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Judicial Power & Civil Rights Reconsidered

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Michael Klarman’s “From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality” is an important contribution to the scholarly literature on both the history of the civil rights struggle and judicial power more generally. Klarman argues that for much of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court was very reluctant to rule in favor of African American civil rights claimants, and had little impact when it did.

Klarman is right to reject traditional accounts that greatly exaggerated the Supreme Court’s willingness and ability to protect minorities. However, he overstates his case. The Court’s views on the proper scope of African Americans’ rights periodically diverged from that of the political branches of government. The Justices’ relative insulation from political pressure; their membership in a different generational cohort than the median voter; the idiosyncrasies of presidential selection of Justices; and the Justices’ nationalist inclinations all help explain this result.

Moreover, in at least three types of situations, judicial invalidation of Jim Crow legislation significantly aided African Americans: (1) when such legislation had solved collective action problems among racist whites; (2) when legislation had enabled white actors to externalize the costs of Jim Crow onto society as a whole; and (3) when laws lowered the overall costs of maintaining Jim Crow.

This Review supports these conclusions by closely examining relevant Supreme Court decisions, especially Progressive Era cases and Brown v. Board of Education.
Book Review

Judicial Power and Civil Rights Reconsidered

David E. Bernstein† and Ilya Somin‡


INTRODUCTION

No line of cases enhanced the prestige of the Supreme Court as much as Brown v. Board of Education1 and other decisions vindicating the rights of African Americans. Initially, Brown was criticized by some prominent liberal legal scholars for overruling the democratic process in a way
reminiscent of hated *Lochner*-era jurisprudence. Later, once a liberal consensus favoring *Brown* coalesced, and *Brown* came to be seen by liberals as a courageous, important, and correct decision on behalf of civil rights, the anti-*Brown* banner was raised, if at all, only by some conservatives opposed to what they perceived as the Court’s illegitimate judicial activism.

In recent years, however, liberal adulation of *Brown* has come under severe criticism from revisionist scholars associated with the political left. This time, the charge is not that *Brown* was wrongly decided or otherwise improper as a matter of constitutional law. Rather, *Brown* revisionists argue that both scholars and the popular media have vastly exaggerated the importance of *Brown* to the African-American freedom struggle. Moreover, the revisionists suggest that *Brown*, by focusing the energies of liberal advocates of social change on what the revisionists see as largely unproductive litigation, has actually retarded the progressive agenda.

Michael J. Klarman’s *From Jim Crow to Civil Rights* is an impressive addition to the revisionist literature. Klarman pays close attention to the social and political context of civil rights litigation and makes a powerful


3. See, e.g., PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS & LAWRENCE M. STRATTON, THE NEW COLOR LINE (1995). Perhaps the lone liberal holdout on *Brown* was quirky originalist Raoul Berger. See RAOUl BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIAry: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE Fourteenth AMENDMENT (1977) (arguing that *Brown* was wrongly decided because it was contrary to the original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment).

4. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: *BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM* (2004) (alleging that *Brown* failed to improve education for African Americans and suggesting that the Court might have done better to enforce the *pre-Brown* “separate but equal” regime more rigorously); CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF *BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION* (2004) (asserting that *Brown* failed to effectively promote integration); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 9-169 (1991) (arguing that *Brown* did nothing to advance civil rights and may even have retarded progress by stimulating a Southern white backlash and by diverting black activists away from political action that would have been more effective than litigation).

argument that defenders of the Supreme Court vastly overstate both its inclination and its ability to protect the rights of politically weak racial minorities. From Jim Crow to Civil Rights is the definitive study of the Supreme Court’s role in the civil rights struggles of the twentieth century. It is also a major contribution to the broader debate over the efficacy of judicial power as a tool for protecting oppressed minority groups.

Reviews of From Jim Crow to Civil Rights have focused primarily on Klarman’s discussion of Brown. Like other revisionist writings, Klarman’s initial works on race and the Supreme Court principally focused on the limitations of Brown and its immediate progeny as vehicles for desegregating schools. But while Klarman provides a detailed and thought-provoking history of Brown and its impact, most of the book is devoted to events and cases that predated Brown and had no direct connection to school desegregation. This Review focuses primarily on this broader history (especially with regard to the Progressive Era), in part to redress the unbalanced treatment of Klarman’s book found in most other reviews, and in part because of the expertise of the authors, but mostly because Brown has peculiar features that make it an unfair exemplar of Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding minority rights. In particular, it seems inappropriate to judge the efficacy of judicial review by the one Supreme Court opinion of the twentieth century to attract massive resistance from an entire region of the United States.

This Review provides a balanced appreciation of Klarman’s impressively multifaceted analysis. Without losing sight of the many important insights and historical details that Klarman provides, the Review focuses on some of the weaknesses in his argument. While Klarman is right to reject the view that courts could, by themselves, eliminate Jim Crow and other forms of oppression, he underestimates both the willingness and the ability of courts to make a difference. Klarman properly emphasizes the limits of law as a tool for protecting oppressed minorities, and his work, like that of other revisionists, serves as a useful corrective to that of


8. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 4; ROSENBERG, supra note 4.


10. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 4.
formerly dominant judicial triumphalists who have overstated the power of litigation as a tool for social change. Yet Klarman, while more modest in his conclusions than some of his revisionist predecessors, at times underestimates the importance of Supreme Court decisions and of law more generally. An accurate understanding of the role of the Supreme Court in aiding or preventing the oppression of minorities—which is important both to understand our past and to escape future errors—requires avoiding both undue hagiography and undue skepticism.

Part I of this Review summarizes Klarman’s analysis of the development of Supreme Court civil rights jurisprudence in the Jim Crow era. Although Klarman covers a wide range of cases and issues, there is a common theme of skepticism about the importance of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence both in contributing to the oppression of African Americans and in reducing that oppression.11

Judges’ ability to affect the condition of African Americans was, Klarman argues, severely limited by two major constraints. First, judges “rarely hold views that deviate far from dominant public opinion.”12 They are therefore “unlikely to have the inclination . . . to defend minority rights from majoritarian invasion.”13 Second, even in the rare cases where judges are inclined to protect oppressed minorities, they generally will be unable to do so because deeply rooted oppression, such as that imposed on African Americans in the Jim Crow era, “depended more on social custom and physical force than on law.”14 In Klarman’s view,

Most Jim Crow laws merely described white supremacy; they did not produce it. Legal disfranchisement measures and de jure railroad segregation played relatively minor roles in disfranchising and segregating southern blacks. Entrenched social mores, reinforced by economic power and the threat and reality of physical violence, were primarily responsible for bolstering the South’s racial hierarchy. Legal instantiation of these norms was often more symbolic than functional. Thus, more favorable Court

12. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 6.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 7.
rulings, even if enforceable, would not have alleviated the oppression of southern blacks.¹⁵

This two-pronged attack on the importance of judicial power pervades Klarman’s analysis of a wide range of issues, though he is careful to note that some decisions had an impact at the margin.¹⁶ Klarman, like Gerald Rosenberg,¹⁷ attributes the eventual improvement in the legal, social, and political position of African Americans after World War II primarily to broad social forces rather than to changes in the law.¹⁸

Part II provides a theoretical framework outlining important qualifications to Klarman’s view that judicial power had little impact on Jim Crow because the judiciary was usually both unwilling and unable to have a major effect. Economists and political scientists have devoted only limited attention to understanding the mechanisms and effects of public-sector discrimination,¹⁹ but more general economic literature suggests that attempts by Southern whites to establish inflexible and unyielding discriminatory norms necessarily ran into problems. Particularly important was the problem of collective action.²⁰ Jim Crow laws that sanctioned white defectors were often necessary to prevent collective action problems from unraveling the system of white supremacy.²¹ These laws also helped to establish and maintain white supremacy through cost externalization. As we shall see, many Jim Crow laws fulfilled the function of externalizing costs from individual whites and white-owned businesses onto society as a whole, including both African-American and white taxpayers.²² These laws also often served the purpose of cost minimization—ensuring that white

¹⁵ Id. at 59-60.
¹⁶ See, e.g., id. at 7; see also infra Part IV (discussing Brown).
¹⁷ ROSENBERG, supra note 4. For the classic article arguing that courts have little power to resist public opinion and broad social trends, see Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
¹⁸ See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 4-5, 443-46. Klarman does not, however, go as far in this direction as Rosenberg. See Klarman, Racial Change, supra note 6, at 10 & n.9 (partially rejecting Rosenberg’s thesis with respect to Brown); see also infra Part IV.
¹⁹ See Robert A. Margo, Segregated Schools and the Mobility Hypothesis: A Model of Local Government Discrimination, 106 Q.J. ECON. 61, 62 (1991) (“Economists have devoted considerable attention to modeling discrimination by private agents, but have been less interested in the formal analysis of discrimination in the public sector.”).
²¹ See generally Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133, 153, 155-56 (1994) (arguing that racist Southern whites in the Jim Crow era could be analogized to a cartel, with the cartel subject to the same pressures that make standard economic cartels so difficult to enforce without supportive state action).
supremacy was enforced at the lowest possible cost to white society. In
these situations, judicial decisions invalidating Jim Crow could and often
did have a substantial impact.

Part II argues that Klarman’s otherwise commendable focus on broader
social forces as the main cause of the eventual collapse of Jim Crow ignores
ways in which those broader developments were in part dependent on a
favorable legal environment. Part II also suggests that Klarman
underestimates the degree to which judges are sometimes willing and able
to reach decisions that run counter to majoritarian views.

Part III addresses the Court’s Progressive Era decisions protecting
African-American civil rights. This period poses a challenge to Klarman’s
theory that Supreme Court decisions usually reflect the political and social
climate of the times. Although the Progressive Era marked the worst period
of post-Civil War American racism, it nonetheless witnessed a series of
important decisions protecting the rights of southern blacks in four areas of
law: defending African-American voting rights against so-called
“grandfather clauses,” stating that Jim Crow laws must guarantee blacks
equivalent railroad accommodations as were provided to whites,
invalidating debt peonage laws intended to restrict the mobility of black
labor, and invalidating housing segregation laws.

Part IV of this Review considers Klarman’s insightful discussion of
did not, in and of itself, substantially reduce school segregation in the
South; he claims, however, that the extreme and violent “massive
resistance” of Southern whites to the Supreme Court’s decision
strengthened Northern white commitment to civil rights and eventually led
to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Unlike Brown, the Act led to
the relatively rapid demise of school segregation throughout the South.

Klarman’s analysis, like that of other Brown skeptics, underestimates
the impact of Brown on Southern public schools. It largely ignores changes
in education policy, including major funding increases for African-
American schools, brought on by the mere threat of a school desegregation
court decision. Furthermore, Klarman’s claim that Brown had, and could
have had, little effect other than through the Northern response to the
massive resistance of Southern whites raises an important question: Why
did segregationists massively resist a court decision that was unlikely to
have any real effect on their cherished institutions? A definitive answer to
this question requires additional research. However, this Review tentatively
suggests that Brown might not have been as toothless as Klarman and other revisionist scholars suggest.

I. SUMMARY OF KLARMAN’S THESIS

This Part briefly summarizes the wide-ranging analysis of From Jim Crow to Civil Rights. The book is divided chronologically into five parts, covering the Plessy era, the Progressive Era, the interwar period, World War II, and finally Brown and its impact. For convenience, this Part follows the same format.

A. The Plessy Era

The main theme of Klarmán’s account of the Plessy era, roughly 1890 to 1910, is that Plessy and other pro-segregation decisions were an inevitable byproduct of social and political developments that undermined Northern white support for African-American civil rights and strengthened Southern white opposition to racial change. Klarmán also argues that Jim Crow laws were not necessary to ensure the perpetuation of segregation and white supremacy, because a combination of social mores, private violence, and informal administrative discretion used against African Americans by low-level officials was more than sufficient to achieve the goals of white racists. The claim that Plessy did not mark a true watershed is not entirely original to Klarmán. But he does give this argument its most thoroughgoing exposition and defense, applying it to a wide range of areas of civil rights law, including segregation in various settings, voting rights, jury service, and education.

B. The Progressive Era

The Progressive Era cases decided during the 1910s seem to undermine Klarmán’s thesis. As he notes, the period marked the “nadir” of post-Civil

27. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at ch. 1.
28. Id. ch. 2.
29. Id. ch. 3.
30. Id. chs. 4-5.
31. Id. chs. 6-7.
32. See id. at 58-59.
33. See id. at 59-60.
34. See, e.g., CHARLES A. LOFREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION (1987) (concluding that Plessy was a natural outgrowth of prior precedent and of the political climate of the time).
35. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 48-52 (segregation); id. at 52-55 (voting rights); id. at 55-57 (jury service); id. at 57-58 (education).
War racism in America.36 Yet African Americans won four major sets of cases in the Supreme Court between 1911 and 1917: Bailey v. Alabama37 and United States v. Reynolds38 invalidated peonage laws “that coerced primarily black labor”;39 dicta in McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.40 stated that railroads acting under color of state segregation laws must ensure that black passengers have access to the same classes of accommodations as white passengers, even if black demand for a certain class of accommodation was too low to justify providing it from a railroad’s economic perspective; Guinn v. United States41 and Myers v. Anderson42 held that “grandfather clauses” that implicitly discriminated against potential black voters violated the Fifteenth Amendment; and Buchanan v. Warley43 held that a residential segregation ordinance unconstitutionally deprived both whites and African Americans of property rights without due process of law.

Klarman claims that the peonage and grandfather clause cases were easy decisions because the laws flagrantly violated the Constitution in ways that even the racist public opinion of the 1910s found reprehensible.44 Furthermore, Klarman contends that the conflict with his thesis is largely dissipated if we recognize that the pro-civil rights Supreme Court decisions of the Progressive Era failed to “produce significant changes in racial practices.”45 In Part III, we dispute this interpretation, arguing that the peonage cases and Buchanan had important positive ramifications for black welfare.

C. The Interwar Period

The interwar years, Klarman notes, were a period of gradual improvement in the status of African Americans. Racial change was driven by gradual increases in black wealth and education levels, the “Great Migration” of African Americans to the more tolerant North and West, and a partial liberalization of white racial attitudes.46 The Supreme Court decisions on race during this period were a “mixed bag,” including both
victories and defeats for African Americans. Klarman concludes that overall, the interwar decisions made only “limited” advances in civil rights law, and claims that the Court’s sympathy for civil rights “advanced at roughly the same pace as the rest of the nation.” Moreover, he argues that even those decisions in which African Americans prevailed had little effect because they did not address private-sector discrimination and were often easily circumvented.

D. The World War II Era

Klarman views World War II as “a watershed event in the history of American race relations.” During this period the social trends that aided blacks in the interwar period—rising black economic status, migration to the North, and liberalization in white attitudes—rapidly accelerated. Moreover, the struggle against Nazi racism abroad helped discredit antiblack racism at home. Blacks who had served in the military or improved their economic status by working in wartime industries were emboldened to combat violations of their rights, contributing to a vast expansion in African-American legal and political activism. After the war, the impact of the antifascist struggle was augmented by that of the Cold War, which led influential white elites to view racial oppression as a hindrance to America’s efforts to win international support for the struggle against communism, especially among emerging Third World nations.

This period also saw a series of Supreme Court decisions significantly expanding protections for black civil rights in the South and border states. In Smith v. Allwright, the Court overruled a recent precedent and invalidated white primaries. Klarman grants this decision a greater impact than he is willing to concede to virtually any other covered in the book. He points out that black voter registration in the South increased from just three percent of all adults in 1940 to twenty percent in 1952, and concludes that Smith “was critical to this dramatic increase in the voting registration of southern blacks.” Klarman attributes this impressive effect to the threat of

47. Id. at 99, 98-99.
48. Id. at 99.
49. Id. at 152-62.
50. Id. at 173.
51. Id. at 173-74.
52. Id. at 174-77.
53. Id. at 175-80.
54. Id. at 182-84. For a more detailed analysis, see Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (2000); and Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988).
56. Klarman, supra note 5, at 236-37.
federal criminal prosecution of recalcitrant Southern election officials and a newfound willingness of lower court judges to vigorously enforce and even extend Supreme Court voting rights decisions. The growing political influence of blacks in both the North and the South and slowly declining Southern white opposition to black voting also contributed to Smith’s impact.

This era saw other key Supreme Court victories for African-American rights. Klarman grants that some of these cases also had significant effects, though not as great as those of Smith. He concludes that the invalidation of the exclusion of blacks from state graduate schools in Sipuel v. Board of Regents, McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, and Sweatt v. Painter was “instrumental to desegregating higher education in the border states and the peripheral South.” Similarly, he finds that a series of decisions invalidating segregation in interstate railroads and buses had a meaningful impact on the ground. On the other hand, he argues that the rejection of judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants in Shelley v. Kraemer, and a series of criminal procedure cases expanding the protection of black defendants and potential jurors against discrimination, had little or no effect.

Nonetheless, Klarman’s treatment of the World War II era is notable for his willingness to concede that several decisions of this era had a substantial impact independent of, or at least in addition to, progress generated by social and political developments. As we shall see, some of the claims that he makes on behalf of Smith and other cases of this period may also be applicable to other decisions that he denies had any impact.

E. Brown v. Board of Education and Its Aftermath

As already noted, Klarman’s main argument in his lengthy discussion of Brown is that the case had little “direct” impact on school desegregation but did have a major indirect effect by promoting a massive and often violent Southern white backlash that repulsed Northerners and eventually led them to support vigorous federal civil rights legislation. Klarman also concedes that Brown helped to mobilize black political activity on behalf of

57. Id. at 237, 244-46.
58. Id. at 180-81, 237-44.
59. 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (per curiam).
62. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 253.
63. Id. at 217-25, 264-65.
64. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
65. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 225-32, 262-64, 267-86.
civil rights. Ultimately, however, he concludes that any such effect was fairly small and that the rise in black activism in the late 1950s and early 1960s was primarily caused by “deep background forces” such as rising black expectations, the example of the decolonization of Africa, and the increasing education and political awareness of Southern blacks. Like Gerald Rosenberg before him, Klarman even argues that Brown may have actually “discouraged” direct-action protest, at least in the “short term,” because it raised false hopes that civil rights goals could be achieved through litigation alone.

II. WHY JUDICIAL POWER MATTERS: ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS

This Part examines several key theoretical reasons to expect that judicial decisions might have an important impact on the rights of oppressed minorities, even in a political environment in which most of the majority group supports, or is at best indifferent to, oppressive policies. Although Klarman is commendably thorough in his analysis of the historical record, he makes little effort to consider relevant theoretical literature from economics and political science. This relative neglect of theory leads Klarman to underestimate the extent to which the enforcement of Jim Crow laws was necessary to sustain white racial domination of blacks, even in a period when white opinion was overwhelmingly racist. The first three Sections present three tasks that laws performed in the maintenance of Jim Crow: solving collective action problems among racist whites, externalizing the costs of segregation and oppression, and minimizing the costs of maintaining a system of white supremacy.

An additional omission from Klarman’s analysis is his failure to consider the possibility that some of the broader social forces to which he attributes the ultimate collapse of Jim Crow were in fact partially dependent on a favorable legal environment. Moreover, Klarman does not sufficiently explore why judges might be expected to go against dominant public opinion or at least to reach decisions protecting black rights that would not have been undertaken by politicians. These considerations are addressed in the final two Sections of this Part.

66. Klarman, supra note 5, at 368-81.
67. Id. at 377, 376-77.
68. See Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 146-50 (arguing that Brown strengthened the NAACP’s commitment to a litigation strategy and exacerbated rivalries between the NAACP and black organizations more oriented toward protest).
69. Klarman, supra note 5, at 377.
A. Jim Crow and the Logic of Collective Action

1. Collective Action as an Obstacle to White Cooperation in Suppressing Blacks

A collective action problem arises if a group of individuals is seeking to produce a “public good”—a benefit for the group that, if produced, will be nonrivalrous and nonexcludable. That is, one group member’s consumption of the good does not interfere with that of others, and it is impossible to exclude any group members from enjoying the benefits of the good once it has been produced. In such a situation, group members will have an incentive to free-ride on the production of the good so long as the failure of any one member to contribute her share will not by itself prevent the good from being produced. A collective problem is exacerbated if group members who free-ride not only save the direct costs of contribution but can actually reap substantial additional private benefits by defecting. For example, a firm that defects from a price-fixing cartel might reap disproportionately large profits as long as other cartel members continue to adhere to the cartel’s rules.

The enforcement of Jim Crow segregation and white supremacy provided public goods for whites who desired these things. If blacks were barred from desirable economic opportunities, prevented from competing with whites, and disfranchised, even those whites who had not made any contribution to the achievement of these goals could potentially reap the perceived benefits of maintaining racial dominance. In most circumstances, an individual white’s failure to contribute was unlikely to make a significant difference with respect to the outcome. This created an incentive for individual whites to free-ride on the efforts of others to maintain Jim Crow segregation and thus a motive for whites to seek legislation to enforce Jim Crow norms. As Robert Cooter has noted, “[D]iscriminatory social groups suffer the same problems of instability as any other cartel. To sustain discriminatory norms, evaders must be punished by a combination of informal sanctions and formal laws.”

Cooter’s point is that collective action theory applies not only to traditional economic price-fixing cartels, but to any situation where a group attempts to achieve a goal that individual members have an incentive to undercut through actions that benefit them personally at the expense of the

70. For the general theory of public goods, see BUCHANAN, supra note 20. See also Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954) (giving an early presentation of the theory).

71. OLSON, supra note 20, at 9-16.

72. Cooter, supra note 21, at 156.
common purpose. Moreover, collective action problems do not occur only among "selfish" individuals actuated solely by narrow self-interest.\textsuperscript{73} In a situation where his or her cooperation or lack thereof will not by itself affect the outcome, even a highly altruistic individual might choose not to contribute to the public good but will instead direct her efforts to helping others in ways that will in fact make a meaningful difference.\textsuperscript{74}

Jim Crow was a comprehensive social system that restricted a wide range of interactions between blacks and whites for the purpose of maintaining white supremacy. As we shall see, the system included traditional economic activities such as employment relations, but went far beyond them. It applied also to a wide range of social norms, many of which involved collective action problems that segregationists sought to address through legal enforcement. The cartel model applies to these activities no less than to traditional economic cartels.

For example, even the Jim Crow ban on interracial sexual relations and marriage involved an attempt to solve a collective action problem among whites through a cartel mechanism. While whites as a group, according to the racist view, had a common interest in maintaining the "purity" of their race and ensuring that white supremacy was not undercut through racial integration caused by intermarriage, the maintenance of the system required individual whites to forgo potentially appealing intimate relationships and marriages with black partners.\textsuperscript{75} For this reason, segregationists believed that antimiscegenation laws were essential to prevent racial "amalgamation" even in an era when the vast majority of whites held racist views hostile to interracial relationships.\textsuperscript{76}

Klarman concludes that "[w]hite supremacy depended less on law than on entrenched social mores, backed by economic power and the threat and reality of violence. Invalidating legislation scarcely would have made a dent in this system."\textsuperscript{77} Rather, only federal civil rights laws could

\textsuperscript{73} The belief that collective action theory relies on the assumption that all human behavior is selfish is a common misunderstanding among scholars critical of the model. For examples of this misconception, see the works cited in Ilya Somin, \textit{Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal}, 12 \textit{CRITICAL REV.} 413, 436 (1998).

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Id.}; see also Olson, \textit{infra} note 20, at 64-65.

\textsuperscript{75} See generally Renee C. Romano, \textit{Race Mixing: Black-White Marriage in Postwar America} 44-144 (2003) (providing numerous examples of whites who sought interracial relationships during the Jim Crow era).

\textsuperscript{76} For example, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held in 1878 that "[t]he purity of public morals, the moral and physical development of both races, and the highest advancement of our cherished southern civilization," Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858, 869 (1878), required that interracial marriage be prevented "by prohibiting and punishing such unnatural alliances with severe penalties," \textit{id.} at 866, so as to ensure that there would be "no evasion" of the rule by individual whites and blacks, \textit{id.} at 869.

\textsuperscript{77} Klarman, \textit{infra} note 5, at 82.
significantly help blacks. Yet, if one sees Jim Crow as a wide-ranging racist cartel, formal law enforcing the cartel’s objectives was hardly superfluous to its success.

Obviously, the best way to break up an existing local cartel—especially one that frequently uses violence with the acquiescence of local authorities—is through the enforcement of a vigorous federal antitrust law, and one can see the federal civil rights laws of the 1960s as serving an analogous function regarding the South’s white supremacist Jim Crow cartel. But this hardly shows that the Jim Crow cartel would not have been weaker, perhaps even far weaker, if it had received less support from the state in helping it externalize costs and overcome collective action problems in particular contexts. If the racist cartel had received additional support from the state—for example, if legally sanctioned chattel slavery had continued for another hundred years—it would have been far more difficult for federal authorities to break it up later.

2. The Cases of Labor Mobility and Housing Segregation

The history of Southern white efforts to reduce the mobility of black laborers and force them to stay with one employer on a near-permanent basis provides an example of how collective action problems impeded white efforts to control blacks and how repressive laws were adopted to prevent breakdowns in cooperation among whites. In the post-Civil War period, Southern white planters repeatedly attempted to form cartels in order to keep down the wages of the sharecroppers and agricultural laborers who formed the vast majority of the black population and prevent them

78. Id.

79. The Mafia, for example, uses “economic power and the threat and reality of violence” to enforce its norms. Id. That hardly means, however, that the Mafia would not significantly benefit from official government endorsement and enforcement of those norms.

80. The fact that the Jim Crow cartel operated not only in the economic realm but was also an oppressive and authoritarian social system does not rebut the view that law played an important role in its maintenance. When citizens become sufficiently disgruntled about a policy or regime, sometimes all it takes to catalyze dissent is a few sincere voices or a minor event that casts doubt on the durability of the status quo. See generally Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification (1995). That the postbellum legal system never countenanced an assault on black property rights and self-ownership ultimately provided the civil rights movement with the ability to challenge the system both from within the South and also via migration to the North.

81. See William Cohen, At Freedom’s Edge: Black Mobility and the Southern White Quest for Racial Control, 1861-1915, at 42 (1991) (“All over the South planters eagerly sought to act collectively to hold down wages and to enforce contracts.”); Roback, supra note 22, at 1161.


http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art9
from leaving abusive employers. However, these efforts almost always foundered because individual white employers had strong incentives to renege on cartel arrangements and attempt to hire away black laborers from their competitors.

In the late nineteenth century, Southern states enacted peonage laws and other restrictive legislation in an attempt to enforce white control of black laborers. These laws substantially reduced black labor mobility relative to what had existed in the face of previous voluntary efforts to enforce white collusion against blacks, efforts consistently undermined by collective action problems. The evidence that the Supreme Court’s invalidation of peonage laws reduced this limitation on black labor mobility is discussed in Section III.B below. The collective action problem also applied to white efforts to keep blacks out of white neighborhoods. White support for keeping blacks out of white neighborhoods was very strong in the early twentieth century. Nonetheless, individual whites often had an incentive to defect from the numerous formal and informal voluntary arrangements set up to exclude blacks. Individual white property owners had an interest in getting the highest possible price when selling property. Such incentives were accentuated in situations where white property owners feared that other whites in the neighborhood were also about to sell to blacks or indeed had already done so; if whites were unwilling to sell to blacks earlier, they might end up doing so later after prices in the area had fallen as a result of a black influx.

In the area of housing policy, local governments adopted residential segregation statutes intended to externalize the costs of enforcing neighborhood boundaries and solve the collective action problems white property owners experienced when trying to prevent blacks from moving.

83. Stephen J. DeCanio, Agriculture in the Postbellum South: The Economics of Production and Supply 38-40 (1974); Higgs, supra note 82, at 47-49.


85. Cohen, supra note 81 (reviewing the panoply of laws intended to stifle black migration, the effects of these laws, and opposition to these laws among Southerners who sought to encourage black out-migration); Roback, supra note 22, at 1165-70 (discussing the types of laws enacted); Jonathan M. Wiener, Class Structure and Economic Development in the American South, 1865-1955, 84 AM. HIST. REV. 970, 979-82 (1979) (reviewing laws used to stifle black labor mobility).

86. See Roback, supra note 22, at 1184-91.

87. See David E. Bernstein, Philip Sober Controlling Philip Drunk: Buchanan v. Warley in Historical Perspective, 51 VAND. L. REV. 797, 859 (1998) (noting that when blacks started to move into a white neighborhood, the remaining white neighbors would often panic and sell at “fire sale” prices).
into white neighborhoods. Section III.D shows that the Supreme Court’s invalidation of these statutes in *Buchanan v. Warley*\(^8\) substantially improved black access to housing by restoring the collective action problems that existed in the absence of formal segregation laws.

3. Using Collective Action Theory To Help Explain Variation in the Effectiveness of Judicial Intervention on Behalf of Blacks

Collective action theory helps explain why some judicial interventions to protect black rights were relatively effective while others were largely futile. In situations where the enforcement of white supremacy required only the cooperation of white government officials, the invalidation of specific discriminatory laws could easily be evaded by means of continued discrimination through administrative discretion. By contrast, formal laws were much more important to the maintenance of Jim Crow in policy areas where maintaining the system required the cooperation of white private-sector economic actors who had pecuniary incentives to defect from Jim Crow arrangements.\(^9\)

As Klarman effectively documents in his book, a series of Supreme Court decisions invalidating laws disfranchising blacks proved to be almost completely ineffective in increasing black voter registration in the South.\(^90\) He tells a similar story about the Supreme Court’s even more extensive efforts to crack down on antiblack discrimination in the criminal justice system.\(^91\) In both sets of cases, white state officials found a variety of ways to circumvent the Court’s decisions and continue to discriminate against blacks.\(^92\) In the case of discrimination in voter registration, a major 1949 study by Harvard political scientist V.O. Key found that the exclusion of blacks was often accomplished not through the application of specific laws

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8. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
9. For a similar argument in the context of analyzing the impact of the Supreme Court’s decisions protecting abortion rights, see ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 195-99 (noting that *Roe v. Wade* had a major impact on the availability of abortions by freeing private abortion clinics from restrictions imposed by state laws banning or closely regulating first-trimester abortions). Rosenberg acknowledges that this conclusion is a departure from his generally highly skeptical view of the effectiveness of judicial intervention. *Id.* at 199-201. He concludes that “the availability of a market mechanism for implementation meant that in states where actors were willing to perform abortions change could occur despite the opposition of key institutional actors” to the Court’s decision. *Id.* at 201.
90. Klarman, supra note 5, at 85-86, 158-59.
91. *Id.* at 152-58, 225-32, 267-86.
92. *Id.* at 457.
but through the exercise of broad administrative discretion delegated to local registrars.93

The registrars who disfranchised black voters and the state prosecutors, police officers, and judges who discriminated against black criminal defendants and potential jurors had little or no incentive to treat blacks fairly. Indeed, they might well have been sanctioned or dismissed by their political superiors if they chose not to discriminate. Key noted that, in most Jim Crow-era Southern states, registrars were appointed by a centralized election board tightly controlled by the state Democratic Party.94

Presumably, only officials willing and able to use their broad discretionary powers to exclude blacks from the franchise were likely to be selected and subsequently reappointed.

Thus, unlike white employers of black labor or white homeowners seeking to exclude blacks from their neighborhoods, white public officials in the electoral and legal systems were not handicapped by collective action problems in their efforts to perpetuate white supremacy. Indeed, to the extent that these officials belonged to a hierarchical bureaucracy headed by higher-level administrators committed to Jim Crow, they actually had strong private interests in discrimination even in the unlikely event that they were personally indifferent or hostile to the goals of the system. As long as this was the case, discrimination against blacks in areas such as voting and criminal justice was not significantly dependent on the establishment of formal discriminatory laws that might be rendered inoperative by judicial decisions.

Policy areas where enforcement of Jim Crow required the cooperation of private economic actors with incentives to resist rooted in collective action problems allowed much greater opportunities for effective judicial intervention. Although they may well have been just as racist as were public officials, these actors often would only cooperate with the system if required to do so by laws supported by significant sanctions.95

Smith v. Allwright,96 the one voting rights decision to which Klarman ascribes a high degree of effectiveness,97 further reinforces the explanatory power of collective action theory. As Klarman perceptively emphasizes, by the 1940s, Southern registrars who continued to flout Smith’s requirement that blacks be allowed to vote in primaries on the same basis as whites

93. V.O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation 560-76 (1949). Key’s book was based on interviews with politicians, activists, and state officials all over the South. Roscoe C. Martin, Foreword to Key, supra, at vi-vii.
94. Key, supra note 93, at 561-63.
95. See the discussion of peonage and residential segregation laws infra Sections III.B and III.D.
97. Klarman, supra note 5, at 236-45.
risked criminal prosecution by the Justice Department and suits for money damages.98 Even though the Justice Department was far from consistent in carrying out such threats,99 the mere possibility of personal criminal or civil liability was enough to deter some registrars from continuing their discriminatory practices.100

By imposing a potential private cost on registrars, the Court and the Justice Department effectively created a collective action problem for them similar to that facing white planters who sought to form a cartel to control black laborers. Although the Department lacked the will or the resources to force compliance on registrars throughout the South had they all refused to follow Smith,101 individual registrars were hesitant to take the risk of noncompliance because they lacked any assurance that their colleagues in neighboring jurisdictions would do the same. And an isolated flouter of federal authority likely faced an unusually high risk of prosecution.

B. Cost Externalization

The problem of cost externalization is related to, but nonetheless distinct from, that of collective action. Even in a situation where efforts to enforce white supremacy did not suffer from collective action problems because the contributions of an individual white could have a substantial impact in their own right, that individual might still choose not to act because of the high cost of doing so. Jim Crow laws could alleviate this reluctance by externalizing some or all of the costs of enforcement from those individual whites to society as a whole.

Once again, white planters’ efforts to control black labor provide a helpful example. Although white efforts to form a cartel under which the planters agreed not to hire away each others’ workers were subject to collective action problems and defection, any individual planter could potentially avoid collective action problems by using the threat of violence to prevent his own employees from leaving or demanding higher wages. In fact, some did just that.102 However, resort to violence entailed considerable costs: Either the planter would have to take the risk of attacking recalcitrant black employees himself, or he would have to hire brutal thugs to serve as enforcers. Moreover, even in the Plessy era, white planters were occasionally punished for egregious acts of violence against black

98. Id. at 241, 458.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 241.
101. See id. (noting that “the [Justice] [D]epartment remained reluctant to prosecute”).
102. See, e.g., Higgs, supra note 82, at 75-76.
workers. In some instances, blacks were bold enough to fight back, further increasing the risks faced by white planters.

Peonage laws greatly reduced the costs faced by white planters seeking to coerce black workers by shifting the costs and risks of enforcement to law enforcement authorities paid for by the public fisc. A study by economist Jennifer Roback concludes that “Southern planters may have found it . . . profitable to collude to hold down black wages . . . only as long as they could pass the enforcement costs on to state and local governments.” She notes that nearly all peonage laws adopted by Southern states included criminal penalties. This is significant because criminal law is enforced entirely at public expense, whereas civil remedies are only effective if private plaintiffs are willing to assume the cost of litigation.

A similar story could be told about white property owners seeking to exclude blacks from their neighborhoods. While violence could be and sometimes was used to scare off black residents, the costs of such action were much higher than simply leaving the job to state authorities enforcing residential segregation laws. First, not all whites were willing to use violence to keep out blacks, and some ethnic groups (Jews in particular) were disinclined sociologically to use violence to exclude blacks from their neighborhoods. Second, violence raised the risks of a violent response. For example, Klarman discusses the case of Dr. Ossian Sweet, who killed one member of a Detroit mob trying to drive him from his home and wounded another. Third, the use of violence carried the risk of arrest and possible prosecution, especially in the North. Law enforcement protection of blacks was hardly perfect and varied dramatically depending on the circumstances, but it was not nonexistent, either. Even in the South, some influential whites—real estate interests, white business elites concerned with the image of their cities, and whites who generally opposed lawlessness of any form—

104. HIGGS, supra note 82, at 76.
105. Roback, supra note 22, at 1163.
106. Id. at 1166.
107. See, e.g., JONATHAN KAUFMAN, BROKEN ALLIANCE: THE TURBULENT TIMES BETWEEN BLACKS AND JEWS IN AMERICA 171-72 (1988) (contrasting the relatively passive Jewish reactions in the 1960s when blacks started to enter their neighborhoods with the violence met by blacks in other neighborhoods).
108. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 133-34.
were opposed to violence and were inclined to pressure local officials to prevent it (with varying degrees of success). 109

Indeed, one reason common carriers such as railroads and streetcar companies were often hostile to segregation laws was that their employees were forced to serve as the primary enforcers of the laws. Not only did such enforcement cost the company time and money, but it caused many problems when, for example, train conductors needed to decide whether an individual with a medium skin tone was a “light skinned negro” or a “dark skinned white.” Railroads faced lawsuits both for being insufficiently vigorous in enforcing separate-car laws and for mistakenly assigning whites to “negro” cars. 110 Streetcars, where the costs of enforcement of segregation were very high, were largely integrated before the law intervened. 111

C. Cost Minimization: Raising the Price of Oppressive Policies

White supporters of Jim Crow were committed to maintaining white supremacy, but for most it was not their only value. Southern whites sought to maintain segregation in ways that minimized the cost to themselves. This consideration is related to that of cost externalization but distinct from it. Cost externalization arises from the desire of some actors to change the distribution of the costs imposed by the maintenance of segregation. The concept of cost minimization, on the other hand, stems from Southern whites’ desire to minimize the total amount of costs.

If the cost of segregation became too high, whites might no longer have been willing to pay it, or at least might have preferred to reduce the scope of the system. This idea of a shift in the “supply curve” for segregation has not been systematically applied to analysis of the impact of judicial review on policies that discriminate against blacks and other minority groups. The potential impact is relatively clear: If judicial review eliminates or curtails the “cheapest” methods of maintaining a system of oppression, it could erode support for the maintenance of that system, even if judicial review


did not lead to an immediate increase in respect for minority rights. As this Review shall argue, this concept helps to elucidate Brown’s significance.\footnote{112 See infra Section IV.C.}

D. Judicial Power and the Rise of External Social Forces Favoring Blacks

Klarman rightly emphasizes the role of broad social forces in accounting for the increased respect and protection for black civil rights. His argument and Gerald Rosenberg’s similar claim\footnote{113 ROSENBERG, supra note 4.} are important correctives to traditional accounts, which focus almost exclusively on the role of the judiciary.\footnote{114 See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (rev. and expanded ed. 2004). Kluger’s book, originally published in 1975, played a key role in establishing the conventional wisdom on Brown.} However, Klarman neglects the possibility that some of the social forces to which he attributes racial progress were in part dependent upon favorable legal decisions.

In particular, Supreme Court decisions striking down peonage laws and racial segregation laws played a key role in protecting black mobility.\footnote{115 See infra Sections III.A-B.} This is of vital importance because Klarman correctly emphasizes the crucial role of mobility in black advancement.\footnote{116 Klarman, supra note 5, at 100-02, 163-64, 173-74, 178.} The Great Migrations of blacks to the North in the 1910s and during and after World War II enabled first hundreds of thousands and later millions of blacks to better their economic prospects and gain access to improved education.\footnote{117 Id. at 100-03.} The ability of blacks to vote in the North ensured that the growth of the black population there would eventually translate into greater black political influence in the nation as a whole, ultimately forcing national politicians to confront the Jim Crow system in the South.\footnote{118 Id. at 100-02, 173-78.}

Klarman deserves credit for being one of the few legal scholars to recognize that migration to the North also had a significant immediate impact on the treatment of blacks who remained in the South. Fear of losing their black labor force led white planters and businessmen to treat blacks better and to lobby for laws ameliorating the most egregious practices of Jim Crow. “Thus, the black exodus induced southern cities and states to promise, and occasionally deliver, ameliorative policies, such as antilynching laws, increased educational spending, higher agricultural wages, and fairer legal treatment.”\footnote{119 Id. at 102.} As a 1917 NAACP publication put it,
migration was “the most effective protest against Southern lynching, lawlessness, and general deviltry.” \(^{120}\)

Migration within the South was also significant. \(^{121}\) Increasing black migration from the countryside to the cities enabled more blacks to gain better economic and educational opportunities and also to move to areas where a much higher proportion of blacks was allowed to vote. Even internal migration within the Southern countryside increasingly enabled blacks to better their prospects by forcing white employers both to bid against each other for their services and to ask their political representatives to provide better public services for blacks. \(^{122}\)

Substantial black migration both inside and outside the South would surely have occurred even in the complete absence of favorable judicial intervention. But to the extent that peonage laws significantly hindered rural blacks’ ability to leave their homes and employers, \(^{123}\) and to the extent that residential segregation laws made it harder for them to move to cities, Supreme Court intervention eliminating these obstacles played a critical and underemphasized role in hastening the end of Jim Crow oppression.

E. Causes of Judicial Independence

So far, this Part has focused on ways in which judicial power helped alleviate the plight of blacks under Jim Crow. However, even if the judiciary had the ability, we must still ask why it would have had the will. While we lack the space to consider the full range of possible reasons why the judiciary’s agenda might diverge from that of public opinion and political leaders, we do note several possibilities that are especially relevant to the history of civil rights jurisprudence. \(^{124}\)

Klarman himself ascribes significance to the fact that most jurists come from relatively wealthy and highly educated “elite” backgrounds. On some

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120. Editorial, Migration and Help, 13 CRISIS 115 (1917), quoted in KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 164.
121. By the 1890s, African Americans were migrating within the South at historic levels. Indeed, “in the 1890s and 1900s every Southern state except Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida registered rates of black outmigration almost as great as in the famed ‘Great Migration’ of the World War I years.” EDWARD L. AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION 151 (1992); id. at 493 n.56.
123. For evidence that this was indeed the case, see Roback, supra note 22, at 1165-70; supra Section II.B; and infra Section III.A.
124. In analyzing possible causes of judicial independence, this Review, like Klarman, focuses primarily on the U.S. Supreme Court. However, most points made in this Review also apply to other Article III courts.
issues, elite opinion systematically differs from that of non-elites. Unfortunately, however, Klarman neglects several other relevant factors, which are discussed below.

1. Life Tenure and Relative Insulation from Political Pressure

The insulation provided by life tenure is the oldest of arguments for judicial independence. In *Federalist No. 78*, Alexander Hamilton argued that it would ensure that the judiciary would function as an “excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body.”

While life tenure certainly does not give judges anything approaching complete immunity from political pressure, it does give them greater discretionary leeway than is usually enjoyed by elected officials and temporary political appointees. Relative to the latter, judges are comparatively immune to punishment by interest groups and others offended by their decisions.

Moreover, regardless of personal prejudices, federal judges typically have institutional loyalty to the federal government and are protective of federal prerogatives. For example, federal judges in the late nineteenth century, almost none of whom had any personal sympathy for Chinese immigrants, generally (and in contrast to state courts) protected them from hostile local legislation by invoking the Fourteenth Amendment and the United States’s treaty obligations to China. Similarly, Ninth Circuit judges hearing immigration cases in the 1890s shared the prevalent negative attitude toward the Chinese, but were constrained by their “perception of their institutional obligations” and when “weighing the evidence in individual cases” often disregarded “the fact that the litigants were Chinese or of Chinese descent.” Indeed, anti-Chinese forces were sufficiently disturbed by judicial rulings that they lobbied to curtail federal courts’ jurisdiction to hear immigration cases.

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125. See Klarman, *supra* note 5, at 450, 452.
127. There is an extensive scholarship outlining ways in which the political branches can influence judicial decisionmaking. For a helpful critical analysis of some of the literature, see Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, *The Choices Justices Make* 138-81 (1998).
130. Id. at xvi.
2. Generational Cohort Effects

An important additional implication of life tenure is the fact that Justices will often be members of a much earlier generation than the majority of politicians and voters. Political scientists and sociologists have for a long time realized that people’s views on controversial political and ideological issues are often critically dependent on generation-specific formative experiences. Social scientists refer to these intergenerational differences in outlook as “cohort effects.”

Cohort effects lead to large intergenerational differences in attitudes on a wide range of political issues. While social scientists have long recognized the importance of cohort effects, those effects have not featured prominently in the debate among legal scholars over the role of the judiciary in protecting minority rights. Particularly important for our purposes is the well-documented finding that cohort effects have a huge impact on the public’s attitudes regarding racial issues. Modern public opinion research finds that later cohorts tend to be more racially tolerant than earlier ones. In the Progressive Era, however, white racism toward blacks was increasing rather than abating, and the fact that most Supreme Court Justices belonged to an older cohort probably made them more tolerant than the median voter and political officeholder.

3. Selection of Justices from Unrepresentative Subgroups Within the Population

A variety of political pressures might lead presidents to select all or most of their Supreme Court appointments from a subset of the population with unrepresentative views on a given set of issues. For present purposes, it is significant that Justices will usually be selected from within the president’s own political party. Presidents sometimes will choose Justices who not only are members of their party, but who come from a faction within the party that is likely to best serve the president’s political and ideological purposes.

In some cases, of course, Justices are deliberately chosen for their views on specific issues. But it is important to recognize that Justices chosen for their liberal views on Issue A may also be disproportionately

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134. Id. at 197-98.
135. See infra Section III.E.
likely to have liberal views on Issue B, even if B was not a significant consideration in the president’s decision to appoint the Justice.

Both types of unrepresentative selection bear on Klarman’s thesis. In the Progressive Era, most of the Justices on the Court had been picked by Republican presidents and were therefore members of the Republican Party. Because the Republican Party in that era had little support among white Southerners, these Republican Justices were all Northerners, and therefore none of them came from subgroups of the population that had the most hostile attitudes toward blacks. While not inevitable, it also is not surprising that these Justices did not look kindly on the expansion of Jim Crow legislation in the South in the cases that came before them.

Under President Franklin Roosevelt, who made a record nine appointments to the Court, judicial selection was heavily influenced by factional and issue-based considerations, as well as by party considerations. Roosevelt sought to ensure that his appointees would be liberals who would vote to support broad presidential power; virtually unlimited federal power over economic regulation; and (to a much lesser degree) freedom of speech and religion.\textsuperscript{136} As a result, six of FDR’s nine appointees were Northern liberal Democrats, the group most likely to share these views.\textsuperscript{137} While “there is no clear evidence that FDR nominated jurists with a specific desire to advance African-American rights, his nominees’ adherence to rights-centered liberalism combined with their devotion to defer to the executive branch ensured that the NAACP would find fertile ground to lay its antisegregation precedential seeds.”\textsuperscript{138} Although helping blacks was not FDR’s goal, the Justices drawn from the faction of the Democratic Party likely to support the President’s actual objectives were also—at that time—more likely to oppose Jim Crow than the average white.

In his book, Klarman recognizes that \textit{Brown}, decided by a Court still dominated by the five remaining FDR appointees, was ahead of both public and political opinion in its willingness to strike down Southern school segregation.\textsuperscript{139} Klarman attributes the Justices’ stance to their “elite” status.\textsuperscript{140} Yet an important additional element was the manner in which they

\textsuperscript{136} See KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE PRESIDENCY PAVED THE ROAD TO \textit{BROWN} 97-143 (2004).

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Id}. Of the three Southerners, James F. Byrnes, Stanley Reed, and Hugo Black, one (Byrnes) served only briefly, \textit{ibid}. at 138, and another (Black) was actually a racial liberal, despite having once been a member of the Ku Klux Klan, \textit{ibid}. at 111-12.

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{Id}. at 142.

\textsuperscript{139} KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 343, 450-52. Although, as Klarman notes, about half the public agreed with the \textit{Brown} decision from the outset, he also recognizes that \textit{Brown} came long before there was any strong political pressure on Congress to attack Jim Crow segregation directly, and acknowledges that the Court “played a vanguard role in school desegregation.” \textit{Id}. at 343.

\textsuperscript{140} \textit{Id}. at 450-52.
were chosen. Certainly, a random sample of nine members of the American elite of 1954 would have been unlikely to unanimously support the elimination of school desegregation.\footnote{141}

III. RACE AND THE SUPREME COURT IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

The major civil rights decisions of the Progressive Era illustrate the importance of considerations that Klarman fails to incorporate into his analytical framework. The Supreme Court turned out to be both more effective and more willing to take steps to protect some of the rights of African Americans than his argument would suggest.

A. The Puzzle of the Progressive Era Race Decisions

As noted previously, in the 1910s, at the height of the Progressive Era, the cause of black civil rights emerged victorious in four sets of cases.\footnote{142} The Progressive Era cases marked a turning point with regard to Supreme Court jurisprudence on race. According to one tally, the Supreme Court heard twenty-eight cases involving African Americans and the Fourteenth Amendment between 1868 and 1910. Of these, African Americans lost twenty-two.\footnote{143} However, between 1920 and 1943, African Americans won twenty-five of twenty-seven Fourteenth Amendment cases before the Supreme Court.\footnote{144}

The Progressive Era decisions came in a decade when “racial attitudes and practices seemed to have reached a post-Civil War nadir.”\footnote{145} Most whites, including most white intellectuals, believed that African Americans were culturally and biologically inferior.\footnote{146} Progressive political and intellectual leaders generally shared the racism of the day,\footnote{147} and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{141. Although the Justices differed among themselves on the legal propriety of Brown, Klarman shows that all but Justice Reed agreed that school segregation was morally reprehensible. \textit{Id.} at 294-301.}
  \item \footnote{142. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.}
  \item \footnote{143. See \textit{Bernard H. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Negro Since 1920}, at 13-14 (1946).}
  \item \footnote{144. \textit{Id.} at 162.}
  \item \footnote{145. \textit{Klarman, supra} note 5, at 63.}
  \item \footnote{146. “The literature of sociology was dominated by the view that Negroes were inferior to the white race in every way. This position of scholars both reflected and reinforced popular beliefs.” \textit{Clement E. Vose, Caucasians Only: The Supreme Court, the NAACP, and the Restrictive Covenant Cases} 65 (1959) (footnote omitted).}
  \item \footnote{147. See \textit{David W. Southern, The Malignant Heritage: Yankee Progressives and the Negro Question} 1901-1914, at 48-49 (1968) (describing the racist connotations of scholarly works of the late nineteenth century); \textit{C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South} 1877-1913, at 369-95 (1951) (asserting that both Northern and Southern Progressives shared a racist outlook).}
\end{itemize}
Progressive social scientists promoted pseudo-scientific theories of race differences.\textsuperscript{148} Moreover, the political branches were overtly hostile to blacks. Politicians almost unanimously endorsed segregation; those who disagreed generally kept quiet.\textsuperscript{149} In 1912, Republican presidential candidate William Howard Taft and Progressive (and former Republican) candidate Theodore Roosevelt were so overtly hostile to the interests of blacks that many leading civil rights activists supported Southern Democrat Woodrow Wilson.\textsuperscript{150} The Wilson Administration, however, turned out to be consistently hostile to African Americans,\textsuperscript{151} and Congress was only marginally better.\textsuperscript{152}

As Klarman acknowledges,\textsuperscript{153} the historical context of the 1910s civil rights decisions is a problem for those, like him, who argue that “changes in the social and political context of race relations preceded and accounted for changes in judicial decision making.”\textsuperscript{154} The decisions of the Court during this period may tempt one to conclude that “this apparent disjunction between cases and context reveals that the justices possess a significant capacity to defend minority rights from majority oppression.”\textsuperscript{155} Yet Klarman resists this conclusion and instead suggests that the Progressive Era race cases simply “may show that where the law is relatively clear, the Court tends to follow it, even in an unsupportive context.”\textsuperscript{156} Klarman adds that except insofar as they inspired civil rights activists, the Court’s Progressive Era race decisions “proved inconsequential”:\textsuperscript{157} Southern peonage continued for decades; railroads continued to offer blacks unequal

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{148} See THOMAS F. GOSSETT, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA 154-75 (1963) (discussing racist theories of this era).
  \item \textsuperscript{150} KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 67-68.
  \item \textsuperscript{152} See generally Morton Sosna, \textit{The South in the Saddle: Racial Politics During the Wilson Years}, 54 WIS. MAG. HIST. 30 (1970) (discussing Congress’s stance towards blacks during the Wilson years).
  \item \textsuperscript{153} KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 62.
  \item \textsuperscript{154} Id. at 443.
  \item \textsuperscript{155} Id. at 62.
  \item \textsuperscript{156} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{157} Id.
\end{itemize}
accommodations; *Guinn* and *Myers* enfranchised no blacks; and American cities became increasingly segregated.\(^\text{158}\)

With respect to the voting rights cases, Klarman makes a strong argument. While the Court could have constructed a plausible opinion upholding grandfather clauses,\(^\text{159}\) the laws in question were a rather blatant attempt to nullify the Fifteenth Amendment, and legal commentators had widely predicted that the Court would invalidate them.\(^\text{160}\) Even President Taft—like others who believed that the Fifteenth Amendment was misconceived but must be obeyed—thought that grandfather clauses were unconstitutional.\(^\text{161}\) And the practical implications of invalidating grandfather clauses were minimal, as Southern states had many other means of restricting the franchise. Indeed, in dicta the *Guinn* Court explicitly endorsed literacy tests. According to Klarman, this dictum “ensured that the ruling had no impact on black disfranchisement.”\(^\text{162}\)

Even if the Court had evinced less tolerance of disfranchisement mechanisms like literacy tests, in practice disfranchisement was primarily the responsibility of local officials who could use their bureaucratic discretion to the detriment of blacks and had every political incentive to do so.\(^\text{163}\) Ensuring blacks’ ability to vote in the South would have taken tremendous litigation resources (which civil rights activists did not have)\(^\text{164}\) and the sustained support of the executive branch in supporting litigation efforts and protecting black registrants and voters from violence (which was not forthcoming).\(^\text{165}\)

Klarman’s argument becomes more dubious when one considers the peonage and railroad segregation cases, which are discussed in more detail below in Sections B and C, respectively. The strongest challenge to Klarman’s position comes from *Buchanan v. Warley*, discussed in Section D. Section E discusses why the Supreme Court suddenly became more sympathetic to civil rights during the Progressive Era.

\(^{158}\) For a similar analysis of the Progressive Era race cases, see Randall Kennedy, *Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of Professor Schmidt*, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1622 (1986).

\(^{159}\) A detailed explanation of how the Court could have justified a ruling that came out the other way is found in 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 958-59 (1984).

\(^{160}\) KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 70.

\(^{161}\) Id. at 71.

\(^{162}\) Id. at 85.

\(^{163}\) See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (discussing Key’s work on disfranchisement).

\(^{164}\) KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 86.

\(^{165}\) Between *Plessy* and the Truman Administration, the administration most friendly to black political aspirations was likely the short-lived Harding Administration. Harding sought to rejuvenate the Republican Party in the South, but unlike other prominent Republicans of his era, hoped to do so via a biracial coalition, not by turning the Republican Party lily white. Nevertheless, the Harding years saw only nominal efforts on voting rights. JOHN W. DEAN, *WARREN G. HARDING* 124-26 (2004).
B. The Peonage Cases

After emancipation, employers responded to rising African-American wages by attempting to create voluntary cartels to assure a noncompetitive labor market.\(^{166}\) When these efforts failed, planters frequently turned to violence to limit black mobility.\(^{167}\) However, private violence had its limits: Its use required a certain level of brutality and lawlessness that only some plantation owners were prepared to exercise; it ran the risk of counter- or defensive violence; and it was costly, because it usually required payment to the overseers and underlings who carried out the violence. Not surprisingly, planters preferred to turn to government to externalize their costs in suppressing black mobility.\(^{168}\) Moreover, government was needed to solve the collective action problems created by the fact that individual planters had an incentive to lure black labor away from other planters by bidding up wages and working conditions.\(^{169}\)

The Fourteenth Amendment outlawed overt legislative discrimination, so the planters lobbied for facially neutral legislation.\(^{170}\) Among the laws used to suppress black labor mobility were emigrant agent laws, which restricted the rights of out-of-state labor recruiters; enticement laws, which prohibited an employer from “enticing” a worker under contract with another employer; the criminal surety and convict-lease system, which allowed the government to lease black workers convicted of petty crimes—real or trumped up—to planters; and false pretenses laws, which made it a criminal offense to fail to repay an advance a worker had fraudulently accepted from his employer.\(^{171}\)

False pretenses laws and the criminal surety system frequently left blacks in a state of peonage. In *Clyatt v. United States*,\(^{172}\) the Court upheld the 1867 Peonage Act, which banned involuntary servitude when physical coercion was used to force a worker to pay off a debt. Six years later, the case of *Bailey v. Alabama* came to the Supreme Court.\(^{173}\) The issue in *Bailey* was the legality of an Alabama false pretenses law under the Peonage Act and the Thirteenth Amendment. After similar laws had been

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166. See *supra* notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., Frederick Douglass, The Nation’s Problem, Speech Made upon the Twenty-Seventh Anniversary of Abolition in the District of Columbia (Apr. 16, 1889), in *NEGRO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1850-1920*, at 323 (Howard Brotz ed., 1966) (reporting that violence was used against African Americans caught trying to migrate).
169. See *supra* Section II.A.
172. 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
173. 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
invalidated or construed narrowly several times by federal and state courts, Alabama enacted a law that created a presumption of fraudulent intent whenever a worker breached a labor contract after receiving an advance from his employer. Moreover, the laborer was not even permitted to testify “as to his uncommunicated motives, purpose, or intention.” The Supreme Court invalidated the law, holding that it effectively criminalized ordinary breach of contract.

*Bailey* marked “the first decision since *Strauder v. West Virginia* in 1880 in which the Supreme Court took the side of black people in an important issue of race relations.” Nevertheless, and although the Court’s opinion drew dissents from Justices Holmes and Lurton, Klarman is correct that one can construe the case as legally and politically “easy.” Debt peonage was commonly understood as a form of involuntary servitude, and public support for debt peonage was minimal outside of the planter class. Even Wilson Administration Attorney General James McReynolds, who later became a Supreme Court Justice notorious for his racism, opposed peonage.

Indeed, McReynolds expedited the next black-labor case to reach the Supreme Court, *United States v. Reynolds*. *Reynolds* tested the legality of Alabama’s criminal surety laws. Criminal surety laws were not inherently objectionable, as formally they merely gave a convicted man a choice between paying a fine, serving jail time (likely on a chain gang as a leased convict), or working for a planter willing to pay off the fine. However, the Court chose not to ignore “the patent fraud in a system that routinely manufactured black criminals” and then entrapped them in a system in which they were destined to be long-term peons.

Given general societal revulsion toward peonage, *Bailey* and *Reynolds* do not, by themselves, seem to reflect any great progressiveness on racial issues by the Supreme Court. Klarman further argues that these cases “seem to have had little effect on peonage” and adds that “experts agree that southern peonage remained widespread after *Bailey* and *Reynolds*.” Both

175. *Bailey*, 219 U.S. at 228 (citing *Bailey v. State*, 49 So. 886, 886 (1909), rev’d, 219 U.S. 219 (1911)) (explaining that this was an evidentiary rule in Alabama, “which must be regarded as having the same effect as if read into the statute itself”).
176. 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 888. *Clay v. United States*, 197 U.S. 207 (1905), upheld the Peonage Act but reversed the conviction under the Act on a technicality.
177. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 75.
178. 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 880-81.
179. 9 Id.
180. 235 U.S. 133 (1914).
181. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 75.
182. Id. at 86.
183. Id. at 88. Klarman points to letters and NAACP files reporting coercive labor practices in various Southern states, as well as a 1921 report by the United States Attorney General on the
of these statements are open to question. The fact that some peonage continued after Bailey does not mean that, as Klarman contends, Bailey “apparently had no effect on the amount of peonage that existed.”

Bailey clearly changed the legal regime in various Southern states. After Bailey, Alabama passed a new false pretenses law that “omitted the objectionable prima facie clause.” Historian Pete Daniel reports that the incidence of peonage complaints in Alabama “fell off abruptly after the Bailey case.” Meanwhile, pending prosecutions under the invalidated statute apparently were dropped. Arkansas removed its unconstitutional false pretenses law from the state code in 1921. “Mississippi’s Code of 1917 included such a statute, but the Revised Code of 1930 did not.” The North Carolina Supreme Court declared the state’s prima facie clause unconstitutional, though the legislature did not delete the law from the state code until 1943.

Klarman believes that such formal legal changes had no effect “on the ground,” but events in Florida suggest otherwise. Florida initially dropped its prima facie evidence clause to comply with Bailey, but then reenacted a statute with this clause in 1919. While this means that Bailey was ineffective in Florida, it also may contradict Klarman’s view that peonage laws were superfluous to the coercion of black labor. Laws are sometimes passed for symbolic or expressive reasons, but the addition of a prima facie clause to a false pretenses statute probably does not fall within that category of laws. The prima facie clause could also have been enacted proactively by the legislature to please planters by showing an interest in their affairs, even if the planters saw little need for such a law. But the more plausible explanation for the reemergence of the clause is that planters’ ability to successfully prosecute workers for failing to pay their debts made a

184. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 96. Alexander Bickel and Benno Schmidt point out that Alabama employers must have thought that pre-Bailey peonage laws were significant, “since it would otherwise be hard to account for the legislature’s tenacity in amending the statute repeatedly to get around the state courts’ aversion to criminal liability for breach.” 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 900.

185. COHEN, supra note 81, at 292-93.


187. 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 872.

188. COHEN, supra note 81, at 293.

189. Id. (italics omitted).

190. Id.

191. See Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 13 (1944) (reviewing the history of the clause and invalidating the statute).
significant difference with respect to the planters’ ability to coerce blacks. In any event, Klarman does not address the issue.

In general, a small risk of incarceration for engaging in illegal peonage likely deterred some plantation owners from engaging in that practice—very preliminary investigations, after all, were enough to frighten some planters into murdering witnesses. The somewhat greater risk of criminal prosecution and eventual exoneration by a jury had its own deterrent effect, given the uncertainty, legal costs, and shame of a trial.

As Klarman notes, while Bailey upheld federal law banning peonage for debt, there was no federal law banning involuntary servitude as such. Nevertheless, one cannot assume that every planter who was willing to force a black employee convicted of fraud to work off a debt would have been willing and able to simply enslave his workers. The former scenario had a far greater air of legitimacy, and, as with all other forms of human behavior, the level of brutality planters were willing to engage in no doubt varied from one individual to another. While there is no way to precisely measure such things, the fact that Bailey made it more difficult to externalize the costs of enforcing coercive labor practices seems to have accelerated a decline in peonage throughout most of the Deep South.

In addition to their connection to the collective action problems faced by planters who sought to cartelize the labor market, the peonage cases provide support for both the cost externalization and cost minimization

192. See DANIEL, supra note 186, at 133-38 (recounting a case of murder provoked by a desire to avoid prosecution for peonage); GREGORY A. FREEMAN, LAY THIS BODY DOWN: THE 1921 MURDERS OF ELEVEN PLANTATION SLAVES (1999); KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 88.

193. See, e.g., Cotton Hands That Stay, 82 THE COUNTRY GENTLEMAN 21 (1917) (describing the labor practices of various Mississippi planters and concluding that while precise management techniques vary, successful planters are “firm, just, men who take a friendly interest in the personal welfare of the negro”). [LE: check]

194. One expert concludes that “it would be misleading to imply that little had changed in the South since 1865, or even since 1911. From the time of Bailey v. Alabama, and probably earlier, involuntary servitude in the South was in decline.” COHEN, supra note 81, at 292. Cohen points out that “[i]n the decade 1910-1920, Mississippi lost over 15 percent of its black population.” Id. at 297. Between 1920 and 1930, South Carolina lost roughly thirty percent of its black population. And these numbers reflect net out-migration, not total out-migration. As Cohen notes, “Numbers of that magnitude are simply inconsistent with a picture of the South as a vast jail.” Id. at 297. Pete Daniel suggests throughout his book on peonage that labor conditions for southern blacks were as bad in the 1920s as they were twenty years earlier. He notes anecdotal evidence that those who investigated peonage in rural areas in the 1920s found it to be widespread. “Widespread” is a subjective and relative term, one that does not lend itself to easy empirical comparison to earlier periods. Meanwhile, Daniel concedes that one objective measure of peonage—the number of complaints about the practice—was lower in the 1920s than it had been twenty years earlier. DANIEL, supra note 186, at 148.

Klarman makes the somewhat mysterious concession that “[b]lack mobility and the competitive market for agricultural labor limited coercive possibilities.” KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 88. But the whole point of the coercive practices was to limit labor mobility. If there was a great deal of labor mobility, it shows that coercive practices, including unlawful peonage post-Bailey, were not effective.
theories of judicial impact.\footnote{195} Obviously, white planters had a strong interest in externalizing the cost of peonage enforcement to the criminal justice system, paid for by all taxpayers, rather than by the planters alone. In addition, public enforcement may have served to minimize the total costs of maintaining the peonage system by freeing planters from the necessity of using relatively costlier and riskier enforcement methods, such as private violence.

C. McCabe v. Atchison

Klarman portrays \textit{McCabe}'s dictum requiring roughly equal railroad allocations for blacks and whites, regardless of levels of demand from each group,\footnote{196} as a case in which the Court simply followed clear law.\footnote{197} Yet compared to the peonage laws at issue in \textit{Bailey} and \textit{Reynolds}, the law at issue in \textit{McCabe} was less clearly legally problematic. \textit{Plessy v. Ferguson} had held that “reasonable” railroad segregation laws were permitted. In the context of the times, many people would not have thought it unreasonable for a train company operating under a segregation law to refuse to provide separate first class cars when market demand for such accommodations did not justify the supply. Moreover, in \textit{Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education}, the Supreme Court had unanimously upheld the provision of a public high school for whites but not for blacks, largely on the grounds that the inequality at issue was reasonable under the circumstances.\footnote{198} As further evidence that \textit{McCabe}’s dicta was not obviously compelled, four Justices concurred without opinion, likely because they agreed with the substantive holding (that the plaintiffs lacked standing) but did not want to associate themselves with the decision’s equalitarian dicta.\footnote{199}

Klarman notes that despite \textit{Plessy} and \textit{Cumming} the common understanding in the legal world was that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, segregation laws had to require equal accommodations for both races.\footnote{200} But despite Klarman’s protestations to the contrary,\footnote{201} it is hard not to see the \textit{McCabe} dicta as an important shift in the Court’s views on the constitutional limits of segregation, especially because the opinion emphasized that equal protection with regard to racial classification was a

\footnotesize{\begin{tabular}{l}
195. \textit{See supra} Sections II.B-C. \\
196. 235 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1914). \\
197. Klarman, supra note 5, at 62, 77-78. \\
198. 175 U.S. 528 (1899). \\
199. Klarman, supra note 5, at 78. Andrew Kull argues, based on a memo from Justice Hughes to Justice Holmes, that Holmes would have upheld the law on the merits had the Court reached the issue. \textit{Andrew Kull, The Color-Blind Constitution} 136-37 (1992). \\
200. Klarman, supra note 5, at 77. \\
201. Id. at 78.
\end{tabular}}
personal right. Unlike in nonracial contexts, this right apparently could not be easily overridden by a showing that the classification at issue was a reasonable one with regard to one’s group, regardless of one’s idiosyncratic characteristics and claims. While the Court was not yet prepared to challenge the general structure of Jim Crow, McCabe “implied that laws requiring segregation were constitutionally disfavored,” a rather significant shift given the climate of the times.

On the other hand, McCabe is consistent with Klarman’s theory that while the Supreme Court will rein in jurisdictions that fail to adhere to national norms, it is rarely in the forefront of social change. Before McCabe, most Southern states explicitly required that separate accommodations be equal; only four states allowed unequal luxury accommodations. The McCabe Court had no intention of challenging the basic edifices of Jim Crow, and the Court continued to uphold segregation laws in the 1920s and 1930s.

Nevertheless, the decision marked a large step forward in the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence. Once the NAACP had the resources and strategic vision to challenge the unequal provision of public schooling for blacks, NAACP attorneys relied on McCabe in support of litigation requiring Southern states to provide equal graduate school education for blacks. Indeed, the Court’s ruling in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, requiring that a black student be provided with state-funded legal education, either through admission to the University of Missouri or creation of a separate but equal law school for blacks, explicitly relied on McCabe.

204. Klarman, supra note 5, at 78.
205. Id.
206. See Welke, supra note 110, at 355 (“[T]he Court’s recognition that the right to equality did not depend on it being economical to provide equal accommodations that were separate laid a critical foundation for future constitutional challenges by African-Americans.”).
207. Klarman, supra note 5, at 149-50.
208. 305 U.S. 337 (1938). McReynolds, who was in the minority in McCabe, not surprisingly dissented in Gaines.
209. Id. at 350-51. Perhaps, given social, political, demographic, and economic changes in the ensuing years, the school cases would have come out the same way even if the McCabe majority had not included strong equalitarian dicta, or even if it had ruled that the denial of equal accommodations was reasonable under the circumstances. But Gaines was decided in 1938, well before the quantum shift in race relations following World War II that Klarman identifies. This suggests that the Court’s willingness to uphold the individual rights of blacks was at least partially a product of legal doctrine. And surely, given its extremely limited resources, the NAACP would have been less likely to have pursued public education cases to begin with if it had not been aware of McCabe’s statement that facilities provided to whites under a Jim Crow regime must also be provided to blacks.

http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art9
Klarman asserts that *McCabe* seems to have “had no effect on railroad accommodations for southern blacks.” The Court said that state law should not authorize inequality; if railroads nevertheless provided unequal accommodations, black passengers only had recourse to the common law or state statutes requiring separate but equal facilities. By the 1910s, blacks, recognizing that state courts were inhospitable to these suits, had generally stopped filing them. However, contrary to what Klarman implies, there do seem to have been occasional successful lawsuits.

*McCabe*, then, had only marginal effect on black railroad passengers. However, it does seem to have had long-term effects on the legal status of unequal public education.

### D. Buchanan v. Warley

1. Buchanan and the Rise and Fall of Housing Segregation Laws

Starting in 1910, many cities in the South, border states, and lower Midwest, responding to a wave of unwanted African-American immigration from rural areas, passed laws mandating residential segregation in housing. As Klarman notes, more cities were ready to follow suit if...
the laws were found to be constitutional. But for the intervention of the Supreme Court, residential segregation by law would likely have become nearly universal in the South and perhaps have spread to the North as well.

Louisville’s residential segregation ordinance prohibited “any colored person to move into and occupy as a residence . . . any house upon any block upon which a greater number of houses are occupied . . . by white people than are occupied . . . by colored people.” The opposite restriction applied to whites. In *Buchanan v. Warley* in 1917, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that Louisville’s law was unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that the law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by infringing on the right to own and alienate property without a valid police power rationale.

After the Supreme Court upheld a general (nonracial) zoning ordinance in 1926, another wave of residential segregation laws swept the South. The NAACP, relying on *Buchanan*, persuaded the Supreme Court to invalidate segregation ordinances in New Orleans and Richmond. Local branches of the NAACP successfully challenged laws passed in Winston-Salem, Baltimore, Indianapolis, Norfolk, and Dallas. By the 1930s, residential segregation laws were rare and clearly unconstitutional.

2. Buchanan as a Civil Rights Decision

Klarman acknowledges that *Buchanan* “was not constitutional minimalism.” The Supreme Court was certainly not bound by precedent to invalidate residential segregation laws. The segregation precedent most

216. Charlotte; Charleston; New Orleans; and Meridian, Mississippi are among the cities known to have considered passing residential segregation laws. Silver, supra note 214, at 193. See Silver, supra note 214, at 191 (discussing the consideration of a residential segregation law in Richmond, Virginia, before the Supreme Court ruled that such laws were unconstitutional).


218. Id. at 71.


222. See Vose, supra note 146, at 51-52 (discussing various successful challenges of segregation ordinances brought by the NAACP).


224. Klarman, supra note 5, at 89.
obviously relevant to Buchanan, Plessy v. Ferguson, held that segregation was a valid police power function, and the Plessy opinion was infused with pseudo-scientific racist assumptions. Moreover, elite legal opinion strongly supported the constitutionality of residential segregation. Both before and after Buchanan, law review authors consistently argued that residential segregation ordinances passed constitutional muster.225

The Court’s opinion in Buchanan, therefore, seems anomalous and presents something of a mystery. Like many other commentators,226 Klarman argues that the mystery unravels once it is understood that Buchanan was mostly about property rights, not civil rights. Undoubtedly, property rights played an important role in the decision, as it allowed the Court to distinguish Buchanan from Plessy.227 African Americans did not have a common law right to sit with whites on trains, so the Plessy Court held that the interest in doing so was a social right unprotected by the Fourteenth Amendment.228 By contrast, blacks clearly had a Fourteenth Amendment right to purchase and occupy property.

To this extent, Klarman is correct that Buchanan was a property rights decision. However, Klarman ignores the most significant aspect of the Buchanan opinion: the Court’s refusal to concede that laws enforcing segregation were within the scope of the police power.229 In addition to relegating railroad seating to the realm of social rights, Plessy had suggested that any “reasonable” segregation regulations would be proper exercises of the police power and had applied a rather lax and racism-infused standard of reasonableness. In contrast, after noting that property rights are subject to the police power, the Buchanan opinion [ME: block quote] “moves immediately into the antidiscrimination litany that no Supreme Court majority had invoked since Strauder: the Reconstruction Amendments; the Slaughter-House Cases as the great expositor of the amendments’ central purpose; Strauder itself, with its famous antidiscrimination passages quoted at length; Ex parte Virginia; and the

225. Id.
226. See 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 811-12 (recounting the views of those who think that Buchanan was purely a property rights decision); KULL, supra note 199, at 139 (“The usual explanation for how it came about that the Supreme Court should vote unanimously to strike down a segregation ordinance in 1917 . . . is that Buchanan is essentially a decision in defense of property rights.”).
227. Carol Rose, Property Stories: Shelley v. Kraemer, in PROPERTY STORIES 169, 174 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2004) (noting that the Court distinguished Buchanan from Plessy on the basis of the former’s focus on the right to own and dispose of property).
228. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
229. Cf. Mark Tushnet, Plessy v. Ferguson in Libertarian Perspective, 16 LAW & PHIL. 245, 258 (1997) (“[T]he desire to create a segregated society was patent, and the Court simply refused to entertain it as a permissible legislative goal.”).
The Court emphasized that “[c]olored persons are citizens of the United States and have the right to purchase property and enjoy and use the same without laws discriminating against them solely on account of color.”

The Court then proceeded to explicitly reject all of the police power rationales that Kentucky argued supported state-enforced segregation, including limiting interracial friction, preventing miscegenation, and preventing the depreciation in the value of property owned by white people when African Americans became their neighbors. The Buchanan Court ruled that blacks could not be deprived of their property rights on such bases.

The Court’s refusal to defer to Kentucky’s assertion of its police power is remarkable for several reasons. First, as noted previously, the 1910s represented the worst period of post-Civil War racism in American history. Second, the Court had to go out of its way to distinguish Plessy and was not entirely persuasive in doing so. As Klarman notes, “After Plessy, one could argue that segregation plainly qualified as . . . a reasonable police-power objective . . . .” Buchanan was “a flat repudiation of the vague and flaccid Plessy standard of reasonableness as the governing constitutional sanction for legalized racism.”

Third, by the 1910s, Progressive advocates of “sociological jurisprudence” so dominated mainstream legal thought that Charles Warren remarked that “any court which recognizes wide and liberal bounds to the State police power is to be deemed in touch with the temper of the times.” Fourth, the Supreme Court had recently

230. KULL, supra note 199, at 139-40; see also 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 799 (stating that the opinion “introduced an abrupt shift of tone and perspective . . . from the entire corpus of Jim Crow law that had grown out of Plessy v. Ferguson”).

231. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 78-79 (1917). Klarman fails to summarize the legal reasoning in Buchanan, much less directly quote from it. It seems nearly impossible to read the opinion closely and maintain that the underlying basis of the decision was solely protection of property rights without consideration of the rights of blacks. The best one can say for the contrary argument is that some of the Justices who joined the opinion—Holmes and McReynolds are likely suspects, the former because he drafted an undelivered dissent and the latter because of his racism—likely did not approve of Justice Day’s emphasis on blacks’ rights.

232. As Bickel and Schmidt argue, “The decision should be read as a recognition, in 1917, that black people could claim basic rights of personhood and autonomy as those concepts were then understood.” 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 989.

233. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 24. Indeed, just before the Court decided Buchanan, the Georgia Supreme Court held that residential segregation laws were constitutional as reasonable exercises of the police power because they would prevent race friction, disorder, and violence. Harden v. City of Atlanta, 93 S.E. 401, 402-03 (Ga. 1917).

234. 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 814.

235. Charles Warren, A Bulwark to the State Police Power—the United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 667, 668 (1913). Warren prefaced this remark by noting that “[u]nder the present prevailing anti-individualism, there can be no doubt that the test of the progressiveness of a court is the degree of remoteness of the line fixed, within which the legislature shall have scope to legislate without being held to infringe on the Constitution.”
expressed sympathy for nonracial zoning, based on Progressive precepts that could also be applied to racial zoning, and Jim Crow racial segregation itself was part of a broader pattern of state regulation that was broadly Progressive in nature. And, fifth, although Buchanan was decided during the Lochner era, and the Court no longer simply deferred to claimed state exercises of the police power, during the 1910s the Court almost always upheld state regulatory legislation as valid exercises of the police power. In 1917, the year Buchanan was decided, the Court upheld several controversial regulatory laws.

Klarman also argues that Buchanan was mostly a victory for property rights, not civil rights, because “three of the five southern courts that considered the issue had invalidated residential segregation ordinances. Though the precise holding varied, these decisions consistently emphasized owners’ rights to sell property unimpeded by government regulation.” The high courts of Georgia, Maryland, and North Carolina did indeed invalidate racial segregation ordinances. However, by 1917 the Georgia Supreme Court had reversed itself and upheld a revised residential segregation law. It distinguished its previous holding by narrowly

237. W Elke, supra note 110, at 351-52.
239. Klarman acknowledges that the specific holding of Lochner itself was silently overruled in 1917 in Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917), but adds that the Court issued a Lochnerian decision that same year invalidating a law banning employment agencies in Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917). Klarman, supra note 5, at 81. Klarman, however, neglects other deferential decisions the same year. See Stettler v. O’Hara, 243 U.S. 629 (1917) (per curiam) (upholding in a 4-4 vote, with Progressive Justice Brandeis recused, a minimum wage law for women); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917) (upholding a statute that required that employees be compensated from a pool into which all employers in an industry had to contribute); N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) (unanimously upholding the constitutionality of workers’ compensation laws); Bowersock v. Smith, 243 U.S. 29 (1917) (upholding a statute eliminating the fellow servant rule and the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk). Many of these decisions split the Court, but one can hardly say that in 1917 the Court was aggressively limiting the states’ exercise of their police powers.

In Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917), the Court upheld a federal law limiting the hours of railroad workers to eight and prohibiting the railroads from reducing pay to make up for the shorter hours. Justice Day, the author of Buchanan, dissented in Wilson, arguing that the law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Klarman, supra note 5, at 81. This shows that Day was not a strict opponent of Lochnerian jurisprudence. Klarman raises this dissent to buttress his claim that Buchanan was primarily a property rights decision. However, as explained above, the facts that Buchanan involved the invocation of property rights and that all the Justices believed that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protected property rights to some degree, did not dictate the outcome of the police power issue.

240. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 81.
interpreting the holding as invalidating the law in question only because it applied retroactively.\textsuperscript{244} The Maryland opinion, meanwhile, was expressly limited to protecting vested rights. Finally, the North Carolina case, though broader in its dicta than the other two, held that the law in question violated the general welfare clause of a city charter, not that it violated the Federal Constitution. Meanwhile, the Virginia\textsuperscript{245} and Kentucky\textsuperscript{246} high courts had upheld residential segregation laws. By the time \textit{Buchanan} was decided, then, no state had ruled that a residential segregation law that did not apply to vested rights exceeded the states’ police power, and three state courts explicitly had held that it did not.\textsuperscript{247}

3. \textit{Buchanan’s Underrated Impact}

As Klarman notes, contemporary civil rights activists hailed \textit{Buchanan} as a momentous decision, and some modern commentators have followed suit.\textsuperscript{248} \textit{Buchanan} was the NAACP’s first major victory before the United States Supreme Court, and Klarman acknowledges that \textit{Buchanan} likely was important in energizing the NAACP and inspiring civil rights activism by encouraging blacks to “believe the racial status quo was malleable.”\textsuperscript{249} However, Klarman concludes that \textit{Buchanan} was otherwise inconsequential. First, he disagrees with those commentators who believe that the decision inhibited state and local governments from passing more pervasive and brutal segregation laws, akin to those enacted in South Africa.\textsuperscript{250} Second, Klarman asserts that \textit{Buchanan} “had little or no effect on

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{244} Harden v. City of Atlanta, 93 S.E. 401 (Ga. 1917).
\item \textsuperscript{245} Hopkins v. City of Richmond, 86 S.E. 139 (Va. 1915).
\item \textsuperscript{246} Harris v. City of Louisville, 177 S.W. 472 (Ky. 1915), \textit{rev’d}, Buchanan v. Varley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
\item \textsuperscript{247} Klarman further contends that the Louisville segregation law was such an obvious infringement on property rights that “[e]ven the committed majoritarian, Holmes, could not countenance such a substantial interference with property rights.” \textit{Klarman}, \textit{supra} note 5, at 82. Yet Holmes drafted a dissenting opinion, arguing that the white plaintiff (who was barred from selling his property to a black man) could not assert the rights of blacks disadvantaged by the statute, and that the law did not infringe on the plaintiff’s property rights in a way that violated the Fourteenth Amendment. See 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, \textit{supra} note 103, at 592 illus. (providing a copy of Holmes’s undelivered dissent in \textit{Buchanan}). Only eleven days before \textit{Buchanan} was released, Holmes was still debating whether to issue his dissent. \textit{Id.} at 805 n.255. He ultimately did not, probably not because he changed his mind on the merits but because he could not get a second vote. \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{248} \textit{Klarman}, \textit{supra} note 5, at 90, 93-94.
\item \textsuperscript{249} \textit{Id.} at 94.
\item \textsuperscript{250} \textit{Id.} at 93; see, e.g., \textit{John R. Howard, The Shifting Wind: The Supreme Court and Civil Rights from Reconstruction to \textit{Brown} 192} (1999) (suggesting that the wave of residential segregation laws passed in the South in the 1910s “can be seen as a formal step toward a system of apartheid”); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al., \textit{De Jure Housing Segregation in the United States and South Africa: The Difficult Pursuit for Racial Justice}, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 763, 770 (concluding that if \textit{Buchanan} had come out the other way, in “many southern states and
segregated housing patterns, and neither did the two summary affirmances in the interwar years, and that the invalidation of segregation laws had little effect on residential patterns.

With regard to Klarman’s first point, the evidence is inconclusive. On the one hand, as Klarman points out, Buchanan clearly did not lead to a rollback of de jure segregation, or even stop its extension “to new areas of life, such as restaurants, parks, and barbershops, and to new technologies, such as office elevators, taxicabs, and buses.” An underfunded NAACP could barely keep up with challenges to clearly unconstitutional residential segregation ordinances that cities continued to enact, much less attempt to expand Buchanan’s holding.

On the other hand, Jim Crow in the South never came close to matching the apartheid system in South Africa, with its stringent restrictions on black residence and migration. Perhaps, as Klarman implies, political, social, and economic forces would have prevented such developments regardless of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Buchanan. But perhaps a contrary ruling in Buchanan would have emboldened racist political interests to launch a broader legal attack on blacks before such forces coalesced. NAACP founder Oswald Garrison Villard warned in 1913 that, if upheld, residential segregation laws would be a first step in a series of broader antiblack measures. Indeed, to get an idea of where things might have gone, one need only consider that agitation for the complete segregation of blacks and whites in the rural South was fairly prominent in the 1910s, and Winston-Salem seriously considered segregating white- and black-owned businesses in 1912, shortly after it segregated housing. Perhaps many other parts of America” the living conditions of black Americans could have been “almost akin to that of black South Africans” under apartheid.

251. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 159.
252. Id. at 143.
253. Id. at 93.
254. Also, Mark Tushnet suggests that the NAACP, allied with Progressives on many issues, was not comfortable about pursuing its civil rights agenda through a property rights paradigm. Mark Tushnet, Laying the Groundwork: From Plessy to Brown 11-12 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
While Buchanan did not change the Court’s acquiescence to the segregation of public spaces, it made clear that Jim Crow had its legal limits. W.E.B. Du Bois, in fact, credited Buchanan with “the breaking of the backbone of segregation.” More recently, Judge Leon Higginbotham argued that “Buchanan was of profound importance in applying a brake to decelerate what would have been run-away racism in the United States.”

Given the counterfactual nature of the inquiry, one cannot say with any certainty who has the better of the argument, but one can say that Klarman’s confidence in his position that Buchanan did not inhibit broader anti-black measures seems unwarranted.

Another important aspect of Buchanan, one not previously emphasized by scholars (though related to the apartheid conjecture), is that the Court clearly enforced blacks’ right to own and alienate property. The right to property not only improved blacks’ economic status, but also gave property- and business-owning Southern blacks some economic autonomy from local whites, which allowed them to play leading roles in the civil rights movement. But for Buchanan, it is possible that the property rights of blacks would ultimately have come under legal threat, at least in the more reactionary parts of the South.

As for Klarman’s second point that Buchanan had little if any effect on segregated housing patterns, he is generally correct. Indeed, “residential...
Segregation dramatically increased in the 1910s and 1920s” despite Buchanan, as blacks poured into cities in both the North and South. The significance of Buchanan should not be exaggerated; a decision invalidating de jure segregation could not, and indeed did not purport to, overcome private preferences that inevitably led to pervasive housing segregation throughout urban America.

However, scholars who argue for Buchanan’s practical significance do not claim that the decision affected segregation levels. Rather, they argue that Buchanan impeded the efforts of urban whites to prevent blacks from “colonizing” white neighborhoods, both in the South and the North. The black urban population in the United States almost doubled between 1910 and 1929, and continued to grow in later years. In certain cities, the growth was far more dramatic; roughly six thousand blacks lived in Detroit in 1910, compared to approximately one hundred and twenty thousand in 1930. In the absence of residential segregation laws, “[a]s the black population continued to grow in a given city . . . some expansion of the black-occupied area was inevitable; and attempts to prevent it sooner or later collapsed.” But if Buchanan had permitted racial zoning, many potential black migrants to cities would literally have had nowhere to go. They either would have been forced to stay in rural areas or been shunted off to the undeveloped suburban periphery of cities. Either result would have been disastrous for black welfare.

Not only did cities provide more economic opportunity for blacks, but, as Klarman himself points out, the

263. Klarman, supra note 5, at 91. In a few Southern cities, such as Charleston, Savannah, New Orleans, and Little Rock, traditional black and white residential intermingling continued. Even in those cities, segregation increased, Kenneth L. Kusmer, A Ghetto Takes Shape: Black Cleveland, 1870-1930, at 173 (1976), though not to the extent it would have if Buchanan had upheld residential segregation laws. On the other hand, Michael Daly and John Wertheimer point out that Winston-Salem’s segregation law, had it survived, would have frozen housing patterns at a relatively integrated level, ultimately creating all-white and all-black blocks, but also requiring the continued integration of neighborhoods. Instead, “blacks flowed into East Winston, and whites flowed out,” eventually leading to Winston-Salem becoming the second-most segregated city in the United States. Daly & Wertheimer, supra note 257, at 266.

264. Thomas Schelling explains that even if most whites and most blacks prefer to live in integrated neighborhoods, if both blacks and whites prefer to live in neighborhoods where their group is a majority, there will be no integrated neighborhoods. Thomas C. Schelling, Sorting and Mixing: Race and Sex, in Micromotives and Macrobehavior 135 (1978). During the Jim Crow era, of course, most whites did not want to live in integrated neighborhoods.

265. E.g., James W. Ely Jr., Book Review, 44 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 293, 294 (2000) (praising Buchanan, but stating that “no decision by the Supreme Court could undo the host of legal devices and informal arrangements that sustained racially separate housing”).


267. Id. at 724.

268. Higgins, supra note 82, at 116.

The migration of blacks to cities, North and South, was a crucial element in the ultimate victory of the civil rights movement. Among other advantages, it enabled blacks to increase their political power by moving to areas where they could vote.270

Klarman never directly addresses the potential effect of residential segregation ordinances on black migration patterns. However, he asserts that segregation ordinances were unnecessary to maintain segregated housing,271 so he likely would also argue that segregation ordinances were unnecessary to prevent blacks from moving to white neighborhoods. Indeed, Klarman, citing an article by Booker T. Washington,272 attributes the proliferation of segregation ordinances not to the demands of white homeowners seeking to exclude blacks but to "politicians seeking votes."273 "A single black family’s entrance into a white neighborhood could rivet public attention and create an irresistible opportunity for ambitious politicians. Once someone proposed extending segregation to a new sphere of life, the incentives of politicians were skewed toward jumping on the bandwagon."274

One of the authors of this Review has favorably cited Washington’s claim as at least a partial explanation for residential segregation laws,275 and political entrepreneurship of the sort that Klarman describes has been discussed in both theoretical and historical academic literature.276 Yet further investigation reveals that Washington was wrong; residential segregation laws were not simply political fluff. Examination of the origins of segregation laws in Baltimore,277 Louisville,278 St. Louis279 and Winston-

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270. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 100-02.
271. Id. at 92.
273. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 92.
274. Id.
276. For example, Jennifer Roback shows that politicians successfully promoted mandatory segregation of streetcars to attract votes from relatively indifferent but politically dominant whites, despite strong opposition from streetcar companies and African Americans. Jennifer Roback, The Separation of Race and State, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 58, 63 (1991). Roback provides a more general and theoretical explanation of the relationship between political entrepreneurship and de jure racism in Jennifer Roback, Racism as Rent Seeking, 27 ECON. INQUIRY 661 (1989) (describing the politicization of race by political entrepreneurs).
277. See VILLARD, supra note 255, at 3 (stating that “the chief motive” underlying the segregation law in Baltimore was the “desire to prevent the depreciation of real estate by sales to colored people”); W.E.B. Du Bois, Baltimore, in 3 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1910-1932, at 23, 23-24 (Herbert Aptheker ed., 1973) (discussing the demand for a segregation law in Baltimore after successful blacks began “invading” white neighborhoods); Garrett Power, Apartheid Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation Ordinances of 1910-1913, 42 MD. L. REV. 289, 299 (1983) (tracing the origins of Baltimore’s segregation law and attributing it to a desire to confine blacks to their existing neighborhoods).
Salem show that they were enacted in response to the demands of white homeowners and real estate investors who sought to keep blacks out of white neighborhoods. St. Louis’s residential segregation ordinance not only originated from the grass roots, but twenty-three of the twenty-eight city aldermen publicly opposed it. Supporters instead turned to a referendum. The ordinance passed by an overwhelming margin, and “[t]he white wards closest to Negro residential areas voted most heavily for the ordinance.”

Of course, showing that white homeowners wanted segregation laws does not necessarily mean that such laws were needed. Indeed, many commentators have argued that restrictive covenants were an almost perfect “private” substitute for residential segregation laws. But Klaman himself, while discussing the effects of *Shelley v. Kraemer*, aptly sums up the academic literature on restrictive covenants as concluding that they generally proved “too clumsy and expensive to frustrate powerful demographic and economic trends.” For example, restrictive covenants were not self-enforcing, but required someone to pay the expense of litigation to enforce the covenant, creating a massive collective action problem.

As economist William Fischel explains:

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280. Daly & Wertheimer, supra note 257, at 257.
282. Id. at 246. The ordinance passed by a three-to-one margin. Blacks cast roughly half of the no votes, which means that among white voters the margin favoring residential segregation was six to one. Roger N. Baldwin, *Negro Segregation by Initiative Election in St. Louis*, 14 AM. CITY 356 (1916).
283. E.g., KLUGER, supra note 114, at 120 (claiming that restrictive covenants made Buchanan’s ban on residential segregation laws “almost worthless”).
284. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 262. Indeed, contrary to the general impression that restrictive covenants spread only after the Buchanan decision, Winston-Salem whites, for example, lobbied for a segregation law precisely because restrictive covenants had proved ineffective in restricting black settlement. Daly & Wertheimer, supra note 257, at 257. Restrictive covenants were also well known in St. Louis before white residents starting campaigning for racial zoning. See Rose, supra note 227, at 181 (noting that the restrictive covenant at issue in *Shelley v. Kraemer* had been signed in 1911).
285. Ely, supra note 265, at 294 (“Not only did the enforcement of covenants rest upon private initiative, but parties had to satisfy highly technical requirements in order to create binding limits on land use.”); Rose, supra note 227, at 175 (“Unlike zoning, [racially restrictive covenants] required developers and homeowners themselves to bear the costs of creating and enforcing legal exclusion; this greater expense undoubtedly discouraged some level of racial exclusion and opened up a greater total amount of housing to minority members, even if minority residential areas remained segregated as they expanded.”). To overcome the collective action problem of enforcing restrictive covenants and externalize the costs to the state, Dallas passed an ordinance making the violation of a restrictive covenant agreement a crime. A state court of appeals held that the ordinance was unconstitutional. City of Dallas v. Liberty Annex Corp., 19 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
Among prejudiced whites, an all-white neighborhood is a “public good.” Such a “good” is non-rival and non-excludable in consumption. Thus if a black family moves into a neighborhood, the well-being of all prejudiced whites is reduced, even though they may have no direct interaction with the newcomer. Indeed, the only person who has an immediate economic interaction with the newcomer is the seller who has most likely departed herself from the neighborhood or, as a landlady, may not live there herself. While a neighboring white homeowner might be willing to pay something to blacks to move out of his neighborhood, his ability to combine his monetary offering with his neighbors’ is complicated by the free rider problem of such goods. His white neighbor will think, “If he is willing to pay let him. We will both benefit, and I won’t have to pay.” Such reasoning would, in situations in which no coercive enforcement of collective action is possible, often defeat attempts to exclude blacks.286

If many blacks had already moved in by the time homeowners or landlords287 in a “threatened” neighborhood managed to raise funds to

286. William A. Fischel, Why Judicial Reversal of Apartheid Made a Difference, 51 VAND. L. REV. 975, 978 (1998). Homeowners lobbying in favor of residential segregation laws also faced a collective action problem, but a less severe one. First, the problem only needed to be overcome once, whereas covenants would need to be continuously enforced over time. Second, politicians will respond to the active lobbying of only a fraction of the relevant population if they believe that the activists’ views reflect the views of more passive neighbors, while making and effectively enforcing covenants required far more cooperation among neighbors. Third, while few white homeowners would have any reason to actively undermine the push for a prospective residential segregation law, Fischel notes that

[i]t is often in the interest of at least a few whites to sell to blacks. Some blacks may have a preference for integrated neighborhoods and be willing to offer more than whites. Or some white homeowners might anticipate that the neighborhood may be about to be integrated, and they may want to sell quickly. Excluding all blacks from the market would often mean that homeowners who are selling get lower offers for what is usually the largest single asset they own.

Id. at 978-79; see also MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 214, at 37 (“The racially segmented market generated real estate values in black areas that far exceeded anything in white neighborhoods, and this simple economic fact created a great potential for profits along the color line, guaranteeing that some real estate agent would specialize in opening up new areas to black settlement.”).

287. Like white homeowners, landlords tried to use restrictive covenants and other private agreements to exclude blacks. Ososky explains, for example, that white landlords in Harlem had restrictive covenants on their properties prohibiting them from renting to blacks. However, no group was able to get the unified support of white property owners to enforce the covenants. Instead, landlords formed block associations, in which all landlords on a given street agreed not to rent to blacks. Yet individual landlords consistently shirked on their agreements; white and black speculators bought tenements and rented them to blacks to try to force neighbors to repurchase them at higher prices. GILBERT OSOSKY, HARLEM: THE MAKING OF A Ghetto 109 (1960).
“protect” their property, the “changed circumstances” doctrine rendered the covenant unenforceable.288 Carol Rose concludes that “[g]iven the patterns of neighborhood change in major cities, there doubtless were many [racially restrictive covenants] that simply fell apart for lack of enforcement.”289

In the absence of segregation laws or effective restrictive covenants, whites often turned to violence to drive out new black residents from white neighborhoods. Violence had a significant advantage over restrictive covenants in that only a minority of local whites needed to participate for it to be a potentially effective tool against black “interlopers.” Yet such violence was neither omnipresent nor fully effective when used. Unlike residential segregation laws, which externalized the costs of excluding blacks to taxpayers, the costs of engaging in violence were internalized by those who engaged in the violence. These costs could be substantial—violence not only raised the risk of arrest for the perpetrators, but also led to the possibility that they would be wounded or killed by blacks acting in self-defense.290

Restrictive covenants and violence did sometimes succeed in excluding blacks from white neighborhoods, but they were nowhere near as effective as residential segregation laws would have been. Despite white opposition, blacks flooded into formerly white neighborhoods in St. Louis,291 East St. Louis,292 Chicago,293 and New York.294 Even in the South, where white

“Harlem landlords who adhered to their original restrictive covenants suffered serious economic consequences. Many were unable to find white people willing to rent their apartments.” Id. at 110. Existing white tenants remained only when rents were reduced drastically. As Osofsky concludes, “The opponents of Negro settlement faced the dilemma of maintaining a ‘White Only’ policy and probably losing everything, or renting to Negroes at higher prices and surviving. Most chose what seemed to them the lesser of two evils.” Id. 288. See Rose, supra note 227, at 188-89 (discussing the “changed circumstances” doctrine in the context of restrictive covenants).

289. Id. at 182.
291. EMMETT J. SCOTT, NEGRO MIGRATION DURING THE WAR 97 (Arno Press 1969) (1920) (“Houses here are as a rule old, having been occupied by whites before they were turned over to negroes.”).
292. Id. at 100.
293. GROSSMAN, supra note 170, at 137 (discussing the expansion of the “black ghetto” starting in 1917); cf. THOMAS LEE PHILPOTT, THE SLUM AND THE GHETTO 117 (1978) (describing the growth of the black community in Chicago); SCOTT, supra note 291, at 104 (“The presence of negroes in an exclusively white locality usually brought forth loud protests and frequently ended in the abandonment of the block by whites.”).
294. Osofsky, supra note 287, at 109-10. Buchanan had no direct effect on black migration to New York or Chicago because, at the time Buchanan was decided, no Northern city had a
hooligans faced less chance of conviction for engaging in violence against encroaching blacks, white homeowners in Atlanta\(^ {295} \); Indianapolis; Norfolk; Richmond; New Orleans; Winston-Salem; Dallas; Charleston; and Dade County, Florida, felt sufficient pressure from expanding black populations to persuade their local governments to ignore \textit{Buchanan} and pass residential segregation laws in the 1920s.\(^ {296} \)

Klarman writes that “[i]n the Deep South, legal regulation was plainly unnecessary to maintain residential segregation. Blacks in cities such as Birmingham, Alabama, knew better than to enter white neighborhoods uninvited.”\(^ {297} \) In fact, Birmingham considered and ultimately adopted a residential segregation ordinance.\(^ {298} \) Even in the Deep South, then, residential segregation laws were apparently seen as an important means to restrict black settlement in white neighborhoods.

residential segregation law. However, Klarman may go a bit too far when he states that segregation ordinances were “never seriously contemplated” in such cities. \textit{Klarman, supra} note 5, at 91. In 1917, the Chicago Real Estate Board—hardly a lightweight interest group—proposed a law segregating housing by race. \textit{Philpott, supra} note 293, at 164-65. The segregation proposal might have received serious consideration if \textit{Buchanan} had upheld Louisville’s law. \textit{Id.} at 164; William M. Tuttle, Jr., \textit{Contested Neighborhoods and Racial Violence: Prelude to the Chicago Riot of 1919}, 55 J. NEGRO HIST. 266, 277 (1970). Indeed, even after \textit{Buchanan}, agitation in Chicago for such laws continued, especially in the wake of the 1919 race riot. In 1919, for example, an alderman urged the city council to establish separate “residential zones for white people and colored people.” \textit{Philpott, supra} note 293, at 177.

But for \textit{Buchanan}, it is not inconceivable that Chicago and other Northern cities would have enacted residential segregation laws. Klarman reports that “[n]orthern opinion was probably as supportive of residential segregation as was southern,” albeit less inclined, at least initially, to pursue this goal through legislation. \textit{Klarman, supra} note 5, at 143. As late as 1942, “84 percent of Americans—in the North as well as the South—favored residential segregation.” \textit{Id.} at 191. Northern groups with an interest in stifling black migration to cities included white homeowners seeking to protect their property values, Democrats opposed to an influx of black Republicans, \textit{Kusmer, supra} note 263, at 176, exclusionary labor unions fearful of black competition, \textit{Henderson H. Donald, The Negro Migration of 1916-1918}, at 56 (1921) (discussing a 1917 Philadelphia riot incited by labor unions against blacks), social Progressives eager to stifle interracial violence and limit the threat from blacks perceived as both inferior and potential economic competitors, \textit{Michael McGerr, A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America, 1870-1920}, at 182-93 (2003), and the Ku Klux Klan.

295. Atlanta’s City Council enacted residential segregation laws in 1922, 1929, and 1931. Each of these was challenged on constitutional grounds and invalidated. \textit{Ronald H. Bayor, Race and the Shaping of Twentieth-Century Atlanta} 55 (1996). If the only purpose for segregation laws was to impress white voters, with the laws themselves being essentially meaningless, the city council would almost certainly not have been this persistent.


297. \textit{Klarman, supra} note 5, at 90.

298. Birmingham considered residential segregation ordinances several times between 1900 and 1920, rejecting the idea largely because of constitutional concerns. Carl V. Harris, \textit{Reforms in Government Control of Negroes in Birmingham, Alabama, 1890-1920}, 38 J.S. Hist. 567, 571 n.10 (1972) [\textit{LE:Check}]. Pressure for segregation ordinances in Birmingham eventually grew sufficiently intense that, despite \textit{Buchanan}, in 1925 Birmingham enacted a racial zoning ordinance “to restrict the negroes to certain districts.” Silver, \textit{supra} note 214, at 197. The city enacted one of the South’s last residential segregation ordinances in 1944, and it was invalidated in 1949. \textit{Monk v. City of Birmingham}, 87 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Ala. 1949), \textit{aff’d}, 185 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1950).
In short, *Buchanan v. Warley* required white homeowners and landlords seeking to exclude blacks from their neighborhoods to overcome major collective action problems and to internalize the costs of exclusion. As a result, whites were often unsuccessful in excluding blacks. As Fischel concludes,

[I]t was, in the absence of apartheid laws like those at issue in *Buchanan*, very difficult to keep the black/white border from moving in ways adverse to whites. In fact, it must have been nearly impossible in most situations. We know this not from econometric studies about who paid what for housing, but from the simple demographic fact that the black ghetto took root and expanded in virtually every large city.

E. Why the Court Acted as It Did

The mystery of why the Court suddenly became more protective of the rights of black Americans in the 1910s, despite increased racism in society as a whole, remains. One theory, propounded by Benno Schmidt, is that these decisions were “rooted in the institutional revival of the Supreme Court in the early part of the twentieth century, a revival which made its impact felt mainly in the aggressive tenets of laissez-faire constitutionalism, but which produced other, nobler and more lasting, if more tentative, constitutional legacies as well.” Yet one could more easily trace the rise in the Court’s assertiveness to 1895—one year before *Plessy*—when the Court ruled the federal income tax unconstitutional, limited the reach of the Sherman Antitrust Act by holding that manufacturing was not interstate commerce subject to federal regulation, and approved the use of the labor injunction by federal courts.

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299. Beyond making it possible for blacks to move into white neighborhoods, *Buchanan* likely also benefited blacks who stayed in black neighborhoods. In the absence of segregation laws, self-interested whites who wanted to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods had an incentive to support more equitable public spending for African-American neighborhoods. Moreover, segregation laws would have allowed whites to impose the costs of segregation on blacks, as blacks would have had to pay exorbitant amounts for the restricted supply of housing in their assigned ghettos. Instead, when neighborhoods began to “turn over,” whites sold to blacks at bargain prices (though in some cases “blockbusting” realtors, black and white, were the prime beneficiaries of panic sales). Whites thus absorbed much of the cost of their own racism in the housing market, and blacks benefited. Bernstein, *supra* note 106, at 859-60.

300. Fischel, *supra* note 286, at 979 (footnote omitted).

301. 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, *supra* note 103, at 990.


304. *In re* Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
Perhaps, however, the important shift in the early twentieth century was not the Court’s willingness in general to assert itself, but its newfound willingness to challenge the states’ assertions of their police powers. As late as 1888, the Court, over a lone dissent by Justice Field, upheld a Pennsylvania law that completely banned the sale of margarine, even though the law was obviously naked protectionist legislation for farmers with no plausible police power rationale.305 Even commentators who thought the Court should generally be deferential to state regulation criticized this decision.306

The Court’s reluctance to challenge state assertions of police power soon ended. In 1905, a five-vote majority in *Lochner v. New York* boldly second-guessed New York’s claimed health rationale for a maximum hours law for bakers.307 The dissenting opinions acknowledged that the Court was obligated to second-guess a state’s assertion of its police powers in appropriate circumstances; the dispute was over who had the burden of proof, and how difficult it should be to meet that burden.

While the aggressiveness of the Court’s *Lochner* jurisprudence ebbed and flowed for the next three decades, the Court’s role as the ultimate guarantor of the fundamental rights of American citizens against the states in a wide range of contexts is firmly traceable to *Lochner*.308 Blacks were hardly the sole beneficiaries of this shift in the Court’s institutional role (which, contrary to historical myth, was not limited to the realm of economic legislation).309 Consider that in the 1920s, the Court invalidated a law inspired by nativist hysteria that banned the teaching of foreign languages,310 an anti-Catholic law that sought to shut down private schools,311 and a law that attempted to prevent Japanese parents in Hawaii

306. See, e.g., ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS § 62, at 57 (1904) (“Even the danger to health or safety should not justify the absolute prohibition of a useful industry or practice [such as the manufacture of oleomargarine].”).
308. See Bernstein, *Lochner Era Revisionism*, supra note 238. The potential for the Court’s robust self-assertion in *Lochner* to aid blacks was first shown in 1908 in *Berea College v. Kentucky*, 211 U.S. 45 (1908). The *Berea College* Court was faced with a *Lochnerian* challenge to a Kentucky law requiring that private universities be integrated, and with Kentucky’s reliance on *Plessy* and its broad view of the police power. See David E. Bernstein, Plessy Versus *Lochner*: The *Berea College* Case, 25 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 93 (2000). The Court was not yet ready to invalidate a segregation law. Rather than simply accede to Kentucky’s arguments, however, the Court resolved the case on nonconstitutional grounds. In doing so, the Court refused to apply *Plessy* to a new set of facts and gave civil rights activists hope that a future decision (like *Buchanan*) involving a challenge to coerced segregation in the private sector would be resolved in their favor.
from sending their children to Japanese-language schools. All three opinions were written by the notoriously racist and anti-Semitic Justice McReynolds, a fact that perhaps makes his consistent votes to invalidate residential segregation laws seem less anomalous.

While the ever-expanding edifice of Jim Crow “ran up against the fundamental American commitment to individual rights both in terms of physical and status mobility as a component of liberty and in terms of freedom of contract as a component of equality,” it was not inevitable that the Court’s increased willingness to challenge state assertions of the police power would manifest itself in increased protection for blacks. With American politics and society having grown increasingly racist, one might have expected the Court to have ignored blacks’ rights, even as it became generally more aggressive in reviewing state laws.

The Supreme Court, however, is usually somewhat behind the times relative to changes in both popular and elite opinion on a given subject. Its members belong to an older cohort than both the median adult and the median influential intellectual and are likely to have experienced their formative intellectual influences in a bygone era. In modern times, the Court’s inherent conservatism has generally cut against its playing a leading role in recognizing and protecting the rights and interests of minority groups and women, as society has become increasingly sympathetic to these groups.

The Court’s inherent conservatism only cuts in favor of courts failing to protect minority rights from contemporary legislation when popular and elite opinion has recently become more favorable to minorities. During the Progressive Era popular and elite opinion were becoming increasingly hostile to blacks, with the result that the median Supreme Court Justice of the 1910s may very well have had comparatively liberal opinions regarding blacks, especially when it came to legal rights and disabilities. Additionally, the Justices’ relative insulation from popular pressures was apparent in Buchanan v. Warley. This insulation helps explain the Court’s decision in the face of racist hysteria aroused in many major cities by the sudden massive increase in black in-migration.

The Court’s ability to act as a check on the increased de jure racism of the Progressive Era was enhanced by the enormous turnover on the Court starting in 1909. The generational shift was monumental, from Justices

314. WELKE, supra note 110, at 354.
315. The five Justices whose terms ended between 1909 and 1912 were Harlan, Fuller, Brewer, Peckham, and Moody. Moody only served for four years, and he had replaced Justice
who grew up in an age when blacks were largely confined to chattel slavery,316 to those who became attorneys when basic rights for blacks were written into the Constitution and statutory law. One can speculate that the new generation of Supreme Court Justices, though hardly radical egalitarians, may very well have been disturbed by what they saw as the increasingly aggressive oppression of blacks in the 1910s.317 Similarly, libertarian and free-labor principles in which the new Justices were inevitably immersed during the laissez-faire Gilded Age may have counseled opposition to statist peonage and housing segregation laws that took away basic rights thought to be guaranteed to all individuals, blacks as well as whites.318

Moreover, unlike the more subtle Jim Crow laws of earlier decades, laws disfranchising blacks, relegating them to peonage, consigning them to unequal accommodations on common carriers, or limiting their ability to own and alienate property could easily have been seen as an explicit attempt by Southern legislatures to undermine federal law. The presence of the first Southern Democrat (Woodrow Wilson) in the White House since Andrew Johnson—and an overtly racist Southern Democrat at that—may have particularly inclined Northern Republicans on the Court to exhibit less deference to Southern sensibilities in *McCabe* than they had in *Plessy*. In the sixteen years prior to Wilson’s election the vast majority of Justices appointed were Northern Republicans, a group with no stake in supporting the Southern racism that Wilson represented. It hardly seems coincidental that five of the six Northern Republicans on the Court (save Holmes) voted to articulate a stringent standard of formal equality with respect to Southern Brown, author of *Plessy*. The new Justices were Lurton, Hughes, Lamar, Van Devanter, and Pitney. Lurton resigned in 1914 and was replaced by fellow Southerner James McReynolds. Lamar and Hughes resigned in 1916 and were replaced by Brandeis and Clarke. See Jesse H. Choper et al., Constitutional Law 1543-53 (9th ed. 2001).

316. See Mark Warren Bailey, Guardians of the Moral Order: The Legal Philosophy of the Supreme Court, 1860-1910, at 215-16 (2004) (noting that all of the Supreme Court Justices appointed through 1895 were educated or trained before the Civil War).

317. In the absence of direct evidence of why the Justices voted a particular way in a particular case, a certain amount of informed speculation is inevitable, and Klarman’s own claims regarding why Court doctrine shifted over time rely quite a bit on speculation. See generally Garrow, supra note 7, at 699 (reviewing Klarman and noting his reliance on “well-educated guesswork”).

318. Both of these factors are apparent in Justice Hughes’s opinion in *Bailey* [ME: formatting?]:

> Without imputing any actual motive to oppress, we must consider the natural operation of the statute here in question, and it is apparent that it furnishes a convenient instrument for the coercion which the Constitution and the act of Congress forbid; an instrument of compulsion peculiarly effective as against the poor and the ignorant, its most likely victims. There is no more important concern than to safeguard the freedom of labor upon which alone can enduring prosperity be based.

*Bailey v. Alabama*, 219 U.S. 219, 244-45 (1911) (citation omitted).
segregation in McCabe, while all three Southerners on the Court declined to join the opinion. Like earlier state and local discrimination against the Chinese, the Jim Crow policies that came before the Progressive Era Court may have raised nationalist hackles. Given that these laws directly challenged the Fifteenth Amendment (Guinn and Myers), the Thirteenth Amendment and the Peonage Act (Bailey and Reynolds), the federal commitment to formal equality (McCabe), and the federal commitment to blacks’ property and contract rights reflected in the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (Buchanan), the Justices may have implicitly sought to defend federal power against recalcitrant states and localities.

F. The Impact of the Progressive Era Cases

The fact that constitutional law changed in a favorable direction for blacks in the 1910s does not answer the question posed by Klarman—whether “the justices possess a significant capacity to defend minority rights from majority oppression.” The answer depends on what one means by “significant capacity.”

The Progressive Era Court was most effective in aiding blacks where its decisions invalidated laws needed to create a government-enforced cartel among private-sector actors who had collective action or cost externalization reasons to defect from voluntary commitments to “do their part.” Southern planters, for example, preferred to cooperate to stifle black mobility and wage growth, but Bailey’s invalidation of peonage laws seems to have accelerated a decline in coercive labor practices. The result was an increase in black mobility. This, in turn, created market incentives

319. See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
320. See 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 987 (attributing the outcome of the Progressive-era race cases in part to a rising sense of nationalism among the Justices, especially Chief Justice White). See generally LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS 50 (1994) (contending that “the competence, perspective, and institutional location and structure of the federal courts” makes them more likely than state courts to give a generous reading to federal constitutional rights (emphasis omitted)); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (arguing that federal courts are institutionally more likely to protect federal constitutional rights from hostile local majoritarian sentiment than are state courts).
321. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 62.
322. With regard to the Chinese, for example, the courts were hardly capable or willing to undermine all anti-Chinese legislation—Congress halted the immigration of Chinese laborers in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, and did repeal that Act and permit foreign-born Chinese to become citizens until 1943. Act of Dec. 17, 1943, Pub L. No. 78-199, 57 Stat. 600. Moreover, in the absence of relevant federal legislation, the Court could do nothing about the widespread discrimination and hostility the Chinese faced from private actors.
323. See sources cited supra note 81.
324. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
among planters to raise blacks’ wages, both in competition with each other and to discourage black migration to urban areas. Buchanan could not force whites to live in the same neighborhoods as blacks, but it did prevent cities from stifling black migration by creating de jure and inflexible boundaries for black neighborhoods, and may have prevented even more damaging legislation.

Also, the effectiveness of judicial decisions in protecting a minority group depends on the legal, economic, and political resources the minority group has to act on those decisions. Blacks in the 1910s had few such resources. There is obviously an element of fortuity in such matters; if a philanthropist had provided the NAACP with a huge grant in the late 1910s or the racially liberal Harding Administration had lasted two terms instead of two scandal-plagued years, the Court’s Progressive Era race decisions would likely have had a greater and more immediate positive impact.

IV. BROWN AND BACKLASH

Brown v. Board of Education is arguably the most widely discussed decision in the history of the United States Supreme Court. Klarman’s detailed and insightful analysis of the case is an enormous contribution to an already extensive literature. Because previous reviewers have already discussed this part of the book in great detail, we limit our focus here to two major points that earlier reviewers, Klarman himself, and the previous literature on Brown have largely neglected.

Klarman claims that Brown had little or no direct impact on school segregation, but argues that it had a major indirect impact by stimulating a huge white backlash—the notorious “massive resistance” to the implementation of Brown. According to Klarman, this backlash induced a Northern white counterbacklash that led to the passage of the Civil Rights

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325. See supra notes 116-122 and accompanying text.
326. Unlike blacks in the 1910s, the Chinese in the late nineteenth century were well organized and had well-funded organizations that allowed them to use favorable court decisions to their significant advantage. See generally McClain, supra note 128 (detailing various litigation engaged in by the Chinese).
327. In thinking about what might have been, consider that President Harding stunned a white audience in Birmingham in October 1921 by announcing that “I would say let the black man vote when he is fit to vote; prohibit the white man from voting when he is unfit to vote” and “I would insist upon equal educational opportunity [for whites and blacks].” Dean, supra note 165, at 125-26 (internal quotation marks omitted).
328. See sources cited supra note 7.
Act of 1964, the legislation that—unlike judicial intervention—finally succeeded in desegregating most Southern schools.\(^{329}\)

We emphasize two major reservations about Klarman’s thesis. First, Klarman, like other scholars who minimize \textit{Brown}’s impact, largely ignores the fact that the mere anticipation of a \textit{Brown}-like decision led several Southern states to enact massive increases in funding for black schools in an attempt to persuade the Court to forgo ordering full desegregation. Second, Klarman’s backlash thesis raises an important question that he does not sufficiently address: If \textit{Brown} was as ineffective in promoting integration as he claims, why did Southern whites find it necessary to launch a costly campaign of massive resistance to counter it? It is possible that massive resistance was simply a result of widespread ignorance among white Southern voters who—egged on by ambitious politicians—overestimated the threat posed by \textit{Brown} to their cherished institutions.\(^{331}\) But there is also considerable evidence suggesting that massive resistance was in fact necessary for segregationists to be able to contain \textit{Brown}’s impact. If this is true, and Southern racists were properly afraid of \textit{Brown}’s effect despite the obvious barriers to implementation facing the Court, it implies that judicial power can be considerably more formidable than Klarman and other skeptics suggest.

Klarman not only argues that \textit{Brown} failed to achieve any substantial desegregation, but also suggests that massive resistance was not needed to prevent it from doing so. He contends that “massive resistance almost certainly proved a mistake” from the perspective of segregationists, and that

\(^{329}\) KLARMAN, \textit{supra} note 5, at 362-64. By 1964, after ten years of judicial action, only one percent of black schoolchildren in the Deep South attended integrated schools. \textit{Id.} at 362-63.

\(^{330}\) See sources cited \textit{supra} note 4 (including Rosenberg’s otherwise very thorough analysis).

\(^{331}\) The possibility that political ignorance played a key role in stimulating massive resistance deserves more detailed analysis than we can give it here. Researchers have found that most citizens have little knowledge and understanding of politics and public policy. See Ilya Somin, \textit{Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory}, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1304-13 (2004) (summarizing the evidence). Public knowledge concerning the judiciary is even lower than that of other political institutions. \textit{See, e.g., id.} at 1308 tbl.1 (presenting survey data showing that in 2000 only eleven percent of Americans could identify the post held by William Rehnquist, in contrast to greater familiarity with other public officials). Several studies of public familiarity with the Supreme Court conducted during the heyday of the Warren Court in the 1960s show that only a minority of Americans knew anything about recent Court decisions. \textit{See ROSENBERG, supra} note 4, at 125-26 (citing studies). Moreover, political knowledge in the South has historically been lower than in other parts of the country. \textit{See, e.g., MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI \\& SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 145, 183 (1996)} (showing that Southerners have lower political knowledge than residents of other regions even when controlling for other variables); Ilya Somin, \textit{Voter Knowledge and Constitutional Change: Assessing the New Deal Experience}, 45 WM. \\& MARY L. REV. 595, 631-34, tbls. 2-5 (2003) (showing that Southerners had lower political knowledge levels in surveys conducted in 1952, just before \textit{Brown}).
more modest “tried-and-true evasive techniques” would probably have better achieved their goals.\textsuperscript{332} But elsewhere in the book, Klarman argues that the Supreme Court may have held back on implementing desegregation for fear of massive resistance.\textsuperscript{333} Based on this, it could be argued that massive resistance was a necessary element of segregationist strategy despite the risks involved.

Either interpretation of Brown’s impact raises serious questions for Klarman’s broader argument that the federal judiciary had little ability to protect black civil rights against Jim Crow. If massive resistance was necessary to prevent Brown from having a major effect, this suggests that the Supreme Court was far less toothless than Klarman acknowledges. This point is especially significant given that massive resistance began to break down even before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reinforced judicial intervention with federal legislative and executive efforts. As Klarman shows, massive resistance was too costly to Southern whites to persist indefinitely, and federal court decisions began to have a substantial impact on school desegregation once resistance began to collapse in the early 1960s. If, on the other hand, massive resistance was not necessary to prevent Brown from having an impact, then we must consider why it nonetheless occurred.

A. Brown’s Neglected Anticipatory Impact

Klarman and other Brown skeptics have almost completely ignored the striking fact that the case had a major positive impact on the education of Southern blacks even before it was decided. As Klarman recognizes, several Southern states, including staunchly segregationist South Carolina and Mississippi, adopted “crash equalization programs that promised rapid redress of educational inequalities in black schools.”\textsuperscript{334} Klarman acknowledges in passing that these measures were in part “a response . . . to the threat of desegregation litigation,”\textsuperscript{335} but fails to consider the implications of this fact for his broader theory of judicial power. This evidence conflicts with the revisionist claim that seeking social justice through litigation is a purely “hollow hope.”\textsuperscript{336} At the very least, the Brown litigation was bound to cause a massive increase in spending on the public schools most blacks attended.

\textsuperscript{332} KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 462.
\textsuperscript{333} Id. at 333-34.
\textsuperscript{334} Id. at 311.
\textsuperscript{335} Id. at 189.
\textsuperscript{336} The title of Gerald Rosenberg’s well-known book. ROSENBERG, supra note 4.
In South Carolina in 1951, Governor James Byrnes persuaded the state legislature to pass a massive $75 million education spending package which he said was intended to “provide for the races substantial equality in school facilities.” His school equalization legislation was closely coordinated with South Carolina’s legal strategy in the ongoing case of Briggs v. Elliott, the South Carolina school desegregation case that eventually became one of five desegregation cases consolidated into Brown. Moreover, it is important to note that Byrnes not only promised an increase in spending, but actually implemented it. Spending on black schools in South Carolina and some other states “rose greatly between 1950 and 1954,” the period during which Brown and related cases were making their way to the Supreme Court.

An almost equally large school equalization spending program was adopted by Mississippi. Despite many shortcomings, the program did increase spending on black schools and raise the salaries of black teachers from thirty-nine percent of white salaries in 1950 to fifty-six percent in 1953-1954. Like South Carolina’s program, Mississippi’s was adopted for the explicit purpose of heading off a federal court decision ordering desegregation. Both programs represented a major departure from earlier policies.

Although this Review is by no means the only scholarly work to discuss these events, their implications for debates about Brown and judicial power have not been appreciated either by Klarman or his predecessors. The South Carolina and Mississippi programs, as well as similar though smaller efforts in other states, were clearly caused by fear of federal judicial intervention rather than by autonomous political or social forces within the affected states themselves. While Byrnes was a relatively moderate segregationist who “opposed the more blatant forms of white
repression” of blacks, the timing of his school equalization program, its close coordination with the state’s litigation strategy in Brown, and Byrnes’s own private explanations of his motives make it clear that staving off federal judicial involvement was his primary objective.

As for Mississippi, the South’s poorest and most vehemently racist state would not have undertaken large expenditures intended to reduce the massive inequalities between black and white schools on its own independent initiative. Thus, it is clear that the mere threat of a Brown decision had a large and beneficial impact on Southern black education as much as several years before the Supreme Court actually reached its decision. In this context, Derrick Bell’s well-known argument that the Brown Court should have given up on desegregation and instead required state governments to fairly implement Plessy-style “separate but equal” schooling seems unintentionally ironic. It was precisely the threat of desegregation that at long last made possible even partial realization of the promise of “equality” under the “separate but equal” standard. Obviously, the funding equalization programs instituted by several Southern states could not and did not eliminate the inequality inherent in Jim Crow segregated education. They did, however, mark a significant improvement over the prior status quo.

There is an even more important implication of the equalization programs for the debate over Brown’s efficacy. Klarman, Rosenberg, Bell, and other critics have repeatedly argued that Brown was largely ineffective in stimulating desegregation. Yet James Byrnes and other segregationist political leaders clearly were not so sanguine as they contemplated the prospect of a pro-integration decision by the Supreme Court. Had they expected such a decision to be ineffective, they would not have tried to head it off by allocating vast public expenditures for the benefit of blacks, most of whom still lacked the vote or any other form of political power. Rather, these politicians probably would have preferred to spend the money on white constituencies that could help them win reelection. The belief of Byrnes and other Southern leaders that a Supreme Court decision in favor of school integration would have significant consequences—and even more so their willingness to back that belief with large public expenditures that

344. KLUGER, supra note 114, at 334; see PATTERSON, supra note 339, at 38.
345. ROBERTSON, supra note 337, at 507-10.
346. On Mississippi’s extreme poverty and commitment to racism and segregation at this time, see KEY, supra note 93, at 229-30.
348. See, e.g., Bolton, supra note 340, at 793-806 (discussing serious flaws of Mississippi’s equalization programs).
otherwise could have been spent on politically powerful white interests rather than powerless blacks—should give pause to scholars who claim that the Court had little ability to force Southern states to integrate.

The equalization programs provide further support for the cost-minimization theory of judicial impact.\(^{349}\) Obviously, equalization was a much more expensive way to maintain segregation than the previous policy of simply assigning blacks to grossly inferior schools without making any effort at all to make them equal to white schools. It is also significant that white political leaders were willing to pay these costs in order to avoid the even greater costs (from their point of view) that were likely to be imposed by a Supreme Court decision mandating integration.

Southern leaders’ expectations of the likely effects of federal court decisions on desegregation is a critical issue that we can only scratch the surface of here. Our analysis cannot be considered definitive, but it does cast serious new doubt on the claim that Brown had little direct impact.

**B. Why the Backlash to Brown?**

1. **The Puzzle of Massive Resistance to an Ineffective Decision**

If, nonetheless, we assume that Klarman and other revisionist scholars are right to claim that Brown could not and did not have a significant effect on Southern school segregation, we must ask why Southern states mounted such an immense backlash against it. Why was there massive resistance to an empty threat?

Klarman argues that massive resistance was fueled by three factors that “radicalized southern politics” in a way that earlier court decisions had not.\(^{350}\) [ME: formatting?]

1. *Brown* was “harder to ignore than earlier changes” because of extensive press coverage of the decision.\(^{351}\)

2. “*Brown* represented federal interference in southern race relations—something that white southerners . . . could not tolerate.”\(^{352}\)

3. “*Brown* commanded that racial change take place in a different order than might otherwise have occurred. . . . White southerners were more

\(^{349}\) See *supra* Sections II.B-C.

\(^{350}\) KLARMAN, *supra* note 5, at 391.

\(^{351}\) *Id.*

\(^{352}\) *Id.*
intensely committed to preserving school segregation, which lay near the top of the white supremacist hierarchy of preferences.\textsuperscript{353}

These three explanations are significant, but they cannot explain the massive scale of Southern backlash if we assume that \textit{Brown} was not likely to have any real impact on Southern school segregation.

With regard to press coverage, it is not clear why extensive press coverage of \textit{Brown} would necessarily lead to a massive backlash against a decision that was not having any significant effect. Indeed, one might expect that extensive press coverage would actually calm white fears as news of the decision’s ineffectiveness spread more quickly than it might have otherwise. Furthermore, Klarman presents little evidence to support his claim that \textit{Brown} received massive press coverage,\textsuperscript{354} and neglects extensive data assembled by Gerald Rosenberg indicating that mid-1950s press attention to \textit{Brown} and other civil rights issues was comparatively modest.\textsuperscript{355}

Klarman is certainly right to claim that \textit{Brown} represented an effort at federal interference in Southern race relations. But the same could be said of virtually every other pro-civil rights decision issued by the federal courts. Yet only \textit{Brown} stimulated such enormous resistance, a puzzling result if the decision was toothless.

Klarman is also right to note that Southern whites were particularly sensitive on the issue of school integration. Even so, it is difficult to understand why they would generate such an enormous backlash against a decision that was not actually causing any integration to occur. At the very least, one would have expected the uproar to have quickly died down as \textit{Brown}'s ineffectiveness became more evident to Southern whites. In reality, as Klarman documents, the scale and vehemence of massive resistance actually \textit{increased} during the first several years following \textit{Brown}.\textsuperscript{356}

In sum, Klarman fails to resolve the tension between the claim that \textit{Brown} was not (and could not have been) effective in promoting school integration, and the undeniable fact that it generated a massive and unprecedented white political backlash. Klarman concludes that massive

\textsuperscript{353} Id.

\textsuperscript{354} The evidence cited consists of the assertion that \textit{Brown} “received front-page coverage in virtually every newspaper in the country” and quotes from two sources—a Northern visitor to the South and a segregationist political activist.\textsuperscript{[LE: check]} Id. It is surely true that \textit{Brown} made the front page, but that is very different than saying that it led to a lasting increase in press attention to civil rights matters.

\textsuperscript{355} See ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 111-16 (citing extensive evidence and numerous studies indicating limited press attention to civil rights matters in the years immediately following \textit{Brown}).

\textsuperscript{356} Klarman, supra note 5, at 393-400.
resistance was probably an irrational strategy because it “abandoned the
tried-and-true evasive techniques that for decades had successfully nullified
the constitutional rights of blacks, in favor of outright defiance.”
Segregationist strategists would have been more successful in escaping the
wrath of Northern whites if they had “eschewed” the use of violence and
“vigilante mobs” to block “desegregation orders” and instead used
inconspicuous “fraudulent mechanisms to circumvent school
desegregation.” Yet it strains credulity to believe that the vast majority of
political leaders and activists across most of the white South were simply
irrational or bullheaded. A more plausible alternative explanation for
massive resistance is that Brown was not as toothless as Klarman suggests.
Massive resistance may in fact have been the only available means to
neutralize Brown’s impact, albeit at the cost of eventually provoking even
greater federal intervention.

3. Was Massive Resistance Needed To Prevent Brown from Having a
Greater Impact?

A. Evidence That Massive Resistance Was Necessary To Block Brown

There are several pieces of evidence suggesting that only massive
resistance was capable of severely constricting Brown’s immediate impact.
While none are definitive in and of themselves, their cumulative impact
seriously undermines the argument that less radical forms of resistance
would have more effectively maintained segregation. First, Klarman’s
excellent account of the Supreme Court’s decisionmaking implies that
massive-resistance advocates were right to believe that drastic threats of
violence and school closures played a decisive role in blocking
implementation of Brown. In their deliberations over Brown II,359 the key
case determining guidelines for implementing the original Brown decision,
Klarman demonstrates that the Justices decided to adopt the notoriously
gradualist “all deliberate speed” formula in large part out of fear of violence.
[LE: check] As Klarman points out, this decision broke with prior practice in civil rights cases—including cases desegregating higher
education—where the rule had been that constitutional rights must be

357. Id. at 462.
358. Id. Klarman uses North Carolina as an example of such subtle resistance to Brown, one
that could have been a model for other states. Id.
360. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 314-16.
implemented immediately.\textsuperscript{361} While we cannot know for certain that the Court would have insisted on swifter implementation in the absence of threats of violence and school closures, such a step would have been consistent with prior practice and with the Justices’ belief that segregation in education was morally abhorrent.\textsuperscript{362} At the very least, the fact that massive resistance played a major role in the Justices’ calculations suggests that they might have acted differently in its absence.

A second source of evidence indicating that massive resistance may have been necessary to stymie the enforcement of Brown was the experience of the border states, where state governments did not engage in major resistance to Brown. As a result, Brown greatly reduced school segregation in these states long before the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Even Rosenberg, the most thoroughgoing of academic Brown skeptics, concedes that “[t]he Supreme Court appears to have had an important impact on school desegregation in the six border states and the District of Columbia.”\textsuperscript{363} Klarman too, acknowledges that Brown was successful in desegregating the border states, though he also notes—correctly—that significant pockets of segregation remained.\textsuperscript{364}

Rosenberg concludes that Brown was effective in the border states because “there was little in the way of large-scale, hard-core opposition”—precisely the kind of opposition that, further south, was supplied by the forces of massive resistance. From a cost-minimization standpoint, border-state whites, because of their lesser commitment to Jim Crow, were more price sensitive than those in the Deep South. When the price of maintaining school segregation was raised by Brown, border-state whites were unwilling to pay it by adopting a strategy of massive resistance.

A third piece of evidence is drawn from Klarman’s account of the demise of massive resistance in the Deep South in the early 1960s.\textsuperscript{366} Massive resistance collapsed because Southern whites began to find constant violence and school closings too great a price to bear.\textsuperscript{367}

\textsuperscript{361} Id. at 314.
\textsuperscript{362} See id. at 292-312.
\textsuperscript{363} ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 50. While only about one percent of Southern black schoolchildren were attending integrated schools as late as 1964, in the border states almost fifty-five percent were doing so. Id.
\textsuperscript{364} Klarman, supra note 5, at 346-48.
\textsuperscript{365} Id. at 104.
\textsuperscript{366} Id. at 417-20.
\textsuperscript{367} Id. White Southern leaders themselves noted that massive resistance had collapsed because its cost was too great. As segregationist Virginia Governor J. Lindsay Almond put it in 1962, “[T]he only way to defeat integration was to close down every single, solitary school in this state, and keep them closed.” JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CRISIS OF CONSERVATIVE VIRGINIA: THE BYRD MACHINE AND THE POLITICS OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE 126 (1976).
business leaders in particular began to oppose massive resistance because they “dreaded the economic impact of closed schools.”368 As a result, they were forced to switch to less aggressive tactics, such as admitting “token” numbers of black students while trying to use administrative machinery to keep out the rest.369 The collapse of massive resistance led to a substantial increase in the pace of desegregation in 1962-1963, prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.370 In the fall of 1963, 161 school districts desegregated, “by far the largest number since 1956.”371 We cannot know how fast desegregation would have proceeded had the Civil Rights Act not been adopted and the judiciary been forced to continue to battle school segregation largely on its own. However, as Klarman notes, it is clear that the collapse of massive resistance “had increased the pace of desegregation.”372

B. Why Evasion Might Not Have Been Enough

If massive resistance was needed to stop Brown from having a major impact, this raises the question of why the subtle evasion tactics that Klarman suggests Southern states might have adopted instead were not sufficient. Obviously, we cannot know for sure what would have happened had Southern state governments abjured massive resistance from the very beginning and instead concentrated on more moderate tactics of evasion. Although historians are more receptive to counterfactuals than they have been in the past,373 counterfactual analysis remains an inexact science at best. Nonetheless, we tentatively suggest two reasons that subtle evasive tactics would not have been effective: greater transparency of school policy as compared to some other aspects of Jim Crow and a lower judicial tolerance for subterfuge caused by the changing composition of the federal judiciary.

Unlike in the areas of criminal procedure and voting registration, where subtle evasion had been highly effective, discrimination in school enrollment was comparatively more transparent. In criminal procedure, for example, courts could relatively easily detect and reverse flagrant cases where defendants were almost literally railroaded to conviction, but could not readily ferret out more subtle forms of discrimination against black

369. Id. at 417-19.
370. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 361-63.
371. Id. at 362.
372. Id. at 363.
defendants and potential jurors.\textsuperscript{374} Similarly, in a context where Supreme Court decisions affirmed the legality of literacy tests, poll taxes, and other facially race-neutral methods of excluding voters, it was very difficult for courts to tell whether local registrars—who generally had broad discretionary authority—were implementing these policies in a discriminatory way in any given case.\textsuperscript{375} By contrast, the ongoing exclusion of all or nearly all black schoolchildren from white schools located in close geographic proximity to them could not easily be hidden or explained away in the face of even mildly skeptical judicial scrutiny.\textsuperscript{376}

Despite the relative transparency of school segregation, there were probably enough subterfuges available to Southern authorities that federal lower courts could have found grounds for ignoring persistent segregation had they been strongly inclined to do so. A vital element of the desegregation story was therefore the refusal of numerous lower court judges to accept excuses and subterfuges. In particular, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which at that time covered most of the Deep South, invalidated a wide range of efforts to get around desegregation requirements and eventually imposed detailed integration requirements on recalcitrant school officials.\textsuperscript{377}

A key factor in the Fifth Circuit’s reluctance to endorse Southern state governments’ efforts at obstructionism as much as its predecessors had done was the court’s composition. Five of the circuit’s judges were

\textsuperscript{374} See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 274-83.

\textsuperscript{375} See KEY, supra note 93, at 560-76 (showing how discriminatory exclusion of black voters was usually accomplished by the exercise of discretionary authority at the local level).

\textsuperscript{376} Obviously, a much different situation arose in later cases, where school segregation existed as a consequence of housing segregation rather than as a result of discriminatory assignment of students to segregated schools far from their homes. See, e.g., DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW (1995) (describing and criticizing judicial decisions using forced busing of students as a remedy for school segregation caused by housing segregation). In the Jim Crow-era South of the 1950s and 1960s, however, the main focus of reform efforts was on the more blatant discrimination embodied in state efforts to force black students to attend more distant segregated schools even in situations where white schools were located nearby.

appointed by President Eisenhower in the 1950s. Three of the five Eisenhower nominees—John Minor Wisdom, Elbert Tuttle, and John Brown—“became prominent supporters of desegregation” on the bench. Wisdom in particular became highly influential as the leader of desegregation efforts in the lower courts.

The emergence of Eisenhower appointees as champions of desegregation was not accidental. Although Eisenhower himself was at best lukewarm with respect to Brown, his Justice Department was staffed by Republicans from the “Party’s eastern liberal wing” supportive of desegregation. In choosing judicial nominees for Southern federal courts, they sought to pick integrationists and, at the very least, exclude strong supporters of segregation. Perhaps even more importantly, Eisenhower’s main goal in selecting judges was to ensure the selection of as many Republicans as possible in order to rectify the “acute political imbalance” in the federal judiciary brought about by twenty years of Democratic control of the nomination process. In the Democrat-dominated South of the 1950s, the Republican Party had for a long time been more receptive to desegregation than had the Democrats. Thus, the policy of appointing Republican judges led to the creation of a federal judiciary more sympathetic to integration and less willing to permit evasions of Brown than would otherwise have been the case. This is a striking example of how political imperatives unrelated to race might nonetheless lead to the selection of judges who disproportionately come from groups relatively sympathetic to civil rights enforcement. While not all of Eisenhower’s Southern judicial appointees supported desegregation, the combination of the President’s partisan objectives and his Justice Department’s
integrationist sympathies ensured that the new judges were, on average, much more liberal on racial issues than those they replaced.387

C. Cost Minimization and Brown’s Impact

Although Brown failed to achieve immediate desegregation in the South of the kind that was accomplished in the border states, it did greatly increase the cost of maintaining school segregation. By the early 1960s, most Southern whites were no longer willing to go on paying it.388 The cost minimization hypothesis is thus supported by the evidence: Brown promoted school desegregation by greatly increasing the costs of preventing it. While the Court certainly was not the omnipotent force for good of traditional Brown hagiography, Klarman’s own meticulous research suggests that he understates its effectiveness.

CONCLUSION

From Jim Crow to Civil Rights is an outstanding contribution to the literature on both civil rights law and judicial power more generally. The book should be, and likely will be, at the forefront of debate over these topics for the foreseeable future. Future research on the Supreme Court’s role in American society should emulate Klarman’s emphasis on the importance of social context for constitutional law and supplement it with equally rigorous attention to collective action problems, cost externalization, cost minimization, and other factors that can augment the impact of judicial decisions invalidating laws. As Klarman persuasively demonstrates, judicial power is no panacea for the troubles of the oppressed. Judges lack the capacity to comprehensively uproot and reform entrenched social systems. But there is also much evidence, some of it provided by Klarman himself, that judicial power can do more for oppressed minorities than today’s skeptics are willing to admit.

387. For evidence of the major changes wrought by Eisenhower’s lower court appointees, see sources cited supra note 377.
388. See supra notes 366-369 and accompanying text.