a dynamic inconsistency problem.

⁷⁷ Andrew Guzman, *Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties*, 38 Va. J. Int’l L. 639 (1998); Tom Ginsburg, *International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions Bilateral Investment Treaties and Governance*, 25 INT’L REV. L. AND ECON. 107 (2005); Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman and Beth Simmons, *Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1959-2000*, (Forthcoming in *International Organization* Fall 2006). For empirical studies of BITS see Susan Rose-Ackerman, and Jennifer Tobin, *Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environment in Developing Countries: The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties*, Yale Law & Economics

In the example above, and in most work to date, the promise by the government has an exclusively international audience—in this case the investor—and costs that will be incurred internationally. The argument I wish to focus on is that sometimes international commitment can also work to resolve problems for *domestic* governance. If we relax the conventional modeling assumption of a monadic state, we can see how international agreements can resolve domestic commitment problems.

The function of domestic commitment differs from the international story in that it does not necessarily involve a signal of private information by the politician. When a politician makes an international promise to other states, he or she may try to communicate to other states a level of seriousness about the intent to abide by the promise. The seriousness of the politician is something other states cannot observe directly, so undertaking costly behavior can communicate information to other states about the probability of compliance. The domestic function of international promises does not necessarily require communication of information, but can rely simply on the increased costs associated with violations of international promises. The next section elaborates on these ways in which international promises affect the domestic environment.

Research Paper No. 293 (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=557121); Eric Neumayer, *Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?* Paper on file with author; Jeswald W. Salacuse and Nicholas P Sullivan, *Do BITS Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and their Grand Bargain*, 46 HARV. INT'L L. J. 67 (2005).

C. How International Law Resolves Domestic Commitment Problems

Relatively little attention has been paid to international delegation as a substitute for domestic delegations.⁷⁸ In particular one can think of international law as helping to solve domestic commitment problems. All politicians face problems committing to their promises. In democracies, electoral institutions ensure that the politician will eventually be out of power. Even in an autocracy, however, the risk of coup, revolution or democratization is always present, and supporters of any dictator will discount her promises by the probability of her losing power, however remote that probability may be. We should thus see some demand for devices to ensure that promises will be kept in both democracies and autocracies.⁷⁹

Domestic legislation is one means of entrenching policies beyond the life (or the whim) of current political leaders. A difficult legislative process means that the legislation will be relatively difficult to overturn in future periods. A relatively easy process, by contrast, will mean that legislation is of less value in situations of electoral uncertainty, because a future politician can easily undo today's policies.

A party that is unsure it will remain in power in the future may wish to entrench its policies in the form of treaties. Since international agreements are typically costly to

⁷⁸ But see Brewster, *supra* note 11; Andrew Moravcsik, *The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe*, 54 INT'L ORG. 217 (1995). Voigt and Salzberger provide one of the few attempts to think through the delegation to international and domestic institutions. Stefan Voigt and Eli Salzberger, *Choosing Not to Choose: When Politicians Choose to Delegate Powers*, 55 KYKLOS 289-310 (2002). In later work, Voigt and co-authors find support for some of these hypotheses. See, e.g., Stefan Voigt, Michael Ebeling & Lorenz Blume, *Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence - the Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council*, Discussion Papers in Economics 67/04, University of Kassel, Institute of Economics (2004); Stefan Voigt, *Membership has its Privileges - On the Effects of Delegating Powers Internationally*, Discussion Papers in Economics 73/05, University of Kassel, Institute of Economics (2005), available at <http://ideas.repec.org/e/pvo43.html>

⁷⁹ Cf. Downs and Rocke, *supra* note 62, and Brewster, *supra* note 11 (both focusing on elections as the main source of uncertainty).

undo, a policy that is entrenched internationally may survive the demise of the current political coalition or even regime.⁸⁰ This increases the value of the commitment made to one's supporters at the time of the promise. The constitutional difficulty of entrenching policies may thereby be correlated with the demand for entrenchment, rendering commitments more valuable.

International commitment devices work in three different ways.⁸¹ First, international commitments can generate information on the behavior of politicians in future periods. This is relevant when the behavior in question is difficult for the domestic constituents to observe. A politician that promises to undertake a particular course of action can enhance the value of his promise by utilizing international monitors, beyond the reach of *any* domestic politician, to generate neutral and valuable information on performance.

Second, politicians can in effect bond their behavior by making sure that any future violation of the promise will generate costs from international actors. A government promise to submit to international arbitration for investment disputes means that the government may have to pay compensation if it violates its promises. Here, it is the simple cost associated with violation, rather than information generated from abroad, that renders the mechanism useful for enhancing commitment.

Third, politicians can make a credible commitment by delegating the decision-making authority to an independent international actor. In this mode, the politician

⁸⁰ For a similar observation focused on the tensions with democratic theory see Terence Daintith, *Is International Law the Enemy of National Democracy?* in *AMBIGUITY IN THE RULE OF LAW: THE INTERFACE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS* 115, 119 (Thomas A.J.A. Vandamme and Jan-Herman Reestman, eds., 2001).

⁸¹ Compare Pritchard and Zywicki, *supra* note 64, on the precommitment and agency roles of constitutions.

guards against his or her future preference shifts by completely ceding decision-making authority. Let us consider each of these mechanisms in turn.

1. Information for Domestic Groups

The first modality of international commitment is information generation. Making an international commitment can generate information for domestic actors that might otherwise be unavailable to them. International organizations, foreign states, and non-governmental organizations have, under certain circumstances, an incentive to monitor the performance of the state.⁸² It is well understood that this information produced by international organizations and other states can help third states decide how to treat the state in question.⁸³ But the information can also be useful for domestic constituencies. Voters can learn about the nonperformance of their leaders.⁸⁴ Domestic interest groups can determine whether politicians are delivering on promises to act on the international plane. This information can reduce or eliminate the agency problem for voters and interest groups, and thus be advantageous to political leaders seeking their support *ex ante*.

Take for example, a state that commits to an environmental agreement, in part, to satisfy a domestic environmentalist movement. The agreement may include a scientific monitoring body to identify overly high levels of pollution, providing information to

⁸² On NGOs, see Eugene Kontorovich, *Is Customary International Law Efficient?* American Law and Economics Association Annual Meetings, 2006, at 49; Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS* (1998).

⁸³ Keohane, *AFTER HEGEMONY* (1984);

⁸⁴ Helen V. Milner, *Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements*, 56 *INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION* 477-513 (2002). Brewster, *supra* note 11, at 15-17.

domestic actors who can pressure their state to comply.⁸⁵ Another example comes from the trade law field.⁸⁶ Trade policy, with its multi-sectoral tradeoffs and package structure, may be particularly amenable to cycling problems. This would occur when groups seek to re-open negotiations so as to secure a better deal for themselves, and no particular solution is likely to be stable in repeated pairwise voting.⁸⁷ Domestic interest groups may therefore wish to lock-in whatever bargain they are able to obtain, and to entrench the agreement, protecting their gains from future renegotiation. The effectiveness of the WTO as an institution, including both its dispute resolution provisions and the broader role it plays in providing information, helps to let interest groups know if their own government is upholding the agreement. This can help them direct lobbying efforts to maintain the course.

This information modality works through enhancing the possibility of *domestic* punishment of a politician who violates his or her promise. The actual cost is incurred domestically, but the international obligation makes that cost more likely by providing incentives to generate and transmit information.⁸⁸ The key factor is the interaction of the domestic and international levels of governance.

⁸⁵ Keck and Sikkink, *supra* note 82.

⁸⁶ Milner, *supra* note 84.

⁸⁷ On cycling, see generally KENNETH J. ARROW, *SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES* (2d. ed., 1963). Arrow provides five assumptions that cannot all coexist with rational decisionmaking: range (all participants can rank all choices); universal domain (all aggregate rankings are possible); unanimity (any pareto optimal proposal will be adopted); nondictatorship (no preferences are imposed); and independence of irrelevant alternatives, that only pairwise voting proceeds at each step). See also Francesco Parisi, *Sources of Law and the Institutional Design of Lawmaking*, George Mason University Law and Economics Working Paper No. 00-42 (Nov. 2000) at 5.

⁸⁸ One can characterize this as a solution whereby principals--the voters and interest groups in a domestic political environment—are able to reduce their agency costs. For more on principal-agent models, see Eric A. Posner, *Agency Models in Legal Scholarship*, in *CHICAGO LECTURES*

2. Obligation for International Enforcement

International law can also increase directly the cost of noncompliance with an obligation. In general, international obligations are enforced in at least four different ways.⁸⁹ For some categories of obligation, particularly involving coordination problems, international obligations can be self-enforcing in that neither party has an incentive to deviate.⁹⁰ In other situations, parties to an agreement can enforce the agreement directly through retaliation. This mechanism works in repeated play games, iterated over time, as in the paradigmatic prisoners' dilemma example.⁹¹ Obligations can also be enforced through reputational sanctions enforced by third parties.⁹² Finally, and relatively rarely, violations can lead to direct financial or materialsanctions. For our purposes, the main point is that violations of international obligations are, under some circumstances, accompanied by *some* cost at the international level.⁹³ In turn, this can reduce the

IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 225 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000) (discussing principal-agent model); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., *Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control*, 3 J. LAW, ECON., & ORG. 243 (1987) (applying principal-agent model to the administrative state); Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, *Decision Costs and Strategic Design of Administrative Process and Judicial Review*, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 347, 361-62 (1997) (applying principal-agent model to judicial review).

⁸⁹ Robert Scott & Paul B. Stephan, *Self-Enforcing International Agreements and the Limits of Coercion*, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 551, 580-81 (2004).

⁹⁰ Tom Ginsburg and Richard McAdams, *Adjudicating in Anarchy; An Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution* 45 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 1229 (2004).

⁹¹ KEOHANE, *AFTER HEGEMONY* (1984); ROBERT AXELROD, *THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION* (1984).

⁹² Scott and Stephan, *supra* note 89 at 101.

⁹³ Note that I am not asserting or assuming perfect compliance with international obligations, or that *all* violations of international obligations will lead to costs. So long as there is some positive probability of an international cost, the function of enhancing commitment can be effective.

incentives for violating the promise, and make the promise more effective for *domestic* groups.

As an illustrative example, consider the minorities regimes that were an important class of treaties in Europe between World War I and World War II.⁹⁴ The end of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires led to the creation of many new states in Eastern Europe. But this created a new set of problems, in that national and ethnic groups did not always reside within the borders of the state. Certain states, beginning with Poland and Czechoslovakia, concluded treaties with Great Powers promising to protect minority rights within their jurisdictions.⁹⁵ In these treaties, the state promised to ensure protection and a certain degree of self-determination for ethnic minorities within its territories. These were important antecedents for the flowering of human rights law after World War II.⁹⁶

How did the minorities regimes work? The conventional understanding of these treaties is that the audience for them was primarily international. By concluding the agreement with Great Powers, the states in question posted a reputational bond for their positive treatment of minorities.⁹⁷ The Great Powers would no doubt monitor the new states' performance and might also sanction a state that violated the terms. A state that

⁹⁴ Discussed in Henkin *supra* note 18; Fred Morrison, *Between a Rock and Hard Place*, 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 31, 35-38 (2005); John R. Valentine, *Toward a Definition of National Minority*, 32 DENVER J. INT'L L. AND POL'Y 445, 450-51 (2004); JACOB ROBINSON ET AL., WERE THE MINORITIES TREATIES A FAILURE? 3-4 (1943).

⁹⁵ Treaty of Poland, Aug. 23, 1919, S. Doc. No. 82 (1919); Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Czechoslovakia, signed at St. Germain-en-Laye, Sept. 10, 1919, 226 Consol. T.S. 170.

⁹⁶ Henkin *supra* note 18.

⁹⁷ On bonding see Larry Ribstein, *Cross-listing and Regulatory Competition*, paper available at www.ssrn.com; Amir N. Licht, *Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or Avoiding?* 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 141 (2003).

mistreated its own ethnic minorities would now suffer reputational harm, and potentially even suffer international economic or military sanction. The audience for this signal included the voters and governments of the large international powers, whose support was needed for the prospective states to come into being.

But it is important to note that the audience for the signal was also domestic, within the new countries making the promise. The minorities in question, residing in the midst of larger groups of others, can hardly have been enthusiastic about the creation of nation-states around them that were explicitly based on ethnic nationalism of the dominant group. One might expect them to have resisted a development which made them suddenly a conspicuous “outsider” in a nationalistic polity of insiders. The new governments needed to reassure these minorities. To do this, they could have promised to treat the minorities well in a domestic constitution or piece of legislation, but by making the promise in the form of an international treaty, the promise had greater credibility. This promise, in turn, may have helped the politicians establishing the new nations, because it reduced the probability that the minorities would resist the new government.⁹⁸ The international promise had domestic ramifications, ultimately reinforcing sovereignty by minimizing internal dissension.

Trade law provides another example. The WTO provides information, typically generated by national reports and other nations' complaints, that may be of value to domestic interest groups unsure of their politicians' performance of agreements.⁹⁹ But it also has “teeth” in the form of dispute resolution provisions known as the Dispute

⁹⁸ See also Ratner, *supra* note 74, at 2065-66 (discussing *uti possidetis* principle in post-colonial Africa along similar lines.)

⁹⁹ See Milner, *supra* note 84.

Settlement Understanding (DSU). These authorize bilateral retaliation against violators of the agreement. The dispute resolution process also provides a coordination point that can facilitate reputational sanctions.¹⁰⁰ The DSU provides a framework for increasing the possibility of internationally-generated costs for violations of the WTO agreements. This means that domestic interest groups such as exporters that value access to foreign markets can count on an international sanction against their own government should it renege on the agreement, raising the value of the promise to keep foreign markets open.¹⁰¹ These examples show that in some cases, one interest group can entrench policies at the international level so as to survive the fall of the current government or even regime type.

3. Delegation

The third modality is to completely remove the politician's ability to influence the policy. This mode relies not so much on costs to be imposed on domestic government, but on isolating decisions from the control of those governments.

One possible example is the international security system. All nations, under the United Nations Charter, give up the right to threaten to use force against other states.¹⁰² They also delegate to the Security Council the right to determine threats to peace and security, and to decide what actions must be taken to maintain global order. A politician might value this loss of control in order to resist domestic pressures to start wars, and to

¹⁰⁰ Ginsburg and McAdams, *supra* note 90; see generally, Richard McAdams. *The Expressive Power of Adjudication*, 2005U . ILL. L. REV. 1049 (developing expressive theory of adjudication).

¹⁰¹ Brewster, *supra* note 11, at 15.

¹⁰² Art. 2(4).

assure domestic interest groups (such as pacifists or mothers) that they will not start wars in the future. This self-binding makes the commitment credible.

To the extent that international obligations involve giving up control to other actors or to exogenous shocks, they reduce domestic accountability and flexibility. For example, after the currency crises of the 1990s Argentina sought to commit itself to stable policies by tying the peso to the United States Dollar. This worked precisely because American monetary policy was unlikely to be made with Argentina's interests in mind. Argentina thus committed itself to following uncertain future policies, by definition outside the control of Argentine citizens.

Committing to a monetary policy made outside ones borders, such as in the Argentine example or in other countries' signing of agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), is conventionally understood as a way of delegating decision-making to attract international capital. I do not contest that delegation may primarily be addressed to international audiences. But the audience for such moves can *also* be domestic. Argentina's move not only attracted international capital, but also assured citizens that they need not remove all their assets from the country. Delegation made the commitment credible in a way that a simple domestic promise could not.

D. International Law's Advantages

As noted above in Section II.A., international obligation is not the only means of entrenching policies. However, international law has significant advantages relative to legislative supermajorities, an independent judiciary, or a specialized independent regulatory agencies. A state can set up an independent judiciary, but legislative majorities

can always later intimidate the judges or change their jurisdiction. An independent judiciary may enhance the value of legislation, but there is nothing to prevent future majorities from enacting new legislation.¹⁰³ And even independent regulatory commissions can be bribed, intimidated, or captured by determined majorities.

International legal actors, by contrast, are more difficult to control. International organizations and courts are beyond the control of any single country, even the most powerful. Indeed, this is the source of the oft-remarked “democratic deficit” in international institutions, a sentiment that is strongest in the United States. The democratic deficit, ironically, may be a *good* thing to the extent that it facilitates the entrenchment of democratically enacted policies.

Independent of its reliance on insulated decision-makers, international commitment may be a better device to entrench policies simply because it is typically more difficult to achieve than ordinary legislation. In the United States, some international agreements may be more difficult to enact than ordinary legislation, but others may not be. Other constitutional schemes vary in terms of the relative difficulty of legislation and treaties. Where treaties are easier to enact than legislation, their value as a commitment device would obviously be reduced. But this seems to be a rare configuration.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ This is a point not adequately considered in the original Landes/Posner paper.

¹⁰⁴ Stefan Voigt, *The Interplay Between National and International Law: Its Economic Effects Drawing on Four New Indicators*, working paper, University of Kassel, 2005 (on file with author). Note that constitutional amendment ought also be taken into account in developing an economic model of the tradeoffs among law-making devices. Even if treaties are more difficult to entrench than legislation, they will be less reliable as entrenchment devices where the constitution is easier to amend because amendment can over-ride treaty commitments. The French experience with the European Union illustrates this story. French courts found several new commitments of the European Union to be incompatible with the French constitution, which was promptly amended. Dominique Remy-Granger, *The Ambiguities of the State Based on the*

There is another reason international law may provide more credible commitments than domestic legislation. The relevant unit of analysis in international law is the state, not the government. New governments can come into power, but they are still bound by the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* and must perform the obligations entered into by a previous regime.¹⁰⁵ This is true, even if the changes are of momentous nature. For example, in the *Gabcikovo* case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) insisted that states retained obligations entered into by communist governments operating under a very different economic system in which the relevant level of planning was multinational.¹⁰⁶ Hungary and Czechoslovakia had concluded an agreement to build a joint dam that made sense under the socialist system, but was seen as both environmentally and economically unfeasible after the fall of communism. When both Hungary and the Slovak Republic (a successor nation to Czechoslovakia) asserted violations of the agreement, the ICJ had to decide whether the circumstances had changed so significantly that the states had been released from their obligations. The ICJ found that the obligation remained even though economic and environmental rationales for the planned dam had been utterly transformed. In this sense, a constitutional design providing for a particular model of treaty entry will be locked in even against future constitutional change, outlasting the government, the entire regime, and even (as in the

Rule of Law: A Unitary System à la Française, in *AMBIGUITY IN THE RULE OF LAW: THE INTERFACE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS* 53-62 (Thomas A.J.A. Vandamme and Jan-Herman Reestman, eds., 2001).

¹⁰⁵ Brewster, *supra* note 11, at 13; See also Ratner *supra* note 74, at 2061.

¹⁰⁶ *Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slov.)*, 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25); Eyal Benvenisti, *Domestic Politics and International Resources: What Role for International Law?*, in *THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW* 109, 114 n.21 (Michael Byers, ed., 2000).

Gabcikovo case) the state itself. This has the effect of strengthening treaty commitments relative to legislation.

E. International Law's Disadvantages

The very qualities that give international law its power to make credible commitments in the domestic sphere—a decision to give up control—have costs. These costs come in two forms. First are those rooted in the “persistent uncertainty” that permeates the international arena.¹⁰⁷ Second are agency problems associated with international governance.

First, the international arena is constantly changing. New states come into being, while old ones die or break up; rising powers displace erstwhile hegemons; and new technologies change the relative position of states. The variation in conditions over time means that it is difficult to determine in advance the costs that will be associated from violating an international obligation. Some of these costs depend on other states voluntarily punishing the violating state through bilateral retaliation or third-party reputational sanctions. These decisions will be made in accordance with the particular political situation of the potential enforcer at the time of violation, as well as the relative power of the violator. From the point of view of a domestic interest group seeking to entrench its policies in international obligations, this reduces the certainty of an externally imposed cost.

¹⁰⁷ Barbara Koremenos, *Contracting Around International Uncertainty*, 99 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 549, 550 (2005).

Koremenos models the world of treaty making as subject to a series of exogenous shocks which affect the distribution of gains from an agreement.¹⁰⁸ The shocks are not anticipatable, observable only at a cost, and cumulative. This means that as time goes on the difference between the initial and anticipated distribution of gains and the actual distribution in any period can grow quite large. Under these circumstances, Koremenos argues that states may prefer international agreements that are short in duration so as to allow renegotiation, particularly when uncertainties abound as to the future distribution of gains. By analogy, a domestic interest group relying on international commitments to entrench policies faces increasing variance in the prospect of externally imposed costs—although there is potential for the probability of enforcement to *increase* as well as to *decrease*, depending on the direction of change in the international arena. To the extent states are risk-averse, however, they will view the dynamic quality of international legal enforcement as a disadvantage.

Second, international obligations sometimes involve delegation to international organizations or actors that are unaccountable to *any* domestic body. It is sometimes asserted that a growing array of regulatory and government decisions are made by “networks” of regulators working across boundaries.¹⁰⁹ These networks, or epistemic communities, are given these powers because of their technocratic expertise in an increasingly complex world. But, even more than domestic regulators, their insulation

¹⁰⁸ Koremenos, *supra* at 550.

¹⁰⁹ Anne-Marie Slaughter, *The Accountability of Government Networks*, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 347 (2001); Anne-Marie Slaughter, *Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies and Disaggregated Democracy*, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L 1041 (2003); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2000); Peter M. Haas, *Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination*, 46 INT'L ORG. 1, 3 (1992); Peter M. Haas, SAVING THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (1990).

from control means that they are not accountable. This implicates the familiar problem of principal and agent. The national governments, duly elected by their citizens, may delegate decision-making to networks of bureaucrats, but there is always the risk that the bureaucrats act in their own collective interest rather than that of any national government.

These forms of uncertainty cut *against* international commitment. There is thus a tradeoff between enhanced credibility of commitments through international entrenchment, which is facilitated by giving up control of policies, and the risks of agency costs and exogenous change that are inherent in the international environment. Given that there are disadvantages as well as advantages to international commitments, we ought not to expect every state to have identical constitutional provisions, nor should we anticipate that patterns will be stable over time. Some periods, when there is a good deal of change in the international arena, will be riskier for delegation. In contrast, when international law is stable and enforcement is predictable, the advantages of international commitment increase for domestic actors.

F. The relative advantages of custom and treaty

We have now seen that international commitments have certain advantages, including insulation of decision-makers and the fact that commitments will survive changes in government or even state structure. They also have disadvantages: the insulated decision-makers may be unaccountable, and the changing nature of the international environment generates unpredictability. With these in mind, this section

considers the relative advantage of custom and treaty in terms of facilitating international commitments for domestic actors.

Traditional international lawyers tended to view the international system as unitary in character and cooperation as normatively desirable as an end in itself. Viewing “international obligation” as unitary makes it difficult to understand why it is that states would differ in terms of their treatment of custom and treaty. While customary international law and treaty law are different in structure and character, most scholarship to date has tended to treat states as having propensities toward cooperation which may vary by issue area but not by instrument type. In practice, however, states tend to vary their constitutional acceptance of forms of international law by instrument, with custom and treaty being treated differently.¹¹⁰

1. Custom

For present purposes we focus on the distinct processes by which international obligations are formed. Whereas consent is explicit in treaty commitments, consent can be implicit in the case of customary international law (CIL) –states are considered permanently bound unless they persistently object to an emerging rule. Another key distinction between customary international law and treaty law is that CIL is created in a decentralized fashion. States, through costly action and *opinio juris*, do create CIL. But the decisions to undertake the action, and the decisions as to what actions “count,” are

¹¹⁰ See e.g., Figure 1, *supra*; Voigt, *supra* n. 104. In reality, the distinction between CIL and treaties is also overstated. For example, many investment treaties explicitly or implicitly invoke customary international law as the standard for expropriation. Andrea Bjorklund, *Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor Protection in Denial of Justice Claims*, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 809, 891-92 (2005) (discussing United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty and NAFTA).

highly decentralized. When a sufficient number of states (the precise number is unclear) have acted in a way to indicate adoption of the rule, the rule “crystallizes” into CIL and thence binds all states that do not persistently object.¹¹¹

These rules are puzzling in a number of ways.¹¹² In particular, they do not seem to acknowledge the presence of persistent uncertainty that marks the international system.¹¹³ A state may at T1 be neutral towards a particular rule, and thus fail to persistently object. Exogenous shocks, however, can significantly affect the distributional gains from a rule of CIL. If so, then the state could find itself in a position where a rule it favored or was neutral towards at T1 has significant costs at T2. It will nevertheless be bound.¹¹⁴ Unlike treaties, which have exit provisions,¹¹⁵ CIL commitments cannot be unilaterally denounced after they have become binding. The only way to escape the obligation will be to convince other states that the rule is ineffective and should give way to a new rule.

This uncertainty might seem to make CIL a particularly attractive commitment device. By joining international regimes which impose costs, a state seems to signal commitment to abide by the obligation *even if it becomes costly to do so in the future*. If Koremenos is correct, this function should be stronger with CIL, which is time-unlimited,

¹¹¹ Michael Byers, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998); Eugene Kontorovich, *Is Customary International Law Efficient?* American Law and Economics Association Annual Meetings, 2006.

¹¹² See also Eugene Kontorovich, *Is Customary International Law Efficient?* American Law and Economics Association Annual Meetings, 2006.

¹¹³ Koremenos, *supra* note 107.

¹¹⁴ Of course, if *enough* states find themselves in this position, the rule of CIL can change. In practice, however, examples of CIL change seems to indicate that strong and powerful states have an inordinate influence on the process. Thus a state of middling power can not anticipate much future control over the international legal system.

¹¹⁵ Helfer, *supra* note 51.

than with agreements which can be and (as she demonstrates) frequently are limited temporally, and can be exited.¹¹⁶

But the problem is that a state cannot specify the *content* of customary international law in the same way that a state can specify treaty obligations. Custom is vague.¹¹⁷ The content is beyond the control of any state. The determination of rules is quite decentralized, with national court decisions, international organization statements, policy pronouncements, scholarly writings and various other materials being commonly cited for support of a particular rule proposed by the analyst. The rules are also adjudicated by myriad bodies, without any centralized mechanism for appeal or control of norm-generation. The potential benefits of CIL as an entrenchment device are outweighed by its inability to specify authoritatively the particular policy to be entrenched.

The value of entrenchment may also be reduced because CIL also relies nearly exclusively on the executive branch in terms of its definition and implementation.¹¹⁸ Much of the evidence for state practice and consent to rules of custom comes from statements by the executive. The executive, typically a ministry of foreign affairs,

¹¹⁶ All this assumes that CIL agreements will be enforced. See Scott and Stephen, *supra* note 89.

¹¹⁷ Brownlie, *supra* note 6, at 50 (“many rules of CIL do not provide precise guidance for their application on the national plane.”) Of course, this might explain why states tolerate it. Since the obligations are not precise, states can shift their positions on the interpretation of particular rules in different situations, to a certain degree.

¹¹⁸ See also, Julian G. Ku, *Structural Conflicts in the Interpretation of Customary International Law*, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 101, 106-08 (2005) (characterizing Executive as primary in the U.S. allocation of powers with regard to CIL). The executive primacy in customary international lawmaking is even more pronounced in parliamentary systems, in which the government is formed out of the legislature. In these systems the executive predominates both in reacting to statements of custom, as well as domestic lawmaking. Compare Joanna Harrington, *Scrutiny and Approval: The Role for Westminster-style Parliaments in Treaty-making* 55 INT’L COMP L.Q. 121 (2006) (discussing parliamentary systems’ adjustments to potential executive dominance).

usually has internal bureaucratic competence for representing the state abroad and will be the actor best situated to monitor and respond to proposed new rules of customary international law. While legislation certainly can provide evidence for state practice and *opinion juris*, generally speaking the executive is in the best position to monitor and respond to changing rules of CIL. In addition, the requirement of state *practice* is heavily weighted toward the executive branch, for it is national bureaucracies that must ultimately undertake actions enforcing or failing to enforce any particular rule.¹¹⁹ All this means that the commitment is within the control of a single branch, so that as control of that branch changes, policy may change too easily.

In terms of the modalities through which international law solves domestic commitment problems, these qualities of custom outweigh its temporal advantages of long-term commitment (or at least commitment of uncertain duration). Because CIL is vague and adjudicated in myriad, unpredictable places, it has relatively little ability to generate information for domestic interest groups. Because the enforcement of customary international law is highly decentralized, states face a collective action problem in enforcing norms. No state has an incentive to incur the costs of enforcing a rule of CIL against a violating state, or generating information for domestic interest groups.¹²⁰ CIL's only advantage as a precommitment device is that it essentially delegates the law-making function to the collectivity of states. Even here, though, CIL's vagueness renders it ineffective. The broad range of topics that CIL covers means that no domestic interest group can be confident that CIL will evolve to cover its specific area of

¹¹⁹ My analysis is consistent with John Setear, *Treaties, Custom, Iteration and Public Choice*, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 715 (2005).

¹²⁰ See also Eugene Kontorovich, *A Positive Theory of Universal Jurisdiction*, paper on file with author.

concern. CIL's weakness bodes poorly for its usage to resolve domestic commitment problems.¹²¹

2. Treaties

In contrast with custom, treaty making structures have been regularly modeled as a signal to communicate credibility of commitment.¹²² Because legislatures have the ability to frustrate implementation of democratic agreements, other states may not believe the executive branch without legislative acquiescence to treaties. Legislative involvement in treaty-making communicates information to other state as to which type of agreements will be enforced by the state and which will not. They are thus commitment-enhancing.

This implies a tradeoff. Countries with more difficult treaty-making processes will tend to have fewer agreements, but they will be more credible, since the cost of legislative involvement itself communicates information about the probabilities of

¹²¹ Kontorovich, id.; J. Patrick Kelly, *The Twilight of Customary International Law*, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449, 452 (2000); Samuel Estreicher, *Rethinking the Binding Effect of Customary International Law*, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 5 (2003).

¹²² Jeffrey Frieden and Lisa L. Martin, *International Political Economy: Global and Domestic Interactions* in POLITICAL SCIENCE: STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 118, 124 (Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, eds., 2002). Lisa Martin, *The United States and International Commitments: Treaties as Signaling Devices* (January 2003) (showing the choice between executive agreements and treaties is a signal of intention to comply); Setear, *supra* note 44; see also Helen V. Milner, THE INTERACTION OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN OIL NEGOTIATIONS AND IN THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION NEGOTIATIONS, 1943-1947, in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 207, 217 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1993) (shifting an oil accord from an executive agreement to a treaty subject to Senate ratification prevented the ultimate acceptance of the accord).

compliance.¹²³ Constitutional designers have to balance cost and commitment, credibility and cooperation.¹²⁴

Two level game theory has long been used to analyze the treaty negotiation process.¹²⁵ This theory models the interaction between domestic and international bargaining. One branch of the theory, initially suggested by Thomas Schelling, suggests that domestic constraint can be used by international negotiators to secure advantages.¹²⁶ By having their hands credibly tied by domestic interests, authorities working on the international plane may be able to secure a better bargain than they otherwise would.¹²⁷ Of course, having ones hand tied too tightly can prevent any deal from happening at all.¹²⁸ Much of the empirical evidence, drawn from trade bargaining, is not consistent with the Schelling conjecture,¹²⁹ but this may be in part because the models do not always address the possibility that too much domestic constraint can hinder agreement altogether, so that the relationship between domestic constraint and international advantage is non-monotonic.

¹²³ Brewster, *supra* note 11, argues that the domestic structure of international agreements will determine their propensity and type. It is important to remember that structure alone will not be dispositive; demand factors such as the need for commitment must also be taken into account. More difficult treaty processes may be more valuable and hence increase demand.

¹²⁴ Henkin, *supra* note 40, at 174 (“Because they took treaties and international obligations seriously, the Framers were not eager for the United States to conclude treaties lightly or widely, and were disposed to render it difficult to make them.”)

¹²⁵ Robert Putnam, *Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games*, 42 INT'L ORG. 427, 451 (1988). Note two level game theory has usually focused on pre-agreement negotiations. We widen the scope of two-level game theory to consider the optimal constitutional design to facilitate good agreements. One can think about this as three level game theory.

¹²⁶ THOMAS SCHELLING, *THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT* 28-29 (1960).

¹²⁷ SCHELLING, *id.*; Putnam, *supra* n. 125.

¹²⁸ Frieden and Martin, *supra* n.122 at 124.

¹²⁹ Robert Pahre, *Endogenous Domestic Institutions in Two-Level Games and Parliamentary Oversight of the European Union*, J. CONFL. RES. 147 (1997) (summarizing literature); see also Frieden and Martin, *supra* n.122 at 125.

This is the tension at the heart of these models. There is an optimal level of cost for international agreements—not so high as to make valuable agreements difficult to reach, but high enough to communicate to other states the seriousness of the obligation. The precise balance between costliness and flexibility will depend on a variety of factors, discussed in the next section. But there is no universally proper balance, and states will have different optimal schemes.

Brewster considers the objection that treaties may not be effective entrenchment devices because they can be exited.¹³⁰ She notes, though, that treaties are *relatively* entrenched. Sometimes treaties are interlinked with other agreements, that makes withdrawal from any one more difficult. They also embed multiple commitments into a single instrument, binding the various substantive provisions together. In some constitutional schemes (though not the American), exiting a treaty requires the explicit consent of the legislature or other bodies that acceded to the treaties. In the analysis that follows, we make the assumption that exiting treaty obligations is costly. Indeed, one wonders why it is that countries would expend the energy to make international commitments unless they believed they would be at least probably binding.

3. Treaty v. Custom

With regard to the modalities of information, enforcement and delegation discussed in Part II.C., treaties have significant advantages over custom.¹³¹ Treaties can

¹³⁰ Brewster, *supra* note 11, at 17-18.

¹³¹ Of course, the precise distinction between treaty and custom used in this article is overstated. Sometimes treaties will serve as evidence of custom, and some treaties will incorporate customary international law into the treaty. They are complements as well as substitutes. For ease of explication, however, we consider the choice between treaty and custom to be a binary one.

tailor the information-generating mechanisms to address the precise needs of domestic interest groups. The complex law of treaty reservations allows states to tailor even multilateral obligations to a great degree. Furthermore, treaty regimes identify specific counter-parties, who therefore have an incentive to enforce the norms either directly or reputationally.¹³² This is quite a contrast with CIL, the enforcement of which is decentralized and therefore subject to a collective action problem for states. Treaties also can provide clear, bounded delegation of particular decisions. The plasticity and vagueness of CIL obligations, though not infinite, suggest that states will prefer treaty obligations. Figure 2 summarizes the relative qualities of custom and treaty in terms of the three modalities of enhancing commitments discussed in Section II.C.

Figure 2: Functions of Enhancing Commitment

	Information Provision	International Enforcement	Delegation of Decisions
Custom	Collective action problem for identifying violations-low	Weak – decentralized	Easy-but no clear decision-maker
Treaty	Mechanisms can be tailored-potentially high	Varies – but potentially high through reciprocity, reputation	Easy-can identify and tailor the decision-maker

As the table indicates, treaty obligations dominate custom along all three dimensions of enhancing commitment. CIL is worse at providing information and norm-enforcement because states are subject to collective action problems. Delegation of decision-making is easy in the sense that states give up complete control of norm-

¹³² The incentive is relative to the decentralized regime of CIL enforcement.

production when they accept a CIL obligation, but the lack of an identified decision-maker to articulate norms makes it inferior to treaties, where the scope and scale of delegation can be precisely designed.

The only other rationalist analysis of the choice between treaty and custom that I know of is that of Professor Setear.¹³³ In comparing two rationalist theories of international cooperation, which he labels the iterative perspective and the public choice perspective, Setear analyzes the Executive branch choice of different instruments of international cooperation in the United States. Professor Setear accurately points out that CIL is primarily determined by the Executive branch in the United States and elsewhere. The Executive makes policy statements, takes positions at international gatherings, and conducts other actions that will count for *opinio juris*. Setear then asserts that public choice theory suggests that executives should prefer customary international law because the Executive has more or less sole control of CIL. Control means that the Executive will be able to extract more rents from interest groups, relative to treaties which require sharing rents with the legislature.

This argument fails to consider that the value of the rents generated may systematically differ between treaty and custom. As Setear acknowledges, CIL may be a less *effective* form of lawmaking because it is fuzzy, has an unclear temporal aspect, and does not have authoritative means for determining applicable rules.¹³⁴ This means that any actor seeking to “sell” CIL rules to interest groups will face a discounted price for those rules. A rational executive considering whether to use custom or treaty will maximize rents. Even though treaty rents must be shared with a legislature, the benefits

¹³³ Setear, *supra* note 5.

¹³⁴ Setear, *id.*

in precision and predicted enforcement may be well worth favoring that instrument when compared with vague customs whose formation is primarily controlled by the executive.

A commitment perspective supports this interpretation. Because treaties are costly, they would be worth more to interest groups than a customary international law obligation, even if precision of obligation were identical.¹³⁵ Treaties are also more likely to be enforced, as the preceding analysis demonstrates. A more costly treaty process may be worth more to interest groups than a simple treaty process, and certainly more than a CIL process, which is likely to be dominated by “cheap talk.”

III. Empirical Implications and Hypotheses

This article has suggested that greater attention needs to be paid to domestic constitutional and political structures as determinants of international legal behavior. To be sure, a number of authors have made similar calls in recent years, typically those associated with the “liberal” school of international law/international relations scholarship.¹³⁶ Few, however, have actually tested the implications of this call. This section develops empirical tests of the theory outlined here.

We begin with the assumption of a single constitutional designer considering three issues: (1) whether to make customary international law directly applicable in the

¹³⁵One further piece of evidence for the commitment perspective is the fact that the United States executive generally seems to prefer the simpler executive agreement format over the more difficult formal treaty process. However, U.S. agreements with democracies are more likely to take the more costly treaty form. Loch K. Johnson, *THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: CONGRESS CONFRONTS THE EXECUTIVE* 40-41 (1984) (providing evidence).

¹³⁶Raustiala, *Form and Substance in International Agreements*, 99 *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW* 581-614 (2005) Slaughter’s various “liberal” work; Brewster, *supra* note 11; Andrew Moravcsik, *Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics*, 51 *INT’L ORG.* 513 (1997).

domestic legal order (for simplicity, we set aside the issue of superiority); (2) how difficult to make the treaty process; and (3) whether to make treaties superior to domestic law. We assume that *any* international obligation comes with a positive probability of some form of international enforcement, either in the form of generating information for domestic groups or a sanction, reputational or otherwise, imposed at the international level. The probability of other states expending resources in this manner increases monotonically with the perceived level of commitment of the state in question. We assume that the domestic judiciary will enforce international legal norms in the manner the constitutional designer provides for.¹³⁷ A final assumption is that there are certain public goods for domestic actors, such as access to foreign markets and international security, that can *only* be obtained at the international level. This means that states have a positive incentive to facilitate international commitments, although states may vary in their demand for commitments.

Each decision involves a choice about commitment structure. As described in the previous section, monist incorporation of CIL into domestic law has serious defects, because the *content* of norms, as well as the *costs* of violation, are quite variant in a changing international environment. We should expect this device to be utilized only when there are particular kinds of public goods that can only be obtained from the international commitment, for which substitute mechanisms are insufficient.

Optimal difficulty of treaty commitment processes requires a balancing of the need for credibility of commitments with the need for an effective process to secure

¹³⁷ This assumption is heroic, of course, but serves the present discussion.

public goods at the international level.¹³⁸ Processes that allow international commitment too easily do not allow policy entrenchment for domestic interests. Neither do they facilitate credible signals on the international plane. Therefore a rational constitutional designer will want to facilitate some level of difficulty for international commitments. The level of commitment (which involves the issue of superiority of treaty obligations) will vary with demand for credibility on the international plane.

Let us now consider two dimensions on which states vary: state power and regime type. Each will plausibly have effects on the design choices discussed here.

A. State Power

Other things being equal, we should expect that large and powerful states would have greater need for commitment than smaller and weaker states. This is true for several reasons. First, as Robert Putnam has noted, larger states may be more self-sufficient and therefore their citizens have a lower opportunity cost of non-agreement.¹³⁹ That is, a self-sufficient state with a large internal market is less dependent on international cooperation and so need not be concerned with facilitating many agreements. This means that its leaders can favor a scheme with few, credible agreements over a scheme which facilitates easier agreement. We thus predict that difficulty of the treaty process will increase with state size and power.

¹³⁸ Note this calls into question the assumption, common in the international law literature and expressed in Figure 1, that easier processes of commitment are *ipso facto* more internationalist. A state with difficult processes of commitment may in fact be *more* internationalist because its commitments are more credible, sincere, and more difficult to escape.

¹³⁹ Putnam, *supra* note 125, at 443 (“All-purpose support for international agreements is probably greater in smaller, more dependent countries with more open economies, as compared to more self-sufficient countries, like the United States....”)

A second reason has to do more directly with the need for credibility of commitments at the heart of this article. Weak states can make international commitments, but by assumption they can also be coerced by more powerful states with which they make agreements. With the possibility of collateral enforcement, treaty partners of weak states do not need a costly treaty process to find the promise of performance credible. Thus suggests that, other things equal, weaker states will have less onerous treaty making processes. As state power increases, we should expect the adoption of more rigorous treaty making processes.¹⁴⁰

B. Regime Type: Democracy and Autocracy

A wide theoretical and empirical literature suggests that democracies and autocracies behave differently with regard to a whole range of international phenomena. Democracies do not go to war with each other.¹⁴¹ They cooperate on trade agreements more often.¹⁴² Some have even argued that democracies comply with international obligations to a greater extent.¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ I am bracketing the interesting problem of foreign interests mobilizing the domestic legislature to secure their advantage in treaty negotiations. See Spiro, *supra* note 10.

¹⁴¹ The voluminous literature on the Democratic Peace begins with Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace* (1795); see generally R.J. Rummel, *Democratic Peace Bibliography Version 3.0. Freedom, Democracy, Peace; Power, Democide, and War*. URL accessed on March 2, 2006.; Charles Lipson, *RELIABLE PARTNERS: HOW DEMOCRACIES HAVE MADE A SEPARATE PEACE* (2003); Paul Huth and Todd L. Allee, *THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE AND TERRITORIAL CONFLICT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY* (2003). Note that democracies do go to war with autocracies, so cannot be characterized as generally peaceful.

¹⁴² Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff, *Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements*, 56 INT'L ORG. 477, 479 (2002); Milner, *supra* note 44.

¹⁴³ Anne-Marie Slaughter, *International Law in a World of Liberal States*, 6 EUR. J INT'L L. 503, 508 (1995); Anne-Marie Burley, *Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine*, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907 (1992); but see Anne-Marie Slaughter, *A Liberal Theory of International Law*, 94 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 240, 252 (2000) (only more likely to comply with international dispute resolution); *International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs*, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819

Without commitment theory, one would expect democracies to desire *simpler* processes of international commitments. If democracies are more internationalist than autocracies, as liberal theory posits, then one would assume they would seek to *facilitate* international engagement. Commitment theory, in contrast, incorporates the cost of obligation into the strength of commitment. The empirical implication of commitment theory is that democracies will tend to involve more bodies in the treaty making process.¹⁴⁴ This makes their promises more believable.

Voigt provides some evidence for this conjecture.¹⁴⁵ He finds that the harder it is to delegate internationally, the more delegation a state actually makes. This finding is consistent with the commitment model of treaty obligations. If actual obligation was monotonically responsive only to the difficulty of the obligation process, we should expect that more difficult processes would lead to *less* obligation. Voigt's finding that the opposite is in fact the case is important and supports the commitment hypothesis: states that desire effective international cooperation will make cooperation more difficult, yet still cooperate more.

Not all democracies are equally situated: *within* the category of democracies, certain countries will have greater need for credibility of commitments. Of particular importance here are newly democratizing countries. New democracies have little international reputation and thus need more credibility on the international plane. But

(2000) cited in Xinyuan Dai, *Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism*, 59 INT'L ORG. 363 n.16 (2005) (democracies do not comply more).

¹⁴⁴ We might also expect that treaty processes will be more difficult than legislative processes. Allowing international commitment too easily can undermine the legislative process and overly empower the executive. Voigt's two measures of international delegation are based on the number of international organizations that the country has joined.

¹⁴⁵ Voigt, *supra* note 104, at 15.

they also have greater difficulty committing to domestic groups. Frequently they are recovering from regimes in which government power was used against citizens, and citizens are unlikely to believe mere promises that rights will be protected. There is less of a record on which to judge whether promises will be kept. Citizens may also believe that the regime itself is fragile and unlikely to survive. We should thus expect greater demand for commitment mechanisms of international law, including both customary international law and treaty obligations, in new democratic constitutions than in established democracies.¹⁴⁶ International law can lock in the commitments, increasing the prospect of compliance past the life of the current government or even regime.

C. Summary

To summarize the hypotheses, we expect that stronger states and new democracies will write constitutions that will have more actors involved in the treaty making process. These actors need credibility of commitments. In contrast, weaker states, autocracies and established democracies have less need for credibility of commitments. We should expect more direct applicability of CIL in newer democracies, but in general we predict that states will be less inclined to incorporate CIL than they will be to provide for treaty commitments, which can be precisely tailored.

¹⁴⁶ See also Jackson, *supra* n. 13, at 335 (Eastern Europe).

IV. Evidence

We consider here some evidence for these propositions based on a sample of 181 constitutions coded as part of the Comparative Constitutions Project at the University of Illinois.¹⁴⁷ The sample consists of nearly every current national constitution in force.¹⁴⁸ This is the first paper to utilize data from this Project, which will eventually contain data on every national constitution ever written.

Consider first the issue of democracies versus autocracies. We characterized each constitutional design situation in our sample as a democratic constitution following a democratic regime (DEM-DEM); an autocratic constitution following an autocratic regime (AUT-AUT); or a transition from autocracy to democracy (AUT-DEM). To make these characterizations we utilized data from Carles Boix, a University of Chicago Political Scientist, who uses other generally available data to make binary characterizations of countries as autocracies or democracies in a large time-series.¹⁴⁹ For each constitution, the country's autocracy/democracy status was considered for the five years preceding the constitution and immediately afterwards. If the country was rated a democracy in the year of or immediately following the promulgation of the constitution, and had been an autocracy at any time in the five preceding years, without an intervening

¹⁴⁷ See *supra* note 61.

¹⁴⁸ There are a half dozen current countries not included in the sample because of difficulties characterizing exactly which documents ought be considered the constitution. These include countries that have no formal written constitution such as Israel, UK, New Zealand, and Saudi Arabia, and others for whom the precise scope of constitutional text is not fully agreed upon by scholars (Canada, Sweden).

¹⁴⁹ Carles Boix, *DEMOCRACY AND REDISTRIBUTION* (2000); Boix, *Constitutions and Democratic Breakdowns* (paper presented at Comparative Law and Economics Forum, Chicago, October 2005).

constitution, it was considered to have undergone a transition from autocracy to democracy.

First, we report several different descriptive statistics. With regard to treaties, we examine whether the constitution mentions treaties at all, provides for constitutional review, and provides for treaty superiority to local legislation.

We also look at the mean number of actors involved in the treaty process. Our coding scheme breaks down the process into treaty proposal, treaty approval, and treaty review for constitutionality (which we treat as a veto point for treaty adoption.)¹⁵⁰ A constitutional configuration in which a president proposes a treaty for approval by two houses of the legislature would be coded 3. If the constitution grants the constitutional court an explicit right to evaluate treaties, that would add a point. But if only one house of the legislature need approve the treaty (as in the United States process for formal treaties), that is coded 2. The table below summarizes the data, giving percentage of constitutions with the relevant characteristic for all columns except the second, which reports the sample mean.

Figure 3: Drafting Situations and Treaties

Type of Drafting Situation	Mention treaties?	Mean # of actors involved in treaty process	Explicit Constitutional Review of Treaties?	Treaties Superior to Legislation?
AUT-AUT (n=71)	.83 (n=59)	1.90	.21 (n=15)	.14 (n=10)
AUT-DEM (n=58)	.93 (n=54)	2.76	.50 (n=29)	.50 (n=29)
DEM-DEM (n=52)	.81 (n=42)	1.63	.17 (n=9)	.17 (n=9)
TOTAL	.88 (n=155)	2.11	.28 (n=51)	.27 (n=48)

¹⁵⁰ On vetoes, see George Tsebelis, *VETO PLAYERS* (2002).

Figure 3 demonstrates that what might be called “democratizing constitutions” are more likely to give treaties superior status and to involve more actors in the treaty process than are constitutions written in either established democracies or autocracies. This finding is consistent with the idea that new democracies need to provide more credible international commitments. New democracies lack both a reputation for cooperation and other mechanisms for obtaining goods in the international arena. Providing more difficult treaty processes indicates broad support for any international agreements. Domestic audiences may also prefer difficult processes, as this means that treaty processes are relatively entrenched in a context where the government may or may not last, and democracy itself may be tenuous. While it may be difficult to obtain the broad agreement among domestic actors to affirm the treaty obligation, the obligation is likely to last, and in this sense is far superior to domestic legislation. Domestic legislation, after all, could be easily overturned by the opposition political party if it takes power.

The interesting finding that democratizing constitutions seem more likely to include review of treaties for constitutionality is important in distinguishing the domestic and international audiences. It is domestic audiences, not international ones, that typically have access to constitutional courts to challenge treaties. While review of treaties makes the commitment more credible internationally, it also provides limits on the treaty making power in ways that enhance the value of commitment for domestic actors.

Democratizing constitutions are more likely to mention customary international law and more likely to be monist with regard to CIL commitments, as Figure 4 below demonstrates. Of the authoritarian constitutions that mention customary international

law, only four out of fourteen purport to make customary international law directly applicable.¹⁵¹ In contrast 16 out of 58 (nearly 30%) of democratizing constitutions provide for the direct applicability of CIL, and 22 of those constitutions mention CIL. Again, this is consistent with the demand for both international and domestic commitment.¹⁵²

Figure 4: Drafting Situations and CIL

Type of Drafting Situation	Constitution Mention CIL?	CIL Directly Applicable?
AUT-AUT (n=71)	.20 (n=14)	.06 (n=4)
AUT-DEM (n=58)	.38 (n=22)	.28 (n=16)
DEM-DEM (n=52)	.29 (n=15)	.06 (n=3)
TOTAL	.28 (n=51)	.13 (n=23)

The contrast between constitutional treatment of custom and treaty is important. The analysis in Part II suggested that custom had distinct defects as a mechanism to make commitments. This led us to predict that states would systematically be more reluctant to rely on constitutional acceptance of customary international law than they would the more precise and flexible instrument of treaties. 86% of all current constitutions mention treaties, whereas only 28% mention customary international law. In every subset of countries, treaties dominate custom. This provides support for the analysis in Part II about the flaws of custom as a lawmaking and commitment device.

More sophisticated analysis requires control variables. The regression reported in Figure 5 below considers the effect of being a new democracy controlling for population

¹⁵¹ The three are Kazakhstan, Byelorussia, and Azerbaijan. The others explicitly require incorporation of international law.

¹⁵² Bivariate regressions confirms this analysis. AUTDEM predicts Directly applicable customary international law, with a positive coefficient of .01, at the 99% confidence level.

(represented by the \log^{10} of population at the time the constitution was promulgated) and wealth (the nominal GDP/capita at the time the constitution was promulgated.) We treat these as proxies for power, with larger and richer states being more powerful. Thus we are controlling for the effect of state power on democratizing constitutions. The dependent variable in Figure 5 is a dummy for whether customary law is directly applicable in the constitutional order.¹⁵³

Figure 5: Customary Law Directly Applicable-Logit Model

Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square				
1	84.707(a)	.117	.169				
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
	POPLOG	-.256	.309	.687	1	.407	.774
	GDPCAP2	.000	.000	.474	1	.491	1.000
	AUTDEM	.018	.007	6.058	1	.014	1.018
	AUTAUT	-.003	.008	.112	1	.738	.997
	Constant	-.274	1.308	.044	1	.834	.761

The result indicates that democratizing constitutions are more likely than “pure” democratic or authoritarian constitutions to make CIL directly applicable, controlling for state size and wealth.¹⁵⁴ The only independent variable demonstrating statistical significance is AUTDEM, the dummy for a democratizing constitution. We cannot find evidence to support the hypotheses about state strength.

We now turn to predictors of the number of bodies involved in approving treaties. Recall that we predicted that stronger states and democracies would prefer to have more complex treaty adoption processes because they to make commitments credible to

¹⁵³ We use a binary logit model, appropriate for a 0/1 dummy dependent variable.

¹⁵⁴ The results are substantially similar when either proxy for power is used alone.

domestic and international audiences. To test these propositions, we again use population and GDP per capita as proxies for state power. The dependent variable is the number of bodies involved in approving treaties.

Figure 6: # Bodies involved in treaties-OLS Model

Model Summary

Step	-R squared
1	.23

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-18.055	33.041		-.546	.589
	GDPCAP2	.001	.002	.102	.547	.589
	POPLOG	10.823	6.751	.301	1.603	.121
	AUTDEM	.213	.159	.249	1.343	.191
	AUTAUT	.063	.171	.068	.370	.714

Although none of the independent variables reaches conventional statistical significance, both population and democratizing constitutions have coefficients in the predicted direction at the 80% confidence level. Large countries, but not necessarily rich countries, tend to have more bodies involved in treaty approval, while new democracies do as well. Both these findings are consistent with the hypotheses laid out in Part III. Large countries obtain advantages at the international level through more difficult treaty processes, for their commitments become more credible; they also suffer relatively less from any inability to make commitments because they have large internal markets. New democracies also benefit from difficult treaty processes for reasons of internal commitment.

V. Conclusion: Locking in Democracy

International law provides important sources of commitment for governments in the domestic legal order. The decision as to how to tailor the structure of commitments is made typically at the stage of constitution drafting. This paper has introduced some considerations relevant to thinking about how drafters will act in designing the interface between the domestic and international legal orders.

The one finding that stands out is that international legal commitments seems to be a particular concern for new democracies. These regimes face a number of particular challenges. The recent authoritarian regime, possibly involving human rights violations, renders control of political power much more salient.¹⁵⁵ Like judicial review, independent regulatory institutions and other commitment devices, international law can help to lock in democracy, by tying the hands of future governments. In turn, this may make domestic interest groups more likely to remain loyal to the new constitutional order. International law makes sense in contexts where one distrusts outsiders less than one distrusts ones own compatriots.

This finding has implications for our understanding of international law. Professor Slaughter and her fellow liberal theorists have made much of the need to unpack the state and examine the domestic determinants of demand for and compliance with international law. This paper has proceeded in that spirit. The result suggests a

¹⁵⁵ Ratner, *supra* note 74, 2072, citing CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL 68-69 (1996) (describing the post-junta Argentine President's plans for ratifications of international human rights treaties); see also Andrew Moravcsik, *The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe*, 54 INT'L ORG. 217, 243-44 (2000) (concluding that newly democratizing states choose to enter treaties to "lock in" human rights). But see Simmons, *Why Commit? Explaining State Acceptance of International Human Rights Obligations* (2002) (finding limited empirical support for lock-in by many states).

further refinement of liberal theory to take into account the particular needs of new democracies, which have the greatest incentive to draw on the norms of international law as means of self-binding. We may need to think further about distinguishing the incentives to produce and supply rules of international law from the incentives to utilize and consume rules of international law. New democracies have incentives to draw on international legal norms, but not necessarily to produce them, and there may be some rules that are skewed so as not to fit the needs of the “consumers.”

On the other hand, given that those articulating CIL rules often draw on state practice, new democracies may have inordinate weight in producing the underpinnings of new rules. Other scholars have observed that the content and scope of international law will reflect the incentives of domestic actors and their divergent needs to respond to the uncertain international environment.¹⁵⁶ The evidence presented here suggests that new democracies are more likely to include CIL in the domestic legal order, so that their courts may have more frequent occasion to interpret the scope of these rules. This in turn means that the content of CIL may reflect the interests of this particular subset of democratic states.

A second implication concerns evaluations of compliance. There is now a vigorous debate on whether and when states comply with international obligations.¹⁵⁷ If the analysis of this paper is correct and international rules function as constraints on *domestic* political action, then the emphasis in the literature on state compliance may not fully take into account the impact of international legal rules. Evaluations of compliance

¹⁵⁶ Downs and Rocke, *supra* note 62, at 3-7.

¹⁵⁷ William A Bradford, *International Legal Compliance: Surveying the Field*, 53 GEO. J. INT’L L. 495 (2005).

with international norms need to take into account domestic mechanisms of forcing compliance.¹⁵⁸ But they also need to consider that international law can shape intra-state behavior even without apparent impact on the international plane. By locking in policies, international law can be effective on the domestic level even when it is ignored on the international plane.

¹⁵⁸ Dai, *supra* note 143.